Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins) Subject: Defense Department's Counterdrug Support Programs Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:07 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:00:35 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony June 22, 1994, Wednesday Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony Headline: Testimony June 22, 1994 Brian Sheridan Deputy Asistant Secretary Of Defense Department Of Defense House Foreign Affairs/International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights Anti-Drug Strategy In The Western Hemisphere Statement Of Brian E. Sheridan Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Drug Enforcement Policy And Support At A Hearing Before The Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights And The Subcommittee On Western Hemisphere Affairs House Committee On Foreign Affairs June 22, 1994 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the Defense Department's counterdrug support programs with you today. During the last year DOD has significantly restructured its counterdrug policy in order to maximize its support of the President's National Drug Control Strategy within existing fiscal guidance. I would like to give you an overview of the new DOD counterdrug policy and programs, among which are activities that support source nation counterdrug efforts in the Andean region. First, I would like to touch on some of the realities that have been brought home very clearly to me in the year that I have been the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. Foremost among these is the enormity of the drug problem facing our Nation. Although the scourge of drug use has been displaced in the headlines in recent years, it is not hard to see that the issues that have moved to the forefront of public concern - crime and healthcare - are integrally connected to the problem of drug use. While we, as a nation, have had some success in past years at decreasing the casual use of drugs, hardcore use continues unabated and, worse still, recent surveys indicate that our young may be increasing their use of drugs. Drug-related crime continues to plague our streets. We all see the tragic effects on the individuals whose lives are destroyed by drug use or drug-related violence, and we all feel the resulting strain on our local communities and our criminal justice and healthcare systems. The numbers are striking: 2.7 million Americans are chronic hardcore users; 10,000 Americans die because of drugs annually; and, illegal drug use drains our economy of tens of billions of dollars each year. In addition to the horrors inflicted by drugs in our own country, drug trafficking continues to threaten the integrity of Latin American democracies. Narcotraffickers have repeatedly used violence and corruption to try to undermine the legislatures, judiciaries, militaries, and police in Latin America. In Colombia alone, hundreds of innocent citizens have been killed and thousands injured by the drug cartels. Furthermore, there has been insufficient attention given to the ecological harms inflicted by the cultivation and processing of illegal drugs. Slash and burn farming techniques have been used to increase the production of coca and poppies, and the runoff of large quantities of precursor chemicals used to manufacture cocaine is polluting the environment. Given the complexity of the issues surrounding drug use, I have become convinced that there is a need for increased dialogue among the Defense Department, Congress, and the American people about the role of DOD in the counterdrug effort. When the Defense Department was drafted into the counterdrug effort in 1989, many people held out the hope that military involvement was the answer to our Nation's drug problem; the term "drug war" misleadingly implied that, with a concerted effort, the military could engage the enemy and bring victory. We must recognize that illicit drug use is a deepseated social problem which, like the problems of crime and inner-city poverty, will have to be addressed by all Americans over the long- term. As the President's recently announced National Drug Control Strategy indicates, the Federal counterdrug effort should involve multiple agencies cooperating to address the drug issue simultaneously on a variety of fronts. The Defense Department, with its unique assets and capabilities, has a critical, but supporting, role to play in that effort. Any assessment of DOD's contribution should be made in this context, and with an eye toward incremental progress. It is my belief that through effective strategic planning, and increased dialogue with the Congress and other Federal counterdrug agencies, we can better articulate reasonable expectations for the wide variety of counterdrug programs executed by DOD. Given that more than three times as much coca is currently produced than is needed to satisfy the U.S. demand for cocaine, it is not realistic to expect Federal supply reduction efforts to significantly limit the availability of cocaine in the near-term. There are, however, a number of goals that coordinated Federal efforts can be expected to achieve, including: disrupting the cocaine cartels, raising the costs of drug trafficking, and denying traffickers their preferred methods and routes, in particular the ability to fly directly into Florida and over the Southwest