From: [b--bu--a] at [newstand.syr.edu] (Miguel Balbuena) Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs Subject: Testimony October 31, 1995 Lee Brown Date: 8 Nov 1995 01:36:21 GMT Copyright 1995 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. Federal Document Clearing House October 31, 1995, Tuesday Congressional Testimony SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY HEADLINE: TESTIMONY October 31, 1995 LEE BROWN DIRECTOR OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL THE HONORABLE LEE P. BROWN DIRECTOR OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OCTOBER 31, 1995 I am pleased to testify before the Committee today, Mr. Chairman, and to have the opportunity to discuss current international counternarcotics issues, and the effectiveness of our law enforcement and intelligence efforts in other countries. As you know, the drug problem in America continues to be very serious. It is national in scope, but its impact is often most clearly felt on the local level--in our cities and neighborhoods. The response to the problem must be international as well as domestic, because drug use and drug trafficking have become global in scope. The overarching goal of the National Drug Control Strategy is to reduce both the casual and chronic use of illicit drugs and its consequences. The best way to reduce the problem is to reduce the number of chronic, hardcore users. Chronic, hardcore users account for nearly two-thirds of the cocaine consumed in the United States today, and they are responsible for much of the violence and crime associated with drug trafficking. The best way to reduce chronic drug use is to provide effective drug treatment in our communities, and in our jails and prisons. The objective is to break the cycle of drugs, crime, and violence. It is imperative, however, to continue to attack the supply of drugs at their source, where traffickers are most vulnerable and our interdiction efforts are most cost effective, in transit, and on the street, where our costs are also highest. Aggressive enforcement and interdiction are critical to our efforts to reduce illicit drug use in the US. The Administration's Strategy stresses both prevention and treatment efforts, while continuing aggressive enforcement, interdiction and international programs. This Strategy provides for smarter and tougher enforcement activities in US ports of entry and borders, as evidenced by Operation Hardline, recently begun by US Customs in San Ysidro, California. Domestic law enforcement efforts-- which have been greatly expanded in recent years and now comprise the largest segment of our drug control budget--remain central to supply reduction efforts to keep the streets free of illicit drugs; and assist in achieving our demand reduction goals. I have recently returned from the coca cultivation and cocaine processing and trafficking areas of South America, and would like to take this opportunity to report to you on the implementation of the President's international Drug Control Strategy in the source countries. I returned convinced that our international strategy is sound, and is causing significant damage to trafficker organizations. Aerial eradication in Colombia has been very successful. In the first eight months of 1995, Colombia eradicated almost 23,000 hectares of coca and 2,000 hecatares of poppy. This constitutes almost a 50 per cent reduction in coca and a 50 per cent reduction in poppy under cultivation in Colombia. President Samper has indicated that his goal is to completely eradicate coca production by the end of 1996. Drug organizations have responded to our successes in the source region by moving cocaine production facilities to more remote and less preferable areas. Traffickers are capitalizing on the largely uncontrolled river systems in the Amazon Basin and increasingly using commercial traffic from Venezuela and Colombia. To avoid Peruvian and Colombian air interdiction, traffickers are shifting air routes to the east to capitalize on what has become a virtual sanctuary over vast expanses of the Amazon in Brazil. Regionalization is at the core of our success in the Andean Region. Upon my return from South America, I asked the Department of Defense to develop a multilateral effort to increase the pressure against trafficker smuggling operations throughout the region. This multilateral surge effort is underway and I would be pleased to discuss it with you in a closed hearing. The role of the US forces is to increase detection and monitoring, intelligence gathering, and support host nation interdiction operations. Our goal is to disrupt the flow of drugs to the US and to enhance regional cooperation by enlisting greater cooperation from other countries of the region. UN SPEECH The President, in his speech before the United Nations last week, used this occasion to announce major new counternarcotics initiatives. First, using his authority under the International Economic Emergency Act (IEEPA), the President signed an executive order which blocks the assets of, and prohibits transactions with, four of the leaders of the Cali Cartel and a number of companies and individuals associated with them. This action will have a major impact and send a very strong signal that the US government is serious about the drug problem. At the same time, the President said that the Administration would consider imposing sanctions against nations that assist with money laundering to prevent them from doing business in the US. The President directed US government agencies to identify and notify those countries that are most egregious in facilitating criminal money laundering that they should enter into bilateral or multi- lateral arrangements to conform with