Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins) Subject: Department of State's Response to the Latin American Narcotics Threat Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:23 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:03:59 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony June 22, 1994, Wednesday Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony Headline: Testimony June 22, 1994 Robert Gelbard Assistant Secretary Of State Department Of State House Foreign Affairs/International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights Anti-Drug Strategy In The Western Hemisphere Statement Of Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters Robert Gelbard Before The House Foreign Affairs Committee June 22, 1994 - Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the Department of State's response to the Latin American narcotics threat including our 1994 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) and the President's certification decisions that were based on it. As you have requested, I will also discuss the President's counternarcotics strategy for the Western Hemisphere, including efforts to safeguard human rights, and our FY 1995 budget request. The 1994 INCSR is this Administration's first full public assessment of the global drug threat, and the President's April 1 certification underscores this Administration's response to that threat. The message is clear. President Clinton's approach to international drug control can be capsulized in five words': no more business as usual. Mr. Chairman, let there be no doubts: the Administration takes the problems of drug abuse and trafficking seriously. We are reminded daily by stories from Colombia, Mexico, Russia, and virtually every American community that the global narcotics trade is an insidious threat to America's domestic and foreign interests. It is an increasingly dangerous threat to democracy and sustainable development abroad, undermining the cornerstones of our policies to make America more secure and competitive in today's world. The effects on American society if we fail to address the narcotics problem abroad will be direct and unambiguous: more addiction, crime, violence, disease, and poverty. Assessment of the Narcotics Trade: Volatile but Vulnerable My first task after confirmation as the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters (INM) in November 1993 was to take a fresh look at the dimensions and implications of the foreign narcotics threat. President Clinton had just issued his counternarcotics directive instructing us to support those countries that demonstrate the political will and commitment to attack the drug problem. He also instructed the Department of State to apply stringent standards in the Congressionally- mandated certification process, a process that can result in the denial of assistance to countries that do not cooperate fully with the United States in counternarcotics or take adequate steps on their own. I have since traveled to Latin America, Asia, and Europe to talk with my counterparts, assess their efforts, and see our programs at work. My assessment is that the international narcotics trade is extremely volatile and continues to pose a grave danger to our foreign and domestic interests. The major international drug syndicates continue to target the U.S. market despite our intensified enforcement efforts in recent years. They are diversifying into other drugs and criminal activities, and are expanding their operations and markets to regions where political control is weak. We need greater international cooperation to overcome this threat. There are opportunities for advancing this objective, but current levels of cooperation and commitment are uneven at best. Focusing on Latin America, let me comment first on the cocaine situation. We made important gains last year, but they could be short-lived without stronger action by Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The good news: coca leaf production fell by 20 percent, the first decline that we have ever recorded. Virtually all of the reduction, however, occurred in Peru's Huallaga Valley as a consequence of a major fungus epidemic, declining soil fertility, and counternarcotics pressure on trafficker operations. Producers are already moving to restore supplies. Coca cultivation increased in Colombia and Bolivia, and Peruvian growers are responding to the disease by shifting cultivation to new areas. Latin American governments made important breakthroughs in attacking the cartels. Pablo Escobar--the last of Colombia's Medellin kingpins--is dead. His demise occurred not only because of outstanding work by the Colombian security forces, but also because, in the end, he had nowhere to flee--international concern had made him a virtual prisoner in his own country. "Vaticano," Peru's most notorious kingpin, was arrested in Colombia, expelled to Peru, and is now serving a lengthy sentence. Colombia's Cali cartel is meanwhile working hard to implement a legal and political strategy to thwart prosecutions by U.S. and Colombian authorities. They are seeking lenient plea bargain arrangements with Colombia's independent prosecutor and, even worse, trying to manipulate ambiguities in the revised Colombian criminal procedures that could be used to avoid punishment for serious drug crimes. We have sent a strong message to Colombia's President-elect Ernesto Samper that the crackdown on the Cali cartel must not falter if Colombia wants to sustain close relations with the United States. As pressure mounts on kingpins elsewhere, I predict that they will shift tactics to follow the pattern set by the Colombian cartel. That is, they will move from simply trying to bribe or intimidate key officials to a more comprehensive strategy aimed at permanently crippling the counternarcotics capabilities of the judicial and enforcement institutions. There is one sure