Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: Department of State's Response to the Latin American Narcotics Threat
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:23 GMT
[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:03:59 GMT ]
Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
June 22, 1994, Wednesday
Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony
Headline: Testimony June 22, 1994 Robert Gelbard Assistant
Secretary Of State Department Of State House Foreign
Affairs/International Security, International Organizations And
Human Rights Anti-Drug Strategy In The Western Hemisphere
Statement Of Assistant Secretary Of State
For International Narcotics Matters
Robert Gelbard
Before The
House Foreign Affairs Committee
June 22, 1994 -
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the
Department of State's response to the Latin American narcotics
threat including our 1994 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR) and the President's certification
decisions that were based on it. As you have requested, I will
also discuss the President's counternarcotics strategy for the
Western Hemisphere, including efforts to safeguard human rights,
and our FY 1995 budget request. The 1994 INCSR is this
Administration's first full public assessment of the global drug
threat, and the President's April 1 certification underscores
this Administration's response to that threat. The message is
clear. President Clinton's approach to international drug
control can be capsulized in five words': no more business as
usual.
Mr. Chairman, let there be no doubts: the Administration
takes the problems of drug abuse and trafficking seriously. We
are reminded daily by stories from Colombia, Mexico, Russia, and
virtually every American community that the global narcotics
trade is an insidious threat to America's domestic and foreign
interests. It is an increasingly dangerous threat to democracy
and sustainable development abroad, undermining the cornerstones
of our policies to make America more secure and competitive in
today's world. The effects on American society if we fail to
address the narcotics problem abroad will be direct and
unambiguous: more addiction, crime, violence, disease, and
poverty.
Assessment of the Narcotics Trade: Volatile but Vulnerable
My first task after confirmation as the Assistant Secretary
for International Narcotics Matters (INM) in November 1993 was to
take a fresh look at the dimensions and implications of the
foreign narcotics threat. President Clinton had just issued his
counternarcotics directive instructing us to support those
countries that demonstrate the political will and commitment to
attack the drug problem. He also instructed the Department of
State to apply stringent standards in the Congressionally-
mandated certification process, a process that can result in the
denial of assistance to countries that do not cooperate fully
with the United States in counternarcotics or take adequate steps
on their own. I have since traveled to Latin America, Asia, and
Europe to talk with my counterparts, assess their efforts, and
see our programs at work.
My assessment is that the international narcotics trade is
extremely volatile and continues to pose a grave danger to our
foreign and domestic interests. The major international drug
syndicates continue to target the U.S. market despite our
intensified enforcement efforts in recent years. They are
diversifying into other drugs and criminal activities, and are
expanding their operations and markets to regions where political
control is weak. We need greater international cooperation to
overcome this threat. There are opportunities for advancing this
objective, but current levels of cooperation and commitment are
uneven at best.
Focusing on Latin America, let me comment first on the
cocaine situation. We made important gains last year, but they
could be short-lived without stronger action by Colombia,
Bolivia, and Peru. The good news: coca leaf production fell by
20 percent, the first decline that we have ever recorded.
Virtually all of the reduction, however, occurred in Peru's
Huallaga Valley as a consequence of a major fungus epidemic,
declining soil fertility, and counternarcotics pressure on
trafficker operations. Producers are already moving to restore
supplies. Coca cultivation increased in Colombia and Bolivia,
and Peruvian growers are responding to the disease by shifting
cultivation to new areas.
Latin American governments made important breakthroughs in
attacking the cartels. Pablo Escobar--the last of Colombia's
Medellin kingpins--is dead. His demise occurred not only because
of outstanding work by the Colombian security forces, but also
because, in the end, he had nowhere to flee--international
concern had made him a virtual prisoner in his own country.
"Vaticano," Peru's most notorious kingpin, was arrested in
Colombia, expelled to Peru, and is now serving a lengthy
sentence.
Colombia's Cali cartel is meanwhile working hard to implement
a legal and political strategy to thwart prosecutions by U.S. and
Colombian authorities. They are seeking lenient plea bargain
arrangements with Colombia's independent prosecutor and, even
worse, trying to manipulate ambiguities in the revised Colombian
criminal procedures that could be used to avoid punishment for
serious drug crimes. We have sent a strong message to Colombia's
President-elect Ernesto Samper that the crackdown on the Cali
cartel must not falter if Colombia wants to sustain close
relations with the United States.
