Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere, Part One
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:07:35 GMT
[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 01:05:34 GMT ]
Copyright 1994 Federal Information Systems Corporation
Federal News Service
JUNE 22, 1994, WEDNESDAY
Section: Capitol Hill Hearing
Headline: Joint Hearing Of The International Security,
International Organizations And Human Rights Subcommittee And The
Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee Of The House Foreign
Affairs Committee
Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere
Chaired By:
Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca)
Representative Robert Torricelli (D-Nj)
Witnesses:
Robert Gelbard,
Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters,
Thomas Constantine,
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration
Brian Sheridan,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, Dc
REP. LANTOS: Before turning to our distinguished witnesses, let me
just make two observations. I identify myself in very strong
measure with the comments of my distinguished colleague and
friend, Chairman Torricelli, but I would like to observe that some
of the comments from the Republican side would make it appear that
we have had a brilliant and successful anti-drug strategy for 12
years, and suddenly in the last 18 months we have fallen down on
the job, and the record will surely not support that. The drug
problem in the United States did not begin on January 20th of
1993. Our anti-drug strategy with respect to the hemisphere did
not begin -- whatever it is -- 16 months ago -- and just as the
problem of the whole drug complex is not a partisan problem, I
would hope that my colleagues will approach it in a somewhat less
partisan fashion that what we have seen in the last few minutes.
We will ask our distinguished witnesses to make concise opening
statements.
Your prepared presentations will be entered in the record in their
entirety.
We will first hear from the assistant secretary for international
narcotics matters, the Honorable Robert Gelbard.
Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. We appreciate your concise
approach at the outset so we can get to questions. There will be
plenty of questions.
MR. GELBARD: Thank you very much. Chairman Lantos, Chairman
Torricelli, Congressman Smith, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today with Mr. Constantine and Mr. Sheridan.
Let me thank you from the outset for agreeing to reschedule this
hearing. I understand the demands on the committee's time and the
problems caused by a last-minute postponement. I hope that by the
end of today's hearing, we will all agree that we were better
served by waiting this past week.
As you requested, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my full
prepared statement for the record.
REP. LANTOS: Without objection.
MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to
talk today about perceptions. I ask you to take a step back and
look at the world through the eyes of the narcotics trafficker.
Unfortunately, it doesn't look so bad, and some trends are moving
his way. In some countries, including our own, the trafficker is
once again hearing the sweet -- to him -- and misleading sounds of
debate over legalization.
In Colombia, the prosecutor-general, Gustavo Degrave (ph) has
negotiated soft deals with leaders of the Cali Cartel, sometimes
bargaining away evidence that we have provided in the process. In
Bolivia, evidence is now coming to light that the previous
government was deeply penetrated by traffickers.
Closer to home, last year the budget of every --
REP. LANTOS: May I stop you there? You say deeply penetrated. How
high was it penetrated?
MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, I was ambassador to Bolivia during the
time of much of that government. Certainly members of the cabinet
-- some members of the cabinet were involved, and at my
insistence, the president of Bolivia fired the minister of the
interior, Guillermo Capobianco (ph), who was deeply involved in
accepting trafficker money, as was the head of the national
police, and we believe there are others. This is currently an
issue under investigation by the Bolivian Congress, so I would
rather not enter into any specifics on this respecting their
prerogatives.
REP. LANTOS: Thank you.
MR. GELBARD: Last year the budget of every United States
government agency dedicated to international counternarcotics was
dramatically reduced. My own bureau's budget dropped 30 percent,
with even deeper cuts to military and economic support funds
supporting our counternarcotics efforts.
We are reducing staff at several narcotics affairs sections
overseas..
This year's budget picture is no brighter. Thanks in part to the
efforts of some members of this committee, the House appropriation
for international counternarcotics restores some of last year's
cuts. The Senate bill, however, leaves us at last year's skeleton
level, well below the president's request.
Mr. Chairman, let me be blunt. I cannot do the job that you
expect of me and the secretary of state asks of me if I do not
have adequate resources. If we take another year of major funding
cuts, then something has to go. Perhaps we will slash sustainable
development programs in the Andes and close other programs
altogether. We might be forced to reduce support for eradication
programs and generally cut back our aviation support.
Unquestionably, we would have difficulty funding new programs
whether targeted against the growing United States' heroin
epidemic or against organized crime in Russia and Eastern Europe.
