From: [n j j] at [cad1.mc.com] (Neil Johnson)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
Subject: Here's some stuff I found in soc.culture.colombia
Date: 29 Jun 1994 16:05:37 -0400
Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
June 22, 1994, Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
HEADLINE: TESTIMONY JUNE 22, 1994 THOMAS CONSTANTINE
ADMINISTRATOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION HOUSE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ANTI-DRUG STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Statement of
Thomas A. Constantine
Administrator
The Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
for
House Foreign Affairs Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
Concerning
International Narcotic Control Programs
June 22, 1994
Chairmen Torricelli and Lantos, Members of the Subcommittees:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the programs of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
in this hemisphere. I appreciate this chance to speak about some
of the important challenges we face in our international
programs.
I have been the Administrator of DEA for three months now,
and in that short time I have recognized the need for us to put
the international programs into a better perspective in relation
to our overall domestic drug enforcement effort. I think we
frequently lose sight of how our international programs go hand
in hand with what we are doing within our borders, and today I'd
like to talk about some important cases and DEA efforts which
link the international and domestic aspects of our drug control
mission.
Violent crime has changed the face of America during the past
decade. You cannot turn on the evening news without hearing
reports of gun violence or vicious crimes against innocent
children. Neighborhoods are no longer safe; even where I come
from in upstate New York, many people will not leave their homes
after dark, or walk down the street to buy a loaf of bread. The
links between drugs and violent crime is sometimes overlooked,
but it is real and still a central issue for us to deal with.
Before 1985, violent crime was actually decreasing after a
significant increase during the sixties and seventies. The
appearance of crack cocaine in 1985 dramatically changed the
landscape of crime and the criminal justice system in our
country. This drug, as you know, spawned violence and addiction,
tragedies we are living with every day.
My assessment is that our current violent crime wave will
remain with us for the foreseeable future. Demographics for the
coming decades indicate that by the year 2005, the number of
young people aged 15-19 will increase by 25 percent. Because
young men aged 1824 are twice as likely to commit crimes as men
over 25, we could continue to see significant rates of violent
crime well into the next century. We must break the cycle of
drug trafficking and drug abuse if we are to survive this crime
wave.
I think we can do that, but it will require us --- the
American people and our government --- to establish sound
policies and to stick with them for the long haul. This will
require both domestic and international efforts which are built
upon programs that work and have shown results.
For many years, DEA has been at the forefront of this
nation's efforts to dismantle international drug trafficking
organizations. We will continue to aggressively pursue
traffickers who operate around the globe. As Administrator, I
intend to continue DEA's important global mission, keeping the
following principles as guiding our actions in the coming years:
First, that we must recognize that cocaine and heroin have
foreign sources and the world's major trafficking organizations
are headquartered in foreign countries. Other nations have
international obligations to address the issues of drug
production and trafficking. DEA will continue to work with the
authorities in other nations to build institutions, share
intelligence and make cases which have an impact on drug
trafficking in the United States. Concurrently, we will enhance
our domestic efforts, as well, balancing both foreign and
domestic programs. That however, does not mean that we are
lessening our pressure on the ma or traffickers in Colombia,
Bolivia and Peru, but rather, that we will increase our
attention on the surrogates that operate within our borders.
Second, that resources for international programs must be
dedicated intelligently and strategically, allowing DEA the
flexibility to act quickly as new threats and opportunities
arise.
Third, that we have an obligation to the American people to
enhance the quality of life in our communities across the nation.
DEA has a major role to play in removing violent traffickers, who
have a direct link to the degradation of life in our communities,
from neighborhoods, and reducing the amount of drugs trafficked
in our cities and towns.
Fourth, that heroin is a major concern to us, and
international and domestic programs must be developed to address
this problem before it becomes any more serious.
I intend to use these principles to formulate DEA's
contribution to the international strategy, articulated in
Presidential Decision Directive 14, which was signed by President
Clinton last November. This Directive states that "the United
States will treat as a serious national security threat the
operations of international criminal syndicates" and will assist
those nations demonstrating the political will necessary to fight
narcotics trafficking. I'd like to take a few minutes to discuss
with you some developments which have led to these assumptions.
