Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere, Part Two
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:07:52 GMT
[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 01:06:53 GMT ]
Copyright 1994 Federal Information Systems Corporation
Federal News Service
JUNE 22, 1994, WEDNESDAY
Section: Capitol Hill Hearing
Headline: Joint Hearing Of The International Security,
International Organizations And Human Rights Subcommittee And The
Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee Of The House Foreign
Affairs Committee
Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere
Chaired By:
Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca)
Representative Robert Torricelli (D-Nj)
Witnesses:
Robert Gelbard,
Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters,
Thomas Constantine,
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration
Brian Sheridan,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, Dc
...
REP. LANTOS: Before turning to Mr. Gilman, I'd like to just
explore a couple of issues that have been raised.
What happened on May 1 that compelled us to stop sharing
information? Why was May 1 different from April 30, April 29 or
May 2? What was the magic of that May 1 date? Secretary Gelbard?
MR. GELBARD: I'm afraid I can't answer that.
REP. LANTOS: Well somebody made the decision. Who, in your
judgment, made that decision, that on May 1 cooperation ceased? .
MR. GELBARD: The decision was made by the Department of Defense.
REP. LANTOS: Mr. Sheridan, why was the Department of Defense ready
to share information on April 30 and April 29 and April 28, and
all the proceeding months, and suddenly stopped sharing
information?
MR. SHERIDAN: There was a concern at the department, it was voiced
in the interagency some time previous to that, that we were having
problems, legal problems, with what could be done with our
information. I would disagree respectfully with Chairman
Torricelli. The assets that we provided down there were never
intended by the previous administration or this one to shoot down
aircraft. They were intended to provide information that could be
used to support ground- based end games, which the chairman I
think did describe quite accurately..
They have been successful in leading to ground operations which
have destroyed airfields and seized cocaine on the ground. They
were never intended to provide information to shoot down aircraft
in flight. And when it became apparent that the Colombians and
Peruvians wanted to do this, which was inconsistent with long-
standing U.S. policy and with agreements that we had with them, we
knew that we had a potentially large problem on our hands and we
decided that, given the ongoing nature of the discussions we were
having and the sense that we couldn't bring this to a close, that
we needed to protect DOD personnel and cease providing that while
we sort this out.
REP. LANTOS: Now, Secretary Gelbard testified a minute ago that he
has every expectation that before the end of this week, he will
work out temporary arrangements that will achieve the goal of
continuing to provide information.
Am I quoting you correctly?
MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.
REP. LANTOS: Well, if you have the ability, Secretary Gelbard, to
make this arrangement within the next 48 hours, what prevented the
Department of State from doing this between April 27 and May 1, so
we wouldn't have had this absurdity of stopping this abruptly,
causing all of the consequences that we have been discussing, and
now having to come to us with legislation that presumably is not
needed because you will be able to arrange the desired result
without legislation?
MR. GELBARD: What I said before, Mr. Chairman, is that, given
current law, we will be seeking interim agreements with those
governments that any U.S.-provided tracking data not be used for
shooting at or shooting down aircraft. Both governments have told
me that if there is a long-term solution in sight, they are
prepared to work out shorter-term interim arrangements along these
lines.
REP. LANTOS: Well, what prevented the Department of State from
doing this two months ago?
MR. GELBARD: Because neither government was prepared, given the
lack of a change in U.S. policy at that time, to work out such
agreements because of their stated policies of shooting down or
shooting at aircraft.
REP. LANTOS: I don't understand the change in status or
attitudes..
MR. GELBARD: When I was in Bogota and Lima during the last two
weeks, we --
REP. LANTOS: No, go back to March and April. The Department of
Defense is testifying that in interagency meetings, they were
threatening to terminate this activity..
Is that accurate?
MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.
REP. LANTOS: Is it also accurate that the Department of State was
fully aware of that?
MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.
REP. LANTOS: So it didn't come as a surprise to you that on May 1
the Department of Defense stopped its sharing of information?
MR. GELBARD: They informed us that they would.
REP. LANTOS: How far in advance?
MR. GELBARD: I can't recall.
REP. LANTOS: Approximately.
MR. GELBARD: Several days before.
REP. LANTOS: Just several days?
Mr. Sheridan, when did DOD advise the other -- who were -- who was
it participating in the interagency discussions, in addition to
State and Defense?
MR. SHERIDAN: Most of these discussions took place -- and we have
interagency working group meetings about every two weeks, and
there's a whole cast of characters who attend those meetings.
REP. LANTOS: At that point, to the best of your recollection, did
DOD advise the others that you will cease sharing information on
May 1?
MR. SHERIDAN: On April 20, the undersecretary of defense sent a
letter to the undersecretary of state notifying him of DOD's
intention unless we receive those assurances.
REP. LANTOS: And what was the response from the Department of
State?
MR. SHERIDAN: I would yield to Ambassador Gelbard. .
REP. LANTOS: What was the response, Secretary Gelbard?
MR. GELBARD: We did not agree with their decision. We did not
send a written answer, but we did not agree with them and we told
them that.
One thing I would like to stress, though, Mr. Chairman --
REP. LANTOS: Well I still -- I still need an answer to my previous
question.
You are now telling these committees that within 48 hours you will
be able to arrange a satisfactory interim solution. Is that
correct?
MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.
REP. LANTOS: Well, if that is the case, then my question still
stands: Why, having received a letter from the deputy secretary of
defense on April 20th, telling you that they will cease sharing
information, why did not Department of State come up with this
interim solution?
