From: [p--s--s] at [bga.com] (Brad Parsons)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns
Subject: ** Committee Report: NORTH & DRUG-RUNNING **
Date: 31 Oct 1994 06:29:13 -0600
Subject: Kerry Committee Report
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND THE CONTRAS
I. INTRODUCTION
The initial Committee investigation into the international drug
trade, which began in April, 1986, focused on allegations that
Senator John F. Kerry had received of illegal gun-running and
narcotics trafficking associated with the Contra war against
Nicaragua.
As the Committee proceeded with its investigation, significant
information began surfacing concerning the operations of
international narcotics traffickers, particularly relating to the
Colombian-based cocaine cartels. As a result, the decision was
made to incorporate the Contra-related allegations into a broader
investigation concerning the relationship between foreign policy,
narcotics trafficking and law enforcement.
While the contra/drug question was not the primary focus of the
investigation, the Subcommittee uncovered considerable evidence
relating to the Contra network which substantiated many of the
initial allegations laid out before the Committee in the Spring
of 1986. On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that
individuals who provided support for the Contras were involved in
drug trafficking, the supply network of the Contras was used by
drug trafficking organizations, and elements of the Contras
themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance
from drug traffickers. In each case, one or another agency of the
U.S. government had information regarding the involvement either
while it was occurring, or immediately thereafter.
The Subcommittee found that the Contra drug links included:
-Involvement in narcotics trafficking by individuals
associated with the Contra movement.
-Participation of narcotics traffickers in Contra supply
operations through business relationships with Contra
organizations.
-Provision of assistance to the Contras by narcotics
traffickers, including cash, weapons, planes, pilots, air
supply services and other materials, on a voluntary basis by
the traffickers.
-Payments to drug traffickers by the U.S. State Department of
funds authorized by the Congress for humanitarian assistance
to the Contras, in some cases after the traffickers had been
indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug
charges, in others while traffickers were under active
investigation by these same agencies.
These activities were carried out in connection with Contra
activities in both Costa Rica and Honduras.
The Subcommittee found that the links that were forged between
the Contras and the drug traffickers were primarily pragmatic,
rather than ideological. The drug traffickers, who had
significant financial and material resources, needed the cover of
legitimate activity for their criminal enterprises. A trafficker
like George Morales hoped to have his drug indictment dropped in
return for his financial and material support of the Contras.
Others, in the words of Marcos Aguado, Eden Pastora's air force
chief:
I took advantage of the anti-communist sentiment which
existed in Central America I and they undoubtedly used
it for drug trafficking.1
While for some Contras, it was a matter of survival, for the
traffickers it was just another business deal to promote and
protect their own operations.
II. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSE TO CONTRA/DRUG CHARGES
In the wake of press accounts concerning links between the
Contras and drug traffickers' beginning December, 1985 with a
story by the Associated Press, both Houses of the Congress began
to raise questions about the drug-related allegations associated
with the Contras, causing a review in the spring of 1986 of the
allegations by the State Department, in conjunction with the
Justice Department and relevant U.S. intelligence agencies.
Following that review, the State Department told the Congress
in April, 1986 that it had at that time "evidence of a limited
number of incidents in which known drug traffickers tried to
establish connections with Nicaraguan resistance groups."
According to the Department, "I these attempts for the most
part took place during the period when the resistance was
receiving no U.S. funding and was particularly hard pressed for
financial support." The report acknowledged that, "I drug
traffickers were attempting to exploit the desperate conditions,"
in which the Contras found themselves.2 The Department had
suggested that while "individual members" of the Contra movement
might have been involved, their drug trafficking was "I without
the authorization of resistance leaders."3
Following further press reports linking contra supply
operations to narcotics, and inquiries from the Foreign Relations
Committee to the State Department concerning these links, the
State Department issued a second statement to the Congress
concerning the allegations on July 24, 1986.