Major Traffickers and their Surrogates: Despite the fact that
an increasing percentage of cocaine is being shipped to new
European markets, the U.S. continues to be the main target for
shipments from the Colombian cocaine cartels. The Cali cartel
maintains a lock on much of the U.S. cocaine supply. This
organization, headquartered in Colombia, depends on cocaine
producers and transporters in Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, other
Central American nations, and the United States. It also staffs
distribution organizations in the major cities of the United
States with Colombians who subcontract with street organizations
in these cities. DEA has a two-tiered approach to reducing the
cocaine supply in the U.S. : targeting the cartel leaders in
Colombia and eliminating their surrogates' operations in the
United States.
It is critical to gather enough information on the major
cartel leaders for indictments in the event that they will be
brought to justice in the U.S. That, however, is less of a
possibility today than it was prior to Colombian constitutional
prohibition on the extradition of nationals. Nevertheless, DEA
continues to put pressure on the cartels by interfering with
their money supplies, transportation networks, chemical supplies
and communications --- all the means that are critical to their
operations. During the past year, DEA, working with other U.S.
agencies and with counterparts in Andean and Central American
nations, made significant inroads into the cocaine trade in this
hemisphere. Some of these include:
Medellin cartel leaders were either jailed or killed. Pablo
Escobar and Juan Camilo ZAPATA-Vasquez were killed in shootouts
with the Colombian National Police. Fabio OCHOA was sentenced to
an eight year prison term.
A major Peruvian trafficker, Demetrio CHAVEZ-Penaherrera (aka
VATICANO) was arrested in Cali and expelled to Peru where he is
now serving a thirty year prison sentence.
Julio Fabio URDINOLA-Grajales, the brother of Ivan Urdinola,
one of Colombia's major money launderers, surrendered to
Colombian authorities in March.
On September 2, 1993, Jaime Garcia-Garcia, whose organization
provided major transportation services for a number of major
Colombian traffickers, was arrested by Colombian authorities; he
is presently incarcerated. Prior to his arrest, in June 1993, one
of Garcia's former associates Joaquin Guzman-Loera, was arrested
in Guatemala on the El Salvador border.
Seizures included major loads in Guatemala (6.6 MT), Mexico
(33.1 MD, OPBAT (2.2 MT) and Peru (8,900 kg).
Several other former leaders of the Medellin cartel remain
incarcerated.
Of equal importance to DEA are accomplishments which have a
direct effect on U.S. cocaine supplies and operations within our
borders. Most cases have both international and domestic
elements, and many could not have been undertaken successfully
without the involvement of our overseas offices. A few examples:
A New York-based Dominican Ramon Valasquez was transporting
Colombian cocaine through Mexico into New York. An informant
arranged to transport 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Mexico thru
Texas into New York. The cocaine was delivered back to
Colombians in New York, where it was seized. Valasquez worked
with Mexican transporters, Colombians in New York and Mexicans in
Texas.
A Colombian cocaine trafficker/money launderer who imported
cocaine from Colombia to Mexico to New Jersey, used car
dealerships in both Los Angeles and Phoenix, Arizona to
facilitate distribution. In June 1992, 800 kilograms of cocaine
transported in a R.V. was seized in Phoenix, Arizona, and 8
individuals were arrested. The Colombian trafficker is currently
a fugitive.
DEA/Tucson targeted a Mexican transportation group based in
Agua Prieta Sonora, Mexico. This group transported Colombian
cocaine and Mexican marijuana. A six-month wiretap investigation,
which monitored 19 telephones and intercepted radio mobile
telephone communications, resulted in the indictment of 108
defendants in the U.S. and Mexico, as well as the seizure of
4,000 pounds of marijuana, 200 kilograms of cocaine, and $3.5
million in assets.
DEA/Houston targeted Colombians and Mexicans transporting
Colombian cocaine into Houston. The organization utilized
"trapped" vehicles, which were loaded with cocaine in Colombia
and driven through Guatemala and Mexico and into Texas. The money
was smuggled back to Colombia in the same fashion. The cocaine
smuggled into Houston was further distributed in New York,
Chicago and Louisiana.
In November, 1993, as a result of a lookout placed by the
Santiago, Chile Country Office, the Newark Field Division of DEA
seized 606 kilograms of cocaine from containers shipped from
Chile.