As pressure mounts on kingpins elsewhere, I predict that they
will shift tactics to follow the pattern set by the Colombian
cartel. That is, they will move from simply trying to bribe or
intimidate key officials to a more comprehensive strategy aimed
at permanently crippling the counternarcotics capabilities of the
judicial and enforcement institutions. There is one sure way to
thwart this tactic--building stronger democratic counternarcotics
institutions in key Latin American drug-producing and -transit
countries.
Latin America also poses an expanding heroin threat to the
United States. There is good news in Mexico and Guatemala.
Mexican production, the traditional threat, is being held in
check through eradication and related enforcement programs. The
Government of Mexico is accomplishing this on its own, having
assumed in 1993 full responsibility for funding and managing the
$20 million a year narcotics control program the State Department
formerly administered there. INM's eradication program has also
virtually eliminated poppy cultivation in Guatemala. Colombia's
burgeoning heroin trade, however, offsets these accomplishments
and presents us with one of our most dangerous drug control
challenges. Seeking to diversify operations, Colombia's cocaine
traffickers have moved rapidly into opium and heroin production.
The Government of Colombia, with our help, is responding with a
crop eradication program, but it still faces an uphill struggle.
It is more important than ever that we integrate our
narcotics control policies with other foreign policy objectives
in Latin America. This need comes at a time of unprecedented
movement toward democracy and economic reform in the region:
military control has given way to civilian rule in country after
country; participatory democracy is flourishing; corruption is
under attack; and trade, investment, and economic growth are
moving forward.
But all of this is jeopardized if the narcotics trade is not
controlled. Trafficker corruption and intimidation can turn
legislatures, judiciaries, police, the media, and other
democratic institutions into mere facades that provide cover for
drug operations. The ability of traffickers to push Colombia to
the brink of political chaos prior to its 1990 presidential
elections and the virtually unobstructed influence they had at
the highest levels of Panama's government before Operation Just
Cause underscore the magnitude of this threat. Such situations
are not only disastrous for host nations, they make it impossible
for us to pursue important security, trade, commercial, and other
regional and bilateral relations.
New opportunities for counternarcotics progress are emerging
in Latin America. Thanks to our leadership, governments are
increasingly aware of the political, economic, and social threat
drug trafficking poses to their societies. Democratic, market-
oriented governments will be especially responsive. They are
more likely to recognize the adverse effects of the drug trade
and to have the political will and commitment to respond. Too
many governments, however, continue to underestimate the risks
and, consequently, are not taking sufficient steps on their own
to address them. Through a combination of sticks, carrots, and
new initiatives, our strategy is designed to encourage and help
them take these steps.
Mr. Chairman, this was the global context on which we based
our certification recommendations to the President--and on which
he made the final decisions--developed our Western Hemisphere
strategy, and drafted our budget. These actions underscore the
promise I made when I accepted this job: there would be no more
business as usual on international narcotics policy. I meant it.
In fact, I would not be in this position today if I did not
believe it. We will be holding countries that receive our
antidrug assistance increasingly accountable for their
counternarcotics performance.
Certification: No More Business as Usual
One area where the President's new policy has had a strong
impact is certification. The Foreign Assistance Act requires
that each year the President identify the major drug-producing
and drug-transit countries and determine whether they have fully
cooperated with the United States or taken adequate steps on
their own-in narcotics control. The United States must cut off
most foreign assistance to those countries that are not certified
and vote against their requests for loans from multilateral
development banks. For countries found not to be fully
cooperating or taking adequate steps on their own, the President
may grant a national interest certification if the vital
interests of the United States require continued provision of
foreign assistance.
On April 1, in accordance with the requirements of the
Foreign Assistance Act, the President issued his 1994
certification determination. This year's certifications are the
toughest ever. Ten of 26 countries were either not certified or
granted only a vital national interest certification. More
countries than ever have been placed in these categories. This
is double the number so categorized every year since 1990. Among
these are not just "pariah" nations, but also countries with
which we have strong bilateral interests.
Three countries--Nigeria, Bolivia, and Peru--had never
received anything less than full certification. Nigeria was
denied certification for failing to take satisfactory action to
curb blatant corruption and trafficking. Bolivia and Peru did
not meet the requirements for "full" certification primarily
because their efforts to attack coca cultivation were
insufficient, but they were granted vital national interest
certifications.
Two countries--Panama and Laos--each of which had been denied
certification before but had been fully certified in recent
years, received vital national interest certifications. Panama
has failed to address squarely its role in international money
laundering, the most critical drug control problem in that
country. Laos has not moved actively to establish its special
police counternarcotics unit, nor did it sustain pressure--after
successive years of decline--to reduce opium poppy cultivation in
1993.