I do not mean to put a gun against my own head and threaten to
pull the trigger if Congress does not vote us a larger budget, but
it is important to acknowledge in advance that these sorts of cuts
will have direct and explicit consequences.
The truth is that we do have a good story to tell about
international counternarcotics programs. We are paying a price
today for some unfortunate rhetoric in the past. Efforts against
drugs are not a war that we will win in two, three or four years.
Success or failure is not tabulated on an accountant's data sheet
of arrests, seizures and current street price. The struggle
against drugs is the work of a generation, not of a statistician.
Last year, we developed a new counternarcotics strategy for the
Western Hemisphere. It addresses the twin concerns confronting
this administration and this Congress in January of 1993: the
perception that the past strategy was not working and the need to
reduce budgets. The new strategy calls for a gradual shift in
emphasis from transit interdiction to source country efforts. It
calls for us to support stronger democratic counternarcotics
institutions in source countries and to integrate counternarcotics
into global alternative development strategy. It seeks greater
involvement by international and multinational organizations and
continued efforts against entire trafficker organizations.
In short, the new strategy seeks to reinforce what we have seen
that works, coordinate and consolidate among multiple programs to
ensure efficiency, and engage international organizations that
previously had shied away from involvement in counternarcotics.
The president's new strategy called for us to use the narcotics
certification process energetically as an antidrug tool. On April
1st, the president's certification decisions put substance behind
the words. Ten of the 26 countries were denied certification or
granted it only on the basis of a vital national interest
certification. This was an honest process. These were not just
pariah nations with whom we have no serious bilateral interests.
Nigeria, Bolivia and Peru had never before received anything less
than full certification. Panama and Laos did not receive full
certification, despite serious and important U.S. concerns outside
of narcotics issues.
The president's certification decision sent a very clear signal.
Business as usual is no longer good enough. We will bear our
burden in the world-wide struggle against drugs, but we expect the
same commitment from our fellow governments. I might add that the
certification provisions, currently codified in Section 489 and
490 of the foreign Assistance Act, are scheduled to expire on
September 30th. I hope this committee will work with us to retain
this very important weapon in the struggle against drugs.
Finally, let me address the Andean narcotics issue that is
probably foremost in your minds. As you know, the United States
government has frozen assistance and intelligence sharing with
Colombia and Peru that could be used for targeting civil aircraft.
We have done so because of those government's announced policies
of firing on suspected narcotics traffickers who refuse to obey
orders to land.
REP. LANTOS: Just to get the record straight. How many actual
shoot-downs took place by the Peruvians?
MR. GELBARD: I'm not certain as to numbers. We --
MR. GELBARD: Can anyone else on the panel give us the answer? Mr.
Sheridan?
MR. SHERIDAN: I believe that we're talking in the range of three,
four, five perhaps.
REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman I'm told the answer is 31.
MR. GELBARD: But, let me ask how you're defining the --
REP. TORRICELLI: When a plane hits the ground is a shoot-down.
MR. GELBARD: The Peruvians deny that they have ever shot down an
aircraft. .
REP. TORRICELLI: Yeah. I'm told the number is 31. Even when I met
with them last it was in excess of 20.
REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, do you have any entry in this
sweepstakes? --(Laughter.) .
MR. CONSTANTINE: None, whatsoever..
REP. LANTOS: Well, it would be sort of nice to have our three top
experts be prepared to answer such an unbelievably elementary
question. So let me get back to you, Secretary Gelbard --.
MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman --
REP. LANTOS: With this coaching from Congressman Torricelli, what
number would you --
MR. GELBARD: I -- I'm afraid I have to differ with Congressman
Torricelli's estimate. The Colombian government has told us that
since they announced their policy early this year they have not
shot down any aircraft. And the Peruvian government told us in
the course of the meetings that I held with them, when I led
delegation to both Colombia and Peru last week, they say that they
have not shot down any aircraft. They have --
REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me -- what do
you expect them to say? If they admit that they're shooting down
aircraft, you suspend cooperation and sharing information with
them. Of course they're going to tell you they're not shooting
down any aircraft. But indeed when you meet with them privately
and to their own people they're giving the number of 31. It is
indeed accurate that Colombians do not acknowledge shooting down
anyone, but the Peruvians are a very different story.
MORE.
