Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins) Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere, Part One Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:07:35 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 01:05:34 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Information Systems Corporation Federal News Service JUNE 22, 1994, WEDNESDAY Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Headline: Joint Hearing Of The International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights Subcommittee And The Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee Of The House Foreign Affairs Committee Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere Chaired By: Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca) Representative Robert Torricelli (D-Nj) Witnesses: Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters, Thomas Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building Washington, Dc REP. LANTOS: Before turning to our distinguished witnesses, let me just make two observations. I identify myself in very strong measure with the comments of my distinguished colleague and friend, Chairman Torricelli, but I would like to observe that some of the comments from the Republican side would make it appear that we have had a brilliant and successful anti-drug strategy for 12 years, and suddenly in the last 18 months we have fallen down on the job, and the record will surely not support that. The drug problem in the United States did not begin on January 20th of 1993. Our anti-drug strategy with respect to the hemisphere did not begin -- whatever it is -- 16 months ago -- and just as the problem of the whole drug complex is not a partisan problem, I would hope that my colleagues will approach it in a somewhat less partisan fashion that what we have seen in the last few minutes. We will ask our distinguished witnesses to make concise opening statements. Your prepared presentations will be entered in the record in their entirety. We will first hear from the assistant secretary for international narcotics matters, the Honorable Robert Gelbard. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. We appreciate your concise approach at the outset so we can get to questions. There will be plenty of questions. MR. GELBARD: Thank you very much. Chairman Lantos, Chairman Torricelli, Congressman Smith, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today with Mr. Constantine and Mr. Sheridan. Let me thank you from the outset for agreeing to reschedule this hearing. I understand the demands on the committee's time and the problems caused by a last-minute postponement. I hope that by the end of today's hearing, we will all agree that we were better served by waiting this past week. As you requested, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my full prepared statement for the record. REP. LANTOS: Without objection. MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to talk today about perceptions. I ask you to take a step back and look at the world through the eyes of the narcotics trafficker. Unfortunately, it doesn't look so bad, and some trends are moving his way. In some countries, including our own, the trafficker is once again hearing the sweet -- to him -- and misleading sounds of debate over legalization. In Colombia, the prosecutor-general, Gustavo Degrave (ph) has negotiated soft deals with leaders of the Cali Cartel, sometimes bargaining away evidence that we have provided in the process. In Bolivia, evidence is now coming to light that the previous government was deeply penetrated by traffickers. Closer to home, last year the budget of every -- REP. LANTOS: May I stop you there? You say deeply penetrated. How high was it penetrated? MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, I was ambassador to Bolivia during the time of much of that government. Certainly members of the cabinet -- some members of the cabinet were involved, and at my insistence, the president of Bolivia fired the minister of the interior, Guillermo Capobianco (ph), who was deeply involved in accepting trafficker money, as was the head of the national police, and we believe there are others. This is currently an issue under investigation by the Bolivian Congress, so I would rather not enter into any specifics on this respecting their prerogatives. REP. LANTOS: Thank you. MR. GELBARD: Last year the budget of every United States government agency dedicated to international counternarcotics was dramatically reduced. My own bureau's budget dropped 30 percent, with even deeper cuts to military and economic support funds supporting our counternarcotics efforts. We are reducing staff at several narcotics affairs sections overseas.. This year's budget picture is no brighter. Thanks in part to the efforts of some members of this committee, the House appropriation for international counternarcotics restores some of last year's cuts. The Senate bill, however, leaves us at last year's skeleton level, well below the president's request. Mr. Chairman, let me be blunt. I cannot do the job that you expect of me and the secretary of state asks of me if I do not have adequate resources. If we take another year of major funding cuts, then something has to go. Perhaps we will slash sustainable development programs in the Andes and close other programs altogether. We might be forced to reduce support for eradication programs and generally cut back our aviation support. Unquestionably, we would have