In this report, the State Department said, "I the available
evidence points to involvement with drug traffickers by a limited
number of persons having various kinds of affiliations with, or
political sympathies for, the resistance groups."4
A year later, in August 1987, the CIA's Central American Task
Force Chief became the first U.S. official to revise that
assessment to suggest instead that the links between Contras on
the Southern Front in Costa Rica to narcotics trafficking was in
fact far broader than that acknowledged by the State Department
in 1986.
Appearing before the Iran-Contra Committees' the CIA Central
American Task Force chief testified:
With respect to (drug trafficking by) the Resistance
Forces I it is not a couple of people. It is a lot of
people.5
The CIA's Chief of the Central American Task Force went on to
say:
We knew that everybody around Pastora was involved in
cocaine I His staff and friends (redacted) they were
drug smugglers or involved in drug smuggling.6
The Justice Department was slow to respond to the allegations
regarding links between drug traffickers and the Contras. In the
spring of 1986, even after the State Department was acknowledging
there were problems with drug trafficking in association with
Contra activities on the Southern Front, the Justice Department
was adamantly denying that there was any substance to the
narcotics allegations. At the time, the FBI had significant
information regarding the involvement of narcotics traffickers in
Contra operations and Neutrality Act violations.7
The failure of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies
to respond properly to allegations concerning criminal activity
relating to the Contras was demonstrated by the handling of the
Committee's own investigation by the Justice Department and the
CIA in the spring of 1986.
On May 6, 1986, a bipartisan group of Committee staff met with
representatives of the Justice Department, FBI, DEA, CIA and
State Department to discuss the allegations that Senator Kerry
had received information of Neutrality Act violations, gun
running and drug trafficking in association with Contra
organizations based on the Southern Front in Costa Rica.
In the days leading up to the meeting, Justice Department
spokesmen were stating publicly that "the FBI had conducted an
inquiry into all of these charges and none of them have any
substance."8 At that meeting, Justice Department officials
privately contradicted the numerous public statements from the
Department that these allegations had been investigated
thoroughly and were determined to be without foundation. The
Justice Department officials at the meeting said the public
statements by Justice were "inaccurate."9 The Justice officials
confirmed there were ongoing Neutrality Act investigations in
connection with the allegations raised by Senator Kerry.
At the same meeting, representatives of the CIA categorically
denied that the Neutrality Act violations raised by the Committee
staff had in fact taken place, citing classified documents which
the CIA did not make available to the Committee. In fact, at the
time, the FBI had already assembled substantial information
confirming the Neutrality Act violations, including admissions
by some of the persons involved indicating that crimes had
taken place. 10
In August 1986, Senator Richard Lugar, then-Chairman of the
Committee and the ranking member, Senator Claiborne Pell, wrote
the Justice Department requesting information on 27 individuals
and organizations associated with the contras concerning
allegations of their involvement in narcotics trafficking and
illegal gunrunning. The Justice Department refused to provide any
information in response to this request, on the grounds that the
information remained under active investigation, and that the
Committee's "rambling through open investigations gravely risks
compromising those efforts."11
On October 5, 1988, the Subcommittee received sworn testimony
from the Miami prosecutor handling the Neutrality and gun-running
cases that he had been advised that some officials in the Justice
Department had met in 1986 to discuss how "to undermine" Senator
Kerry's attempts to have hearings regarding the allegations.12
The Subcommittee took a number of depositions of Justice
Department personnel involved in responding to the Committee
investigation or in prosecuting allegations stemming from the
Committee's investigation. Each denied participating in any
agreement to obstruct or interfere with a Congressional
investigation. In order to place in their proper perspective the
attempts to interfere with' or undermine, the Committee
investigation, a lengthy chronology has been prepared which
appears at appendix A of this report.
