Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins) Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere, Part Two Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:07:52 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 01:06:53 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Information Systems Corporation Federal News Service JUNE 22, 1994, WEDNESDAY Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Headline: Joint Hearing Of The International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights Subcommittee And The Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee Of The House Foreign Affairs Committee Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere Chaired By: Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca) Representative Robert Torricelli (D-Nj) Witnesses: Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters, Thomas Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building Washington, Dc ... REP. LANTOS: Before turning to Mr. Gilman, I'd like to just explore a couple of issues that have been raised. What happened on May 1 that compelled us to stop sharing information? Why was May 1 different from April 30, April 29 or May 2? What was the magic of that May 1 date? Secretary Gelbard? MR. GELBARD: I'm afraid I can't answer that. REP. LANTOS: Well somebody made the decision. Who, in your judgment, made that decision, that on May 1 cooperation ceased? . MR. GELBARD: The decision was made by the Department of Defense. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Sheridan, why was the Department of Defense ready to share information on April 30 and April 29 and April 28, and all the proceeding months, and suddenly stopped sharing information? MR. SHERIDAN: There was a concern at the department, it was voiced in the interagency some time previous to that, that we were having problems, legal problems, with what could be done with our information. I would disagree respectfully with Chairman Torricelli. The assets that we provided down there were never intended by the previous administration or this one to shoot down aircraft. They were intended to provide information that could be used to support ground- based end games, which the chairman I think did describe quite accurately.. They have been successful in leading to ground operations which have destroyed airfields and seized cocaine on the ground. They were never intended to provide information to shoot down aircraft in flight. And when it became apparent that the Colombians and Peruvians wanted to do this, which was inconsistent with long- standing U.S. policy and with agreements that we had with them, we knew that we had a potentially large problem on our hands and we decided that, given the ongoing nature of the discussions we were having and the sense that we couldn't bring this to a close, that we needed to protect DOD personnel and cease providing that while we sort this out. REP. LANTOS: Now, Secretary Gelbard testified a minute ago that he has every expectation that before the end of this week, he will work out temporary arrangements that will achieve the goal of continuing to provide information. Am I quoting you correctly? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. REP. LANTOS: Well, if you have the ability, Secretary Gelbard, to make this arrangement within the next 48 hours, what prevented the Department of State from doing this between April 27 and May 1, so we wouldn't have had this absurdity of stopping this abruptly, causing all of the consequences that we have been discussing, and now having to come to us with legislation that presumably is not needed because you will be able to arrange the desired result without legislation? MR. GELBARD: What I said before, Mr. Chairman, is that, given current law, we will be seeking interim agreements with those governments that any U.S.-provided tracking data not be used for shooting at or shooting down aircraft. Both governments have told me that if there is a long-term solution in sight, they are prepared to work out shorter-term interim arrangements along these lines. REP. LANTOS: Well, what prevented the Department of State from doing this two months ago? MR. GELBARD: Because neither government was prepared, given the lack of a change in U.S. policy at that time, to work out such agreements because of their stated policies of shooting down or shooting at aircraft. REP. LANTOS: I don't understand the change in status or attitudes.. MR. GELBARD: When I was in Bogota and Lima during the last two weeks, we -- REP. LANTOS: No, go back to March and April. The Department of Defense is testifying that in interagency meetings, they were threatening to terminate this activity.. Is that accurate? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. REP. LANTOS: Is it also accurate that the Department of State was fully aware of that? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. REP. LANTOS: So it didn't come as a surprise to you that on May 1 the Department of Defense stopped its sharing of information? MR. GELBARD: They informed us that they would. REP. LANTOS: How far in advance? MR. GELBARD: I can't recall. REP. LANTOS: Approximately. MR. GELBARD: Several days before. REP. LANTOS: Just several days? Mr. Sheridan, when did DOD advise the other -- who were -- who was it participating in the interagency discussions, in addition to State and Defense? MR. SHERIDAN: Most of these discussions took place -- and we have interagency working group meetings about every two weeks, and there's a whole cast of characters who attend those meetings. REP. LANTOS: At that point, to the best of your recollection, did DOD advise the others that you will cease sharing information on May 1? MR. SHERIDAN: On April 20, the undersecretary of defense sent a letter to the undersecretary of state notifying him of DOD's intention unless we receive those assurances. REP. LANTOS: And what was the response from the Department of State? MR. SHERIDAN: I would yield to Ambassador Gelbard. . REP. LANTOS: What was the response, Secretary Gelbard? MR. GELBARD: We did not agree with their decision. We did not send a written answer, but we did not agree with them and we told them that. One thing I would like to stress, though, Mr. Chairman -- REP. LANTOS: Well I still -- I still need an answer to my previous question. You are now telling these committees that within 48 hours you will be able to arrange a satisfactory interim solution. Is that correct? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. REP. LANTOS: Well, if that is the case, then my question still stands: Why, having received a letter from the deputy secretary of defense on April 20th, telling you that they will cease sharing information, why did not Department of State come up with this interim solution? MR. GELBARD: Because those governments were not prepared, as we saw during our visit to those two countries last week, to accept that kind of interim solution or that kind of solution as a long- term solution, unless there was going to be a chance in U.S. policy. They urged us to change our policy, but at the time and until yesterday, when the president made his decision, there was no change in U.S. policy envisioned.. REP. LANTOS: But why was this change of policy coming about in such a leisurely fashion? MR. GELBARD: We have not been taking this in any leisurely fashion. This has been examined very intensively. We have been struggling with this issue which is a very complicated one and we have not been happy about this in the slightest, none of us. But this has been a serious problem and we do take the law of the United States very seriously. REP. LANTOS: Everybody takes the law of the United States very seriously. Apparently on April 30th -- was that law in effect on April 30th? MR. GELBARD: Of course it was. REP. LANTOS: Was it in effect on March 31? MR. GELBARD: Yes sir. REP. LANTOS: How 'bout last Christmas? MR. GELBARD: Yes sir, the Congress had passed -- REP. LANTOS: How about a year ago this Easter? MR. GELBARD: Yes sir the Congress had passed this -- REP. LANTOS: (Interrupts) -- So all of this time this law was in effect. MR. GELBARD: Yes sir. The Congress had passed this law in 1984. REP. LANTOS: So for ten years between 1984 and May 1, 1994, the law was in effect and it didn't make much difference. But suddenly on May 1, it became an item on which this action had to be taken by DOD. MR. GELBARD: Let me explain two separate sets of legal issues. In July of 1990, during the last administration, the U.S. government did convey to the government of Colombia our concerns based on international law that we were opposed to their using the data we were providing them at that time for shooting down aircraft. This is based on the Chicago convention and the Montreal conventions. And we told them at the time -- as I said, July of 1990 -- that if such information provided by the United States or assistance provided by the United States were used for shooting down aircraft, that would have serious affect on our ability to continue to provide such assistance. The Colombian government only changed its policy to have a stated policy of shooting at or shooting down aircraft earlier this year and it was based on that change in policy that there was a new examination of the implications of that policy on international law. In the course of this examination, the Justice Department and the general counsels of the other departments of the executive branch discovered these various domestic laws and after intensive examination this spring, they came back to us very firmly and very clearly and told us that we were not allowed to provide such assistance. REP. LANTOS: Colombia changed its policy only early this year. MR. GELBARD: Yes sir. REP. LANTOS: When did Peru change its policy? MR. GELBARD: I believe a year ago. REP. LANTOS: Well, why wasn't there an immediate change then? MR. GELBARD: I can't answer that, sir. REP. LANTOS: Congressman Gilman. REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your are certainly raising some important issues.. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you're certainly raising some important issues. Mr. Sheridan, it's my understanding that Section 1004 of the code of 21 USC 1503 establishing the office of drug control policy states that, and I quote: "The head of the national drug control program agency shall notify the director in writing regarding any proposed change in policies relating to the activities of such department or agency under the national drug control program prior to the implementation of such a change." Was the director notified of your change? I'm talking now about the director of the national drug control program, the Drug Czar, as we refer to him. Had he been notified prior to the change? MR. SHERIDAN: Well, in the interagency meetings which we discussed there was representation from ONDCP at that meetings. REP. GILMAN: Says that the "Agency shall notify the director in writing regarding any proposed change in policies." Had the director been notified, in writing, of any proposed change by the Pentagon? MR. SHERIDAN: Well, the -- REP. GILMAN: Can you tell us whether he was notified? I think that only takes a yes or no answer. MR. SHERIDAN: Well sir, it depends on what you're calling a change in policy. There's been a long-standing U.S. policy that we do not fire at civil aircraft in flight, and do not support that activity. REP. GILMAN: Then you contend, Mr. Sheridan, that by the Pentagon directing a cessation of the sharing of intelligence was not a change of policy? Is that what you're telling this committee? Is that your impression, that this was not a change in policy? MR. SHERIDAN: It was not a change in policy regarding U.S. policy toward the treatment of civil aircraft in flight. REP. GILMAN: The cutting off of intelligence to Colombia and Peru was not a change in our government's policy toward Colombia and Peru? That's an astounding response as far as I'm concerned. What would you call it if it's not a change in policy? MR. SHERIDAN: Well, let me just remind that it was never the Department of Defense's intention to cease providing information. But we had wanted and had hoped and continue to hope is that those nations would not use out information to shoot down civil aircraft in flight. REP. GILMAN: Is that put down in writing someplace? That's the first I've heard that condition. MR. SHERIDAN: Which condition is that? REP. MYERS: The one you just recited, that it was your hope that you continue to give them information but that they wouldn't use it for some purpose. MR. SHERIDAN: Well, that was certainly understood to be DOD's position. REP. GILMAN: Understood by who? MR. SHERIDAN: It was understood by all the elements of our government that that's what we wanted. REP. GILMAN: Mr. Sheridan, again I'm asking you, why wasn't there a compliance with this section of the code, that any change in policy would be provided to the director in writing? So that the director would have an opportunity, as this statue goes out to promptly review such proposed change and certify to the department or agency head in writing whether such change is consistent with our national drug control strategy? I don't think I'm asking for a complicated response. MR. SHERIDAN: Well, I'm not sure what you're asking me for. Was there a letter sent? No, there was not. REP. GILMAN: There was nothing in writing then provided