MR. GELBARD: Because those governments were not prepared, as we
saw during our visit to those two countries last week, to accept
that kind of interim solution or that kind of solution as a long-
term solution, unless there was going to be a chance in U.S.
policy. They urged us to change our policy, but at the time and
until yesterday, when the president made his decision, there was
no change in U.S. policy envisioned..
REP. LANTOS: But why was this change of policy coming about in
such a leisurely fashion?
MR. GELBARD: We have not been taking this in any leisurely
fashion. This has been examined very intensively. We have been
struggling with this issue which is a very complicated one and we
have not been happy about this in the slightest, none of us. But
this has been a serious problem and we do take the law of the
United States very seriously.
REP. LANTOS: Everybody takes the law of the United States very
seriously.
Apparently on April 30th -- was that law in effect on April 30th?
MR. GELBARD: Of course it was.
REP. LANTOS: Was it in effect on March 31?
MR. GELBARD: Yes sir.
REP. LANTOS: How 'bout last Christmas?
MR. GELBARD: Yes sir, the Congress had passed --
REP. LANTOS: How about a year ago this Easter?
MR. GELBARD: Yes sir the Congress had passed this --
REP. LANTOS: (Interrupts) -- So all of this time this law was in
effect.
MR. GELBARD: Yes sir. The Congress had passed this law in 1984.
REP. LANTOS: So for ten years between 1984 and May 1, 1994, the
law was in effect and it didn't make much difference. But
suddenly on May 1, it became an item on which this action had to
be taken by DOD.
MR. GELBARD: Let me explain two separate sets of legal issues. In
July of 1990, during the last administration, the U.S. government
did convey to the government of Colombia our concerns based on
international law that we were opposed to their using the data we
were providing them at that time for shooting down aircraft. This
is based on the Chicago convention and the Montreal conventions.
And we told them at the time -- as I said, July of 1990 -- that if
such information provided by the United States or assistance
provided by the United States were used for shooting down
aircraft, that would have serious affect on our ability to
continue to provide such assistance.
The Colombian government only changed its policy to have a stated
policy of shooting at or shooting down aircraft earlier this year
and it was based on that change in policy that there was a new
examination of the implications of that policy on international
law. In the course of this examination, the Justice Department
and the general counsels of the other departments of the executive
branch discovered these various domestic laws and after intensive
examination this spring, they came back to us very firmly and very
clearly and told us that we were not allowed to provide such
assistance.
REP. LANTOS: Colombia changed its policy only early this year.
MR. GELBARD: Yes sir.
REP. LANTOS: When did Peru change its policy?
MR. GELBARD: I believe a year ago.
REP. LANTOS: Well, why wasn't there an immediate change then?
MR. GELBARD: I can't answer that, sir.
REP. LANTOS: Congressman Gilman.
REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your are certainly raising
some important issues..
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you're certainly raising some important
issues.
Mr. Sheridan, it's my understanding that Section 1004 of the code
of 21 USC 1503 establishing the office of drug control policy
states that, and I quote: "The head of the national drug control
program agency shall notify the director in writing regarding any
proposed change in policies relating to the activities of such
department or agency under the national drug control program prior
to the implementation of such a change." Was the director notified
of your change? I'm talking now about the director of the
national drug control program, the Drug Czar, as we refer to him.
Had he been notified prior to the change?
MR. SHERIDAN: Well, in the interagency meetings which we discussed
there was representation from ONDCP at that meetings.
REP. GILMAN: Says that the "Agency shall notify the director in
writing regarding any proposed change in policies." Had the
director been notified, in writing, of any proposed change by the
Pentagon?
MR. SHERIDAN: Well, the --
REP. GILMAN: Can you tell us whether he was notified? I think
that only takes a yes or no answer.
MR. SHERIDAN: Well sir, it depends on what you're calling a change
in policy.
There's been a long-standing U.S. policy that we do not fire at
civil aircraft in flight, and do not support that activity.
REP. GILMAN: Then you contend, Mr. Sheridan, that by the Pentagon
directing a cessation of the sharing of intelligence was not a
change of policy? Is that what you're telling this committee? Is
that your impression, that this was not a change in policy?
MR. SHERIDAN: It was not a change in policy regarding U.S. policy
toward the treatment of civil aircraft in flight.
REP. GILMAN: The cutting off of intelligence to Colombia and Peru
was not a change in our government's policy toward Colombia and
Peru? That's an astounding response as far as I'm concerned.
What would you call it if it's not a change in policy?
MR. SHERIDAN: Well, let me just remind that it was never the
Department of Defense's intention to cease providing information.
But we had wanted and had hoped and continue to hope is that those
nations would not use out information to shoot down civil aircraft
in flight.
REP. GILMAN: Is that put down in writing someplace? That's the
first I've heard that condition.
MR. SHERIDAN: Which condition is that?
REP. MYERS: The one you just recited, that it was your hope that
you continue to give them information but that they wouldn't use
it for some purpose.
MR. SHERIDAN: Well, that was certainly understood to be DOD's
position.
REP. GILMAN: Understood by who?
MR. SHERIDAN: It was understood by all the elements of our
government that that's what we wanted.
REP. GILMAN: Mr. Sheridan, again I'm asking you, why wasn't there
a compliance with this section of the code, that any change in
policy would be provided to the director in writing? So that the
director would have an opportunity, as this statue goes out to
promptly review such proposed change and certify to the department
or agency head in writing whether such change is consistent with
our national drug control strategy?
I don't think I'm asking for a complicated response.
MR. SHERIDAN: Well, I'm not sure what you're asking me for. Was
there a letter sent? No, there was not.