III. THE GUNS AND DRUG SMUGGLING INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPS
Covert war, insurgency and drug trafficking frequently go hand-
in-hand without regard to ideology or sponsorship. General Paul
Gorman, testified that the use of narcotics profits by armed
resistance groups was commonplace. Gorman stated further that:
"If you want to move arms or munitions in Latin America, the
established networks are owned by the cartels. It has lent itself
to the purposes of terrorists, of saboteurs, of spies, of
insurgents and subversions."13
DEA Assistant Administrator David Westrate said of the
Nicaraguan war:
It is true that people on both sides of the equation
(in the Nicaraguan war) were drug traffickers, and a
couple of them were pretty signficant.14
Drug trafficking associated with revolution in Nicaragua began
during the late 1970's with the Sandinistas attempt to overthrow
the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. At the time, the
Sandinistas were supported by most governments in the region.
Those governments helped provide the FSLN with money, weapons,
and the sanctuary they needed to overthrow Somoza.15
Costa Rica, which has dozens of unsupervised airstrips near the
Nicaraguan border, became an important supply and staging area
for the Sandinistas. These air strips were used by Noriega and
others for shipments of weapons to the Sandinistas.16
Former senior Costa Rican Law enforcement officials told the
Subcommittee they were instructed to keep their narcotics
investigators away from the Nicaraguan border during the
Sandinista revolution. Even when they had received hard
information about drugs on the aircraft delivering weapons, the
officials, in effort to avoid controversy regarding the war,
ignored the tips and let the flights go. 17
A number of Costa Ricans became suppliers for the Sandinistas.
These included Jaime "Pillique" Guerra, who owned a crop dusting
service and a related aircraft support business in northern Costa
Rica. Guerra refueled and repaired the planes which came from
Panama loaded with Cuban weapons for the Sandinistas.18 Guerra's
crop dusting business was excellent cover for the movement of
aviation fuel to the dozens of remote airstrips they used without
arousing the suspicions of Costa Rican authorities.
When the Sandinista insurgency succeeded in 1979, smuggling
activity in northern Costa Rica did not stop. Surplus weapons
originally stored in Costa Rica for use by the Sandinistas were
sold on the black market in the region.19 Some of these weapons
were shipped to the Salvadoran rebels from the same airstrips in
the same planes, flown by the same pilots who had previously
worked for the Sandinistas.20
Costa Rican law enforcement authorities said that the drug
trafficking through northern Costa Rica continued as well. They
said that their police units lacked the men, the communications
equipment and the transport to close down the airstrips and seize
weapons and drugs.21
Werner Lotz, a Costa Rican pilot serving sentence for drug
smuggling, testified that there was little the Costa Rican
government could do to deal with the continuing drug trafficking:
"Costa Rica has got only civil guards, underpaid and
easily bought I To be very clear I our guard down there
is barefoot, and you're talking about 50 men to cover
400 kilometers maybe." 22
IV. DRUG TRAFFICKING AND THE COVERT WAR
When the Southern Front against the Sandinista Government in
Nicaragua was established in 1983, Costa Rica remained ill-
equipped to deal with the threat posed by the Colombian drug
cartels. Then, as now, the country does not have a military, its
law enforcement resources remain limited, and its radar system
still so poor that Contra supply planes could fly in and out of
the clandestine strips without being detected.23
Following their work on behalf of the Sandinistas and the
Salvadoran rebels, the Colombian and Panamanian drug operatives
were well positioned to exploit the infrastructure now serving
and supplying the Contra Southern Front. This infrastructure was
increasingly important to the drug traffickers, as this was the
very period in which the cocaine trade to the U.S. from Latin
America was growing exponentially.
In the words of Karol Prado, an officer of the ARDE Contra
organization of Eden Pastora on the Southern Front, "drug
traffickers I approaches political groups like ARDE trying to
make deals that would somehow camouflage or cover up their
activities."
The head of the Costa Rican "air force" and personal pilot to
two Costa Rican presidents, Werner Lotz, explained the
involvement of drug traffickers with the Contras in the early
days of the establishment of the Southern Front as a consequence
of the Contras lack of resources:
"There was no money. There were too many leaders and too few
people to follow them, and everybody was trying to make money as
best they could."24
The logic of having drug money pay for the pressing needs of
the Contras appealed to a number of people who became involved in
the covert war. Indeed, senior U.S. policy makers were not immune
to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the
Contra's funding problems.