Of the remaining five countries, we gave a vital national
interest certification to Lebanon, because it is in our vital
interest that Lebanon continue to receive assistance aimed at
promoting economic and political stability, and to Afghanistan.
To deny certification to Afghanistan would undermine progress
toward political stability which is essential for
counternarcotics efforts. We continued to deny certification to
Burma, Iran, and Syria.
These were difficult decisions. They took into account a
number of important U.S. foreign policy interests. Judging from
their public reactions, some countries were clearly surprised.
They apparently thought that performing at the previous year's
levels would be sufficient. This is not what the law requires
and they know it. Some may have thought they could impress us by
stepping up efforts against less critical targets. Not so. We
will not accept progress by a country against marginal targets as
a substitute for neglecting the key drug issue. If a country is
a money laundering center, we will expect progress against this
problem; increased arrests of low-level couriers will not be
sufficient.
Countries that were fully certified should not relax. It is
no more in their interests to relax their counternarcotics
efforts than it is ours. Fully certified countries must continue
to strengthen and improve their drug control programs. The goal
of our "no more business as usual to approach is progress, not
status quo. In making our recommendations to the President, we
intend to continue strictly applying the statutory standards for
certification.
The fact that the President decided not to grant full
certification to so many countries--several for the first time--
sends powerful narcotics control messages to foreign and domestic
audiences alike:
International narcotics control is a key foreign policy
concern that the U.S. will put ahead of other bilateral interests
if necessary.
We will no longer accept weak excuses for inaction; countries
know what we expect.
We expect concrete results. After years of supplying
assistance and building institutions, we now expect key countries
to be more responsible for their own antidrug programs.
We are going to cut waste from global drug control programs.
If assistance is not being used effectively, it will be shifted
elsewhere.
Many countries where we have important narcotics bilateral
interests will be electing new governments soon; these new
governments should realize that narcotics control is at the top
of our agenda.
We do not seek to embarrass governments. We do not want to
force them to adopt our standards. But we want certification to
be an effective tool for securing greater international narcotics
control and cooperation. I believe it will be. In fact, I have
a simple message for the governments of the world, the American
people, and the Congress: narcotics certification is an honest
process.
We obviously would prefer to make substantive progress
through cooperative relationships rather than impose sanctions
owing to a lack of cooperation. Nevertheless, this certification
decision has given our international counternarcotics policy
greater credibility. It is important to sustain this momentum.
I have begun exploring, in Washington and at posts abroad,
improved ways of keeping the attention of key drug countries
focused on achieving concrete narcotics control goals. We are in
the process of making demarches to these countries, highlighting
critical areas of performance during the current certification
cycle. I welcome a dialogue with this Committee on how the
Legislative and Executive Branches can make the certification
process more effective.
A final point concerning certification legislation. As you
are aware, if Congress does not act by September 1994, important
provisions of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992
will expire, eliminating several important improvements that have
helped make certification a more effective counternarcotics tool.
These improvements, codified in Sections 489 and 490 of the
Foreign Assistance Act, have greatly improved the scope,
objectivity, and efficiency of the drug reporting and
certification processes. Before the deadline, we would like to
see Congress retain these sections with only a few minor language
changes we hope to provide soon to the Committee.
Improved Strategy: Sharper Focus, Better Tactics
The Administration is making new use of these instruments
because it has a new international narcotics control strategy and
policy. Both were developed to find a better and more cost-
effective long-term solution to our drug problem and to ensure
that our foreign counternarcotics objectives are integrated with
our broader foreign policy goals of promoting democracy,
sustainable development, and security around the world. Allow me
to highlight the key elements of that strategy.
First, we will support the development of stronger democratic
counternarcotics institutions in countries that demonstrate a
commitment to narcotics control. This is critical for convincing
host governments to shoulder more of the drug control burden.
Strong and accountable institutions are the foundation for an
effective policy; they are essential for successful operations.
The stronger the institutions, and the more responsive they are
to public concerns and respectful of the rule of law, the less
likely they are to succumb to the corrosive influence of narco-
corruption and intimidation. We will put more emphasis on the
cocaine source countries where the political and economic stakes
are potentially higher and the trade is potentially more
vulnerable.
Strengthening the institutional base starts with enacting
good drug control laws and then building the judicial,
enforcement, and penal organizations to enforce them. This must
include building respect for the rule of law and human rights.