to the director? MR. SHERIDAN: No. That's right. REP. GILMAN: So then you're in violation of the statute. Is that right? MR. SHERIDAN: We did not interpret the statute that way or our activity that way. REP. GILMAN: Had you ever notified the director of your change in sharing of intelligence in writing? MR. SHERIDAN: In writing, no. REP. GILMAN: Isn't there a task force that meets regularly on narcotics? Do you meet with that task force? MR. SHERIDAN: Yes, those are the working group meetings that we discussed earlier. REP. GILMAN: How often do you meet with the working group? MR. SHERIDAN: Once every two weeks or as called. REP. GILMAN: And was the drug czar present at the working group immediately after you changed your policy or, as you say, you made a -- I don't know what you want to call it if it's not a change of policy -- when you differed from what you were doing in the past? Was he present at a meeting following that May 1st decision? MR. SHERIDAN: There were many meetings that followed that. REP. GILMAN: Did you discuss that with the director? MR. SHERIDAN: This was thoroughly discussed. REP. GILMAN: And was it discussed with Mr. Gelbard's office? . MR. SHERIDAN: We've been involved in nonstop discussions on this issue every day since I don't know. REP. GILMAN: Was it discussed with the DEA? MR. SHERIDAN: Yes, DEA -- REP. GILMAN: Was there any difference in opinion amongst -- within the task force with regard to this shifting of policy if it's not a change in policy? MR. SHERIDAN: You can discuss that with other members of the interagency. REP. GILMAN: I'm sorry. I didn't understand the response. MR. SHERIDAN: Other members of the interagency process, I think, could speak for themselves. I will not speak for them. REP. GILMAN: Well, was there any difference of opinion as far as you recall after you had made that pronouncement of a shifting of the policy? MR. SHERIDAN: There were a number of different -- I mean -- positions held by different agencies, but I would prefer to let them speak for themselves. REP. GILMAN: Well, what is your recollection? Was there a difference of opinion expressed by those other agencies? MR. SHERIDAN: Regarding the interpretation of international law? REP. GILMAN: No, regarding your shifting -- the Pentagon shifting of the policy on exchange of intelligence. I don't think I'm making a very complicated question out of this. MR. SHERIDAN: There were some agencies, I suppose, that agreed and some that disagreed. REP. GILMAN: Mr. Gelbard, were you present at any of these meetings? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. I'm the chairman of the group. REP. GILMAN: And was there any difference of opinion with regard to those members of the task force, the working group. MR. GELBARD: There were differences of opinion, sir. REP. GILMAN: And did anyone raise the question of shouldn't the director be given a notice in writing to give him an opportunity to respond in writing? MR. GELBARD: Members of his staff are in attendance at all those meetings and the issue of informing him in writing, however, did not come up. REP. GILMAN: Had the Congress ever been notified about that time of the change in policy? MR. GELBARD: Not that I'm aware of. REP. GILMAN: When was the Congress first notified? MR. GELBARD: I can't recall, sir. REP. GILMAN: As I recall I guess it was a newspaper notification is the first we received. I haven't seen any formal notification from the task force, from the director or from your office with regard to a -- my colleagues seem to confirm that it was a newspaper when we first learned of the shifting of the policy. It seems to me that the task force ought to take a look at the statute and get back to where the Congress intended them to be with regard to the narcotics control strategy and any change in the strategy. Now according to most recent -- (word inaudible) -- reports, there's been a 30 percent decline in coco cultivation in Peru since the last report. I understand that the upper Huallaga production has gone down considerably because of a fungus. Maybe we ought to make use of that fungus elsewhere. However, the combination factors would seem to provide an ideal opportunity for our nation and Peru to explore some new initiatives since that irradication that's been completed by the fungus makes them now explore new seed beds and apparantly we see a disarray in the U.S. policy that's undermining our ability to cooperate with the Peruvians and yet we have an opportunity now to get into these new areas where it's going to take three to five years to provide new growth. And with production down, with the growers more susceptible to counter measures, I think we're missing some great opportunities to exploit the vulnerabilities in the cultivation production cycle that we've seen since cultivation first exploded in the Andean region. I was one of the first promoters of putting some money in the upper Huallaga valley -- $50 million initial appropriation and try to irradicate and they still haven't spent some of that money because the terrorists and the drug traffickers control that whole valley. I'm wondering what we're doing to take advantage of this situation where the cultivation has been reduced substantially; they're going to have to go into new beds of productions. What are we doing to try to take advantage of that to see what we can do about irradicating that entire crop in that region? MR. GELBARD: First, we have extended all the available funds we have to support irradication and alternative crop programs. That is precisely why I made my plea a bit earlier to free up the $77 million in economic support funds for Peru which has still been frozen.. We could use those funds right now, Congressman Gilman, precisely for the purposes that you have cited. I agree with you 100 percent. We are missing an opportunity if we're not able to begin those kinds of projects to take advantage of the effect of the significant decrease in coca production in the upper Huallaga and other parts of Peru. Second, since we have had so little in the way of economic support funds to help use to support eradication and alternative development programs, but because it also makes sense, we are also trying to get the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank engaged for the first time in alternative development projects to help lure farmers away from growing coca and into other kinds of pursuits. We're pursuing that aggressively and we think we are making some good headway on that. REP. GILMAN: Well I'm pleased to hear that you're taking a look at that. Tell me now, we have a $37 million cut made in the House side in the State Department's INM program in the budget for '95. That I would