international standards. If an identified nation does not enter into such agreements, the President could invoke economic sanctions against those countries. The President also called for the negotiation of an international declaration on Citizens' Security and Combating International Organized Crime. Through this declaration, nations would join in a series of international commitments to deny sanctuary to international criminals and provide mutual assistance in investigations of international crimes. The President's use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act at this time shows great leadership and vision; as a result I am looking forward to strengthened momentum against international terrorism, criminal rings, narcotics and weapons. ACTION PLAN TO STRENGTHEN INTERDICTION AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS U.S. drug control agencies have developed an aggressive., coordinated response to the cocaine, heroin, and marijuana threats facing this Nation. The Action Plan for Strengthening Interdiction and international Efforts encourages other nations to take a strong stand against illicit drugs. In 1993, an interagency review of our international cocaine strategy resulted in a Presidential Decision Directive, which emphasized that the international cocaine industry is a serious national security threat requiring an extraordinary and coordinated response by all agencies involved in national security. Our resulting strategy is designed to: assist nations who have demonstrated the political will to combat narcotrafficking; increase international cooperation; interdict narcotics trafficking; and destroy narcotrafficking organizations. There has been a controlled shift of emphasis among cocaine interdiction priorities from the traditional transit zones to source countries. With limited resources, it is more effective to attack drugs principally at the source of production. This is where our intelligence is best, and the traffickers most vulnerable, thereby allowing us and our allies to better target our interdiction resources. Moreover, the strategy recognizes that drug trafficking organizations have significantly shifted their preferred method of smuggling drugs by employing different tactics, methods, and geographic areas. For example, more than 70 percent of the cocaine entering the US crosses the border with Mexico. Thus, we are focusing our efforts to interdict cocaine before it gets to Mexico. Evidence suggests that this strategy is working -- parts of the cocaine air pipeline have recently been squeezed almost shut in Peru where the traffickers are scrambling to develop new routes and means to move their drugs to the US and Europe. HALTING THE FLOW OF DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES Interdiction of drugs in source countries, in transit, and at the US border is a priority national security objective. Our efforts, along with those of our allies, are directed at disrupting drug smuggling operations by forcing traffickers to abandon activities and shift to more costly or ineffective smuggling regimens. Traffickers use a mix of air, land, and maritime approaches including high flying large aircraft, fast boats, semisubmersibles, and various commercial transports. Within and between Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, the traffickers rely almost exclusively on general aviation aircraft and river craft to move cocaine base and finished cocaine. Smuggling routes flow in all directions from source countries, but most of the cocaine destined for the US moves to Mexico where it can be temporarily stored or moved directly across the US border. Puerto Rico is a second gateway that is growing in importance to the traffickers. Given the nature of the current flow and potential opportunities to interdict illicit drug shipments, we and our allies are focusing our primary efforts on: * The Peru/ Colombia "airbridge;" * The Colombia/Mexico "airbridge;" and * Puerto Rico and the nations of the Eastern Caribbean. Our interdiction strategy is to: * Continue to assist Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Mexico to develop their "end game" interdiction capabilities; * Improve the sharing of information and intelligence among our international partners; * Foster greater regional cooperation; * Enlist greater cooperation and interdiction support from the British, French, Dutch, and Canadians. THE PERU/ COLOMBIA "AIRBRIDGE" Roughly 75 per cent of the supply of cocaine base in Peru is currently moved to Colombia by air. The Peru/ Colombia "airbridge" offers the US and host nation partners a good opportunity to disrupt cocaine production and reduce the flow of drugs from the source countries. Encouraged by our advice and counsel, and supported by our detection and monitoring resources, such as airborne and ground- based radars, Peruvian and Colombian counterdrug forces during the past six months have successfully disrupted the flow of cocaine along the "airbridge." Numerous smuggling aircraft flying illegally in Colombia and Peru have been seized or destroyed. Since March, there has been a steady decrease in the number of flights between the two countries. The traffickers apparently are having difficulty finding pilots who are willing to take the increased risk. This successful interdiction activity against the current "airbridge" is forcing the traffickers to move more cocaine by less efficient and slower riverine and overland routes. The increased Peruvian and Colombian counternarcotics activity has led to a significant disruption in the supply and reduction in price of cocaine base. In some areas the price of base has dropped by as much as 50 per cent. Over time, continued lower prices will make