difficulty funding new programs whether targeted against the growing United States' heroin epidemic or against organized crime in Russia and Eastern Europe. I do not mean to put a gun against my own head and threaten to pull the trigger if Congress does not vote us a larger budget, but it is important to acknowledge in advance that these sorts of cuts will have direct and explicit consequences. The truth is that we do have a good story to tell about international counternarcotics programs. We are paying a price today for some unfortunate rhetoric in the past. Efforts against drugs are not a war that we will win in two, three or four years. Success or failure is not tabulated on an accountant's data sheet of arrests, seizures and current street price. The struggle against drugs is the work of a generation, not of a statistician. Last year, we developed a new counternarcotics strategy for the Western Hemisphere. It addresses the twin concerns confronting this administration and this Congress in January of 1993: the perception that the past strategy was not working and the need to reduce budgets. The new strategy calls for a gradual shift in emphasis from transit interdiction to source country efforts. It calls for us to support stronger democratic counternarcotics institutions in source countries and to integrate counternarcotics into global alternative development strategy. It seeks greater involvement by international and multinational organizations and continued efforts against entire trafficker organizations. In short, the new strategy seeks to reinforce what we have seen that works, coordinate and consolidate among multiple programs to ensure efficiency, and engage international organizations that previously had shied away from involvement in counternarcotics. The president's new strategy called for us to use the narcotics certification process energetically as an antidrug tool. On April 1st, the president's certification decisions put substance behind the words. Ten of the 26 countries were denied certification or granted it only on the basis of a vital national interest certification. This was an honest process. These were not just pariah nations with whom we have no serious bilateral interests. Nigeria, Bolivia and Peru had never before received anything less than full certification. Panama and Laos did not receive full certification, despite serious and important U.S. concerns outside of narcotics issues. The president's certification decision sent a very clear signal. Business as usual is no longer good enough. We will bear our burden in the world-wide struggle against drugs, but we expect the same commitment from our fellow governments. I might add that the certification provisions, currently codified in Section 489 and 490 of the foreign Assistance Act, are scheduled to expire on September 30th. I hope this committee will work with us to retain this very important weapon in the struggle against drugs. Finally, let me address the Andean narcotics issue that is probably foremost in your minds. As you know, the United States government has frozen assistance and intelligence sharing with Colombia and Peru that could be used for targeting civil aircraft. We have done so because of those government's announced policies of firing on suspected narcotics traffickers who refuse to obey orders to land. REP. LANTOS: Just to get the record straight. How many actual shoot-downs took place by the Peruvians? MR. GELBARD: I'm not certain as to numbers. We -- MR. GELBARD: Can anyone else on the panel give us the answer? Mr. Sheridan? MR. SHERIDAN: I believe that we're talking in the range of three, four, five perhaps. REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman I'm told the answer is 31. MR. GELBARD: But, let me ask how you're defining the -- REP. TORRICELLI: When a plane hits the ground is a shoot-down. MR. GELBARD: The Peruvians deny that they have ever shot down an aircraft. . REP. TORRICELLI: Yeah. I'm told the number is 31. Even when I met with them last it was in excess of 20. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, do you have any entry in this sweepstakes? --(Laughter.) . MR. CONSTANTINE: None, whatsoever.. REP. LANTOS: Well, it would be sort of nice to have our three top experts be prepared to answer such an unbelievably elementary question. So let me get back to you, Secretary Gelbard --. MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman -- REP. LANTOS: With this coaching from Congressman Torricelli, what number would you -- MR. GELBARD: I -- I'm afraid I have to differ with Congressman Torricelli's estimate. The Colombian government has told us that since they announced their policy early this year they have not shot down any aircraft. And the Peruvian government told us in the course of the meetings that I held with them, when I led delegation to both Colombia and Peru last week, they say that they have not shot down any aircraft. They have -- REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me -- what do you expect them to say? If they admit that they're shooting down aircraft, you suspend cooperation and sharing information with them. Of course they're going to tell you they're not shooting down any aircraft. But indeed when you meet with them privately and to their own people they're giving the number of 31. It is indeed accurate that Colombians do not acknowledge shooting down anyone, but the Peruvians are a very different story. MORE. I don't know how you could expect a different