Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: Defense Department's Counterdrug Support Programs
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:07 GMT
[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:00:35 GMT ]
Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
June 22, 1994, Wednesday
Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony
Headline: Testimony June 22, 1994 Brian Sheridan Deputy Asistant
Secretary Of Defense Department Of Defense House Foreign
Affairs/International Security, International Organizations And
Human Rights Anti-Drug Strategy In The Western Hemisphere
Statement Of
Brian E. Sheridan
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense For
Drug Enforcement Policy And Support
At A Hearing Before The
Subcommittee On International Security, International
Organizations, And Human Rights And The Subcommittee
On Western Hemisphere Affairs House Committee On Foreign
Affairs
June 22, 1994
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the Defense
Department's counterdrug support programs with you today. During
the last year DOD has significantly restructured its counterdrug
policy in order to maximize its support of the President's
National Drug Control Strategy within existing fiscal guidance.
I would like to give you an overview of the new DOD counterdrug
policy and programs, among which are activities that support
source nation counterdrug efforts in the Andean region.
First, I would like to touch on some of the realities that
have been brought home very clearly to me in the year that I have
been the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug
Enforcement Policy and Support. Foremost among these is the
enormity of the drug problem facing our Nation. Although the
scourge of drug use has been displaced in the headlines in recent
years, it is not hard to see that the issues that have moved to
the forefront of public concern - crime and healthcare - are
integrally connected to the problem of drug use. While we, as a
nation, have had some success in past years at decreasing the
casual use of drugs, hardcore use continues unabated and, worse
still, recent surveys indicate that our young may be increasing
their use of drugs. Drug-related crime continues to plague our
streets. We all see the tragic effects on the individuals whose
lives are destroyed by drug use or drug-related violence, and we
all feel the resulting strain on our local communities and our
criminal justice and healthcare systems. The numbers are
striking: 2.7 million Americans are chronic hardcore users;
10,000 Americans die because of drugs annually; and, illegal drug
use drains our economy of tens of billions of dollars each year.
In addition to the horrors inflicted by drugs in our own
country, drug trafficking continues to threaten the integrity of
Latin American democracies. Narcotraffickers have repeatedly used
violence and corruption to try to undermine the legislatures,
judiciaries, militaries, and police in Latin America. In
Colombia alone, hundreds of innocent citizens have been killed
and thousands injured by the drug cartels. Furthermore, there
has been insufficient attention given to the ecological harms
inflicted by the cultivation and processing of illegal drugs.
Slash and burn farming techniques have been used to increase the
production of coca and poppies, and the runoff of large
quantities of precursor chemicals used to manufacture cocaine is
polluting the environment.
Given the complexity of the issues surrounding drug use, I
have become convinced that there is a need for increased dialogue
among the Defense Department, Congress, and the American people
about the role of DOD in the counterdrug effort. When the
Defense Department was drafted into the counterdrug effort in
1989, many people held out the hope that military involvement was
the answer to our Nation's drug problem; the term "drug war"
misleadingly implied that, with a concerted effort, the military
could engage the enemy and bring victory. We must recognize that
illicit drug use is a deepseated social problem which, like the
problems of crime and inner-city poverty, will have to be
addressed by all Americans over the long- term. As the
President's recently announced National Drug Control Strategy
indicates, the Federal counterdrug effort should involve multiple
agencies cooperating to address the drug issue simultaneously on
a variety of fronts. The Defense Department, with its unique
assets and capabilities, has a critical, but supporting, role to
play in that effort. Any assessment of DOD's contribution should
be made in this context, and with an eye toward incremental
progress.
It is my belief that through effective strategic planning,
and increased dialogue with the Congress and other Federal
counterdrug agencies, we can better articulate reasonable
expectations for the wide variety of counterdrug programs
executed by DOD. Given that more than three times as much coca
is currently produced than is needed to satisfy the U.S. demand
for cocaine, it is not realistic to expect Federal supply
reduction efforts to significantly limit the availability of
cocaine in the near-term. There are, however, a number of goals
that coordinated Federal efforts can be expected to achieve,
including: disrupting the cocaine cartels, raising the costs of
drug trafficking, and denying traffickers their preferred methods
and routes, in particular the ability to fly directly into
Florida and over the Southwest border. The Defense Department
has contributed to significant successes in these areas. In
1993, DOD support activities led directly to the seizure of over
100 metric tons of cocaine that would otherwise have ended up on
U.S. streets, and thereby denied traffickers the associated
profits.
