From: [philsm t h] at [teleport.com]
Newsgroups: alt.culture.oregon,alt.drugs,alt.drugs.pot,or.politics,rec.drugs.cannabis,talk.politics.drugs
Subject: New Study - War on Drugs Increases Violent Crime
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 96 05:03:33 GMT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Carl Close
August 14, 1996
510/632-1366

THE WAR ON DRUGS INCREASES VIOLENT CRIME, NEW STUDY REVEALS .
DIVERSION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCES MAKES CITIZENS LESS SAFE.

OAKLAND, CA - Despite high hopes that America's "war on drugs" would reduce
the rate of serious nondrug crime - assault, homicide, rape, robbery, and
the like - the drug war has diverted scarce resources away from fighting
such crime, putting the lives and property of citizens at greater risk,
according to a new study released today by the Independent Institute.

        In Illicit Drugs and Crime, economists Bruce Benson and David
Rasmussen compare crime trends in Kansas (whose enforcement of drug laws
lagged behind national trends) with trends in other states.  They conclude
that Kansans - and other states' residents - were relatively safer from
nondrug violent crime before escalating drug law enforcement.

        "When a decision is made to wage a 'war on drugs,' other things
that criminal justice resources might do have to be sacrificed.  Getting
tough on drugs inevitably translates into getting soft on nondrug crime,"
Benson and Rasmussen conclude.

        Policymakers mistakenly believe that combating drug use is an
effective away to reduce violence and property crime.  But because only a
small percentage of drug users commit large numbers of crimes against
persons or property, efforts to combat these crimes by targeting drug use
have proven ineffective, Benson and Rasmussen argue.  Combating nondrug
crime through direct means would utilize criminal justice resources far
more effectively, they maintain.

        Benson and Rasmussen are professors of economics at Florida State
University and research fellows at the Independent Institute, a public
policy research organization in Oakland, California.  The 60-page report
can be obtained by contacting Carl Close, the Institute's Public Affairs
Director, at 510/632-1366, or by e-mail at [i--ep--d] at [dnai.com.]  Web site:
http://www.independent.org

#  #  #

ILLICIT DRUGS AND CRIME
An Independent Policy Report
By Bruce L. Benson & David Rasmussen
Professors of Economics, Florida State University
Research Fellows, The Independent Institute

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING

 In the early 1980s, policymakers and law enforcement officials stepped up
efforts to combat the trafficking and use of illicit drugs.  This was the
popular "war on drugs," hailed by conservatives and liberals alike as a
means to restore order and hope to communities and families plagued by
anti-social or self-destructive pathologies.  By reducing illicit drug use,
many claimed, the drug war would significantly reduce the rate of serious
nondrug crimes - robbery, assault, rape, homicide and the like.  Has the
drug war succeeded in doing so?

In ILLICIT DRUGS AND CRIME, Bruce L. Benson and David W. Rasmussen
(Professors of Economics, Florida State University, and Research Fellows,
the Independent Institute), reply with a resounding no.  Not only has the
drug war failed to reduce violent and property crime but, by shifting
criminal justice resources (the police, courts, prisons, probation
officers, etc.) away from directly fighting such crime, the drug war has
put citizens' lives and property at greater risk, Benson and Rasmussen
contend.

"Getting tough on drugs inevitably translates into getting soft on nondrug
crime," they write.  "When a decision is made to wage a 'war on drugs,'
other things that criminal justice resources might do have to be
sacrificed."

To support this conclusion, Benson and Rasmussen compare data on drug law
enforcement and crime trends between states, and debunk numerous
misconceptions about drug use and criminality.

DO DRUGS CAUSE CRIME?

One of the most prevalent misconceptions, Benson and Rasmussen, contend is
the notion that a large percentage of drug users commit nondrug crimes,
what might be called the "drugs-cause-crime" assumption implicit in the
government's drug-war strategy.  If true, then an effective crackdown on
drug use would reduce nondrug crime rates.  However, Benson and Rasmussen
show that the "drugs-cause-crime" assumption is false.  Certainly many
violent and property criminals use drugs. But only a small percentage of
drug users commit violent or property crimes.  Drug offenders are far more
likely to recidivate for a drug offense than for a violent offense or
property crime.

Is drug use to blame for the crimes drug users do commit?  Benson and
Rasmussen sug-gest that the reverse is closer to the mark: Many criminals
who use drugs did not begin to do so until after they began committing
nondrug crimes.  A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey of prison inmates
found that about half of the inmates who had used a major drug, and about
60 percent of those who used a major drug regularly, did not do so until
after their first arrest for a nondrug crime.

"Similarly," Benson and Rasmussen note, "more than half of local jail
inmates who reported they were regular drug users in the survey . . . said
that their first arrest for a crime occurred an average of two years before
their drug use.  Once an individual has decided to turn to crime as a
source of income, he or she may discover that drugs are more easily
obtained within the criminal subculture and perhaps that the risks posed by
the criminal justice system are not as great as initially anticipated.
Furthermore, criminal activity generates income with which to buy goods
that previously were not affordable, including drugs.  Thus, crime leads to
drug use, not vice versa."