answer than the one you're receiving, given your pledge to cease operations with them if they give you a different answer. It would be amazing if they said anything differently. MR. GELBARD: Well, with respect, Mr. Chairman, the Peruvian government and the Colombian government have both made it very clear to me that they do not intend to renounce their policy, their stated policy of having the capability of going after aircraft and shooting at or shooting down such aircraft. But they still stated that they have not shot aircraft down. Now, what they have done, and I've seen videotapes that corroborate this, they have shot at aircraft and hit wing tips or other nonvital parts of aircraft, and as a result, those aircraft have landed under their own power. REP. LANTOS: How many such incidents are we aware of where force was used even though it was not decisive? MR. GELBARD: We believe there are perhaps slightly more than a dozen, perhaps around 15. REP. LANTOS: In Peru? MR. GELBARD: Yes. REP. LANTOS: How about Colombia? MR. GELBARD: As I said, I don't believe that they have shot at any aircraft since their stated policy has been put into place earlier this year. MR. SHERIDAN: And let me -- if I could, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that, when I gave a number of somewhere around five, I was defining the issue similar to Ambassador Gelbard, which would mean they fired at weapons but have not shot any out of the sky and caused a crash landing. I meant that they had fired weapons at and perhaps caused some damaged aircraft, but those aircraft landed under their own power. And I think five, 10, somewhere in there is the appropriate number. REP. TORRICELLI: If we are, though, Mr. Chairman, defining this as firing at aircraft rather than downing aircraft, then the conclusion that the Colombians are not engaged in this is also then not correct. (Break in audio) -- crashed after firing. They have fired at wings and at our aircraft, just not brought them down. . REP. LANTOS: Congressman Smith? REP. CHRIS SMITH (R-NJ): I'd just point out that in The Dallas Morning News, May 14th, '94, it points out that Peru intercepted about 75 planes last year according to the spokesman at the embassy, and they point out that Peruvian jets haven't shot down planes, but they have crashed in trying to evade pursuit. I mean, we may be playing -- they may be playing a game here as the gentleman from New Jersey pointed out. I mean, they crashed while being pursued, perhaps with some bullets or some other coordinates helping them to crash. REP. LANTOS: Go ahead, Mr. Gelbard.. MR. GELBARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. government has frozen assistance and intelligence-sharing with Colombia and Peru, as I said, that could be used for targeting civil aircraft. We have done so because of those governments' announced policies of firing on suspected narcotics traffickers who refuse to obey orders to land. I do not need to tell you how important these two countries are to a successful counternarcotics strategy in the Andes. Indeed, with Colombia and Peru, there is no air interdiction strategy in the Andes. We took this decision very seriously. We did not freeze this assistance because of an interagency dispute or because of a decision to downgrade our relations with these two countries or as part of a general retreat on counternarcotics. The Department of Defense and other agencies suspended their assistance in order to review policy implications in light of actions by Colombia and Peru. After that, an interagency legal review led by the Department of Justice concluded that we could not provide this assistance without risk of violating United States criminal law. This is not an easy issue susceptible to a sound bite solution. There is a fundamental conflict between our long-standing policy of maximum protection for civil aircraft in flight and our equally long- standing policy of stopping narcotics traffickers. We searched for a solution that would not undercut either. I spent much of last week in almost nonstop negotiations in Bogota and Lima seeking such a solution. A simple solution under existing law simply was not there. The president, as you are aware, has now made his decision, though, on this policy. The administration will send up as soon as possible proposed legislation that permits us to resume intelligence- sharing and assistance to both Colombia and Peru. I spoke this morning with officials from both governments, Colombia and Peru, and I hope that we can announce soon interim agreements that permit us to resume our counternarcotics cooperation even while our legislative proposal is pending before Congress. Mr. Chairman, I will close as I began, speaking of perceptions. Our critics argue that we are in retreat, that we are not pursuing an aggressive counternarcotics policy. That is not correct. We have a new strategy and a new approach. We have signaled that we will hold all governments to an honest certification process. We are building on past successes. We are confronting head on the tension between our civil aviation and counternarcotics policies.. We appreciate the support of these committees over the years for international counternarcotics efforts. We will need it again as we seek to resolve the conflict between U.S. criminal law and our counternarcotics efforts, and I look forward to continue to working with you. REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Secretary Gelbard. We'll next hear