As DEA officials testified last July before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, Lt. Col. Oliver North suggested to the DEA
in June 1985 that $1.5 million in drug money carried aboard a
plane piloted by DEA informant Barry Seal and generated in a
sting of the Medellin Cartel and Sandinista officials, be
provided to the Contras.25 While the suggestion was rejected by
the DEA, the fact that it was made highlights the potential
appeal of drug profits for persons engaged in covert activity.
Lotz said that Contra operations on the Southern Front were in
fact funded by drug operations. He testified that weapons for the
Contras came from Panama on small planes carrying mixed loads
which included drugs. The pilots unloaded the weapons, refueled,
and headed north toward the U.S. with drugs.26 The pilots
included Americans, Panamanians, and Colombians, and
occasionally, uniformed members of the Panamanian Defense
Forces.27 Drug
pilots soon began to use the Contra airstrips to refuel even when
there were no weapons to unload. They knew that the authorities
would not check the airstrips because the war was "protected".28
The problem of drug traffickers using the airstrips also used
to supply the Contras persisted through 1985 and 1986. By the
summer of 1986, it became of significant concern to the U.S.
Government officials who were involved in the covert Contra
supply operations undertaken during the Boland Amendment period.
As then-CIA Station Chief, "Thomas Castillo" testified to the
Iran/Contra Committees, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica Lewis Tambs
wanted to place guards on the secret Contra supply airstrip at
Santa Elena in Costa Rica, to avoid:
having drug traffickers use that site, and this was a
continuing concern during the period of June, July and
August.29
The concern highlights the degree to which the infrastructure
used by the Contras and that used by drug traffickers was
potentially interchangeable, even in a situation in which the
U.S. government had itself established and maintained the
airstrip involved.
V. THE PILOTS
Pilots who made combined Contra weapons/drug flights through
the Southern Front included:
-Gerardo Duran, a Costa Rican pilot in the airplane
parts supply business. Duran flew for a variety of
Contra organizations on the Southern Front' including
those affiliated with Alfonso Robelo, Fernando"El
Negro"Chamorro, and Eden Pastora, before U.S.
officials insisted that the Contras sever their ties
from Duran because of his involvement with drugs. 30
Duran was convicted of narcotics trafficking in Costa
Rica in 1987 and jailed.
-Gary Wayne Betzner, drug pilot who worked for
convicted smuggler George Morales. Betzner testified
that twice in 1984 he flew weapons for the Contras
from the U.S. to northern Costa Rica and returned to
the United States with loads of cocaine. Betzner is
presently serving a lengthy prison term for drug
smuggling.31
-Jose"Chepon" Robelo, the head of UDN-FARN air force
on the Southern front. Robelo turned to narcotics
trafficking and reselling goods provided to the
Contras by the U.S.32
VI. U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND COMPANIES WITH DRUG
CONNECTIONS
The State Department selected four companies owned and operated
by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the
Contras. The companies were:
-SETCO Air, a company established by Honduran drug
trafficker Ramon Matta Ballesteros;
-DIACSA, a Miami-based air company operated as the
headquarters of a drug trafficker enterprise for
convicted drug traffickers Floyd Carlton and Alfredo
Caballero;
-Frigorificos de Puntarenas, a firm owned and operated
by Cuban-American drug traffickers;
-Vortex, an air service and supply company partly
owned by admitted drug trafficker Michael Palmer.
In each case, prior to the time that the State Department
entered into contracts with the company, federal law enforcement
had received information that the individuals controlling these
companies were involved in narcotics.