I don't know how you could expect a different answer than the one
you're receiving, given your pledge to cease operations with them
if they give you a different answer. It would be amazing if they
said anything differently.
MR. GELBARD: Well, with respect, Mr. Chairman, the Peruvian
government and the Colombian government have both made it very
clear to me that they do not intend to renounce their policy,
their stated policy of having the capability of going after
aircraft and shooting at or shooting down such aircraft. But they
still stated that they have not shot aircraft down. Now, what
they have done, and I've seen videotapes that corroborate this,
they have shot at aircraft and hit wing tips or other nonvital
parts of aircraft, and as a result, those aircraft have landed
under their own power.
REP. LANTOS: How many such incidents are we aware of where force
was used even though it was not decisive?
MR. GELBARD: We believe there are perhaps slightly more than a
dozen, perhaps around 15.
REP. LANTOS: In Peru?
MR. GELBARD: Yes.
REP. LANTOS: How about Colombia?
MR. GELBARD: As I said, I don't believe that they have shot at any
aircraft since their stated policy has been put into place earlier
this year.
MR. SHERIDAN: And let me -- if I could, Mr. Chairman, let me just
say that, when I gave a number of somewhere around five, I was
defining the issue similar to Ambassador Gelbard, which would mean
they fired at weapons but have not shot any out of the sky and
caused a crash landing. I meant that they had fired weapons at
and perhaps caused some damaged aircraft, but those aircraft
landed under their own power. And I think five, 10, somewhere in
there is the appropriate number.
REP. TORRICELLI: If we are, though, Mr. Chairman, defining this as
firing at aircraft rather than downing aircraft, then the
conclusion that the Colombians are not engaged in this is also
then not correct. (Break in audio) -- crashed after firing. They
have fired at wings and at our aircraft, just not brought them
down. .
REP. LANTOS: Congressman Smith?
REP. CHRIS SMITH (R-NJ): I'd just point out that in The Dallas
Morning News, May 14th, '94, it points out that Peru intercepted
about 75 planes last year according to the spokesman at the
embassy, and they point out that Peruvian jets haven't shot down
planes, but they have crashed in trying to evade pursuit. I mean,
we may be playing -- they may be playing a game here as the
gentleman from New Jersey pointed out. I mean, they crashed while
being pursued, perhaps with some bullets or some other coordinates
helping them to crash.
REP. LANTOS: Go ahead, Mr. Gelbard..
MR. GELBARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. government has
frozen assistance and intelligence-sharing with Colombia and Peru,
as I said, that could be used for targeting civil aircraft. We
have done so because of those governments' announced policies of
firing on suspected narcotics traffickers who refuse to obey
orders to land. I do not need to tell you how important these two
countries are to a successful counternarcotics strategy in the
Andes.
Indeed, with Colombia and Peru, there is no air interdiction
strategy in the Andes. We took this decision very seriously.
We did not freeze this assistance because of an interagency
dispute or because of a decision to downgrade our relations with
these two countries or as part of a general retreat on
counternarcotics. The Department of Defense and other agencies
suspended their assistance in order to review policy implications
in light of actions by Colombia and Peru. After that, an
interagency legal review led by the Department of Justice
concluded that we could not provide this assistance without risk
of violating United States criminal law.
This is not an easy issue susceptible to a sound bite solution.
There is a fundamental conflict between our long-standing policy
of maximum protection for civil aircraft in flight and our equally
long- standing policy of stopping narcotics traffickers. We
searched for a solution that would not undercut either. I spent
much of last week in almost nonstop negotiations in Bogota and
Lima seeking such a solution. A simple solution under existing
law simply was not there.
The president, as you are aware, has now made his decision,
though, on this policy. The administration will send up as soon
as possible proposed legislation that permits us to resume
intelligence- sharing and assistance to both Colombia and Peru. I
spoke this morning with officials from both governments, Colombia
and Peru, and I hope that we can announce soon interim agreements
that permit us to resume our counternarcotics cooperation even
while our legislative proposal is pending before Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I will close as I began, speaking of perceptions.
Our critics argue that we are in retreat, that we are not pursuing
an aggressive counternarcotics policy. That is not correct. We
have a new strategy and a new approach. We have signaled that we
will hold all governments to an honest certification process. We
are building on past successes. We are confronting head on the
tension between our civil aviation and counternarcotics policies..