Administration of justice programs that serve both ourbroader
democracy-building and our drug control objectives will be a
major part of this effort. So too will be training and, in some
countries, support to the military, with emphasis in both cases
on human rights. Other important elements include public
awareness and demand-reduction programs to alleviate the adverse
social effects of the drug trade and to build public support for
antidrug programs.
Second, we will integrate our antidrug efforts with
sustainable development programs, focusing on both macro and
micro objectives. Strengthening the economies of key drug-
producing and -transit countries creates economic alternatives to
narcotics production and trafficking and increases the resources
host nations can devote to narcotics control. Macro objectives
are aimed at broad-based growth that expands income and
employment alternatives throughout the economy and include such
measures as balance of payments supports and other programs to
generate foreign trade and investment. micro objectives--
targeted in and outside drug-producing areas--are important for
ensuring that small producers have viable alternatives for
narcotics crops. Such projects also help to facilitate
eradication and other enforcement efforts by extending government
authority and presence into drug-producing areas.
Third, we will seek to involve multilateral and regional
organizations in our counternarcotics programs and objectives.
Multilateral organizations can complement our institution-
building and sustainable development initiatives, operate where
our access is limited, and attract additional international
donors to the antidrug effort. We will increase support to our
traditional UN partner--the United Nations Drug Control Program
(UNDCP)--and will continue to urge greater involvement by other
UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP. We have recently undertaken
the first-ever initiatives to engage international financial
institutions and multilateral development banks in the
counternarcotics effort. INM and AID have already held many
meetings with the leadership of the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank to discuss how their programs can
contribute to eliminating illicit coca cultivation in Bolivia and
Peru. We will be coordinating with them more closely to ensure
that their programs complement our counternarcotics and
sustainable development objectives in host nations.
Our fourth objective is to achieve more effective law
enforcement operations against the kingpins and their
organizations--a goal supported by institution-building and
sustainable development initiatives which enhance the political
will and ability of host nations to move in this direction.
Although we have yet to see appropriately aggressive prosecution
on significant kingpins in Colombia, recent enforcement
operations in Colombia and other countries convince us that the
kingpins and their organizations are now vulnerable to increased
and enhanced host nation enforcement efforts. The institutional
building blocks, USG support, and commitment are already in place
to be more aggressive on this front. We intend to encourage
greater regional and international cooperation, tougher action on
chemical and money controls, adoption and implementation of
aggressive and comprehensive asset forfeiture legislation,
extraditions, and other measures to weaken the major
organizations, and apprehend, convict, and incarcerate for
appropriately severe terms of imprisonment, their leaders.
Targeting the leadership of the cartels and their vast ill-gotten
fortunes disrupts their entire organization, makes narcotics
trafficking less profitable, and blunts the effects of corruption
and intimidation, the most dangerous drug-related threats to
democratic political systems.
Success will depend on securing the commitment of foreign
governments to set their drug enforcement sights on the kingpins.
It will be achieved through good intelligence and police work and
not necessarily through the constant application of high-cost
technology as has been the case with interdiction.
Human Rights
I am aware of how the human rights issue is connected to the
narcotics control assistance we provide to foreign police and
military units. Fortunately, we have rarely found human rights
abuses in our counter-narcotics programs, but we remain
concerned. As I have already emphasized, a major thrust of our
institution-building initiatives is to strengthen respect for
human rights. Accordingly, we have established several
mechanisms to minimize the potential for violations and to
identify them and take corrective actions quickly when they
occur.
In Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, U.S. Embassies screen
individuals for counternarcotics training, target assistance
specifically for antidrug units, and monitor ongoing operations
for possible abuses. We are in the process of establishing
mechanisms to screen units prior to delivering counternarcotic's
assistance. Meanwhile, I work closely with the Department's
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to monitor and
respond to allegations of human rights abuses by government
forces that may receive funding, training, or other support from
U.S. Government counternarcotics programs. Assistant Secretary
Shattuck and I co-chair an interagency working group to address
these problems and recently agreed to instruct our military group
in Colombia to add more aggressive human rights monitoring to its
end- use-monitoring mission for equipment and assistance provided
to the Colombian military. INM recently discussed our Colombia
initiatives with Amnesty International representatives. Our
Embassies in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru have human rights
working groups that mirror our efforts in Washington to identify
and resolve human rights abuses. In addition, AID programs that
advance drug control objectives, such as justice system reform in
Colombia and Bolivia, also include mechanisms to protect human
rights.