REP. GILMAN: There was nothing in writing then provided to the
director?
MR. SHERIDAN: No. That's right.
REP. GILMAN: So then you're in violation of the statute. Is that
right?
MR. SHERIDAN: We did not interpret the statute that way or our
activity that way.
REP. GILMAN: Had you ever notified the director of your change in
sharing of intelligence in writing?
MR. SHERIDAN: In writing, no.
REP. GILMAN: Isn't there a task force that meets regularly on
narcotics? Do you meet with that task force?
MR. SHERIDAN: Yes, those are the working group meetings that we
discussed earlier.
REP. GILMAN: How often do you meet with the working group?
MR. SHERIDAN: Once every two weeks or as called.
REP. GILMAN: And was the drug czar present at the working group
immediately after you changed your policy or, as you say, you made
a -- I don't know what you want to call it if it's not a change of
policy -- when you differed from what you were doing in the past?
Was he present at a meeting following that May 1st decision?
MR. SHERIDAN: There were many meetings that followed that.
REP. GILMAN: Did you discuss that with the director?
MR. SHERIDAN: This was thoroughly discussed.
REP. GILMAN: And was it discussed with Mr. Gelbard's office? .
MR. SHERIDAN: We've been involved in nonstop discussions on this
issue every day since I don't know.
REP. GILMAN: Was it discussed with the DEA?
MR. SHERIDAN: Yes, DEA --
REP. GILMAN: Was there any difference in opinion amongst -- within
the task force with regard to this shifting of policy if it's not
a change in policy?
MR. SHERIDAN: You can discuss that with other members of the
interagency.
REP. GILMAN: I'm sorry. I didn't understand the response.
MR. SHERIDAN: Other members of the interagency process, I think,
could speak for themselves. I will not speak for them.
REP. GILMAN: Well, was there any difference of opinion as far as
you recall after you had made that pronouncement of a shifting of
the policy?
MR. SHERIDAN: There were a number of different -- I mean --
positions held by different agencies, but I would prefer to let
them speak for themselves.
REP. GILMAN: Well, what is your recollection? Was there a
difference of opinion expressed by those other agencies?
MR. SHERIDAN: Regarding the interpretation of international law?
REP. GILMAN: No, regarding your shifting -- the Pentagon shifting
of the policy on exchange of intelligence. I don't think I'm
making a very complicated question out of this.
MR. SHERIDAN: There were some agencies, I suppose, that agreed and
some that disagreed.
REP. GILMAN: Mr. Gelbard, were you present at any of these
meetings?
MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. I'm the chairman of the group.
REP. GILMAN: And was there any difference of opinion with regard
to those members of the task force, the working group.
MR. GELBARD: There were differences of opinion, sir.
REP. GILMAN: And did anyone raise the question of shouldn't the
director be given a notice in writing to give him an opportunity
to respond in writing?
MR. GELBARD: Members of his staff are in attendance at all those
meetings and the issue of informing him in writing, however, did
not come up.
REP. GILMAN: Had the Congress ever been notified about that time
of the change in policy?
MR. GELBARD: Not that I'm aware of.
REP. GILMAN: When was the Congress first notified?
MR. GELBARD: I can't recall, sir.
REP. GILMAN: As I recall I guess it was a newspaper notification
is the first we received. I haven't seen any formal notification
from the task force, from the director or from your office with
regard to a -- my colleagues seem to confirm that it was a
newspaper when we first learned of the shifting of the policy. It
seems to me that the task force ought to take a look at the
statute and get back to where the Congress intended them to be
with regard to the narcotics control strategy and any change in
the strategy.
Now according to most recent -- (word inaudible) -- reports,
there's been a 30 percent decline in coco cultivation in Peru
since the last report. I understand that the upper Huallaga
production has gone down considerably because of a fungus. Maybe
we ought to make use of that fungus elsewhere. However, the
combination factors would seem to provide an ideal opportunity for
our nation and Peru to explore some new initiatives since that
irradication that's been completed by the fungus makes them now
explore new seed beds and apparantly we see a disarray in the U.S.
policy that's undermining our ability to cooperate with the
Peruvians and yet we have an opportunity now to get into these new
areas where it's going to take three to five years to provide new
growth. And with production down, with the growers more
susceptible to counter measures, I think we're missing some great
opportunities to exploit the vulnerabilities in the cultivation
production cycle that we've seen since cultivation first exploded
in the Andean region. I was one of the first promoters of putting
some money in the upper Huallaga valley -- $50 million initial
appropriation and try to irradicate and they still haven't spent
some of that money because the terrorists and the drug traffickers
control that whole valley. I'm wondering what we're doing to take
advantage of this situation where the cultivation has been reduced
substantially; they're going to have to go into new beds of
productions. What are we doing to try to take advantage of that
to see what we can do about irradicating that entire crop in that
region?
MR. GELBARD: First, we have extended all the available funds we
have to support irradication and alternative crop programs. That
is precisely why I made my plea a bit earlier to free up the $77
million in economic support funds for Peru which has still been
frozen..
We could use those funds right now, Congressman Gilman, precisely
for the purposes that you have cited. I agree with you 100
percent. We are missing an opportunity if we're not able to begin
those kinds of projects to take advantage of the effect of the
significant decrease in coca production in the upper Huallaga and
other parts of Peru.
Second, since we have had so little in the way of economic support
funds to help use to support eradication and alternative
development programs, but because it also makes sense, we are also
trying to get the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development
Bank engaged for the first time in alternative development
projects to help lure farmers away from growing coca and into
other kinds of pursuits. We're pursuing that aggressively and we
think we are making some good headway on that.