We appreciate the support of these committees over the years for
international counternarcotics efforts. We will need it again as
we seek to resolve the conflict between U.S. criminal law and our
counternarcotics efforts, and I look forward to continue to
working with you.
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Secretary Gelbard.
We'll next hear from the Honorable Thomas A. Constantine,
administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.
MR. CONSTANTINE: Chairmen Lantos, Torricelli, and members of the
subcommittee, I want to thank you for this, my first opportunity
to appear before your committees and talk about DEA's role in our
international programs.
As you may know, I've been administrator of the DEA for a fairly
short period of time, a little over three months..
However, prior to taking this position, I've served in law
enforcement for 34 years, the last eight of which as
superintendent of the New York State Police.
So I have spent most of my adult life dealing with victims of
crime and have seen first-hand what happens when drug addiction
and drug problems visit communities. I also now, in my new role,
have gotten an education, learned about the international programs
that the United States government is involved in in law
enforcement, especially as it relates to drugs. It's given me a
new perspective and I think it has helped me a great deal in
understanding how that problem came to many of the communities
that I was familiar with in New York state.
I think it's important, however, that we not lose sight of the
fact that the international programs must go hand in hand with
what we're doing within the United States, and I'd like to talk
today about how our enforcement efforts link the international and
the domestic because they are intertwined and cannot be separated.
I think, like the ambassador had said, and some of the people on
the dais, we are at an important and critical stage in our
society. This problem of drugs and violent crime has built since
the mid-1960s. It has taken us 30 years to get into the present
deplorable state. It will take us a sustained period of time and
a great deal of will to get out of it. This is at a time when
resources for law enforcement and foreign assistance are very
tight. We're required to balance the need to protect citizens
from crime in our streets with our international obligations to
overseas partners in the drug fight.
For many years, DEA has been at the forefront of this nation's
effort to dismantle international drug trafficking organizations.
We will continue to aggressively pursue those traffickers who
operate around the globe. As administrator of the DEA, I intend
to continue those important global missions, keeping the following
principles as guiding our actions in the coming year.
First, we must recognize that cocaine and heroin traffic have
foreign sources and are foreign controlled, and the world's major
trafficking organizations are headquartered outside of the United
States. Other nations have international obligation to address
the issues of drug production and trafficking. DEA must and will
continue to work with the authorities in other nations to build
institutions, share intelligence and make criminal cases which
will have an impact on drug trafficking within the United States.
Simultaneously, we must enhance our domestic efforts as well,
balancing both foreign and domestic programs. We should not and
cannot put all of our strategies and resources in the
international investigative program. That doesn't mean that we
will lessen our pressure on the major traffickers in Colombia or
other parts of the hemisphere, but rather that we must increase
our attention on their surrogates who operate within the United
States.
The next most important thing I think to be talked about is heroin
as a resurrection within the global economy, not only the United
States, not only Western Europe, but every country in this world
is affected now by a new growth in heroin traffic. A large part
of that is coming from Colombia. They have developed the ability
to manufacture heroin, to bring it to the shores of the United
States and cause us an additional problem.
Let me talk a minute about the major traffickers and their
surrogates -- one foreign, one domestic..
Despite the fact that an increasing percentage of cocaine is being
shipped now to new European markets, the U.S. continues and will
continue to be the main target for shipments from the Colombian
cocaine cartels. The Cali cartel in Colombia maintains a virtual
criminal monopoly on all of the U.S. cocaine supply. This
criminal organization, headquartered in Colombia, depends on
producers in Bolivia and Peru and transporters in Mexico and other
Central American nations, and distribution systems within the
United States. It also staffs the distribution organizations in
virtually every city in the United States with Colombians who
subcontract to street organizations in these cities.
DEA has a two-tiered approach to reducing the cocaine supply in
the United States, targeting the cartel leaders in Colombia and
trying to eliminate their surrogate operations here in the United
States. It is critical to gather enough information on the major
cartel leaders for indictments in the event they will ever be
brought to justice in the United States. However, I honestly must
tell you the opportunity to bring these drug lords to justice is
less of a possibility today than it was five years ago, when
Colombia allowed extradition to the United States. As a result,
all of the traditional law enforcement strategies that I am
familiar with, having worked organized crime cases throughout the
United States, of attacking the leaders of the criminal
enterprises cannot be implemented against the Cali cartel. They
live in luxury, virtually immune from punishment as they profit
from their enterprise.