The bottom line is that our counternarcotics assistance can
be a powerful force in advancing, rather than retarding, human
rights objectives in the hemisphere. Our training and oversight
help instill respect for human rights and professionalism among
police and military commanders in the host countries, a fact
underscored by the virtual absence of confirmed human rights
violations by counternarcotics forces. Moreover, it is through
the provision of assistance that we can conduct end use
monitoring and in that way keep an eye on the human rights
performance of these forces. Indeed, in many ways, the narcotics
kingpins, whom these commanders and their forces are trying to
subdue, pose a far more fundamental threat to human rights. This
is evident in the way narco-traffickers have terrorized the
press, corrupted local police forces, and paralyzed the
judiciary. We will remain vigilant, but I believe that a
withdrawal of our counternarcotics support could be a setback for
human rights.
Budget Support
Mr. Chairman, the President's counternarcotics strategy
recognizes that we must operate within tight budgets. This is
why it stresses the need to concentrate resources and pursue
operations more efficiently and effectively than in the past.
INM, with its program focus on institution-building and long
experience in the source countries, developed its FY 1995
counternarcotics budget request for $232 million with these
principles in mind.
Let me assure you that we have used fiscal restraint in
planning our programs. Our FY 95 request reflects a new
consolidated budget that includes for the first time the
traditional INM account ($152 million) as well as funds that were
formerly provided through counternarcotics economic (ESF) and
military (FMF) security assistance and International Military
Education and Training (IMET) accounts. Of the $232 million
total, approximately $205 million is for Latin American and
Caribbean programs. The $232 million is less than what we had
requested in FY 94 and over $100 million less than what we
received in FY 93.
The House recently voted out an appropriations bill that
frankly jeopardizes our programs and policy. The traditional INM
account was broken out and cut to $115 million, marginally more
than last year. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out
last week an INM budget of only $100 million. Cuts in our
overall request for economic and military assistance are likely
to force us to reduce further our counternarcotics assistance.
We are surviving on our drastically reduced FY 94 budget by
drawing on the prior-year pipeline, deferring upgrades and
improvements, and seeking augmentations from ONDCP and DoD. We
have cut most overseas programs to the core. A continuation at
the $115 million level will have serious consequences.
Scaling back source country programs: INM will be faced with
reducing its plans for sustainable development initiatives in
Bolivia and Peru, weakening our efforts to strengthen the
political and economic underpinnings for their counternarcotics
commitment and performance. We would curb aviation support to
the Andes, causing large cutbacks in police operations.
Closing programs: we would make deep cuts in transit country
programs, possibly closing some operations completely. Judicial
enhancement, intelligence collection and sharing, and
interdiction operations would suffer.
Stopping eradication initiatives At $115 million, we will not
be able to sustain the recent momentum that has overcome major
hurdles in winning greater host nation commitment to eradication.
Colombia will not be able to keep pace with poppy production and
will have to delay its new coca eradication efforts. Setbacks in
Colombia will cause recent progress to strengthen the political
will of the governments of Bolivia and Peru to falter.
Gutting aviation support:. We are abiding by Congress's
wishes that we get out of the air force business. We have
already reduced our air wing from 62 to 48 aircraft. The budget
cuts, however, would force us to make deeper reductions than
planned, forcing us to either mothball aircraft or turn them over
to host countries before they are fully capable of receiving or
maintaining them.
Diverting funds from other Priorities: To save what we can of
the Andean programs, we would have to divert funding from other
priority programs such as international heroin control and our
new initiatives to address the organized crime threats from the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere.
I do not mean to sound alarmist, but I do mean to inform the
Committee that a $115 million budget will have practical
consequences for U.S. international counternarcotics efforts.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend that there is an easy solution
to the global narcotics problem. I am here to say, however, that
the stakes in terms of America's security and welfare are too
high for us to abandon"or disengage from the international
narcotics control effort. The President has altered our
approach. The increasingly dangerous nature of the threat, new
opportunities, and current funding realities require it. our new
approach does more than sustain pressure; it attacks at the
criminal, economic, and political heart of the trade and raises
the stakes against those who oppose or obstruct our efforts. We
have built this strategy on lessons learned. We have enough
evidence to know that it can work if given time and support, and
that the consequences are dire if it is allowed to fail.
I look forward to working closely with the Members of this
Committee on our counternarcotics objectives and seek your
support in ensuring that we have adequate funds to meet these
objectives. We must avoid making cuts that will starve the
President's strategy to death in its first year and leave the
United States without a coherent, supportable international
narcotics control strategy.
--
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"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
under conditions of absolute reality"
-- Shirley Jackson
The Haunting of Hill House
Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268