imagine would have a significant impact on your work, and yet we didn't hear anything from the administration about its efforts to do battle with that cut or to come forward and advocate greater funding. Have you made some efforts now to try to correct that loss in the INM budget? MR. GELBARD: Congressman, as I said in my opening statement, first the decrease in fiscal year '94 from $152 million to $100 million has hurt us enormously. Second, while the efforts by helpful members of the House of Representatives, such as you, have helped bring up the level to $115 million in the House, and we continue to try to press for the full $152 million as we did in the House and also are now trying in the Senate, if we do not get full funding, given the more globalized nature of this problem, particularly because of the increasing spread of heroin trafficking, opium poppy cultivation and the geographic increase throughout Asia and into the former Soviet Union, we are going to have to cut back and close programs in a number of areas. This has just had a chilling effect on us. REP. GILMAN: I think, Mr. Gelbard -- and I appreciate your comments about that, and we certainly want to help, I think it would be extremely helpful if the administration would put its shoulder behind the wheel of what you're trying to do and raise that funding. We have too seldom heard from this administration with regard to the need for better funding in the drug programs. The words out there are great and the speeches are great, but the deeds lack any support for those words.. MORE. And I hope that you would encourage the administration to show up on the Hill and let us know that they're fully behind what you're seeking to do. I'd be pleased to yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. LANTOS: (Off mike.) REP. WYNN (?): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sheridan, just generally speaking, from an operational standpoint, how do you assess the success or failure of DOD's operations in this interdiction effort? I mean, there's obviously a substantial loss in confidence in our ability to execute this type of program. What's your overall assessment? MR. SHERIDAN: Of DOD's performance in South America? REP. WYNN (?): Yes. MR. SHERIDAN: I would say that over the last number of years, principally supporting the State Department's (INMF ?) efforts and working with DEA, we have been developing the capability to disrupt the movement of cocaine, and I think the results are improving every year. I think my numbers indicate there were somewhere around 130 metric tons seized in Latin America last year, and that is significantly more than you would have found, certainly 10 years ago -- REP. WYNN (?): Okay. You're not focusing significantly on disruption of production, is that a safe conclusion? MR. SHERIDAN: On production? Our efforts are designed to -- DOD's specifically are designed to interdict the flow of either finished cocaine or semi-finished cocaine. REP. WYNN (?): Mr. Gelbard, my colleague jokingly suggested perhaps we ought to use that fungus in a more systematic manner. I think to some extent he has a point in that that's the only thing that seems to have slowed production. Is there any consideration of utilizing a biological technology in this way? MR. GELBARD: Don't think it hasn't occurred to us, Congressman. And I say this with great hesitation in front of Congressman Torricelli, but once again, we have laws, through the Biological Warfare Convention and U.S. statutes, which prevent us from using what would be biological agents. We are trying -- REP. WYNN (?): Have there been any attempts to maybe focus that question? As opposed to biological warfare, to drug interdiction, has there been any attempt to create that kind of focus? MR. GELBARD: We are really pressing the governments of Bolivia and Peru on eradication attempts, because as I said earlier, this is what really gets to the heart of the problem. REP. WYNN (?): It seems to be working in Guatemala. What's the problem? You have a good record, apparently, of elimination and eradication of poppy production -- cultivation, rather, in Guatemala. Why hasn't that been duplicated? MR. GELBARD: First, in Guatemala, the area that was involved was really pretty small, although indeed you're right, the eradication efforts have been very, very effective there. Colombia, too, has been working at eradicating opium poppies and they've eradicated approximately 22,000 hectares, about 55,000 hectares -- REP. WYNN (?): Apparently that's not very significant. I know we have a vote (on question ?). In Colombia, apparently there have been allegations that some of the military units are engaged in human rights violations. Can you comment on that? And if so, what efforts are being made to prevent this from happening, screening out these units or what have you? MR. GELBARD: We have been working to assure that there is strong end use monitoring measures for any military equipment that we provide. REP. WYNN (?): First of all, do you have the information on the violations? Do they exist or not? MR. GELBARD: We do have reports about human rights violations, and we have been pressing the government of Colombia about this over time. We have had lots of conversations with human rights organizations in the United States and internationally, and we feel that the Colombian government has been trying to improve its systems to prevent human rights violations because they feel strongly about it. REP. WYNN (?): In view of the time, could you send me something a little more comprehensive on this subject in terms of exactly what we're doing, exactly the extent of the alleged violations, how broad- based they are, and whether they have any official sanction? MR. GELBARD: Yes, Congressman, I will. REP. WYNN (?): Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.,. REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you. Mr. Lantos is going to return in a moment. However, since I may not get the chance again, let me finally just say for myself on two issues. First, the Bush administration certainly could be criticized for emphasizing the war against drugs only in the growing fields of Latin America and in interdiction while ignoring the consumption problem of the United States. This administration must be very careful in its considerable and commendable enthusiasm for dealing with the narcotics problem within the United States in terms of consumption that our efforts at interdiction are not compromised. Part of the reason why there has been so much concern with this failure to continue cooperation with Peru and Colombia, that it is final evidence that our previous efforts at interdiction no longer have considerable