way to thwart this tactic--building stronger democratic counternarcotics institutions in key Latin American drug-producing and -transit countries. Latin America also poses an expanding heroin threat to the United States. There is good news in Mexico and Guatemala. Mexican production, the traditional threat, is being held in check through eradication and related enforcement programs. The Government of Mexico is accomplishing this on its own, having assumed in 1993 full responsibility for funding and managing the $20 million a year narcotics control program the State Department formerly administered there. INM's eradication program has also virtually eliminated poppy cultivation in Guatemala. Colombia's burgeoning heroin trade, however, offsets these accomplishments and presents us with one of our most dangerous drug control challenges. Seeking to diversify operations, Colombia's cocaine traffickers have moved rapidly into opium and heroin production. The Government of Colombia, with our help, is responding with a crop eradication program, but it still faces an uphill struggle. It is more important than ever that we integrate our narcotics control policies with other foreign policy objectives in Latin America. This need comes at a time of unprecedented movement toward democracy and economic reform in the region: military control has given way to civilian rule in country after country; participatory democracy is flourishing; corruption is under attack; and trade, investment, and economic growth are moving forward. But all of this is jeopardized if the narcotics trade is not controlled. Trafficker corruption and intimidation can turn legislatures, judiciaries, police, the media, and other democratic institutions into mere facades that provide cover for drug operations. The ability of traffickers to push Colombia to the brink of political chaos prior to its 1990 presidential elections and the virtually unobstructed influence they had at the highest levels of Panama's government before Operation Just Cause underscore the magnitude of this threat. Such situations are not only disastrous for host nations, they make it impossible for us to pursue important security, trade, commercial, and other regional and bilateral relations. New opportunities for counternarcotics progress are emerging in Latin America. Thanks to our leadership, governments are increasingly aware of the political, economic, and social threat drug trafficking poses to their societies. Democratic, market- oriented governments will be especially responsive. They are more likely to recognize the adverse effects of the drug trade and to have the political will and commitment to respond. Too many governments, however, continue to underestimate the risks and, consequently, are not taking sufficient steps on their own to address them. Through a combination of sticks, carrots, and new initiatives, our strategy is designed to encourage and help them take these steps. Mr. Chairman, this was the global context on which we based our certification recommendations to the President--and on which he made the final decisions--developed our Western Hemisphere strategy, and drafted our budget. These actions underscore the promise I made when I accepted this job: there would be no more business as usual on international narcotics policy. I meant it. In fact, I would not be in this position today if I did not believe it. We will be holding countries that receive our antidrug assistance increasingly accountable for their counternarcotics performance. Certification: No More Business as Usual One area where the President's new policy has had a strong impact is certification. The Foreign Assistance Act requires that each year the President identify the major drug-producing and drug-transit countries and determine whether they have fully cooperated with the United States or taken adequate steps on their own-in narcotics control. The United States must cut off most foreign assistance to those countries that are not certified and vote against their requests for loans from multilateral development banks. For countries found not to be fully cooperating or taking adequate steps on their own, the President may grant a national interest certification if the vital interests of the United States require continued provision of foreign assistance. On April 1, in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President issued his 1994 certification determination. This year's certifications are the toughest ever. Ten of 26 countries were either not certified or granted only a vital national interest certification. More countries than ever have been placed in these categories. This is double the number so categorized every year since 1990. Among these are not just "pariah" nations, but also countries with which we have strong bilateral interests. Three countries--Nigeria, Bolivia, and Peru--had never received anything less than full certification. Nigeria was denied certification for failing to take satisfactory action to curb blatant corruption and trafficking. Bolivia and Peru did not meet the requirements for "full" certification primarily because their efforts to attack coca cultivation were insufficient, but they were granted vital national interest certifications. Two countries--Panama and Laos--each of which had been denied certification before but had been fully certified in recent years, received vital national interest certifications. Panama has failed to address squarely its role in international money laundering, the most critical drug control problem in that country. Laos has not moved actively to establish its special police counternarcotics unit, nor did it sustain pressure--after successive years of decline--to reduce opium poppy cultivation in 1993. Of the remaining five countries, we gave a vital national interest certification to Lebanon, because it is in our vital interest that Lebanon continue to receive