Officials at NHAO told GAO investigators that all the supply
contractors were to have been screened by U.S. intelligence and
law enforcement agencies prior to their receiving funds from
State Department on behalf of the Contras to insure that they
were not involved with criminal activity.33 Neither the GAO nor
the NHAO were certain whether or not that had actually been
done.34
The payments made by the State Department to these four
companies between January and August 1986, were as follows:
SETCO, for air transport service
...................................................$186,924.25
DIACSA, for airplane engine parts
...............................................41,120.90
Frigorificos De Puntarenas, as a broker/supplier for various serv-
ices to Contras on the Southern Front
.......................................... 261,932.00
VORTEX, for air transport services
.............................................317,425.17
Total35
.......................... 806,401.20
A number of questions arise as a result of the selection of
these four companies by the State Department for the provision of
humanitarian assistance to the contras, to which the Subcommittee
has been unable to obtain clear answers:
-Who selected these firms to provide services to the
Contras, paid for with public funds, and what
criteria were used for selecting them?
-Were any U.S. officials in the CIA, NSC, or State
Department aware of the narcotics allegations
associated with any of these companies? If so, why
were these firms permitted to receive public funds on
behalf of the Contras?
-Why were Contra suppliers not checked against federal
law enforcement records that would have shown them to
be either under active investigation as drug
traffickers, or in the case of DIACSA, actually under
indictment?
Ambassador Robert Duemling, Director of the Nicaraguan
Humanitarian Assistance Organization (NHAO), who was responsible
for the operation of the program, was unable to recall how these
companies were selected, when questioned by Senator Kerry in
April, 1988.36 Ambassador Duemling also could not recall whether
or not the contractors had in fact been checked against law
enforcement records prior to receiving funds from the State
Department. In previous testimony before the Iran/Contra
Committees, Ambassador Duemling had recalled that NHAO had been
directed by Lt. Col. Oliver North to continue "the existing
arrangements of the resistance movement" in choosing
contractors.37
At best, these incidents represent negligence on the part of
U.S. government officials responsible for providing support to
the Contras. At worst it was a matter of turning a blind eye to
the activities of companies who use legitimate activities as a
cover for their narcotics trafficking.
A. SETCO/HONDU CARIB
Before being chosen by the State Department to transport goods
on behalf of the Contras from late 1985 through mid-1986, SETCO
had a long-standing relationship with the largest of the Contra
groups, the Honduras-based FDN. Beginning in 1984, SETCO was the
principal company used by the Contras in Honduras to transport
supplies and personnel for the FDN, carrying at least a million
rounds of ammunition, food, uniforms and other military supplies
for the Contras from 1983 through 1985. According to testimony
before the Iran/Contra Committees by FDN leader Adolfo Calero,
SETCO received funds for Contra supply operations from the contra
accounts established by Oliver North.38
U.S. law enforcement records state that SETCO was established
by Honduran cocaine trafficker Juan Matta Ballesteros, whose
April 1988 extradition from Honduras to the United States in
connection with drug trafficking charges caused riots outside the
U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa.
For example, a 1983 Customs Investigative Report states that
"SETCO stands for Services Ejectutivos Turistas Commander and is
headed by Juan Ramon Mata Ballestros, a class I DEA violator."