from the Honorable Thomas A. Constantine, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. MR. CONSTANTINE: Chairmen Lantos, Torricelli, and members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this, my first opportunity to appear before your committees and talk about DEA's role in our international programs. As you may know, I've been administrator of the DEA for a fairly short period of time, a little over three months.. However, prior to taking this position, I've served in law enforcement for 34 years, the last eight of which as superintendent of the New York State Police. So I have spent most of my adult life dealing with victims of crime and have seen first-hand what happens when drug addiction and drug problems visit communities. I also now, in my new role, have gotten an education, learned about the international programs that the United States government is involved in in law enforcement, especially as it relates to drugs. It's given me a new perspective and I think it has helped me a great deal in understanding how that problem came to many of the communities that I was familiar with in New York state. I think it's important, however, that we not lose sight of the fact that the international programs must go hand in hand with what we're doing within the United States, and I'd like to talk today about how our enforcement efforts link the international and the domestic because they are intertwined and cannot be separated. I think, like the ambassador had said, and some of the people on the dais, we are at an important and critical stage in our society. This problem of drugs and violent crime has built since the mid-1960s. It has taken us 30 years to get into the present deplorable state. It will take us a sustained period of time and a great deal of will to get out of it. This is at a time when resources for law enforcement and foreign assistance are very tight. We're required to balance the need to protect citizens from crime in our streets with our international obligations to overseas partners in the drug fight. For many years, DEA has been at the forefront of this nation's effort to dismantle international drug trafficking organizations. We will continue to aggressively pursue those traffickers who operate around the globe. As administrator of the DEA, I intend to continue those important global missions, keeping the following principles as guiding our actions in the coming year. First, we must recognize that cocaine and heroin traffic have foreign sources and are foreign controlled, and the world's major trafficking organizations are headquartered outside of the United States. Other nations have international obligation to address the issues of drug production and trafficking. DEA must and will continue to work with the authorities in other nations to build institutions, share intelligence and make criminal cases which will have an impact on drug trafficking within the United States. Simultaneously, we must enhance our domestic efforts as well, balancing both foreign and domestic programs. We should not and cannot put all of our strategies and resources in the international investigative program. That doesn't mean that we will lessen our pressure on the major traffickers in Colombia or other parts of the hemisphere, but rather that we must increase our attention on their surrogates who operate within the United States. The next most important thing I think to be talked about is heroin as a resurrection within the global economy, not only the United States, not only Western Europe, but every country in this world is affected now by a new growth in heroin traffic. A large part of that is coming from Colombia. They have developed the ability to manufacture heroin, to bring it to the shores of the United States and cause us an additional problem. Let me talk a minute about the major traffickers and their surrogates -- one foreign, one domestic.. Despite the fact that an increasing percentage of cocaine is being shipped now to new European markets, the U.S. continues and will continue to be the main target for shipments from the Colombian cocaine cartels. The Cali cartel in Colombia maintains a virtual criminal monopoly on all of the U.S. cocaine supply. This criminal organization, headquartered in Colombia, depends on producers in Bolivia and Peru and transporters in Mexico and other Central American nations, and distribution systems within the United States. It also staffs the distribution organizations in virtually every city in the United States with Colombians who subcontract to street organizations in these cities. DEA has a two-tiered approach to reducing the cocaine supply in the United States, targeting the cartel leaders in Colombia and trying to eliminate their surrogate operations here in the United States. It is critical to gather enough information on the major cartel leaders for indictments in the event they will ever be brought to justice in the United States. However, I honestly must tell you the opportunity to bring these drug lords to justice is less of a possibility today than it was five years ago, when Colombia allowed extradition to the United States. As a result, all of the traditional law enforcement strategies that I am familiar with, having worked organized crime cases throughout the United States, of attacking the leaders of the criminal enterprises cannot be implemented against the Cali cartel. They live in luxury, virtually immune from punishment as they profit from their