the cultivation of coca plants substantially less profitable. Traffickers are stockpiling cocaine base hoping that the current level of "airbridge" activity abates. Unless Peruvian traffickers can find alternate routes and methods to move their product, the current disruption in Peru's drug economy will become permanent. THE COLOMBIA/MEXICO "AIRBRIDGE" A significant portion of cocaine produced in Colombia moves to Mexico by air and sea for transhipment to the United States. To address this problem we have worked closely with Colombia and Mexico to disrupt these flights before they can be launched and once they have arrived in Mexico. Since the beginning of the year, our allies have put together an operational plan to halt the flights of the large cargo, 727-type aircraft, used to transport cocaine from Colombia to Mexico. After a furious pace of deliveries last year, traffickers appear to have suspended these operations. The latest "large plane" flight probably occurred in March. The plane, a Caravelle, was tracked by US and Mexico, which directed the Mexican Northern Border Response Force to a remote landing field in Mexico. Eventually, Mexican authorities were able to seize 2.8 tons of cocaine near the landing site. THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN AND PUERTO RICO To respond to the smuggling threat through Puerto Rico and the Eastern Caribbean, we have developed interdiction agreements with the Dominican Republic, Antigua, Barbados, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Dominica; fielded contraband detection technology on board ships in the Caribbean; and worked with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) to develop broad international agreements on maritime counterdrug enforcement practices. Recent successes include seizure of 800 kilograms of cocaine airdropped off the Turks and Caicos Islands intended for delivery in Miami; and seizure of 1,140 lbs of marijuana on board a Colombian fishing boat near the Cayman Islands. In order to better deal with the problem of cocaine transiting the Eastern Caribbean, last year I designated Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA). Through this HIDTA, Federal law enforcement agencies, including the Coast Guard and Customs, are working closely with law enforcement and National Guard officials in both Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands to develop a more effective and better coordinated interdiction and drug law enforcement program. RECENT LAW ENFORCEMENT SUCCESSES In addition to successes in our interdiction efforts, the U.S. and its South American allies have made significant progress in attacking the major drug kingpins. Over the past few months, six major traffickers have been arrested and their organizations dismantled or severely disrupted. In January, 20 members of the Peruvian based Lopez-Paredes Organization were arrested following the seizure of about three tons of cocaine. The leaders of this group, all of whom were arrested, were in the process of shipping this cocaine directly to Mexico. A week later, two top Bolivian traffickers, Carlos Ali Bravo and Pedro Ramirez Correa, were arrested by Bolivian police. In June, the top Peruvian supplier of cocaine HCL and base, Cachique Rivera, was arrested in Bogota. Cachique fled to Colombia in the wake of heavy Peruvian law enforcement pressure. His capture and extradition to Colombia were the result of close cooperation between the Peru and Colombia governments. Also in June, Colombian National police arrested Gilberto Rodriquez Orejuela, one of the top Cali Cartel kingpins. This arrest was the result of extensive collaboration between the U.S. and Colombia and was preceded by numerous raids on kingpin properties and enterprises. The August 6 arrest of Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, the last of the Orejuela brothers--and at the time the world's top cocaine kingpin--means that six of the top seven leaders of the Cali cartel have been arrested by the Colombian National Police with the help of the U.S. government. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS Currently we are in the process of developing better methods to evaluate program efforts. The legislation which reauthorized ONDCP last year also establishes an important new step in our official review process by which each year's goals and objectives will be assessed. As part of the Crime Control Act of 1994, agencies and departments are required to develop Measures of Effectiveness to gauge results of their programs. I expect to be able to use the findings of this study to help evaluate our overall international drug control effort, particularly the impact of agency programs on meeting Strategy objectives. I also will use the study to recommend changes in next year's National Drug Control Strategy. HEROIN As I said when I testified before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in June, we have been experiencing an increase in the availability of heroin on our streets over the past year as indicated by lower prices and greater purity due to bumper crops coming out of Asia and increased production in South America. It is imperative that we respond aggressively to this increase in heroin use. Our failure to do so will lead to increased health care and criminal justice costs, as well as incalculable human costs. Our strategy to address the heroin threat is targeted, comprehensive, and cost-effective to address the problems of trafficking, production and use, and to prevent the spread of this deadly drug throughout our nation. As you may know, Mr. Chairman, worldwide opium production has more than doubled in the last decade. Poppy growing areas are expanding in Afghanistan and the new