assistance aimed at promoting economic and political stability, and to Afghanistan. To deny certification to Afghanistan would undermine progress toward political stability which is essential for counternarcotics efforts. We continued to deny certification to Burma, Iran, and Syria. These were difficult decisions. They took into account a number of important U.S. foreign policy interests. Judging from their public reactions, some countries were clearly surprised. They apparently thought that performing at the previous year's levels would be sufficient. This is not what the law requires and they know it. Some may have thought they could impress us by stepping up efforts against less critical targets. Not so. We will not accept progress by a country against marginal targets as a substitute for neglecting the key drug issue. If a country is a money laundering center, we will expect progress against this problem; increased arrests of low-level couriers will not be sufficient. Countries that were fully certified should not relax. It is no more in their interests to relax their counternarcotics efforts than it is ours. Fully certified countries must continue to strengthen and improve their drug control programs. The goal of our "no more business as usual to approach is progress, not status quo. In making our recommendations to the President, we intend to continue strictly applying the statutory standards for certification. The fact that the President decided not to grant full certification to so many countries--several for the first time-- sends powerful narcotics control messages to foreign and domestic audiences alike: International narcotics control is a key foreign policy concern that the U.S. will put ahead of other bilateral interests if necessary. We will no longer accept weak excuses for inaction; countries know what we expect. We expect concrete results. After years of supplying assistance and building institutions, we now expect key countries to be more responsible for their own antidrug programs. We are going to cut waste from global drug control programs. If assistance is not being used effectively, it will be shifted elsewhere. Many countries where we have important narcotics bilateral interests will be electing new governments soon; these new governments should realize that narcotics control is at the top of our agenda. We do not seek to embarrass governments. We do not want to force them to adopt our standards. But we want certification to be an effective tool for securing greater international narcotics control and cooperation. I believe it will be. In fact, I have a simple message for the governments of the world, the American people, and the Congress: narcotics certification is an honest process. We obviously would prefer to make substantive progress through cooperative relationships rather than impose sanctions owing to a lack of cooperation. Nevertheless, this certification decision has given our international counternarcotics policy greater credibility. It is important to sustain this momentum. I have begun exploring, in Washington and at posts abroad, improved ways of keeping the attention of key drug countries focused on achieving concrete narcotics control goals. We are in the process of making demarches to these countries, highlighting critical areas of performance during the current certification cycle. I welcome a dialogue with this Committee on how the Legislative and Executive Branches can make the certification process more effective. A final point concerning certification legislation. As you are aware, if Congress does not act by September 1994, important provisions of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 will expire, eliminating several important improvements that have helped make certification a more effective counternarcotics tool. These improvements, codified in Sections 489 and 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act, have greatly improved the scope, objectivity, and efficiency of the drug reporting and certification processes. Before the deadline, we would like to see Congress retain these sections with only a few minor language changes we hope to provide soon to the Committee. Improved Strategy: Sharper Focus, Better Tactics The Administration is making new use of these instruments because it has a new international narcotics control strategy and policy. Both were developed to find a better and more cost- effective long-term solution to our drug problem and to ensure that our foreign counternarcotics objectives are integrated with our broader foreign policy goals of promoting democracy, sustainable development, and security around the world. Allow me to highlight the key elements of that strategy. First, we will support the development of stronger democratic counternarcotics institutions in countries that demonstrate a commitment to narcotics control. This is critical for convincing host governments to shoulder more of the drug control burden. Strong and accountable institutions are the foundation for an effective policy; they are essential for successful operations. The stronger the institutions, and the more responsive they are to public concerns and respectful of the rule of law, the less likely they are to succumb to the corrosive influence of narco- corruption and intimidation. We will put more emphasis on the cocaine source countries where the political and economic stakes are potentially higher and the trade is potentially more vulnerable. Strengthening the institutional base starts with enacting good drug control laws and then building the judicial, enforcement, and penal organizations to enforce them. This must include building respect for the rule of law and human rights. Administration of justice programs that serve both ourbroader democracy-building and our drug control objectives will be a major part of this effort. So too will be training and, in some countries, support to