enterprise. Nevertheless, we try to operate against their money supplies, transportation networks, chemical supplies and communications. All of these are critical to their operation. We work closely with most of the law enforcement agencies in the hemisphere to achieve that. Equally important to the DEA are the accomplishments which have a direct effect on United States cocaine supplies in organizations within the United States. This is the link which I talked about, and it's well illustrated by a case that I was involved in when I was superintendent of the New York State Police. The Herrara family, with direction from Cali, Colombia, operated a major cell in the major cities throughout the country, one of which was in New York City. The state police, the New York City police and the DEA, focused on the organization through extensive surveillances and wiretapping, were able to identify the principals through a series of raids. We found out very quickly, one, that their whole organization for the year made more money than the entire DEA budget, and that is only one of the families operating out of Cali. All of the decisions that are carried out in the United States are being made in Colombia. They tell the group which phone numbers to use, when the load is ready to move, which loads to move, how much to pay the workers, detail the records on the salaries.. They have a family history questionnaire that means that they know the relatives of all of the people who are working for them, many of them illegal aliens from Colombia, which means that they cannot testify against the principals in the organization, for fear of loss of family or loved ones. There is a tremendous reluctance for them to cooperate. It then moves down to the next level of violent street gangs in the United States. These investigations have to be played from both ends, because we find out that many of the people are replaceable, and until such time as we can use what I think is the appropriate strategy of arresting, prosecuting, convicting and sentencing the principals in these organizations, we're limited to dealing with surrogates, which is second best. But the pressure must be kept up. We've got to remember, it's the violent street gangs, who shoot children in a public housing complex in Washington Heights, are in essence part of that whole operation. If you have any further questions about the role of DEA, I would be glad to put them forward, and I give you my entire statement. The only thing that I can tell you is that I believe that this whole situation, the violent crime and drugs, has become an intolerable situation for people in America, and it's going to take a dramatic resolve on the part of all of us in government and out of government, to do something about it over a sustained period of time. We did not get into this problem overnight, and we will not get out of it immediately, but I do think the next five years will be extremely critical for the United States. Thank you. REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much. Our final witness is Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense. Mr. Sheridan. MR. SHERIDAN: Chairman Lantos, Torricelli, members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss DOD's role on implementing the administration's source nation strategy. There are two quick points I'd like to make before we start with the questioning. First, DOD has a very strong commitment to the strategy and to our responsibilities in South America. The Department of Defense in 1994 will spend approximately $150 million in South America, and that comes in light of dramatic cuts to our budget in '94 of $300 million. There are three pillars to our programs in Latin America: first, intelligence collection and analysis; second, support for interdiction; and third, training of host nation police and military that are engaged in counter-drug activity. My second point is that the Department of Defense's efforts are consistent with the national strategy. As you know, the president's strategy called for a shift from the transit zone to source nations. MORE. In implementing that strategy, DOD is shifting on the international side of our effort from 25 percent of our efforts in source nations to 37 percent of our efforts. So you've heard much in the papers over the last couple weeks that DOD is seeking to walk away from South America. The numbers speak otherwise. Percentage of our dollars is going up, not down. I would also note that under the leadership of the secretary of defense over the past year, we have initiated a number of major programs to enhance our support to South America. We have decided to locate an over-the-horizon radar in Puerto Rico that will cost $25 million to start up plus $13 million a year to operate. We've decided to go (forward with ?) tracker aircraft, at a cost of $45 million, for use in South America. That will cost $18 million a year in the out years to operate. Until the trackers come on line and the over-the- horizon radar comes on line, we are looking to spend about 3 to 4 million dollars a year in cooperation with the Customs Service to help them fund their citation tracker program in South America. And as we plan our funding activity for '96 in the out years, we plan to significantly enhance our support. So DOD is engaged. We are not walking away, and we have a number of major programs which are already in our beginning phases of implementation. And those were the two major points I wanted to make, and