border. The Defense Department has contributed to significant successes in these areas. In 1993, DOD support activities led directly to the seizure of over 100 metric tons of cocaine that would otherwise have ended up on U.S. streets, and thereby denied traffickers the associated profits. During the last year I have taken a number of steps to more aggressively manage DOD's counterdrug programs and resources which previously had grown at an explosive rate. As you know, the DOD counterdrug budget rose from $380 million to $1.1 billion between Fiscal Years 1989 and 1993. Last summer, at my suggestion, the Department initiated an internal Comprehensive Review of DOD counterdrug activities that was conducted by a team consisting of representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Review Team evaluated the operational impact and cost- effectiveness of each of DOD's 170 counterdrug projects with respect to National objectives, and recommended $135 million in cuts to specific programs which were deemed of limited operational impact. When the DOD counterdrug budget was significantly reduced in the FY 94 Appropriation process, rather than allocate the undistributed reductions across the board, we directed cuts based on the findings of the Comprehensive Review. As a result, twenty-four programs that had been found to be of insufficient utility have been terminated. The level of funding for numerous other programs was decreased in favor of more cost- effective alternatives, while bringing the Department's activities in line with the priorities of the National Drug Control Strategy. This restructuring, which I will describe in more detail in a moment, has been implemented in FY 94 and is still being refined. The Department recommends continuing this strategy and programmatic initiative which is reflected in the FY 95 budget request. As a mechanism for analyzing the results of the restructuring, and in order to ensure that the level of accountability for DOD counterdrug expenditures continues to rise, I have established a working group of experts, with members from relevant divisions under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, to serve as a quasi-Board of Directors for DOD counterdrug activities. This group will review counterdrug program effectiveness on an ongoing basis, and consider additional policy initiatives. I will now more specifically describe the policy and programs that DOD is implementing. Background As you are aware, DOD was given a number of counterdrug responsibilities in 1989. Specifically, DOD was: (1) assigned the lead role in the detection and monitoring of the air and maritime transport of illegal drugs; (2) tasked to integrate the command, control, communications, and tactical intelligence counterdrug assets of Federal agencies; and, (3) directed to approve and fund Governor's State Plans for National Guard counterdrug support efforts in each of the 54 states and territories. DOD has effectively executed and continues to execute each of these missions, developing an integrated DOD counterdrug program involving the operational activities of five supported CINCS. These activities have been in support of U.S. and Host Nation law enforcement agencies; DOD personnel have not engaged in direct law enforcement activities such as arrests and seizures. Impetus for Refocusing DOD Counterdrug Policy Despite the combined efforts of DOD and the other Federal agencies with counterdrug responsibilities, the flow of cocaine and other illegal drugs into the U.S. continues to constitute a critical threat to National security. The Clinton Administration has clearly articulated a multifaceted strategy for addressing the myriad of problems associated with illicit drug use. In both the Interim National Drug Control Strategy and the recently released 1994 National Drug Control Strategy, President Clinton has called for an integrated Federal effort with increased drug education, prevention and treatment, as well as renewed commitment to supply reduction activities. Domestically, supply reduction efforts are to give priority to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's) and are to be supported by increased funding for community policing. With respect to international supply reduction, the new National Strategy directs a controlled shift in emphasis from the transit zone to the source nations of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. In response to the new Presidential direction from the National Strategy, and incorporating the findings of our internal Comprehensive Review, the Department of Defense issued new counterdrug policy guidance in October, 1993. Signed by then Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, the new guidance refocused DOD counterdrug policy around five strategic elements: (1) support to cocaine source nations; (2) intelligence support targeted toward dismantling cartels; (3) detection and monitoring of the transport of illegal drugs; (4) support to domestic drug law enforcement agencies, emphasizing the Southwest border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's); and (5) demand reduction. .1 will discuss the plans and objectives within each of these five strategic elements in a moment. It should be noted that while cocaine consumption continues to pose the greatest drug problem in the United States, and continues to be the top priority of the