the military, with emphasis in both cases on human rights. Other important elements include public awareness and demand-reduction programs to alleviate the adverse social effects of the drug trade and to build public support for antidrug programs. Second, we will integrate our antidrug efforts with sustainable development programs, focusing on both macro and micro objectives. Strengthening the economies of key drug- producing and -transit countries creates economic alternatives to narcotics production and trafficking and increases the resources host nations can devote to narcotics control. Macro objectives are aimed at broad-based growth that expands income and employment alternatives throughout the economy and include such measures as balance of payments supports and other programs to generate foreign trade and investment. micro objectives-- targeted in and outside drug-producing areas--are important for ensuring that small producers have viable alternatives for narcotics crops. Such projects also help to facilitate eradication and other enforcement efforts by extending government authority and presence into drug-producing areas. Third, we will seek to involve multilateral and regional organizations in our counternarcotics programs and objectives. Multilateral organizations can complement our institution- building and sustainable development initiatives, operate where our access is limited, and attract additional international donors to the antidrug effort. We will increase support to our traditional UN partner--the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP)--and will continue to urge greater involvement by other UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP. We have recently undertaken the first-ever initiatives to engage international financial institutions and multilateral development banks in the counternarcotics effort. INM and AID have already held many meetings with the leadership of the World Bank and the Inter- American Development Bank to discuss how their programs can contribute to eliminating illicit coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru. We will be coordinating with them more closely to ensure that their programs complement our counternarcotics and sustainable development objectives in host nations. Our fourth objective is to achieve more effective law enforcement operations against the kingpins and their organizations--a goal supported by institution-building and sustainable development initiatives which enhance the political will and ability of host nations to move in this direction. Although we have yet to see appropriately aggressive prosecution on significant kingpins in Colombia, recent enforcement operations in Colombia and other countries convince us that the kingpins and their organizations are now vulnerable to increased and enhanced host nation enforcement efforts. The institutional building blocks, USG support, and commitment are already in place to be more aggressive on this front. We intend to encourage greater regional and international cooperation, tougher action on chemical and money controls, adoption and implementation of aggressive and comprehensive asset forfeiture legislation, extraditions, and other measures to weaken the major organizations, and apprehend, convict, and incarcerate for appropriately severe terms of imprisonment, their leaders. Targeting the leadership of the cartels and their vast ill-gotten fortunes disrupts their entire organization, makes narcotics trafficking less profitable, and blunts the effects of corruption and intimidation, the most dangerous drug-related threats to democratic political systems. Success will depend on securing the commitment of foreign governments to set their drug enforcement sights on the kingpins. It will be achieved through good intelligence and police work and not necessarily through the constant application of high-cost technology as has been the case with interdiction. Human Rights I am aware of how the human rights issue is connected to the narcotics control assistance we provide to foreign police and military units. Fortunately, we have rarely found human rights abuses in our counter-narcotics programs, but we remain concerned. As I have already emphasized, a major thrust of our institution-building initiatives is to strengthen respect for human rights. Accordingly, we have established several mechanisms to minimize the potential for violations and to identify them and take corrective actions quickly when they occur. In Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, U.S. Embassies screen individuals for counternarcotics training, target assistance specifically for antidrug units, and monitor ongoing operations for possible abuses. We are in the process of establishing mechanisms to screen units prior to delivering counternarcotic's assistance. Meanwhile, I work closely with the Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to monitor and respond to allegations of human rights abuses by government forces that may receive funding, training, or other support from U.S. Government counternarcotics programs. Assistant Secretary Shattuck and I co-chair an interagency working group to address these problems and recently agreed to instruct our military group in Colombia to add more aggressive human rights monitoring to its end- use-monitoring mission for equipment and assistance provided to the Colombian military. INM recently discussed our Colombia initiatives with Amnesty International representatives. Our Embassies in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru have human rights working groups that mirror our efforts in Washington to identify and resolve human rights abuses. In addition, AID programs that advance drug control objectives, such as justice system reform in Colombia and Bolivia, also include mechanisms to protect human rights. The bottom line is that our counternarcotics assistance can be a