REP. GILMAN: Well I'm pleased to hear that you're taking a look at
that. Tell me now, we have a $37 million cut made in the House
side in the State Department's INM program in the budget for '95.
That I would imagine would have a significant impact on your work,
and yet we didn't hear anything from the administration about its
efforts to do battle with that cut or to come forward and advocate
greater funding. Have you made some efforts now to try to correct
that loss in the INM budget?
MR. GELBARD: Congressman, as I said in my opening statement, first
the decrease in fiscal year '94 from $152 million to $100 million
has hurt us enormously.
Second, while the efforts by helpful members of the House of
Representatives, such as you, have helped bring up the level to
$115 million in the House, and we continue to try to press for the
full $152 million as we did in the House and also are now trying
in the Senate, if we do not get full funding, given the more
globalized nature of this problem, particularly because of the
increasing spread of heroin trafficking, opium poppy cultivation
and the geographic increase throughout Asia and into the former
Soviet Union, we are going to have to cut back and close programs
in a number of areas. This has just had a chilling effect on us.
REP. GILMAN: I think, Mr. Gelbard -- and I appreciate your
comments about that, and we certainly want to help, I think it
would be extremely helpful if the administration would put its
shoulder behind the wheel of what you're trying to do and raise
that funding. We have too seldom heard from this administration
with regard to the need for better funding in the drug programs.
The words out there are great and the speeches are great, but the
deeds lack any support for those words..
MORE.
And I hope that you would encourage the administration to show up
on the Hill and let us know that they're fully behind what you're
seeking to do.
I'd be pleased to yield back the balance of my time. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
REP. LANTOS: (Off mike.) REP. WYNN (?): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sheridan, just generally speaking, from an operational
standpoint, how do you assess the success or failure of DOD's
operations in this interdiction effort? I mean, there's obviously
a substantial loss in confidence in our ability to execute this
type of program. What's your overall assessment?
MR. SHERIDAN: Of DOD's performance in South America?
REP. WYNN (?): Yes.
MR. SHERIDAN: I would say that over the last number of years,
principally supporting the State Department's (INMF ?) efforts and
working with DEA, we have been developing the capability to
disrupt the movement of cocaine, and I think the results are
improving every year. I think my numbers indicate there were
somewhere around 130 metric tons seized in Latin America last
year, and that is significantly more than you would have found,
certainly 10 years ago --
REP. WYNN (?): Okay. You're not focusing significantly on
disruption of production, is that a safe conclusion?
MR. SHERIDAN: On production? Our efforts are designed to -- DOD's
specifically are designed to interdict the flow of either finished
cocaine or semi-finished cocaine.
REP. WYNN (?): Mr. Gelbard, my colleague jokingly suggested
perhaps we ought to use that fungus in a more systematic manner.
I think to some extent he has a point in that that's the only
thing that seems to have slowed production. Is there any
consideration of utilizing a biological technology in this way?
MR. GELBARD: Don't think it hasn't occurred to us, Congressman.
And I say this with great hesitation in front of Congressman
Torricelli, but once again, we have laws, through the Biological
Warfare Convention and U.S. statutes, which prevent us from using
what would be biological agents. We are trying --
REP. WYNN (?): Have there been any attempts to maybe focus that
question? As opposed to biological warfare, to drug interdiction,
has there been any attempt to create that kind of focus?
MR. GELBARD: We are really pressing the governments of Bolivia and
Peru on eradication attempts, because as I said earlier, this is
what really gets to the heart of the problem.
REP. WYNN (?): It seems to be working in Guatemala. What's the
problem? You have a good record, apparently, of elimination and
eradication of poppy production -- cultivation, rather, in
Guatemala. Why hasn't that been duplicated?
MR. GELBARD: First, in Guatemala, the area that was involved was
really pretty small, although indeed you're right, the eradication
efforts have been very, very effective there. Colombia, too, has
been working at eradicating opium poppies and they've eradicated
approximately 22,000 hectares, about 55,000 hectares --
REP. WYNN (?): Apparently that's not very significant.
I know we have a vote (on question ?). In Colombia, apparently
there have been allegations that some of the military units are
engaged in human rights violations. Can you comment on that?
And if so, what efforts are being made to prevent this from
happening, screening out these units or what have you?
MR. GELBARD: We have been working to assure that there is strong
end use monitoring measures for any military equipment that we
provide.
REP. WYNN (?): First of all, do you have the information on the
violations? Do they exist or not?
MR. GELBARD: We do have reports about human rights violations, and
we have been pressing the government of Colombia about this over
time. We have had lots of conversations with human rights
organizations in the United States and internationally, and we
feel that the Colombian government has been trying to improve its
systems to prevent human rights violations because they feel
strongly about it.
REP. WYNN (?): In view of the time, could you send me something a
little more comprehensive on this subject in terms of exactly what
we're doing, exactly the extent of the alleged violations, how
broad- based they are, and whether they have any official
sanction?
MR. GELBARD: Yes, Congressman, I will.
REP. WYNN (?): Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.,.
REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you. Mr. Lantos is going to return in a
moment.
However, since I may not get the chance again, let me finally just
say for myself on two issues. First, the Bush administration
certainly could be criticized for emphasizing the war against
drugs only in the growing fields of Latin America and in
interdiction while ignoring the consumption problem of the United
States. This administration must be very careful in its
considerable and commendable enthusiasm for dealing with the
narcotics problem within the United States in terms of consumption
that our efforts at interdiction are not compromised. Part of the
reason why there has been so much concern with this failure to
continue cooperation with Peru and Colombia, that it is final
evidence that our previous efforts at interdiction no longer have
considerable support. That may or may not be the case, but it is
the impression, and it clearly is causing political doubts in
Colombia and Peru and is being interpreted by the narcotraffickers
as open season, leading to precipitous increases in shipments.