Through wire intercepts, pen registers and surveillance,
earlier this month (June 1-2), DEA seized 150 kilograms of
cocaine, $600,000 and numerous documents connected to a cocaine
trafficking organization related to Ivan Urdinola and other major
traffickers in Miami, New York and Houston. 32 people were
arrested, including a cell manager for the Houston area. Prior
enforcement action taken in this investigation in Miami, Houston,
and New York resulted in the arrest of over 18 suspects, and the
seizure of 5 pounds of Colombian heroin, nearly 1,470 kilograms
of cocaine, and over $15 million.
DEA depends heavily on the use of court-ordered wiretaps to
intercept conversations in pursuit of making cases against the
cartel members. These Title 3's are costly and manpower
intensive since most of the conversations are in Spanish and must
be translated into English. Last year, Title 3's agency-wide
cost over $14 million; this year's cost is projected to be about
$17 million.
A major Nigerian heroin trafficking organization was
documented in August 1993 with the arrest of two Nigerians in
Bangkok, Thailand. Extradition proceedings are pending against
each of these individuals, who face heroin importation charges in
New Jersey. This investigation also developed intelligence that
led to indictments in the Northern District of California,
District of Florida, and District of Minnesota for separate multi-
kilogram importations of heroin into the United States.
Additional intelligence and evidence to support prosecutions of
American- based members of this organization in the Eastern and
Northern District of New York was also developed. The
investigation confirmed that this Nigerian trafficking
organization operated in Southeast Asia, utilized New Jersey
based West Africans, and imported multiple kilograms of heroin
annually into the United States. The organization utilized
international monetary transfers to facilitate this importation
and to disburse the proceeds. In addition, the organization was
also responsible for supplying secondary distribution
organizations operating in the Northeast, Middle Atlantic and
Midwest areas of the United States.
The intemational-domestic links between major cocaine
organizations and the street-level drug trade in the United
States are well illustrated by a case I'm familiar with from my
days as Superintendent of the New York State Police. The Herrera
family, with direction from Cali, Colombia, operated a cell in
New York City. The cell head was Helmer Herrera, brother of the
cartel head. (The Herrera organization's annual profits were
three times those of DEA's yearly budget.) All decisions carried
out in the United States were made in Colombia --which phone
numbers to use, which loads to move, what to pay workers.
Detailed records on salaries, family history of workers and
consignments of cocaine were kept. This was the cocaine which
ended up in the suburbs of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut,
the cocaine which was ultimately distributed by violent street
gangs. DEA, working with the New York State Police, dismantled
this cell and seized records, computer disks and money. 100
arrests were made, 22 of which were principal defendants. After
a disruption of several months, another cell resumed operations
and there was no ultimate reduction in cocaine supplies in New
York.
What this case proves is the fact that both ends of the
cocaine trade must be vigorously pursued. Players on both ends
are replaceable, and the pressure must be kept up at the high,
middle and low ends of the trade. While Pacho Herrera heads the
arm of the cocaine organization doing part of the cocaine
business in New York City, it is the violent street gangs who
shoot children in the public housing complex in Washington
Heights. It's critical to get them off the street too.
We are at an important junction in our drug strategy. At a
time when resources for law enforcement and foreign assistance
programs are tight, we are having to balance the need to protect
Americans from crime in our streets with our international
obligations to our overseas partners in the drug fight. As the
Administrator of DEA, I am reviewing both our domestic and
international programs to determine how we can make better use of
our resources. I expect that with the advice and input of DEA's
senior management, we will be streamlining some of our
international efforts in order to ensure that our programs
contribute to the overall drug strategy which has both domestic
and international components.
The Need to Balance International and Domestic Programs:
Building on the premise that we must balance our domestic
enforcement programs and our international efforts, I would like
to discuss some of the obstacles we must overcome to be
successful in our international programs. The reality is that
major traffickers have intimidated or subomed various police and
government officials, enabling them to continue operating. There
are limits on what the United States can expect foreign nations
to do, given the fact that many of these nations do not control
large areas where drug production and trafficking take place. We
have more leverage in some places than in others; in a country
like Burma, the source of most of the world's opium, we have
almost none. We cannot influence Colombia's Constitutional
Court, which recently held that possession and use of small
amounts of certain drugs are constitutionally protected in
Colombia, nor can we control government officials who advocate
more liberal drug policies in Colombia. We can, and do, use the
Presidential certification process to send strong signals to
other nations to comply with their international obligations to
reduce drug production and trafficking, and in some cases, the
message is heard loud and clear. The President's decision not to
certify Nigeria has certainly gotten that government's attention.