republics of the former Soviet Union. Heroin addict populations, particularly in Asia, are increasing. The cocaine cartels in Colombia are now shipping more heroin to the US. And in the US, higher purity heroin is being marketed in a smokable form, thus avoiding the stigma associated with the use of needles and the consequences of contracting HIV-AIDS through injection. Today at least 11 countries produce a total of 3,400 metric tons of illicit opium for the international drug markets. Our heroin strategy encompasses a focus on demand reduction, treatment of addicts, and prevention of new users. Our recommended international heroin strategy is a part of this broader program effort, and has four major goals: * expanding and intensifying contacts with foreign leaders to mobilize greater international cooperation against the threat of heroin; * dismantling the illicit heroin trafficking organizations by prosecuting their leaders and seizing profits and assets; * treating heroin trafficking as a serious national security threat; and * reducing the supply of heroin entering the US We seek to optimize our limited counternarcotics resources to carefully target those countries and regions that pose the most direct heroin threat to the domestic health and national security interests of the United States. Approximately 60 per cent of the heroin sold in the US comes from Southeast Asia, particularly Burma. Our primary heroin control priority within our international strategy will be to reduce this flow. We will continue to employ a range of activities to address US counternarcotics concerns without undermining other vital US objectives, including efforts to promote political reform and reconciliation and curb human rights violations. Fortunately, the Burmese regime released Aung San Suu Kyi on July 10, 1995, who had been held under house arrest since 1989. However, the language contained in the recently agreed to House/Senate Conference Report on Foreign Operations would restrict any assistance to Burma at this time. The overwhelming proportion of our resources, programs and activities are directed toward reducing the supply and demand for cocaine in the United States, because cocaine remains the principal drug threat to us. However, as the supply and purity level of heroin have risen, so has use. If left unchecked, these conditions can produce another drug use epidemic in the United States that will create more health problems, more drug related crime, and staggering social and economic costs. BUDGET The key to success is full support of the President's budget request for international and interdiction resources. Here, Congress has come up short. As you know, despite your support f or the President's request, Mr. Chairman, the House/Senate Conference cut the INL budget to $115 million; and will once again raise questions among our allies about our resolve to deal seriously with the drug threat. In fact, Congress has cut the INL budget below the President's request since 1993. Congress provided only $148 million of the President's request of $173 million for FY 1993, $100 million of the $148 million request for FY 1994, and $105 million of the $228 million requested for FY 1995. Despite these cuts, the U.S. has fielded a credible effort against the cocaine threat by increased cooperation with our allies, using pipe-line funds, fielding better technology and realigning our declining resources. As a result, total worldwide cocaine seizures have remained relatively constant, all but one Cali mafia leader is in jail, successful interdiction has backed up tons of cocaine in Peru, and Colombia so far this year has eradicated half of the country's coca crop, some 23,000 hectares. The FY 96 budget for INL will not sustain this level of performance. The drug threat in Mexico is growing rapidly and the South American traffickers are investing in new routes and carriers to better protect their shipments. These developments warrant greater U.S. and allied responses or we will lose more ground to the traffickers. The INL budget is critical to meeting this challenge since it supports programs in every major strategy area: dismantling drug organizations, interdiction, institution building, and international diplomacy. The cuts allow for little if any sustained alternative development, which will greatly concern our Andean allies. Without alternative development help, the political costs for eradicating coca fields is too high. It will be necessary to cut INL funds to support the development and improvement of "end games"--the capability of allies to take action on the intelligence and detection and monitoring information. This is a critical shortfall for which we are already paying a stiff price; helping our allies resolve this relies heavily on INL funding. I cannot conclude without mentioning funds for ONDCP. Conference discussions indicate that the overall operational budget for ONDCP will be cut by approximately one-fourth. This does not make any sense. Only last year, while reauthorizing ONDCP, Congress voted to strengthen this office. Congress created this office in 1988 in order to bring focus and central coordination of Federal counterdrug efforts. My job is to develop the President's National Drug Control Strategy and Budget to provide coherence and planning to our nation's fight to reduce drug use. This involves coordinating the efforts of more than 50 Federal agencies and departments. The fight against drug abuse must be a bipartisan effort. This is too important an issue for our Nation and our Nation's children to allow ourselves to become caught in partisan rhetoric. I welcome your interest, and look forward to working with you to change the picture of drug use in America.