Nevertheless, we try to operate against their money supplies,
transportation networks, chemical supplies and communications.
All of these are critical to their operation. We work closely
with most of the law enforcement agencies in the hemisphere to
achieve that.
Equally important to the DEA are the accomplishments which have a
direct effect on United States cocaine supplies in organizations
within the United States.
This is the link which I talked about, and it's well illustrated
by a case that I was involved in when I was superintendent of the
New York State Police. The Herrara family, with direction from
Cali, Colombia, operated a major cell in the major cities
throughout the country, one of which was in New York City. The
state police, the New York City police and the DEA, focused on the
organization through extensive surveillances and wiretapping, were
able to identify the principals through a series of raids.
We found out very quickly, one, that their whole organization for
the year made more money than the entire DEA budget, and that is
only one of the families operating out of Cali. All of the
decisions that are carried out in the United States are being made
in Colombia. They tell the group which phone numbers to use, when
the load is ready to move, which loads to move, how much to pay
the workers, detail the records on the salaries..
They have a family history questionnaire that means that they know
the relatives of all of the people who are working for them, many
of them illegal aliens from Colombia, which means that they cannot
testify against the principals in the organization, for fear of
loss of family or loved ones. There is a tremendous reluctance
for them to cooperate. It then moves down to the next level of
violent street gangs in the United States.
These investigations have to be played from both ends, because we
find out that many of the people are replaceable, and until such
time as we can use what I think is the appropriate strategy of
arresting, prosecuting, convicting and sentencing the principals
in these organizations, we're limited to dealing with surrogates,
which is second best. But the pressure must be kept up. We've
got to remember, it's the violent street gangs, who shoot children
in a public housing complex in Washington Heights, are in essence
part of that whole operation.
If you have any further questions about the role of DEA, I would
be glad to put them forward, and I give you my entire statement.
The only thing that I can tell you is that I believe that this
whole situation, the violent crime and drugs, has become an
intolerable situation for people in America, and it's going to
take a dramatic resolve on the part of all of us in government and
out of government, to do something about it over a sustained
period of time. We did not get into this problem overnight, and
we will not get out of it immediately, but I do think the next
five years will be extremely critical for the United States.
Thank you.
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much.
Our final witness is Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary for Drug
Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense. Mr.
Sheridan.
MR. SHERIDAN: Chairman Lantos, Torricelli, members of the
committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss DOD's role on
implementing the administration's source nation strategy. There
are two quick points I'd like to make before we start with the
questioning.
First, DOD has a very strong commitment to the strategy and to our
responsibilities in South America. The Department of Defense in
1994 will spend approximately $150 million in South America, and
that comes in light of dramatic cuts to our budget in '94 of $300
million. There are three pillars to our programs in Latin America:
first, intelligence collection and analysis; second, support for
interdiction; and third, training of host nation police and
military that are engaged in counter-drug activity.
My second point is that the Department of Defense's efforts are
consistent with the national strategy. As you know, the
president's strategy called for a shift from the transit zone to
source nations.
MORE.
In implementing that strategy, DOD is shifting on the
international side of our effort from 25 percent of our efforts in
source nations to 37 percent of our efforts. So you've heard much
in the papers over the last couple weeks that DOD is seeking to
walk away from South America. The numbers speak otherwise.
Percentage of our dollars is going up, not down.
I would also note that under the leadership of the secretary of
defense over the past year, we have initiated a number of major
programs to enhance our support to South America. We have decided
to locate an over-the-horizon radar in Puerto Rico that will cost
$25 million to start up plus $13 million a year to operate.
We've decided to go (forward with ?) tracker aircraft, at a cost
of $45 million, for use in South America. That will cost $18
million a year in the out years to operate. Until the trackers
come on line and the over-the- horizon radar comes on line, we are
looking to spend about 3 to 4 million dollars a year in
cooperation with the Customs Service to help them fund their
citation tracker program in South America. And as we plan our
funding activity for '96 in the out years, we plan to
significantly enhance our support.
So DOD is engaged. We are not walking away, and we have a number
of major programs which are already in our beginning phases of
implementation. And those were the two major points I wanted to
make, and I'm ready for your questions.
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much.
We'll begin the questioning with Chairman Torricelli.