It would appear to me that the concern of this committee, the
attention of the media and, I suspect, the considerable attention
of the president of the United States has led to, if not a
reversal, a correction in policy that will solve this problem. If
that is the case, I'm pleased with the hearing, it is mission
accomplished, we can get on with our business. But it is a word
to the wise that there may be an imbalance in policy.
Finally, let me say I was in Nicaragua last week and visited the
Atlantic Coast, the Mosquito Coast..
The next policy issue this administration must address is because
of our historic differences with the Sandinista military of
Nicaragua there is no communication and no cooperation. The
Atlantic coast of Nicaragua is open season for narco-traffickers.
There is not one patrol boat operating by the Nicaraguan
government on the Atlantic coast. There is no interdiction.
Narco-traffickers daily are stopping their craft along that coast
for supplies and for (rations ?) without interruption. We have to
get over the difficulties of the last decade and begin cooperating
with the Nicaraguan military, because they share some of our
interests in gaining sovereignty back over their coast.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Chairman Torricelli.
Let me pursue the proposed legislation that I take it will be sent
up here soon.
When do you expect that legislative draft to reach the Hill,
Secretary Gelbard?
MR. GELBARD: I'm hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that it will be in the
next day or so.
REP. LANTOS: Now, let us assume that we introduce it immediately
and Chairman Torricelli and I will introduce it, assuming that it
meets our approval immediately -- let's assume that Congress acts
expeditiously and the legislation passes. What in essence will
that legislation call for?
MR. GELBARD: We're asking for a narrow change in existing U.S.
Criminal Code provisions on the use of force against civilian
aircraft. There would be an exemption from criminal liability use
of force by specifically designated foreign governments facing
national security threats from drug trafficking so long as those
countries have in place appropriate procedures to protect innocent
aircraft.
We would also exempt assistance by the United States government to
those countries. And we are doing this obviously in the context
of the very difficult conditions that we see the governments of
Colombia and Peru in right now..
REP. LANTOS: Is this legislation, proposed legislation, in any
sense in conflict with procedures and policies of international
organizations?
MR. GELBARD: At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we want to begin to
looking at changes in international conventions because there is a
feeling that they might very well -- in fact, they are in conflict
with some existing international conventions. I have already
discussed with the governments of Colombia and Peru the issue of
developing a multilateral approach to make a similar kind of
narrow exception in the international -- relevant international
conventions through the International Civil Aviation Organization.
REP. LANTOS: Well, let's assume that International Civil Aviation
Organization does not change its policies. Are we under those
circumstances prepared to go it -- go this way on a unilateral
basis?
MR. GELBARD: My understanding is that once we are able to affect
the necessary legislative changes in U.S. law, that we are
prepared to do so.
REP. LANTOS: Is this your understanding also, Mr. Sheridan?
MR. SHERIDAN: The Department of Defense will do what it's told, if
that is the intention of the president. I mean, you're talking
about a hypothetical situation, and we're not there yet. But
certainly the department is committed to the counterdrug effort
and will support the president's desire.
REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, what is your view of this proposed
legislation?
MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I've been kind of sitting here kind of
happy I wasn't either of these two for about the last hour. --
(Laughter.) .
REP. LANTOS: We decided that since this is your first appearance,
we would give you somewhat of a free ride. -- (Laughter.) .
MR. CONSTANTINE: One of the things that I think is important to
say, Congressman, is that -- to put all this stuff in perspective
-- is that this is just one part of a strategy on the part of law
enforcement or government to do something about the drug problem.
The providing of information if it can be done legally to other
countries and that they take action as necessary, that is some bit
of deterrence as to narcotics traffickers flying from Bolivia or
Peru into Colombia, and it's somewhat like -- it becomes
exacerbated when you say, "Well, we can't do anything about it."
It becomes public. It's like saying you'll never chase a drunken
driver down a road again, every drunken driver will decide to
flee. But there's a lot of other issues from the position of DEA
that I mentioned here today that we think are equally if not more
important. The eradication seems to have seized tonnage and
tonnage of cocaine, and surely if it wasn't seized, it would be
here and cause us even more problems, perhaps at a lower price.
But the price hasn't gone up, and the amount keeps increasing or
keeps becoming available.
We look at DEA as to the seizure of narcotics if possible should
be related to the making of a criminal case against all of the
principles who are involved in the process, and I think that's
where the seizure become important. And that's where the
intelligence information becomes vital to you to put it together.
My concern is -- other than this issue, which everybody has
addressed today, and I appreciate everybody's concern, it was an
education to me -- is that the principles involved in this
narcotic traffic presently are immune from sanction. As long as
they remain immune from sanction, a lot of other strategies that
we have are really less effective.
REP. LANTOS: I full agree with you, and let me ask Secretary
Gelbard, why do they remain immune from sanctions?
MR. GELBARD: I'm sorry, could you --
REP. LANTOS: Why are the principles immune from sanctions?
MR. GELBARD: You mean the drug traffickers? We are attempting and
we have had major efforts in a variety of ways to emphasize
extradition, to emphasize evidence sharing when there are either
not indictments in the United States or a prohibition on
extradition of nationals, we've made major efforts to try to help
governments develop --
REP. LANTOS: But what leverage do we have? What leverage do we
have?