support. That may or may not be the case, but it is the impression, and it clearly is causing political doubts in Colombia and Peru and is being interpreted by the narcotraffickers as open season, leading to precipitous increases in shipments. It would appear to me that the concern of this committee, the attention of the media and, I suspect, the considerable attention of the president of the United States has led to, if not a reversal, a correction in policy that will solve this problem. If that is the case, I'm pleased with the hearing, it is mission accomplished, we can get on with our business. But it is a word to the wise that there may be an imbalance in policy. Finally, let me say I was in Nicaragua last week and visited the Atlantic Coast, the Mosquito Coast.. The next policy issue this administration must address is because of our historic differences with the Sandinista military of Nicaragua there is no communication and no cooperation. The Atlantic coast of Nicaragua is open season for narco-traffickers. There is not one patrol boat operating by the Nicaraguan government on the Atlantic coast. There is no interdiction. Narco-traffickers daily are stopping their craft along that coast for supplies and for (rations ?) without interruption. We have to get over the difficulties of the last decade and begin cooperating with the Nicaraguan military, because they share some of our interests in gaining sovereignty back over their coast. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Chairman Torricelli. Let me pursue the proposed legislation that I take it will be sent up here soon. When do you expect that legislative draft to reach the Hill, Secretary Gelbard? MR. GELBARD: I'm hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that it will be in the next day or so. REP. LANTOS: Now, let us assume that we introduce it immediately and Chairman Torricelli and I will introduce it, assuming that it meets our approval immediately -- let's assume that Congress acts expeditiously and the legislation passes. What in essence will that legislation call for? MR. GELBARD: We're asking for a narrow change in existing U.S. Criminal Code provisions on the use of force against civilian aircraft. There would be an exemption from criminal liability use of force by specifically designated foreign governments facing national security threats from drug trafficking so long as those countries have in place appropriate procedures to protect innocent aircraft. We would also exempt assistance by the United States government to those countries. And we are doing this obviously in the context of the very difficult conditions that we see the governments of Colombia and Peru in right now.. REP. LANTOS: Is this legislation, proposed legislation, in any sense in conflict with procedures and policies of international organizations? MR. GELBARD: At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we want to begin to looking at changes in international conventions because there is a feeling that they might very well -- in fact, they are in conflict with some existing international conventions. I have already discussed with the governments of Colombia and Peru the issue of developing a multilateral approach to make a similar kind of narrow exception in the international -- relevant international conventions through the International Civil Aviation Organization. REP. LANTOS: Well, let's assume that International Civil Aviation Organization does not change its policies. Are we under those circumstances prepared to go it -- go this way on a unilateral basis? MR. GELBARD: My understanding is that once we are able to affect the necessary legislative changes in U.S. law, that we are prepared to do so. REP. LANTOS: Is this your understanding also, Mr. Sheridan? MR. SHERIDAN: The Department of Defense will do what it's told, if that is the intention of the president. I mean, you're talking about a hypothetical situation, and we're not there yet. But certainly the department is committed to the counterdrug effort and will support the president's desire. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, what is your view of this proposed legislation? MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I've been kind of sitting here kind of happy I wasn't either of these two for about the last hour. -- (Laughter.) . REP. LANTOS: We decided that since this is your first appearance, we would give you somewhat of a free ride. -- (Laughter.) . MR. CONSTANTINE: One of the things that I think is important to say, Congressman, is that -- to put all this stuff in perspective -- is that this is just one part of a strategy on the part of law enforcement or government to do something about the drug problem. The providing of information if it can be done legally to other countries and that they take action as necessary, that is some bit of deterrence as to narcotics traffickers flying from Bolivia or Peru into Colombia, and it's somewhat like -- it becomes exacerbated when you say, "Well, we can't do anything about it." It becomes public. It's like saying you'll never chase a drunken driver down a road again, every drunken driver will decide to flee. But there's a lot of other issues from the position of DEA that I mentioned here today that we think are equally if not more important. The eradication seems to have seized tonnage and tonnage of cocaine, and surely if it wasn't seized, it would be here and cause us even more problems, perhaps at a lower price. But the price hasn't gone up, and the amount keeps increasing or keeps becoming available. We look at DEA as to the seizure of narcotics if possible should be related to the making of a criminal case against all of the principles who are involved in the process, and I think that's where the seizure become important. And that's where the intelligence information becomes vital to you to put it together. My concern is -- other than this issue, which everybody has addressed today, and I appreciate everybody's concern, it was an education to me -- is that the principles involved in this narcotic traffic presently are immune from sanction. As long as they remain immune from sanction, a lot of other strategies that we have are really less effective. REP. LANTOS: I full agree with you, and let me ask Secretary Gelbard, why do they remain immune from sanctions? MR. GELBARD: I'm sorry, could you -- REP. LANTOS: Why are the principles immune from sanctions? MR. GELBARD: You mean the drug traffickers? We are attempting and we have had major efforts in a variety of ways to emphasize extradition, to emphasize evidence sharing when there are either not indictments in the United States or a prohibition on extradition of nationals, we've made