During the last year I have taken a number of steps to more
aggressively manage DOD's counterdrug programs and resources
which previously had grown at an explosive rate. As you know,
the DOD counterdrug budget rose from $380 million to $1.1 billion
between Fiscal Years 1989 and 1993. Last summer, at my
suggestion, the Department initiated an internal Comprehensive
Review of DOD counterdrug activities that was conducted by a team
consisting of representatives of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The Review Team evaluated the operational impact and cost-
effectiveness of each of DOD's 170 counterdrug projects with
respect to National objectives, and recommended $135 million in
cuts to specific programs which were deemed of limited
operational impact. When the DOD counterdrug budget was
significantly reduced in the FY 94 Appropriation process, rather
than allocate the undistributed reductions across the board, we
directed cuts based on the findings of the Comprehensive Review.
As a result, twenty-four programs that had been found to be of
insufficient utility have been terminated. The level of funding
for numerous other programs was decreased in favor of more cost-
effective alternatives, while bringing the Department's
activities in line with the priorities of the National Drug
Control Strategy. This restructuring, which I will describe in
more detail in a moment, has been implemented in FY 94 and is
still being refined. The Department recommends continuing this
strategy and programmatic initiative which is reflected in the FY
95 budget request. As a mechanism for analyzing the results of
the restructuring, and in order to ensure that the level of
accountability for DOD counterdrug expenditures continues to
rise, I have established a working group of experts, with members
from relevant divisions under the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, to
serve as a quasi-Board of Directors for DOD counterdrug
activities. This group will review counterdrug program
effectiveness on an ongoing basis, and consider additional policy
initiatives. I will now more specifically describe the policy
and programs that DOD is implementing.
Background
As you are aware, DOD was given a number of counterdrug
responsibilities in 1989. Specifically, DOD was:
(1) assigned the lead role in the detection and monitoring of the
air and maritime transport of illegal drugs;
(2) tasked to integrate the command, control, communications, and
tactical intelligence counterdrug assets of Federal agencies;
and,
(3) directed to approve and fund Governor's State Plans for
National Guard counterdrug support efforts in each of the 54
states and territories.
DOD has effectively executed and continues to execute each of
these missions, developing an integrated DOD counterdrug program
involving the operational activities of five supported CINCS.
These activities have been in support of U.S. and Host Nation law
enforcement agencies; DOD personnel have not engaged in direct
law enforcement activities such as arrests and seizures.
Impetus for Refocusing DOD Counterdrug Policy
Despite the combined efforts of DOD and the other Federal
agencies with counterdrug responsibilities, the flow of cocaine
and other illegal drugs into the U.S. continues to constitute a
critical threat to National security. The Clinton Administration
has clearly articulated a multifaceted strategy for addressing
the myriad of problems associated with illicit drug use. In both
the Interim National Drug Control Strategy and the recently
released 1994 National Drug Control Strategy, President Clinton
has called for an integrated Federal effort with increased drug
education, prevention and treatment, as well as renewed
commitment to supply reduction activities. Domestically, supply
reduction efforts are to give priority to the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's) and are to be supported by increased
funding for community policing. With respect to international
supply reduction, the new National Strategy directs a controlled
shift in emphasis from the transit zone to the source nations of
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.
In response to the new Presidential direction from the
National Strategy, and incorporating the findings of our internal
Comprehensive Review, the Department of Defense issued new
counterdrug policy guidance in October, 1993. Signed by then
Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, the new guidance
refocused DOD counterdrug policy around five strategic elements:
(1) support to cocaine source nations;
(2) intelligence support targeted toward dismantling cartels;
(3) detection and monitoring of the transport of illegal drugs;
(4) support to domestic drug law enforcement agencies,
emphasizing the Southwest border and other High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's); and
(5) demand reduction. .1 will discuss the plans and objectives
within each of these five strategic elements in a moment.