THE DRUG WAR'S FAILURE TO REDUCE CRIME

Because relatively few illicit drug offenders commit violent and property
crimes and because criminal activity more often precedes drug use than vice
versa, targeting drugs is an inefficient strategy for combating nondrug
crime.  And because it requires withdrawing a large amount of scarce
criminal justice resources from directly fighting nondrug crime, it is also
an ineffective, often counterproductive, strategy for fighting such crime.
Indeed, the trade-off between fighting drugs and fighting nondrug crime is
so severe that in some juris-dictions it seems to have led to an increase
in nondrug crime.

Benson and Rasmussen examined Florida crime data and found that increasing
police efforts against drugs relative to the efforts against serious
nondrug crimes resulted in a lower probability of arrest for property
crime.  "Primarily as a consequence of this reduced probability of arrest,
the property crime rate in Florida rose 16.3 percent, from 6,892 offenses
per 100,000 population in 1983 to 8,019 in 1989."  Violent crime also
increased markedly in response to greater drug law enforcement, as drug
dealers displaced by law enforcement invaded the turf of established
dealers, and residents of previously untapped markets fell prey to violent
criminals.  Since 1989, Florida has reduced its drug enforcement efforts,
and its property crime rate has fallen.

Benson and Rasmussen also discuss how prison overcrowding due to increased
drug law enforcement has compromised the punishment of other criminals.
Although statistical studies of the impact of early prison release on
overall crime rates have not been performed yet, a growing number of
violent felons have been released early, only to commit more violent
crimes.

THE DRUG WAR'S FAILURE TO REDUCE DRUG USE

Crime reduction was sold as one of the drug war's important side benefits.
But what about its main mission, to reduce drug use?  Despite the increase
in the number of drug arrests and convictions, drug consumption overall has
not demonstrably fallen.  While the drug war may have played a significant
role in reducing the demand for and supply of marijuana, access to cocaine
has increased.  From 1984 to 1990, the proportion of high school students
who reported that cocaine was "fairly easy" or "very easy" to obtain rose
by about 20 percent.

This failure is due in large part, Benson and Rasmussen explain, to drug
entrepreneurs' adoption of new production techniques, new products, and new
marketing strategies in response to greater law enforcement. Their
"innovations" include lengthening the drug distribution chain and using
younger drug pushers and runners (to reduce the risk of arrest and
punishment), increasing domestic drug production (to avoid the risk of
seizure at the border), smuggling into the country less marijuana and more
cocaine (which is harder to detect), development of "crack" cocaine (a
low-cost substitute for higher priced powdered cocaine and for marijuana,
which the drug war made harder to obtain), and development of drugs with
greater potency (because they are less bulky and because punishment is
based on a drug's weight, not its potency).

WHAT TO DO ABOUT ILLICIT DRUGS AND CRIME?

Given the failure of the drug war to reduce crime and drug use, what ought
to be done?  Benson and Rasmussen offer seven public policy
recommendations.

1) Reduce Crime and Drug Abuse by Cracking Down on Juvenile Criminals.
Punishing youthful offenders early might divert them from further crime and
remove them from the crime sub-culture where they are more likely to begin
drug use.

2) Emphasize Treatment Over Drug Law Enforcement.  Treatment is more
cost-effective because it cuts consumption directly, whereas law
enforcement works indirectly, by raising the price of drugs.

3) Abolish Civil Forfeiture Laws.  Civil forfeiture laws give the illusion
that drug law enforcement is self-financing.  They give law enforcement
agencies incentives to pursue counter-productive policies that violate due
process.

4) Make Public Safety the Main Police Priority.  Law enforcement agencies
should be evaluated on the basis of their effectiveness in preventing
crime, not merely in responding to it after the fact.  Improved citizen
cooperation and sense of public safety should also be high priorities.

5) Make Sentencing Guidelines Reflect the Highest Priorities.  Sentencing
guidelines must allow officials to consider prison capacity, so that
dangerous prisoners are not released prematurely to make space for the less
dangerous.

6) Decentralize the Prisons.  Keeping prosecutors and judges in the same
jurisdictions as the prisons to which they send convicts would reduce the
likelihood of dangerous prisoners being released prematurely.

7) Decriminalize Drug Use.  Decriminalization would free up scarce criminal
justice resources in order to focus on violent and property crime.
Prohibition, especially of less dangerous drugs, is ultimately a
self-defeating policy.*

The entire text of ILLICIT DRUGS AND CRIME is on the Independent
Institute's Web Site: http://www.independent.org.  A hard copy of the
60-page report is available for $7.95 + $3.00 (S/H) from the Independent
Institute, 134 Ninety-Eighth Avenue, Oakland, CA 94603 (USA).  Credit card
orders accepted.  510-632-1366 (ph), 510-568-6040 (fax), [i--ep--d] at [dnai.com]
(e-mail).


Mark Greer
Media Awareness Project (MAP)
[M G reer MAP] at [worldnet.att.net]
URL http://www.drcnet.org/map/

[reposted by Phil Smith of Portland NORML:  http://www.pantless.com/~pdxnorml/