National Drug Control Strategy, the increasing supply and purity of heroin in the U.S. warrants increased attention. Colombia's role as a supplier of heroin in the Western Hemisphere is growing, and there are increasing reports of opium cultivation in Peru. DOD is committed to assisting increased law enforcement efforts aimed at heroin kingpins and their organizations. However, in light of the fragmented and complex nature of the heroin industry, any support provided by DOD must be applied judiciously. DOD is currently involved in an interagency process to review and strengthen our international heroin strategy which will result in recommendations submitted to the President for approval this year. New DOD Counterdrug Policy 1) Source Nation Support - The new National Strategy calls for increased support to those nations that demonstrate the political will to combat narcotrafficking. Specifically, DOD will focus its supporting efforts in the Andean countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Support will be aimed at strengthening the democratic institutions in these nations, encouraging national resolve and regional cooperation, and further developing air sovereignty and ground-based endgame (effective arrest and prosecution) capabilities with the objective of moving these nations toward self-sustaining counterdrug programs. DOD will achieve these goals by providing, to the extent feasible and effective, consistent with law, training and operational support to source nation police and military units with counterdrug responsibilities through deployments funded by security assistance or counterdrug funding -- primarily by utilizing authority under Section 1004 of the FY 91 National Defense Authorization Act as amended, and Sections 517 and 506(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. All source nation activities will be accomplished in cooperation with the Host Nations, and under the auspices of the U.S. State Department. As in the past, DOD personnel will be prohibited from engaging in, or accompanying Host Nation forces on, law enforcement operations. The Department understands the need for vigilant sensitivity to the danger of human rights abuses in the Andean region. For this reason all DOD training of Host Nation forces includes a human rights component. Furthermore, the Defense Department, in coordination with the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, has established standard operating procedures for end use monitoring of U.S.supplied equipment. Additionally, DOD has strengthened its end use monitoring practices by requiring all Department personnel who deploy to the field to verify the presence and use of U.S. supplied equipment at the unit or site they are visiting. In the last year U.S. efforts to bolster the political will and the enforcement capabilities of source nations have yielded encouraging results. One of the largest Peruvian drug traffickers, Demitrio Chavez Penaherra, aka "Vaticanon, was arrested in Colombia and expelled to Peru where he was prosecuted for narcotrafficking and treason; he is now serving a 30 year sentence. Moreover, the end of the eighteen-month pursuit of Pablo Escobar marked the demise of the once dominant Medellin cartel. Additionally, the government of Bolivia, in joint operations with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), dismantled four major cocaine trafficking organizations in 1993. No one is under any illusions that fighting drug traffic in the Andes is less complicated than it has ever been, but we should look to these recent successes as reasons for hope, and for lessons about what types of programs work. In addition to the DOD programs that directly assist source nation counterdrug efforts, a number of the programs which I'll describe below as part of other strategic elements of the DOD counterdrug policy also support U.S. objectives in the Andean region. It is important to understand that the DOD counterdrug policy is designed to support the multifaceted approach directed by the National Drug Control to exert pressure on the drug trade from a variety of angles simultaneously. 2) Dismantling the Cartels - Among the most cost-effective contributions which DOD can make to cooperative counterdrug efforts is bringing its intelligence capabilities to projects that target trafficking organizations. DOD is enhancing its support of the DEA's Kingpin Strategy and the Counterdrug Community's Kingpin Linear Approach which are specifically designed to dismantle the cocaine cartels and the cocaine business. DOD is also enhancing support to drug law enforcement agencies through the use of Section 1004 authority to provide translator and intelligence analyst support, and by expanding intelligence gathering and sharing programs. Additionally, the FY 95 budget request reflects DOD's funding for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). 