It should be noted that while cocaine consumption continues
to pose the greatest drug problem in the United States, and
continues to be the top priority of the National Drug Control
Strategy, the increasing supply and purity of heroin in the U.S.
warrants increased attention. Colombia's role as a supplier of
heroin in the Western Hemisphere is growing, and there are
increasing reports of opium cultivation in Peru. DOD is
committed to assisting increased law enforcement efforts aimed at
heroin kingpins and their organizations. However, in light of
the fragmented and complex nature of the heroin industry, any
support provided by DOD must be applied judiciously. DOD is
currently involved in an interagency process to review and
strengthen our international heroin strategy which will result in
recommendations submitted to the President for approval this
year.
New DOD Counterdrug Policy
1) Source Nation Support - The new National Strategy calls
for increased support to those nations that demonstrate the
political will to combat narcotrafficking. Specifically, DOD
will focus its supporting efforts in the Andean countries of
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Support will be aimed at
strengthening the democratic institutions in these nations,
encouraging national resolve and regional cooperation, and
further developing air sovereignty and ground-based endgame
(effective arrest and prosecution) capabilities with the
objective of moving these nations toward self-sustaining
counterdrug programs. DOD will achieve these goals by providing,
to the extent feasible and effective, consistent with law,
training and operational support to source nation police and
military units with counterdrug responsibilities through
deployments funded by security assistance or counterdrug funding
-- primarily by utilizing authority under Section 1004 of the FY
91 National Defense Authorization Act as amended, and Sections
517 and 506(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as
amended. All source nation activities will be accomplished in
cooperation with the Host Nations, and under the auspices of the
U.S. State Department. As in the past, DOD personnel will be
prohibited from engaging in, or accompanying Host Nation forces
on, law enforcement operations.
The Department understands the need for vigilant sensitivity
to the danger of human rights abuses in the Andean region. For
this reason all DOD training of Host Nation forces includes a
human rights component. Furthermore, the Defense Department, in
coordination with the State Department's Bureau of International
Narcotics Matters, has established standard operating procedures
for end use monitoring of U.S.supplied equipment. Additionally,
DOD has strengthened its end use monitoring practices by
requiring all Department personnel who deploy to the field to
verify the presence and use of U.S. supplied equipment at the
unit or site they are visiting.
In the last year U.S. efforts to bolster the political will
and the enforcement capabilities of source nations have yielded
encouraging results. One of the largest Peruvian drug
traffickers, Demitrio Chavez Penaherra, aka "Vaticanon, was
arrested in Colombia and expelled to Peru where he was prosecuted
for narcotrafficking and treason; he is now serving a 30 year
sentence. Moreover, the end of the eighteen-month pursuit of
Pablo Escobar marked the demise of the once dominant Medellin
cartel. Additionally, the government of Bolivia, in joint
operations with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
dismantled four major cocaine trafficking organizations in 1993.
No one is under any illusions that fighting drug traffic in the
Andes is less complicated than it has ever been, but we should
look to these recent successes as reasons for hope, and for
lessons about what types of programs work.
In addition to the DOD programs that directly assist source
nation counterdrug efforts, a number of the programs which I'll
describe below as part of other strategic elements of the DOD
counterdrug policy also support U.S. objectives in the Andean
region. It is important to understand that the DOD counterdrug
policy is designed to support the multifaceted approach directed
by the National Drug Control to exert pressure on the drug trade
from a variety of angles simultaneously.
2) Dismantling the Cartels - Among the most cost-effective
contributions which DOD can make to cooperative counterdrug
efforts is bringing its intelligence capabilities to projects
that target trafficking organizations. DOD is enhancing its
support of the DEA's Kingpin Strategy and the Counterdrug
Community's Kingpin Linear Approach which are specifically
designed to dismantle the cocaine cartels and the cocaine
business. DOD is also enhancing support to drug law enforcement
agencies through the use of Section 1004 authority to provide
translator and intelligence analyst support, and by expanding
intelligence gathering and sharing programs. Additionally, the
FY 95 budget request reflects DOD's funding for the National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC).
3) Detection and Monitoring of the Transport of Illegal Drugs
- DOD will support domestic law enforcement and host nation
detection and monitoring efforts by:
(a) emphasizing activities in the cocaine source countries of
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru;
(b) streamlining activities in the transit zone (the region
between the source countries and the U.S. border region), with
detection and monitoring efforts focused toward intelligencecued
operations that directly support the Kingpin Linear Approach and
source country and arrival zone operations; and
(c) refocusing activities in the U.S. to emphasize the cocaine
threat at critical border locations.