MR. GELBARD: We have the ability --
REP. LANTOS: Be specific, country by country.
MR. GELBARD: I -- we have the ability on an overall basis, because
of the certification process, to impose sanctions when we feel
those governments are not cooperating fully with us. We have --
REP. LANTOS: We are -- leaving the kingpins immune certainly would
indicate that they are not cooperating with us.
MR. GELBARD: What we have been doing is trying to help those
governments develop cases --
REP. LANTOS: No, no, let me take you back to Director
Constantine's point. His main complaint -- and I suspect the
American people would overwhelming agree with him -- that we are
impotent as long as the kingpins living in these countries are
immune. Now do you agree with his basic point that they are
immune?
MR. GELBARD: No, I don't. We have -- the governments of Colombia,
Peru and Bolivia specifically have put a number of these people in
jail, there have been other instances where major traffickers have
been killed, fleeing or in other law enforcement efforts.
REP. LANTOS: Now what is the current status of the Colombian
government's efforts to negotiate a settlement with the leaders of
the Cali cartel under the surrender decree?
MR. GELBARD: We have had a major problem with their prosecutor-
general, Gustavo Degrave (ph), who is independent from the
government, and who, as we have said publicly, as we have said
privately, as we have been fighting, has been trying to avoid
serious prosecution and asset seizure of major traffickers -- from
major traffickers in the Cali cartel. As a result, we have
suspended any --
REP. LANTOS: So when you say independent, you mean independent for
what period of time, and how can that independence be curtailed?
MR. GELBARD: He has an independent term.
REP. LANTOS: When does that term end?
MR. GELBARD: I believe he has several more years, theoretically,
in office.
REP. LANTOS: And under no circumstances can he be removed --
MR. GELBARD: He can be --
REP. LANTOS: -- prior to the termination of his tenure?
MR. GELBARD: As I understand it, he can be removed by the
Colombian constitutional or supreme court.
REP. LANTOS: And has that been attempted?
MR. GELBARD: That has not yet been attempted, but has been under
discussion within Colombia. We have made very clear, both
publicly and privately, our refusal to work with him because of
his misuse of U.S.-provided assistance, his lack of seriousness
about prosecution of major drug traffickers.
REP. LANTOS: Well, and what -- what's the next step.
MR. GELBARD: And we hope that -- and we have tried to encourage
the government of Colombia, particularly there, to urge that he be
removed from his position, and we have stressed this through our
unwillingness to work with him..
We feel that President Gaviria and his government, who have very
strong records of fighting against drug trafficking, are also very
dissatisfied with his performance, and they've made that very
clear. President Gaviria has come out very strongly against him
publicly.
REP. LANTOS: How about the degree of cooperation we are getting
from Peru?
MR. GELBARD: It's a very different situation because of the fact
that the major traffickers are mostly concentrated in Colombia.
But back in January, for example, the Colombian police arrested
the leading Peruvian trafficker, they quickly deported him to
Peru, he received a life sentence, which he's currently serving,
and they are also trying to go after other major traffickers.
However, as in many of these countries, there have been serious
problems in terms of both prosecution and problems with
correction.
REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, having been in the job only three
months and having a very distinguished record in the field of law
enforcement, on the basis of this very limited time frame, what
changes would you recommend in our international drug policy?
MR. CONSTANTINE: I would think that the key issue right now and
will be for the next several years is the Cali cartel because, as
the Ambassador Gelbard has said, the Colombian police at great
personal cost were very effective in dealing with the group out of
Medellin.
REP. LANTOS: Yes.
MR. CONSTANTINE: I think it was a good example for us to see how,
with the right pressure and government moving strongly against it,
how something like that can disintegrate fairly quickly. I
honestly have to tell you, even though I'm new to this job, I've
been involved in investigations with the Cali cartel since 1985 in
New York state, substantial investigations in which major
principals were indicted for criminal violations of substantial
crimes in New York state as long ago as 1989 and have never been
brought to justice. And I am concerned that there are that group
of people which account for at least 80 percent of all the cocaine
traffic in the United States and is suspected of many vicious
crimes, under the present constitution of Colombia, obviously,
will not be extradited to the United States.
The next question is, will they be brought to justice with the
appropriate sanctions in Colombia? In my three months of reading
every historic report I can, I do not see that happening, and the
analogy that I have made with people, having worked organized
crime cases, it's a little like letting John Gotti sit in Howard
Beach, Queens, and go to the Ravenite (sp) Social Club and do what
he wants to do every day, and sending all of the bookmakers and
loan-sharkers to jail, while the major principal exists immune.
And one of the things that's been effective in organized crime in
this country -- I give great credit to Bobby Kennedy, who started
all this thing -- was going after the principals, using witnesses
against them, giving people breaks, all the way up the line until
you get the major figures and send them to prison..
That, to me, would be the greatest asset that you could add to all
the present tools that you have to deal with the international
narcotics cartels that operate in the United States because it's
not that they just sit over there, they direct every minute piece
of the operation that's going on in Queens or Los Angeles or
Houston.
REP. LANTOS: Mr. Gelbard, you are the government's top foreign
policy expert in this field; you have this as your responsibility.
What in your judgment makes the Cali cartel so much more resilient
compared to the Medellin cartel?
MR. GELBARD: I think it's been much more difficult to try to
develop strong cases but at the same time, we have seen enormous
difficulties on the part of individuals in terms of developing the
political will to go after them. We have serious difficulty, as I
have mentioned before, because of Gustavo Degrave's (pp)
unwillingness to seriously approach the problem of the leadership
of the Cali cartel in a way of trying to prosecute them -- serious
cases. We have been working with the Gaviria government, as Mr.