International programs are an important component of our
overall strategy which must be viewed through the prism of
reality. We must not abandon or significantly scale back these
programs. But, we cannot expect them to solve our drug problem
or eliminate drug trafficking and abuse from our nation.
DEA will absolutely continue to support institution building
in other nations as we implement the President's directive.
Working with the Colombian National Police, we have been able to
help them enhance their law enforcement operations aimed against
production and transportation networks in more remote regions of
Colombia. We have also been able to increase the Bolivian
Government's capabilities in managing, assessing and
disseminating drug intelligence information. DEA has been
instrumental in improving the ability of law enforcement
organizations in Mexico, El Salvador and Argentina, to cite some
examples. Regarding DEA programs, such as Snowcap, we will
ensure that the role of DEA is to train and provide liaison with
host-country enforcement organizations. As host countries
gradually become more sophisticated and capable in their law
enforcement programs, there will be less of a need for DEA to
play a direct operational role. During 1993, 2,383 officers from
45 countries have been trained in basic and advanced drug
enforcement by DEA. Of particular note is our work with
officials from the Newly Independent States whose nations are now
confronting a serious drug problem. Later this month, I will be
traveling with FBI Director Freeh and (State) INM Assistant
Secretary Robert Gelbard to Russia and several Eastern European
countries to assess their needs as these countries address crime
and drugs.
I have asked DEA's top management to take a look at our
international programs, including Operation Snowcap, and report
back to me on whether these programs should continue as currently
structured. I believe that our commitments to some of these
programs should not be limitless, given budget and staffing
realities. DEA will continue to participate as a full partner in
our international programs, but we need to be more conscious of
costs and results than we have in the past.
Heroin: I am deeply concerned about the increased
availability and dramatically increased purity in heroin in the
United States. Worldwide production of opium rose from 2,580
metric tons in 1988 to 3,699 metric tons in 1993. Most of this
production occurred in Afghanistan and Burma, where the central
government does not control the growing areas. In addition,
analysis of data from DEA's Domestic Monitor Program shows street-
level purity continuing to rise. Heroin purity in the United
States has increased from 3.6 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in
1992. With the increase in heroin availability and purity
levels, we have also seen a continued rise in the number of
heroin-related emergency room drug abuse episodes, especially in
Seattle, Newark and San Francisco.
Of special concern is the fact that traffickers in Colombia
are cultivating opium and producing heroin. Despite the
Colombian government's herbicidal eradication program, there are
about 20,000 hectares of opium under cultivation. This makes
Colombia the world's third largest source of opium poppy. From
an enforcement standpoint, we are also concerned because Colombia
has in place sophisticated trafficking networks which could
readily diversify into heroin trafficking.
During the coming months, DEA, as part of the
Administration's review of heroin programs, will be developing
heroin strategies to address the myriad heroin threats from
Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, Nigerian traffickers and the
Colombian organizations now producing and trafficking heroin. We
must vigorously confront this threat by focusing the operational
resources of all international intelligence and law enforcement
agencies on attacking the infrastructure and leadership of these
trafficking organizations. We must identify and attack the
weaknesses in these organizations and disrupt their financial
operations, as well as arrest, prosecute and imprison those
responsible. This will take a concerted effort by the
international community to address this renewed threat from an
old enemy.
Flexibility to meet new opportunities and threats: DEA must
remain flexible and innovative in addressing the challenges posed
by international drug traffickers. In order to respond fully to
both the domestic and international aspects of the drug problem,
we must have the necessary resources required to address this
national threat. These international drug organizations are well-
financed, with connections throughout the United States and
abroad. Therefore, DEA must be in a position to move quickly to
address emerging threats after having identified opportunities
for meaningful actions.
In closing, I again want to thank the Chairmen for this
opportunity to discuss DEA's international programs with you
today. I know that the coming months hold much challenge for me
personally and for DEA as an agency. I will be happy to answer
any questions you, or others on the Committee may have.