powerful force in advancing, rather than retarding, human rights objectives in the hemisphere. Our training and oversight help instill respect for human rights and professionalism among police and military commanders in the host countries, a fact underscored by the virtual absence of confirmed human rights violations by counternarcotics forces. Moreover, it is through the provision of assistance that we can conduct end use monitoring and in that way keep an eye on the human rights performance of these forces. Indeed, in many ways, the narcotics kingpins, whom these commanders and their forces are trying to subdue, pose a far more fundamental threat to human rights. This is evident in the way narco-traffickers have terrorized the press, corrupted local police forces, and paralyzed the judiciary. We will remain vigilant, but I believe that a withdrawal of our counternarcotics support could be a setback for human rights. Budget Support Mr. Chairman, the President's counternarcotics strategy recognizes that we must operate within tight budgets. This is why it stresses the need to concentrate resources and pursue operations more efficiently and effectively than in the past. INM, with its program focus on institution-building and long experience in the source countries, developed its FY 1995 counternarcotics budget request for $232 million with these principles in mind. Let me assure you that we have used fiscal restraint in planning our programs. Our FY 95 request reflects a new consolidated budget that includes for the first time the traditional INM account ($152 million) as well as funds that were formerly provided through counternarcotics economic (ESF) and military (FMF) security assistance and International Military Education and Training (IMET) accounts. Of the $232 million total, approximately $205 million is for Latin American and Caribbean programs. The $232 million is less than what we had requested in FY 94 and over $100 million less than what we received in FY 93. The House recently voted out an appropriations bill that frankly jeopardizes our programs and policy. The traditional INM account was broken out and cut to $115 million, marginally more than last year. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out last week an INM budget of only $100 million. Cuts in our overall request for economic and military assistance are likely to force us to reduce further our counternarcotics assistance. We are surviving on our drastically reduced FY 94 budget by drawing on the prior-year pipeline, deferring upgrades and improvements, and seeking augmentations from ONDCP and DoD. We have cut most overseas programs to the core. A continuation at the $115 million level will have serious consequences. Scaling back source country programs: INM will be faced with reducing its plans for sustainable development initiatives in Bolivia and Peru, weakening our efforts to strengthen the political and economic underpinnings for their counternarcotics commitment and performance. We would curb aviation support to the Andes, causing large cutbacks in police operations. Closing programs: we would make deep cuts in transit country programs, possibly closing some operations completely. Judicial enhancement, intelligence collection and sharing, and interdiction operations would suffer. Stopping eradication initiatives At $115 million, we will not be able to sustain the recent momentum that has overcome major hurdles in winning greater host nation commitment to eradication. Colombia will not be able to keep pace with poppy production and will have to delay its new coca eradication efforts. Setbacks in Colombia will cause recent progress to strengthen the political will of the governments of Bolivia and Peru to falter. Gutting aviation support:. We are abiding by Congress's wishes that we get out of the air force business. We have already reduced our air wing from 62 to 48 aircraft. The budget cuts, however, would force us to make deeper reductions than planned, forcing us to either mothball aircraft or turn them over to host countries before they are fully capable of receiving or maintaining them. Diverting funds from other Priorities: To save what we can of the Andean programs, we would have to divert funding from other priority programs such as international heroin control and our new initiatives to address the organized crime threats from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. I do not mean to sound alarmist, but I do mean to inform the Committee that a $115 million budget will have practical consequences for U.S. international counternarcotics efforts. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend that there is an easy solution to the global narcotics problem. I am here to say, however, that the stakes in terms of America's security and welfare are too high for us to abandon"or disengage from the international narcotics control effort. The President has altered our approach. The increasingly dangerous nature of the threat, new opportunities, and current funding realities require it. our new approach does more than sustain pressure; it attacks at the criminal, economic, and political heart of the trade and raises the stakes against those who oppose or obstruct our efforts. We have built this strategy on lessons learned. We have enough evidence to know that it can work if given time and support, and that the consequences are dire if it is allowed to fail. I look forward to working closely with the Members of this Committee on our counternarcotics objectives and seek your support in ensuring that we have adequate funds to meet these objectives. We must avoid making cuts that will starve the President's strategy to death in its first year and leave the United States without a coherent, supportable international narcotics control strategy. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com]) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268