3) Detection and Monitoring of the Transport of Illegal Drugs - DOD will support domestic law enforcement and host nation detection and monitoring efforts by: (a) emphasizing activities in the cocaine source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; (b) streamlining activities in the transit zone (the region between the source countries and the U.S. border region), with detection and monitoring efforts focused toward intelligencecued operations that directly support the Kingpin Linear Approach and source country and arrival zone operations; and (c) refocusing activities in the U.S. to emphasize the cocaine threat at critical border locations. The use of more cost-effective technologies (such as relocatable- over-the-horizonradars (ROTHRs), and refitted TAGOS Radar Picket ships), in place of some of the more costly ship steaming and flying done in the past, is allowing DOD to maintain a robust and flexible detection and monitoring capability in the transit zone. The ROTHR operating in Chesapeake, Virginia, since early 1993 has provided promising results. The addition of a second ROTHR, scheduled to be operational in FY 95, will render more complete coverage of the transit area. Additionally, in FY 95 we hope to begin site preparation for a ROTHR in Puerto Rico that will improve coverage of the source nation area. 4) Direct Support to Domestic Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs)-Emphasizing the Southwest Border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas DOD will continue to directly support domestic DLEAs through: (a) a Detailee program that provides intelligence analysts, translators, and support personnel; (b) a program implementing Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, as amended, that provides transportation, maintenance, equipment upgrades and other forms of support; (c) a program implementing Section 1208 of the NDAA that provides excess DOD equipment to Federal, State and local DLEAS through four regional logistical support offices; and (d) the Governors' State Counterdrug Plans that use the National Guard to support DLEAs and drug demand reduction activities. DOD is developing comprehensive prioritization plans for requirements submitted under these programs, emphasizing the importance of efforts at the Southwest border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. If allowed by Congress, the Department will increase funding support for the Section 1004- program. In addition, DOD will continue to support Federal counterdrug law enforcement agencies in addressing multi-agency counterdrug command, control, communications, and technical intelligence problems. DOD is also aggressively pursuing a research and development program for cargo container inspection systems. The technologies being explored utilize very sophisticated X-ray and nuclear techniques and will be demonstrated at testbed sites in Otay Mesa, California, Tacoma, Washington, and at relocatable systems testbeds on the Southwest border. 5) Demand Reduction - All Military Department and Defense Agency drug testing and education programs will be continued, with an emphasis placed on increased regionalization, automation, and consolidation of testing. Additionally, DOD will continue the community outreach demand reduction pilot program directed by the FY 93 Defense Authorization Act. As part of the pilot study, each of the Military Departments and the National Guard are running programs which use military personnel as role models and target at-risk youth. We are currently reviewing the efficacy of these programs, and a report and accompanying recommendations will be sent to Congress this fall. These five strategic elements form the basis for a focused DOD counterdrug program which directly supports the National Drug Control Strategy. It is within this framework that we evaluate the efficacy of each of our many different projects. As discussed earlier, the reductions in the Department's FY 94 counterdrug budget were distributed in accordance with the findings of the Comprehensive Review; this was done with an eye toward achieving a balance among the five strategic areas that reflects the priorities of the National Strategy. The following charts show, by strategic area, how the budget distribution has evolved to fit the new policy guidance, with continuing refinements in the FY 95 request. Conclusion In summary, the Department's restructured counterdrug policy is well defined and directly supports the National Drug Control Strategy. In the last year DOD has significantly improved program management, and efforts to further enhance program effectiveness and increase accountability are underway. The Administration's budget request for FY 1995 Defense Department counterdrug activities represents 7% of the Federal counterdrug budget. At that funding level DOD will be able to continue to provide meaningful assistance to overburdened Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and crucial support to fragile democracies in Latin America. There can be no doubt of the harm illicit drugs inflict. While DOD does not have a "silver bullet" that could end the drug problem quickly, it does have unique talents and assets to bring to the interagency counterdrug effort. Internationally, DOD is engaged in operations that significantly strengthen the ability of foreign governments, particularly those in the Andean region, to arrest and prosecute drug traffickers. Domestically, the results of DOD counterdrug programs - from providing excess equipment to State police, to funding National Guard demand reduction programs for at risk youth, to detailing intelligence analysts to Federal agencies to prepare evidence for successful criminal prosecutions - impact communities around the country every day. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com]) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268