Constantine says, with very good success against the Medellin
cartel. These people are indeed slicker. They have operated in a
very different way and they have tried to create the image of
kinder, gentler drug traffickers.
In point of fact, there's still tremendous violence, many murders
and this is not a gentle group of people. But we need strong
political will on the part of the law enforcement authorities in
Colombia to continue to go after them. We've seen it in the
Colombian police in the past, we certainly have seen it in the
Gaviria administration. We want to work with them and maintain
that kind of international cooperation but it's awfully difficult
when the individual charged with the prosecutions of these people
either won't do it or provides them with nothing more than slaps
on the wrist and no asset siezure.
REP. LANTOS: Is it your judgment that the government is doing
everything it can to get rid of him?
MR. GELBARD: I feel quite confident that President Gaviria's
government has tried to be very effective on this and they are
very frustrated, extremely frustrated.
REP. LANTOS: That's not a good enough answer for me. What do you
mean by frustrated?
MR. GELBARD: Under their system, they do not have the ability to
remove him. As I said earlier, he has to be removed by the
courts.
MORE.
REP. LANTOS: And the courts are intimidated.
MR. GELBARD: For whatever reasons --
REP. LANTOS: Well, what's your judgment? I mean, this is not an
unusual question. I mean, if the courts have the legal right to
remove the obstacle in the way of getting at the kingpins of the
drug world, then why don't the courts do it?
MR. GELBARD: I really don't --
REP. LANTOS: They're either paid off or they're intimidated. So,
which of the two is the answer?
MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, I really don't know the answer to that,
but I am still hopeful that DeGrave (sp) will be removed from his
position.
REP. LANTOS: Well, what is your hunch? Are they intimidated or
are they paid off?
MR. GELBARD: I'd rather not answer that in open session.
REP. LANTOS: Well, we will have a closed session on this whole
subject because the answers, frankly, are simply unacceptable to
the American people; that this nightmare of the drug epidemic
continues because an individual in Colombia is unwilling to
prosecute the kingpins of this giant international conspiracy.
Mr. Manzullo?
REP. MANZULLO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Constantine -- Constantine, forgive me -- do you have enough
DEA agents?
MR. CONSTANTINE: You mean overall?
REP. MANZULLO: That's correct.
MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I mean, that's a very tough question. I've
run police departments now for almost nine or ten years, and there
was never enough troopers, there's never enough agents, there's
never enough people from the FBI.
I think that the difficulty started three years ago when there was
gradually, I think in 1991, there was a freezing of budgets, then
successively it started to become more difficult --
REP. MANZULLO: Can I race you three years ahead to now, because
the administration is cutting the DEA budget by $2 million. That
obviously will have some impact on the hiring of DEA agents. It's
a very simple question. I mean, at this point -- and I know
you've been on the job a very short period of time -- do you feel
you have enough DEA agents to carry out your program of
interdiction?
MR. CONSTANTINE: I'd have to say at this stage of the game that if
we could maintain ourselves at full strength, that we'd be able to
meet most of the missions. But I also have to tell you -- and I'm
going to be very honest with you -- as the heroin targets start to
explode underneath us everywhere, that means that you have to look
down the road and say, gee, all that I have to do right now, with
all of the assets -- and they are not infinite, I mean they are
finite resources, and the problems are becoming infinite, so you
try to --
REP. MANZULLO: You're short of agents.
MR. CONSTANTINE: At this point in time we're about 130 over what
has become a reduced target. I've heard on the markup on the
bills in both houses that that may very well be corrected..
REP. MANZULLO: So what's your answer?
MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I --
REP. MANZULLO: Are you short of agents to adequately --
MR. CONSTANTINE: I can't give you the exact number of agents --
REP. MANZULLO: But you're short, is that correct?
MR. CONSTANTINE: Presently we're 130 or 140 over the target. It's
less than existed in 1991. But there's a reduced appropriation
for the target figure --
REP. MANZULLO: No, I -- I want to lay aside all appropriations and
all the congressional legalese and all this -- all this stuff --
and ask you, as a professional police officer, and you've been in
this a long, long time and understand the issue, do you feel as of
this date that you have enough DEA agents to adequately do the
job?
MR. CONSTANTINE: No.
REP. MANZULLO: Okay. And this is at the same time that the
administration is seeking $2 million less than your old DEA budget
-- overall DEA budget?
MR. CONSTANTINE: I'm not sure that's the figure, though,
Congressman. I mean, I would have to check that.
REP. MANZULLO: Has the president -- is the president seeking more
funding so you can have more DEA agents?
MR. CONSTANTINE: I think the budget was hold harmless this year.
There was 10 less DEA agents in the budget.
REP. MANZULLO: How many do you need, Mr. Constantine?
MR. CONSTANTINE: Oh, I mean, I would --
REP. MANZULLO: Do you have any idea?
MR. CONSTANTINE: It would be an unreasonable figure if I gave it
to you right now, because --.
REP. MANZULLO: Be unreasonable, because we --
MR. CONSTANTINE: Oh, wow.
REP. MANZULLO: -- you know --
MR. CONSTANTINE: People accuse me of that often, but I kind of --
REP. MANZULLO: That's not the case, because we're obviously here
because we feel there have been cutbacks in --
MR. CONSTANTINE: You presently have 3,500 sworn personnel for DEA
covering all of the domestic United States and 53 foreign offices.
You know, you could rise up to a number of 7,000 or 8,000. But I
think there comes a point in time where all of us say, look, this
is the amount of money that we can afford to put into something.