REP. ROBERT TORRICELLI (D-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In 1991 I went to Peru to see President Fujimori and Colombia with
President Gaviria in enormous frustration. The United States at
considerable expense had put radars on stations. We were tracking
narcotraffickers, and the Peruvian and the Colombian governments
refused to intercept. We were doing no more than intellectually
satisfying ourselves in seeing the travel routes. As time passed,
in part due to pressure from the United States Congress, the
Peruvian government changed its policy. The Colombian government
even adjusted its policy, and intercept policies began, resulting
in the fact that now, 780 flights of narcotraffickers last year
were tracked. This led to 31 tons of cocaine being seized, 101
illicit airfields of narcotraffickers being found, and 31 aircraft
in Peru being forced to the ground after receiving hostile fire
from Peruvian aircraft.
This program, just when it was beginning to work, under the
insistence of the United States Congress, after the payment from
the American taxpayers, is halted. The American people wouldn't
believe it if they hadn't seen it for themselves.
Now, what is most incredible about this, is the legal analysis is
that this is being ceased because of legal vulnerabilities of U.S.
government officials from cooperating in the program. Let's
understand what the program is. The United States government
tracks narco-traffickers bringing cocaine to the United States.
That information is merely provided to the Peruvian or Colombian
governments. They pass it to their own officials, who make their
own judgements. Peruvian aircraft tracks a narco-trafficker,
operating with no flight plan, often at night, with no lights.
The plane is approached and wing tips attempt to communicate.
There's no response. They attempt on radio communications on
multiple frequencies. There's no response. There's an effort to
lead them to an airport for a forced landing. They refuse and
attempt to evade. And then warning shots are fired. Do you
seriously believe that there is a jury in America, of any
combination of American citizens, anywhere, under those
circumstances, that would find a liability for U.S. government
officials?
Having simply for provided information on that basis? This change
of policy stands logic on its head.
Fortunately, President Clinton, having read what was now
happening, in the Defense Department, and elsewhere in his
administration, has reversed the policy. And this Congress, I am
certain, as soon as we get language from the executive, will pass
in short order legislation that is required, to allow cooperation
to continue. But the question remains, in the weeks or months
that it takes to correct this change of policy, what will happen.
Is it therefore the intention of the Pentagon not in these ensuing
weeks, despite overwhelming logic, to continue to share
information? Do we assume, in the following weeks, no further
information will continue to be shared, despite the fact that we
are now told by the Colombian government that cocaine shipments
are up 20 percent last month since the sharing of this
interdiction information has ceased?
MORE HSE FOR. AFF/GELBARD, ET AL PAGE 21 06/22/94 .
MR. GELBARD: If I may respond to that, please, I'd like to answer
in several parts. First of all, what we intend to do -- and I
have already spoken to our ambassadors in Bogota and Lima and
spoken to authorities of those two governments -- what we intend
to do is try to establish very, very quickly interim agreements
with those governments that would permit us to resume the
provision of real-time tracking data as quickly as possible, and I
would hope even before the end of this week.
REP. TORRICELLI: And what would the substance of those agreements
include?
MR. GELBARD: The substance of the agreements would be that we
would have to continue under existing law, as I mentioned in my
oral statement, continue to ask that our data not be used for the
shooting down of aircraft.
The second part of what I wanted to say is that whether we like
the law or not, it is the law. This was a law that was passed by
the Congress of the United States in 1984, certainly for other
purposes. It was for counterterrorism purposes. But because of
the way this law was drafted, it was written to cover any civil
aircraft under any circumstances.
REP. TORRICELLI: And you think it was the intention of the
Congress, of the United States government in the writing of this
law taking responsibility for the Peruvian and Colombian air
forces?
MR. GELBARD: The way the law is written -- and I have to admit I
am not a lawyer, but I have read the law repeatedly and I have
sought the advice, of course, of all the legal authorities of our
government. We have been told by the Department of Justice,
particularly including the office of legal counsel, which makes
the ultimate decisions on these issues, that this law is written
in such a way as to cover any activities and the aiding and
abetting of destruction of civil aircraft in service at any time.
REP. TORRICELLI: Let me tell you something. In all respect to my
profession, lawyers concluding that the United States government
is criminally liable for shooting down narcotraffickers because we
give information to the Peruvian and Colombian government stands
logic on its head. There isn't a jury in the world that would
find somebody liable under those circumstances. That is an
incredible interpretation of the law. Somebody would have a
better chance in the ensuing months if their child is a victim of
cocaine on an American street suing the United States government
because we had the means to track narcotraffickers, they're
appearing on a radar screen, and we refuse to give the information
to the Colombian or Peruvian government to intercept them. That
would be a better suit than attempting to hold the U.S. government
official liable because we're allowing the Colombian government to
meet their own responsibilities and independent judgment..