major efforts to try to help governments develop -- REP. LANTOS: But what leverage do we have? What leverage do we have? MR. GELBARD: We have the ability -- REP. LANTOS: Be specific, country by country. MR. GELBARD: I -- we have the ability on an overall basis, because of the certification process, to impose sanctions when we feel those governments are not cooperating fully with us. We have -- REP. LANTOS: We are -- leaving the kingpins immune certainly would indicate that they are not cooperating with us. MR. GELBARD: What we have been doing is trying to help those governments develop cases -- REP. LANTOS: No, no, let me take you back to Director Constantine's point. His main complaint -- and I suspect the American people would overwhelming agree with him -- that we are impotent as long as the kingpins living in these countries are immune. Now do you agree with his basic point that they are immune? MR. GELBARD: No, I don't. We have -- the governments of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia specifically have put a number of these people in jail, there have been other instances where major traffickers have been killed, fleeing or in other law enforcement efforts. REP. LANTOS: Now what is the current status of the Colombian government's efforts to negotiate a settlement with the leaders of the Cali cartel under the surrender decree? MR. GELBARD: We have had a major problem with their prosecutor- general, Gustavo Degrave (ph), who is independent from the government, and who, as we have said publicly, as we have said privately, as we have been fighting, has been trying to avoid serious prosecution and asset seizure of major traffickers -- from major traffickers in the Cali cartel. As a result, we have suspended any -- REP. LANTOS: So when you say independent, you mean independent for what period of time, and how can that independence be curtailed? MR. GELBARD: He has an independent term. REP. LANTOS: When does that term end? MR. GELBARD: I believe he has several more years, theoretically, in office. REP. LANTOS: And under no circumstances can he be removed -- MR. GELBARD: He can be -- REP. LANTOS: -- prior to the termination of his tenure? MR. GELBARD: As I understand it, he can be removed by the Colombian constitutional or supreme court. REP. LANTOS: And has that been attempted? MR. GELBARD: That has not yet been attempted, but has been under discussion within Colombia. We have made very clear, both publicly and privately, our refusal to work with him because of his misuse of U.S.-provided assistance, his lack of seriousness about prosecution of major drug traffickers. REP. LANTOS: Well, and what -- what's the next step. MR. GELBARD: And we hope that -- and we have tried to encourage the government of Colombia, particularly there, to urge that he be removed from his position, and we have stressed this through our unwillingness to work with him.. We feel that President Gaviria and his government, who have very strong records of fighting against drug trafficking, are also very dissatisfied with his performance, and they've made that very clear. President Gaviria has come out very strongly against him publicly. REP. LANTOS: How about the degree of cooperation we are getting from Peru? MR. GELBARD: It's a very different situation because of the fact that the major traffickers are mostly concentrated in Colombia. But back in January, for example, the Colombian police arrested the leading Peruvian trafficker, they quickly deported him to Peru, he received a life sentence, which he's currently serving, and they are also trying to go after other major traffickers. However, as in many of these countries, there have been serious problems in terms of both prosecution and problems with correction. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, having been in the job only three months and having a very distinguished record in the field of law enforcement, on the basis of this very limited time frame, what changes would you recommend in our international drug policy? MR. CONSTANTINE: I would think that the key issue right now and will be for the next several years is the Cali cartel because, as the Ambassador Gelbard has said, the Colombian police at great personal cost were very effective in dealing with the group out of Medellin. REP. LANTOS: Yes. MR. CONSTANTINE: I think it was a good example for us to see how, with the right pressure and government moving strongly against it, how something like that can disintegrate fairly quickly. I honestly have to tell you, even though I'm new to this job, I've been involved in investigations with the Cali cartel since 1985 in New York state, substantial investigations in which major principals were indicted for criminal violations of substantial crimes in New York state as long ago as 1989 and have never been brought to justice. And I am concerned that there are that group of people which account for at least 80 percent of all the cocaine traffic in the United States and is suspected of many vicious crimes, under the present constitution of Colombia, obviously, will not be extradited to the United States. The next question is, will they be brought to justice with the appropriate sanctions in Colombia? In my three months of reading every historic report I can, I do not see that happening, and the analogy that I have made with people, having worked organized crime cases, it's a little like letting John Gotti sit in Howard Beach, Queens, and go to the Ravenite (sp) Social Club and do what he wants to do every day, and sending all of the bookmakers and loan-sharkers to jail, while the major principal exists immune. And one of the things that's been effective in organized crime in this country -- I give great credit to Bobby Kennedy, who started all this thing -- was going after the principals, using witnesses against them, giving people breaks, all the way up the line until you get the major figures and send them to prison.. That, to me, would be the greatest asset that you could add to all the present tools that you have to deal with the international narcotics cartels that operate in the United States because it's not that they just sit over there, they direct every minute piece of the operation that's going on in Queens or Los Angeles or Houston. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Gelbard, you are the government's top foreign policy expert in this field; you have this as your responsibility. What in your judgment makes the Cali cartel so much more resilient compared to the Medellin cartel? MR. GELBARD: I think it's been much more difficult to try to develop strong cases but at the same time, we have seen enormous difficulties on the part of individuals in terms of developing the political will to go after them. We have serious difficulty, as I have mentioned before, because of Gustavo Degrave's (pp) unwillingness to seriously approach the problem of the leadership of the Cali cartel in a way of trying to prosecute them -- serious cases. We have been working with the Gaviria government, as Mr. Constantine says, with very good success against the Medellin cartel. These people are indeed slicker. They have operated in a very different way and they have tried to create the image of kinder, gentler drug traffickers. In point of fact, there's still tremendous violence, many murders and this is not a gentle group of people. But we need strong political will on the part of the law enforcement authorities in Colombia to continue to go after them. We've seen it in the Colombian police in the past, we certainly have seen it in the Gaviria administration. We want to work with them and maintain that kind of international cooperation but it's awfully difficult when the individual charged with the prosecutions of these people either won't do it or provides them with nothing more than slaps on the wrist and no asset siezure. REP. LANTOS: Is it your judgment that the government is doing everything it can to get rid of him? MR. GELBARD: I feel quite confident that President Gaviria's government has tried to be very effective on this and they are very frustrated, extremely frustrated. REP. LANTOS: That's not a good enough answer for me. What do you mean by frustrated? MR. GELBARD: Under their system, they do not have the ability to remove him. As I said earlier, he has to be removed by the courts. MORE. REP. LANTOS: And the courts are intimidated. MR. GELBARD: For whatever reasons -- REP. LANTOS: Well, what's your judgment? I mean, this is not an unusual question. I mean, if the courts have the legal right to remove the obstacle in the way of getting at the kingpins of the drug world, then why don't the courts do it? MR. GELBARD: I really don't -- REP. LANTOS: They're either paid off or they're intimidated. So, which of the two is the answer? MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, I really don't know the answer to that, but I am still hopeful that DeGrave (sp) will be removed from his position. REP. LANTOS: Well, what is your hunch? Are they intimidated or are they paid off? MR. GELBARD: I'd rather not answer that in open session. REP. LANTOS: Well, we will have a closed session on this whole subject because the answers, frankly, are simply unacceptable to the American people; that this nightmare of the drug epidemic continues because an individual in Colombia is unwilling to prosecute the kingpins of this giant international conspiracy. Mr. Manzullo? REP. MANZULLO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Constantine -- Constantine, forgive me -- do you have enough DEA agents? MR. CONSTANTINE: You mean overall? REP. MANZULLO: That's correct. MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I mean, that's a very tough question. I've run police departments now for almost nine or ten years, and there was never enough troopers, there's never enough agents, there's never enough people from the FBI. I think that the difficulty started three years ago when there was gradually, I think in 1991, there was a freezing of budgets, then successively it started to become more difficult -- REP. MANZULLO: Can I race you three years ahead to now, because the administration is cutting the DEA budget by $2 million. That obviously will have some impact on the hiring of DEA agents. It's a very simple question. I mean, at this point -- and I know you've been on the job a very short period of time -- do you feel you have enough DEA agents to carry out your program of interdiction? MR. CONSTANTINE: I'd have to say at this stage of the game that if we could maintain ourselves at full strength, that we'd be able to meet most of the missions. But I also have to tell you -- and I'm going to be very honest with you -- as the heroin targets start to explode underneath us everywhere, that means that you have to look down the road and say, gee, all that I have to do right now, with all of the assets -- and they are not infinite, I mean they are finite resources, and the problems are becoming infinite, so you try to -- REP. MANZULLO: You're short of agents. MR. CONSTANTINE: At this point in time we're about 130 over what has become a reduced target. I've heard on the markup on the bills in both houses that that may very well be corrected.. REP. MANZULLO: So what's your answer? MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I -- REP. MANZULLO: Are you short of agents to adequately -- MR. CONSTANTINE: I can't give you the exact number of agents -- REP. MANZULLO: But you're short, is that correct? MR. CONSTANTINE: Presently we're 130 or 140 over the target. It's less than existed in 1991. But there's a reduced appropriation for the target figure -- REP. MANZULLO: No, I -- I want to lay aside all appropriations and all the congressional legalese and all this -- all this stuff -- and ask you, as a professional police officer, and you've been in this a long, long time and understand the issue, do you feel as of this date that you have enough DEA agents to adequately do the job? MR. CONSTANTINE: No. REP. MANZULLO: Okay. And this is at the same time that the administration is seeking $2 million less than your old DEA budget -- overall DEA budget? MR. CONSTANTINE: I'm not sure that's the figure, though, Congressman. I mean, I would have to check that. REP. MANZULLO: Has the president -- is the president seeking more funding so you can have more DEA agents? MR. CONSTANTINE: I think the budget was hold harmless this year. There was 10 less DEA agents in the budget. REP. MANZULLO: How many do you need, Mr. Constantine? MR. CONSTANTINE: Oh, I mean, I would -- REP. MANZULLO: Do you have any idea? MR. CONSTANTINE: It would be an unreasonable figure if I gave it to you right now, because --. REP. MANZULLO: Be unreasonable, because we -- MR. CONSTANTINE: Oh, wow. REP. MANZULLO: -- you know -- MR. CONSTANTINE: People accuse me of that often, but I kind of -- REP. MANZULLO: That's not the case, because we're obviously here because we feel there have been cutbacks in -- MR. CONSTANTINE: You presently have 3,500 sworn personnel for DEA covering all of the domestic United States and 53 foreign offices. You know, you could rise up to a number of 7,000 or 8,000. But I think there comes a point in time where all of us say, look, this is the amount of money that we can afford to put into something. I've dealt with these types of issues back in New York State before I came here. Because there's other people, there's people who need