I'm ready for your questions. REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much. We'll begin the questioning with Chairman Torricelli. REP. ROBERT TORRICELLI (D-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 1991 I went to Peru to see President Fujimori and Colombia with President Gaviria in enormous frustration. The United States at considerable expense had put radars on stations. We were tracking narcotraffickers, and the Peruvian and the Colombian governments refused to intercept. We were doing no more than intellectually satisfying ourselves in seeing the travel routes. As time passed, in part due to pressure from the United States Congress, the Peruvian government changed its policy. The Colombian government even adjusted its policy, and intercept policies began, resulting in the fact that now, 780 flights of narcotraffickers last year were tracked. This led to 31 tons of cocaine being seized, 101 illicit airfields of narcotraffickers being found, and 31 aircraft in Peru being forced to the ground after receiving hostile fire from Peruvian aircraft. This program, just when it was beginning to work, under the insistence of the United States Congress, after the payment from the American taxpayers, is halted. The American people wouldn't believe it if they hadn't seen it for themselves. Now, what is most incredible about this, is the legal analysis is that this is being ceased because of legal vulnerabilities of U.S. government officials from cooperating in the program. Let's understand what the program is. The United States government tracks narco-traffickers bringing cocaine to the United States. That information is merely provided to the Peruvian or Colombian governments. They pass it to their own officials, who make their own judgements. Peruvian aircraft tracks a narco-trafficker, operating with no flight plan, often at night, with no lights. The plane is approached and wing tips attempt to communicate. There's no response. They attempt on radio communications on multiple frequencies. There's no response. There's an effort to lead them to an airport for a forced landing. They refuse and attempt to evade. And then warning shots are fired. Do you seriously believe that there is a jury in America, of any combination of American citizens, anywhere, under those circumstances, that would find a liability for U.S. government officials? Having simply for provided information on that basis? This change of policy stands logic on its head. Fortunately, President Clinton, having read what was now happening, in the Defense Department, and elsewhere in his administration, has reversed the policy. And this Congress, I am certain, as soon as we get language from the executive, will pass in short order legislation that is required, to allow cooperation to continue. But the question remains, in the weeks or months that it takes to correct this change of policy, what will happen. Is it therefore the intention of the Pentagon not in these ensuing weeks, despite overwhelming logic, to continue to share information? Do we assume, in the following weeks, no further information will continue to be shared, despite the fact that we are now told by the Colombian government that cocaine shipments are up 20 percent last month since the sharing of this interdiction information has ceased? MORE HSE FOR. AFF/GELBARD, ET AL PAGE 21 06/22/94 . MR. GELBARD: If I may respond to that, please, I'd like to answer in several parts. First of all, what we intend to do -- and I have already spoken to our ambassadors in Bogota and Lima and spoken to authorities of those two governments -- what we intend to do is try to establish very, very quickly interim agreements with those governments that would permit us to resume the provision of real-time tracking data as quickly as possible, and I would hope even before the end of this week. REP. TORRICELLI: And what would the substance of those agreements include? MR. GELBARD: The substance of the agreements would be that we would have to continue under existing law, as I mentioned in my oral statement, continue to ask that our data not be used for the shooting down of aircraft. The second part of what I wanted to say is that whether we like the law or not, it is the law. This was a law that was passed by the Congress of the United States in 1984, certainly for other purposes. It was for counterterrorism purposes. But because of the way this law was drafted, it was written to cover any civil aircraft under any circumstances. REP. TORRICELLI: And you think it was the intention of the Congress, of the United States government in the writing of this law taking responsibility for the Peruvian and Colombian air forces? MR. GELBARD: The way the law is written -- and I have to admit I am not a lawyer, but I have read the law repeatedly and I have sought the advice, of course, of all the legal authorities of our government. We have been told by the Department of Justice, particularly including the office of legal counsel, which makes the ultimate decisions on these issues, that this law is written in such a way as to cover any activities and the aiding and abetting of destruction of civil aircraft in service at any time. REP. TORRICELLI: Let me tell you something. In all respect to my profession, lawyers concluding that the United States government is criminally liable for shooting down narcotraffickers because we give information to the Peruvian and Colombian government stands logic on its head. There isn't