The use of more cost-effective technologies (such as
relocatable- over-the-horizonradars (ROTHRs), and refitted TAGOS
Radar Picket ships), in place of some of the more costly ship
steaming and flying done in the past, is allowing DOD to maintain
a robust and flexible detection and monitoring capability in the
transit zone. The ROTHR operating in Chesapeake, Virginia, since
early 1993 has provided promising results. The addition of a
second ROTHR, scheduled to be operational in FY 95, will render
more complete coverage of the transit area. Additionally, in FY
95 we hope to begin site preparation for a ROTHR in Puerto Rico
that will improve coverage of the source nation area.
4) Direct Support to Domestic Drug Law Enforcement Agencies
(DLEAs)-Emphasizing the Southwest Border and other High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas DOD will continue to directly support
domestic DLEAs through:
(a) a Detailee program that provides intelligence analysts,
translators, and support personnel;
(b) a program implementing Section 1004 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, as
amended, that provides transportation, maintenance, equipment
upgrades and other forms of support;
(c) a program implementing Section 1208 of the NDAA that provides
excess DOD equipment to Federal, State and local DLEAS through
four regional logistical support offices; and
(d) the Governors' State Counterdrug Plans that use the National
Guard to support DLEAs and drug demand reduction activities.
DOD is developing comprehensive prioritization plans for
requirements submitted under these programs, emphasizing the
importance of efforts at the Southwest border and other High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. If allowed by Congress, the
Department will increase funding support for the Section 1004-
program. In addition, DOD will continue to support Federal
counterdrug law enforcement agencies in addressing multi-agency
counterdrug command, control, communications, and technical
intelligence problems. DOD is also aggressively pursuing a
research and development program for cargo container inspection
systems. The technologies being explored utilize very
sophisticated X-ray and nuclear techniques and will be
demonstrated at testbed sites in Otay Mesa, California, Tacoma,
Washington, and at relocatable systems testbeds on the Southwest
border.
5) Demand Reduction - All Military Department and Defense
Agency drug testing and education programs will be continued,
with an emphasis placed on increased regionalization, automation,
and consolidation of testing. Additionally, DOD will continue the
community outreach demand reduction pilot program directed by the
FY 93 Defense Authorization Act. As part of the pilot study,
each of the Military Departments and the National Guard are
running programs which use military personnel as role models and
target at-risk youth. We are currently reviewing the efficacy of
these programs, and a report and accompanying recommendations
will be sent to Congress this fall.
These five strategic elements form the basis for a focused
DOD counterdrug program which directly supports the National Drug
Control Strategy. It is within this framework that we evaluate
the efficacy of each of our many different projects. As
discussed earlier, the reductions in the Department's FY 94
counterdrug budget were distributed in accordance with the
findings of the Comprehensive Review; this was done with an eye
toward achieving a balance among the five strategic areas that
reflects the priorities of the National Strategy. The following
charts show, by strategic area, how the budget distribution has
evolved to fit the new policy guidance, with continuing
refinements in the FY 95 request.
Conclusion
In summary, the Department's restructured counterdrug policy
is well defined and directly supports the National Drug Control
Strategy. In the last year DOD has significantly improved
program management, and efforts to further enhance program
effectiveness and increase accountability are underway. The
Administration's budget request for FY 1995 Defense Department
counterdrug activities represents 7% of the Federal counterdrug
budget. At that funding level DOD will be able to continue to
provide meaningful assistance to overburdened Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies, and crucial support to fragile
democracies in Latin America.
There can be no doubt of the harm illicit drugs inflict.
While DOD does not have a "silver bullet" that could end the drug
problem quickly, it does have unique talents and assets to bring
to the interagency counterdrug effort. Internationally, DOD is
engaged in operations that significantly strengthen the ability
of foreign governments, particularly those in the Andean region,
to arrest and prosecute drug traffickers. Domestically, the
results of DOD counterdrug programs - from providing excess
equipment to State police, to funding National Guard demand
reduction programs for at risk youth, to detailing intelligence
analysts to Federal agencies to prepare evidence for successful
criminal prosecutions - impact communities around the country
every day.
--
--------------------------------------------------------------------
"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
under conditions of absolute reality"
-- Shirley Jackson
The Haunting of Hill House
Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268