Does this really make sense to you?
MR. GELBARD: Congressman, it certainly didn't make sense to me
when I read it, but it is the law. And I certainly was not
prepared to be in a position of violating the United States law,
passed by our Congress, especially once I found out we were
subject to the death penalty. And the idea of pursuing policies
which --
REP. TORRICELLI: Have you gone to the authors of this legislation
to try to decipher their legislative intent?
MR. GELBARD: The Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department
did look at this. They have done an extensive legal opinion on
this and this was the subject of truly extensive --
REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Gelbard, 435 members of this House voted on
that legislation. You will not find one statement in the
Congressional Record to support legislative intent. You will find
no committee hearing, you will find no author of the legislation
who would support that interpretation of the law of liability.
Not only will you find it, I suspect some lawyer in the Justice
Department who wrote this interpretation, who never did so much as
open their window to hear the outside noise, never asked anybody
whether that was anybody's legislative intent. This has been
written in a vacuum, and it is an incredible betrayal of the
American people and a fundamental national interest.
Let me -- Mr. Chairman, you've been gracious with the time. Let
me just move quickly, if I could --
MR. GELBARD: Could I just add one other point, please?
REP. TORRICELLI: Yeah, sure.
MR. GELBARD: You mentioned 1991 in Peru. Let me add, though,
another aspect of this problem. Nineteen ninety-one also marked
the year when we ceased providing economic support funds and
military assistance funds to the government of Peru, because the
Congress decided that we could not disburse such funds because of
certain conditions that were provided. So, as of today, we have
approximately $77 million in economic support funds that we have
not been able to disburse, and as a result not used to support
activities to eradicate coca through alternative development
programs, nor have we been able to provide the military assistance
that we have requested because of these actions. .
REP. TORRICELLI: Well, Mr. Gelbard, as you know, aid to Peru was
suspended for a variety of reasons. One of those reasons, much to
my great embarrassment, is that I went in that year and saw
President Fujimori and I said, "I will not be part of using
American taxpayers' money for counternarcotics operations in your
country when you get this radar information and then you won't
intercept the narco- traffickers. If you're serious about this
and you want American cooperation, shoot at the narco-
traffickers." They thought about it for a long time and they
didn't want to do it. They finally agreed, now to find out that
the United States government disagreed with this Congress and
pulls away from the cooperation when they were finally starting to
help..
MR. GELBARD: I would still like --
REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Sheridan --
MR. GELBARD: -- very much to be able to have those funds so we
could get to the heart of the problem, which is the eradication of
coca. And I would ask for the assistance of this committee in
freeing up those funds, whether as cash transfers or as project
funds, so that we can use this to support their efforts to
eradicate coca. Because that's what gets to the heart of the
problem.
REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Gelbard, I suspect at the moment that such
damage has been done to our cooperation with Colombia and Peru and
narco-trafficking, that if the funds are available to you, you're
going to have a hard time getting the same degree of cooperation.
These Peruvian and Colombian officials were vilified in their own
countries for allowing the United States military to fly over
their airspace, to do operations, to take information for the
United States Air Force, to do shootdown operations against narco-
traffickers. This was not good politics for Peru and Colombia,
but theyd did it. They did partially at the request of members of
this Congress, and now to have it shut off humiliates them and I
think is a setback that's going to be very difficult to reverse.
Mr. Sheridan, finally, if I could, with all due respects to the
intensive interest of the United States military in helping in
narco- trafficking interdiction, every six months for the last
four years I have had to call successive secretaries of defense
and ask that their intentions to close down these radars be
reversed. First, it was the Persian Gulf War. The radars are
needed in the Middle East. By all means, take them away. Then it
took months to get them back. And then six months later, they
were needed somewhere else.
And then six months later they wanted to close them down again.
if indeed the United States military has reached the point that
they want to help and they are committed to fight against narco-
trafficking, I will tell you there is precious little evidence of
it.
I know that members of the United States military did not join to
fight narco-traffickers. It was for other and very admirable
goals. This is a dirty and a nasty business. And I don't blame
you for not wanting to be part of it.