a jury in the world that would find somebody liable under those circumstances. That is an incredible interpretation of the law. Somebody would have a better chance in the ensuing months if their child is a victim of cocaine on an American street suing the United States government because we had the means to track narcotraffickers, they're appearing on a radar screen, and we refuse to give the information to the Colombian or Peruvian government to intercept them. That would be a better suit than attempting to hold the U.S. government official liable because we're allowing the Colombian government to meet their own responsibilities and independent judgment.. Does this really make sense to you? MR. GELBARD: Congressman, it certainly didn't make sense to me when I read it, but it is the law. And I certainly was not prepared to be in a position of violating the United States law, passed by our Congress, especially once I found out we were subject to the death penalty. And the idea of pursuing policies which -- REP. TORRICELLI: Have you gone to the authors of this legislation to try to decipher their legislative intent? MR. GELBARD: The Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department did look at this. They have done an extensive legal opinion on this and this was the subject of truly extensive -- REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Gelbard, 435 members of this House voted on that legislation. You will not find one statement in the Congressional Record to support legislative intent. You will find no committee hearing, you will find no author of the legislation who would support that interpretation of the law of liability. Not only will you find it, I suspect some lawyer in the Justice Department who wrote this interpretation, who never did so much as open their window to hear the outside noise, never asked anybody whether that was anybody's legislative intent. This has been written in a vacuum, and it is an incredible betrayal of the American people and a fundamental national interest. Let me -- Mr. Chairman, you've been gracious with the time. Let me just move quickly, if I could -- MR. GELBARD: Could I just add one other point, please? REP. TORRICELLI: Yeah, sure. MR. GELBARD: You mentioned 1991 in Peru. Let me add, though, another aspect of this problem. Nineteen ninety-one also marked the year when we ceased providing economic support funds and military assistance funds to the government of Peru, because the Congress decided that we could not disburse such funds because of certain conditions that were provided. So, as of today, we have approximately $77 million in economic support funds that we have not been able to disburse, and as a result not used to support activities to eradicate coca through alternative development programs, nor have we been able to provide the military assistance that we have requested because of these actions. . REP. TORRICELLI: Well, Mr. Gelbard, as you know, aid to Peru was suspended for a variety of reasons. One of those reasons, much to my great embarrassment, is that I went in that year and saw President Fujimori and I said, "I will not be part of using American taxpayers' money for counternarcotics operations in your country when you get this radar information and then you won't intercept the narco- traffickers. If you're serious about this and you want American cooperation, shoot at the narco- traffickers." They thought about it for a long time and they didn't want to do it. They finally agreed, now to find out that the United States government disagreed with this Congress and pulls away from the cooperation when they were finally starting to help.. MR. GELBARD: I would still like -- REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Sheridan -- MR. GELBARD: -- very much to be able to have those funds so we could get to the heart of the problem, which is the eradication of coca. And I would ask for the assistance of this committee in freeing up those funds, whether as cash transfers or as project funds, so that we can use this to support their efforts to eradicate coca. Because that's what gets to the heart of the problem. REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Gelbard, I suspect at the moment that such damage has been done to our cooperation with Colombia and Peru and narco-trafficking, that if the funds are available to you, you're going to have a hard time getting the same degree of cooperation. These Peruvian and Colombian officials were vilified in their own countries for allowing the United States military to fly over their airspace, to do operations, to take information for the United States Air Force, to do shootdown operations against narco- traffickers. This was not good politics for Peru and Colombia, but theyd did it. They did partially at the request of members of this Congress, and now to have it shut off humiliates them and I think is a setback that's going to be very difficult to reverse. Mr. Sheridan, finally, if I could, with all due respects to the intensive interest of the United States military in helping in narco- trafficking interdiction, every six months for the last four years I have had to call successive secretaries of defense and ask that their intentions to close down these radars be reversed. First, it was the Persian Gulf War. The radars are needed in the Middle East. By all means, take them away. Then it took months to get them back. And then six months later, they were needed somewhere else. And then six months