rehabilitation, there's prevention programs, there's a balance to all of these things. As I said, I'm pretty sure correctly, in the beginning, if held harmless at the figures for 1991, I think DEA could be very effective in the role that we have to play. REP. MANZULLO: But the reason I'm asking these questions is that the President's overall request for drug control through various programs is $13.2 billion. That's 1.1 billion more than the 12.1 billion enacted for fiscal year 1994. The administration is seeking increased funds in five areas -- drug prevention, up $448 million; drug treatment, up $360 million; drug-related criminal justice spending, up $227 million; international programs, up $76 million; drug-related research -- whatever that is -- up $27 million. And the White House requested reductions in two areas: interdiction, down $94 million; anti-drug intelligence programs, down $600,000. I think that's the reason why we're having this hearing today, because people in the United States Congress and the people in America believe that there is an insincere effort on the part of the Clinton administration to adequately stop the flow of drugs into this country. REP. LANTOS: If my friend will yield to me, I think this is an appalling and totally inaccurate, unfair statement.. To accuse the administration, any American administration, of having an insincere effort to fighting the war against drugs is simply not worthy of a member of this body. REP. MANZULLO: Well, I -- REP. LANTOS: And I truly believe my good friend does not -- cannot mean what he has just said. Partisanship has a role in political debate, but to accuse either this administration or the previous administration of a lack of sincerity in fighting the drug war is not one of them. REP. MANZULLO: Well, I will stand by my ground on that, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your interjection of your thought in here, but when it comes -- apparently when it comes to interdiction, there is no emphasis by this administration. And that's borne out by the fact of the request made by the administration itself. I can only state to you that's how we feel. There are many members of Congress that feel there's been a lack of emphasis on interdiction, and that's why my question to you was sincere, because you're in a position where you know how short you are. And there are many members that feel that the DEA needs more help and want to take and channel resources from other areas into interdiction. So I would stand by my ground that there's a lack of sincerity in trying to interdict the drugs, as borne out by this whole issue with the AWACS. Thank you. MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, if I might -- REP. LANTOS: Please. MR. GELBARD: -- respond to that briefly. As I said in my opening statement, Congressman, the president's strategy concentrates on maintaining very strong interdiction capabilities and very strong law enforcement capabilities. What we have been doing because of the serious budgetary problems with which the administration is faced have been trying to look for the most efficient ways of pursuing these interdiction and law enforcement efforts. And as a result, the president's Western Hemisphere strategy calls for a gradual shift away from the so-called transit zone interdiction area to really trying to concentrate more on the source countries and stopping it at the source. That's a much more effective way than trying to catch it just before it enters our borders. We still feel that is important, too, but we are trying to shift the funds more in the direction of the source countries, where we feel we can stop it with much greater efficiency and cost effectiveness. MR. CONSTANTINE: I would also add, if I could, sir, that the administration's request this year is 9 percent over the '94 actual. And so, as far as we are concerned, the ball is in your court, and we will see what the Congress does with the president's request. But given the budgetary environment that we are in, a 9 percent increase over '94 I think is a substantial commitment on the part of the administration. I would also note that 59 percent of our spending is still on supply reduction. So this notion that, you know, while there is an increased emphasis on drug treatment and so on, that this administration is not committed to supply reduction is imply not so. Sixty cents of every dollar spent is still on the supply reduction side. As Ambassador Gelbard indicated, what we're doing is just -- on the international side -- making some adjustments.. I would also note that international spending is up 22 percent in this Clinton administration's '95 budget request. So if we want to start looking at the numbers, let's look at all of them, and I think we do pretty well. REP. LANTOS: Congressman Mica? REP. MICA: Well I -- you know, I just have tremendous problems with this the -- you know, we're talking about interdiction, they're cutting off intelligence to Peru and Colombia. I mean, that's what really precipitated everything going on here. And when Mr. Gilman was trying to ask a question -- you know, it's apparent to us that when the drug czar, for example, his funding was cut, I believe, by 73 percent, with a massive layoff in his office -- that there are members of Congress that are deeply concerned because we're hearing from the folks back home, and I don't want to use that same word again. But I would expect you gentlemen to get in there and try to scrap more for what little federal dollars are left on discretionary spending in areas of cutting off drugs. I mean -- MR. GELBARD (?): Congressman, we've been trying to do this, and we have been spending a great deal of our time trying to press for the request that went to the Congress in the fiscal year '95 budget. As I said earlier, my budget was reduced by a third in fiscal year '94. We requested $150 million, we received $100 million. I'm afraid the same thing is happening for fiscal year '95. The amounts of money we have available to support eradication programs and development to lure the farmers away from growing coca has diminished enormously. We simply have no funds right now, as I responded to Congressman Gilman, to help the Peruvian government in its efforts to eradicate coca. Now we're encouraging them to look elsewhere, particularly through the development banks, and we're creating an opening there. But we've got serious problems with simply a lack of availability of cash from what we've requested. REP. LANTOS: We'll be in recess for 10 minutes and then resume with Mr. Mica. (Sounds gavel.) . END OF COVERAGE -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com]) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268