I've dealt with these types of issues back in New York State
before I came here. Because there's other people, there's people
who need rehabilitation, there's prevention programs, there's a
balance to all of these things.
As I said, I'm pretty sure correctly, in the beginning, if held
harmless at the figures for 1991, I think DEA could be very
effective in the role that we have to play.
REP. MANZULLO: But the reason I'm asking these questions is that
the President's overall request for drug control through various
programs is $13.2 billion.
That's 1.1 billion more than the 12.1 billion enacted for fiscal
year 1994. The administration is seeking increased funds in five
areas -- drug prevention, up $448 million; drug treatment, up $360
million; drug-related criminal justice spending, up $227 million;
international programs, up $76 million; drug-related research --
whatever that is -- up $27 million. And the White House requested
reductions in two areas: interdiction, down $94 million; anti-drug
intelligence programs, down $600,000.
I think that's the reason why we're having this hearing today,
because people in the United States Congress and the people in
America believe that there is an insincere effort on the part of
the Clinton administration to adequately stop the flow of drugs
into this country.
REP. LANTOS: If my friend will yield to me, I think this is an
appalling and totally inaccurate, unfair statement..
To accuse the administration, any American administration, of
having an insincere effort to fighting the war against drugs is
simply not worthy of a member of this body.
REP. MANZULLO: Well, I --
REP. LANTOS: And I truly believe my good friend does not -- cannot
mean what he has just said. Partisanship has a role in political
debate, but to accuse either this administration or the previous
administration of a lack of sincerity in fighting the drug war is
not one of them.
REP. MANZULLO: Well, I will stand by my ground on that, Mr.
Chairman. I appreciate your interjection of your thought in here,
but when it comes -- apparently when it comes to interdiction,
there is no emphasis by this administration. And that's borne out
by the fact of the request made by the administration itself. I
can only state to you that's how we feel. There are many members
of Congress that feel there's been a lack of emphasis on
interdiction, and that's why my question to you was sincere,
because you're in a position where you know how short you are.
And there are many members that feel that the DEA needs more help
and want to take and channel resources from other areas into
interdiction.
So I would stand by my ground that there's a lack of sincerity in
trying to interdict the drugs, as borne out by this whole issue
with the AWACS. Thank you.
MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, if I might --
REP. LANTOS: Please.
MR. GELBARD: -- respond to that briefly. As I said in my opening
statement, Congressman, the president's strategy concentrates on
maintaining very strong interdiction capabilities and very strong
law enforcement capabilities. What we have been doing because of
the serious budgetary problems with which the administration is
faced have been trying to look for the most efficient ways of
pursuing these interdiction and law enforcement efforts. And as a
result, the president's Western Hemisphere strategy calls for a
gradual shift away from the so-called transit zone interdiction
area to really trying to concentrate more on the source countries
and stopping it at the source. That's a much more effective way
than trying to catch it just before it enters our borders. We
still feel that is important, too, but we are trying to shift the
funds more in the direction of the source countries, where we feel
we can stop it with much greater efficiency and cost
effectiveness.
MR. CONSTANTINE: I would also add, if I could, sir, that the
administration's request this year is 9 percent over the '94
actual. And so, as far as we are concerned, the ball is in your
court, and we will see what the Congress does with the president's
request. But given the budgetary environment that we are in, a 9
percent increase over '94 I think is a substantial commitment on
the part of the administration.
I would also note that 59 percent of our spending is still on
supply reduction.
So this notion that, you know, while there is an increased
emphasis on drug treatment and so on, that this administration is
not committed to supply reduction is imply not so. Sixty cents of
every dollar spent is still on the supply reduction side. As
Ambassador Gelbard indicated, what we're doing is just -- on the
international side -- making some adjustments..
I would also note that international spending is up 22 percent in
this Clinton administration's '95 budget request. So if we want
to start looking at the numbers, let's look at all of them, and I
think we do pretty well.
REP. LANTOS: Congressman Mica?
REP. MICA: Well I -- you know, I just have tremendous problems
with this the -- you know, we're talking about interdiction,
they're cutting off intelligence to Peru and Colombia. I mean,
that's what really precipitated everything going on here. And
when Mr. Gilman was trying to ask a question -- you know, it's
apparent to us that when the drug czar, for example, his funding
was cut, I believe, by 73 percent, with a massive layoff in his
office -- that there are members of Congress that are deeply
concerned because we're hearing from the folks back home, and I
don't want to use that same word again. But I would expect you
gentlemen to get in there and try to scrap more for what little
federal dollars are left on discretionary spending in areas of
cutting off drugs. I mean --
MR. GELBARD (?): Congressman, we've been trying to do this, and we
have been spending a great deal of our time trying to press for
the request that went to the Congress in the fiscal year '95
budget. As I said earlier, my budget was reduced by a third in
fiscal year '94. We requested $150 million, we received $100
million. I'm afraid the same thing is happening for fiscal year
'95. The amounts of money we have available to support
eradication programs and development to lure the farmers away from
growing coca has diminished enormously. We simply have no funds
right now, as I responded to Congressman Gilman, to help the
Peruvian government in its efforts to eradicate coca. Now we're
encouraging them to look elsewhere, particularly through the
development banks, and we're creating an opening there. But we've
got serious problems with simply a lack of availability of cash
from what we've requested.
REP. LANTOS: We'll be in recess for 10 minutes and then resume
with Mr. Mica.
(Sounds gavel.) .
END OF COVERAGE
--
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"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
under conditions of absolute reality"
-- Shirley Jackson
The Haunting of Hill House
Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268