later they wanted to close them down again. if indeed the United States military has reached the point that they want to help and they are committed to fight against narco- trafficking, I will tell you there is precious little evidence of it. I know that members of the United States military did not join to fight narco-traffickers. It was for other and very admirable goals. This is a dirty and a nasty business. And I don't blame you for not wanting to be part of it. But a principal national security need of the United States today is no longer the Cold War. It is narcotraffickers. And operating these radars and keeping them there. And people, like members of this having to call and fight to keep them on station and now to share the information is not evidence of a strong commitment in the fight against narco traffickers. MR. SHERIDAN: Mr. Chairman, I can't speak to what happened during the previous administration. I can only say that during this administration I think the record speaks for itself in terms of our allegation of resources. I don't know a more exact measure of commitment than you're willingness to put dollars to it. And as I stated in my opening comments, under this secretary of defense we have committed to a -- (word inaudible) -- in Puerto Rico at a cost of $25 million up front, $13 million a year the outyears, $45 million up front, $18 a year in the outyears for tracker aircraft, helping the customs service in the meantime at a cost of 3 to $4 million per year to fly their tracker aircraft, and we have significantly enhanced our support in our five-year planning process.. I don't know what more you want from this administration. REP. TORRICELLI: Well, Mr. Sheridan, here's what I -- here's what I'd like. MR. SHERIDAN: Yes. REP. TORRICELLI: Last fall, President Gaviria of Colombia sent a message to this committee that the radars were about to be removed, would I call Secretary Perry's office. I did. Six months before that, I got a call from President Gaviria the Pentagon was going to remove the radars, would I call Secretary Aspin. I did. A good evidence of the commitment of the military would be to stop trying to find every excuse to get out of Colombia, to close down the radars, to cease cooperation, and instead, to accept this as a national priority. And the refusal to share this information is not a good example of it being of a high national priority. Mr. Gelbard, finally -- I know my time has expired here -- but if indeed we're going to have a gap now of several weeks or months before this Congress can pass legislation which I will introduce the moment it arrives on this Hill to correct this incredible legal misinterpretation, why do we not now simply transfer or lease these radars, allow the Colombians to operate them, to separate ourselves from this alleged liability so there's no interruption in interdiction? As I said, Congressman, I am hoping to be able to work out arrangements on an interim basis with the two governments involved in the next day or two. I just spoke earlier with the Colombian ambassador, and we may be meeting even this afternoon. REP. TORRICELLI: Okay, well, let's leave it this way. MR. GELBARD: But in the mean -- REP. TORRICELLI: If for any reason this cannot happen, can we then agree that if we're going into next week, given the fact that we are seeing a 20 percent upward spike in cocaine trafficking since this interruption has taken place, that we can instead find more imaginative means in the interim -- if we have to go to a lease, if we have to go to a temporary transfer, something to separate us from liability but continue the operations, that we will do so? MR. GELBARD: I think the issue, even more than the ground-based radars, though, is the airborne platforms, which we cannot provide, but I am fully confident we will be able to work out these interim arrangements before the end of the week. REP. TORRICELLI: Could you -- could you comment briefly on the allegations today in the media? It is alleged that during the recent Colombian presidential campaign, representatives of the man who is now to become the next president of Colombia, Ernesto Samper, received in excess of $800,000 in campaign contributions from the Cali cocaine cartel.. Could you comment on those allegations and the videotapes that are now circulating giving evidence of that transfer? MR. GELBARD: First, they are audio cassettes, or an audio cassette. REP. TORRICELLI: There are both. MR. GELBARD: Second, I believe that the sums that have been described, from the transcripts I've seen that were released in Colombia, are actually substantially more in terms of funds that were allegedly received. REP. TORRICELLI: Well, one videotape has $800,000 in cash. MR. GELBARD: Yeah, I've heard -- REP. TORRICELLI: I'm told the total number is $3.5 million. MR. GELBARD: Well, I think it's actually more. I think it's about $6 million. Obviously, this is the worst kind of information that we could receive. We are looking into this to try to determine the veracity of any and all of this kind of information. This, if true, would obviously have the most serious effect on not only any kind of bilateral relationship with that government, but obviously would create the most serious problems in terms of fighting counternarcotics. But we take this extremely seriously and we are investigating this very intensively right now. REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com]) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268