But a principal national security need of the United States today
is no longer the Cold War. It is narcotraffickers. And operating
these radars and keeping them there. And people, like members of
this having to call and fight to keep them on station and now to
share the information is not evidence of a strong commitment in
the fight against narco traffickers.
MR. SHERIDAN: Mr. Chairman, I can't speak to what happened during
the previous administration. I can only say that during this
administration I think the record speaks for itself in terms of
our allegation of resources. I don't know a more exact measure of
commitment than you're willingness to put dollars to it.
And as I stated in my opening comments, under this secretary of
defense we have committed to a -- (word inaudible) -- in Puerto
Rico at a cost of $25 million up front, $13 million a year the
outyears, $45 million up front, $18 a year in the outyears for
tracker aircraft, helping the customs service in the meantime at a
cost of 3 to $4 million per year to fly their tracker aircraft,
and we have significantly enhanced our support in our five-year
planning process..
I don't know what more you want from this administration.
REP. TORRICELLI: Well, Mr. Sheridan, here's what I -- here's what
I'd like.
MR. SHERIDAN: Yes.
REP. TORRICELLI: Last fall, President Gaviria of Colombia sent a
message to this committee that the radars were about to be
removed, would I call Secretary Perry's office. I did. Six
months before that, I got a call from President Gaviria the
Pentagon was going to remove the radars, would I call Secretary
Aspin. I did. A good evidence of the commitment of the military
would be to stop trying to find every excuse to get out of
Colombia, to close down the radars, to cease cooperation, and
instead, to accept this as a national priority. And the refusal to
share this information is not a good example of it being of a high
national priority.
Mr. Gelbard, finally -- I know my time has expired here -- but if
indeed we're going to have a gap now of several weeks or months
before this Congress can pass legislation which I will introduce
the moment it arrives on this Hill to correct this incredible
legal misinterpretation, why do we not now simply transfer or
lease these radars, allow the Colombians to operate them, to
separate ourselves from this alleged liability so there's no
interruption in interdiction?
As I said, Congressman, I am hoping to be able to work out
arrangements on an interim basis with the two governments involved
in the next day or two. I just spoke earlier with the Colombian
ambassador, and we may be meeting even this afternoon.
REP. TORRICELLI: Okay, well, let's leave it this way.
MR. GELBARD: But in the mean --
REP. TORRICELLI: If for any reason this cannot happen, can we then
agree that if we're going into next week, given the fact that we
are seeing a 20 percent upward spike in cocaine trafficking since
this interruption has taken place, that we can instead find more
imaginative means in the interim -- if we have to go to a lease,
if we have to go to a temporary transfer, something to separate us
from liability but continue the operations, that we will do so?
MR. GELBARD: I think the issue, even more than the ground-based
radars, though, is the airborne platforms, which we cannot
provide, but I am fully confident we will be able to work out
these interim arrangements before the end of the week.
REP. TORRICELLI: Could you -- could you comment briefly on the
allegations today in the media? It is alleged that during the
recent Colombian presidential campaign, representatives of the man
who is now to become the next president of Colombia, Ernesto
Samper, received in excess of $800,000 in campaign contributions
from the Cali cocaine cartel..
Could you comment on those allegations and the videotapes that are
now circulating giving evidence of that transfer?
MR. GELBARD: First, they are audio cassettes, or an audio
cassette.
REP. TORRICELLI: There are both.
MR. GELBARD: Second, I believe that the sums that have been
described, from the transcripts I've seen that were released in
Colombia, are actually substantially more in terms of funds that
were allegedly received.
REP. TORRICELLI: Well, one videotape has $800,000 in cash.
MR. GELBARD: Yeah, I've heard --
REP. TORRICELLI: I'm told the total number is $3.5 million.
MR. GELBARD: Well, I think it's actually more. I think it's about
$6 million.
Obviously, this is the worst kind of information that we could
receive. We are looking into this to try to determine the
veracity of any and all of this kind of information. This, if
true, would obviously have the most serious effect on not only any
kind of bilateral relationship with that government, but obviously
would create the most serious problems in terms of fighting
counternarcotics.
But we take this extremely seriously and we are investigating this
very intensively right now.
REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
under conditions of absolute reality"
-- Shirley Jackson
The Haunting of Hill House
Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268