The same report states that according to the Drug Enforcement
Agency, "SETCO aviation is a corporation formed by American
businessmen who are dealing with Matta and are smuggling
narcotics into the United States."39
One of the pilots selected to fly Contra supply missions for
the FDN for SETCO was Frank Moss, who has been under
investigation as an alleged drug trafficker since 1979. Moss has
been investigated, although never indicted, for narcotics
offenses by ten different law enforcement agencies.40
In addition to flying Contra supply missions through SETCO,
Moss formed his own company in 1985, Hondu Carib, which also flew
supplies to the Contras, including weapons and ammunition
purchased from R.M. Equipment, an arms company controlled by
Ronald Martin and James McCoy.41
The FDN's arrangement with Moss and Hondu Carib was pursuant to a
commercial agreement between the FDN's chief supply officer,
Mario Calero, and Moss, under which Calero was to receive an
ownership interest in Moss' company. The Subcommittee received
documentation that one Moss plane, a DC-4, N90201, was used to
move Contra goods from the United States to Honduras.42 On the
basis of information alleging that the plane was being used for
drug smuggling, the Customs Service obtained a court order to
place a concealed transponder on the plane.43
A second DC-4 controlled by Moss was chased off the west coast
of Florida by the Customs Service while it was dumping what
appeared to be a load of drugs, according to law enforcement
personnel. When the plane landed at Port Charlotte no drugs were
found on board, but the plane's registration was not in order and
its last known owners were drug traffickers. Law enforcement
personnel also found an address book aboard the plane, containing
among other references the telephone numbers of some Contra
officials and the Virginia telephone number of Robert Owen,
Oliver North's courier.44 A law enforcement inspection of the
plane revealed the presence of significant marijuana residue.45
DEA seized the aircraft on March 16, 1987.
B. FRIGORIFICOS DE PUNTARENAS
Frigorificos de Puntarenas is a Costa Rican seafood company
which was created as a cover for the laundering of drug money,
according to grand jury testimony by one of its partners, and
testimony by Ramon Milian Rodriguez, the convicted money
launderer who established the company.46
From its creation, it was operated and owned by Luis Rodriguez
of Miami, Florida, and Carlos Soto and Ubaldo Fernandez, two
convicted drug traffickers, to launder drug money.47 Luis
Rodriguez, who according to Massachusetts law enforcement
officials directed the largest marijuana smuggling ring in the
history of the state, was indicted on drug trafficking charges by
the federal government on September 30, 1987 and on tax evasion
in connection with the laundering of money through Ocean Hunter
on April 5,1988.48
Luis Rodriguez controlled the bank account held in the name of
Frigorificos which received $261,937 in humanitarian assistance
funds from the State Department in 1986. Rodriguez signed most of
the orders to transfer the funds for the Contras out of that ac-
count.49 Rodriguez was also president of Ocean Hunter, an
American seafood company created for him by Ramon Milian-
Rodriguez.50 Ocean Hunter imported seafood it bought from
Frigorificos and used the intercompany transactions to launder
drug money.51
In statements before a Florida federal grand jury in connection
with a narcotics trafficking prosecution of Luis Rodriguez, Soto
testified that he knew Luis Rodriguez as a narcotics trafficker
who had been smuggling drugs into the U.S. since 1979. Soto also
testified that they were partners in the shipment of 35,000
pounds of marijuana to Massachusetts in 1982.52
Milian-Rodriguez told Federal authorities about Luis Rodriguez'
narcotics trafficking prior to Milian-Rodriguez' arrest in May
1983. In March and April 1984, IRS agents interviewed Luis
Rodriguez regarding Ocean Hunter, drug trafficking and money
laundering, and he took the Fifth Amendment in response to every
question.53 In September, 1984, Miami police officials advised
the FBI of information they had received that Ocean Hunter was
funding contra activities through "narcotics transactions," and
noting that Luis Rodriguez was its president. This information
confirmed previous accounts the FBI had received concerning the
involvement of Ocean Hunter and its officers in Contra supply
operations involving the Cuban American community.54
Despite the information possessed by the FBI, Customs and other
law enforcement agencies documenting Luis Rodriguez' involvement
in narcotics trafficking and money laundering, the State
Department used Frigorificos, which he owned and operated, to
deliver humanitarian assistance funds to the Contras in late
1985. Official funds for the Contras from the United States began
to be deposited into the Frigorificos account in early 1986, and
continued until mid-1986.55
In May 1986, Senator Kerry advised the Justice Department, Drug
Enforcement Agency, State Department, NHAO and CIA of allegations
he had received involving Luis Rodriguez and his companies in
drug trafficking and money laundering. In August 1986, the
Foreign Relations Committee asked Justice whether the allegations
about Luis Rodriguez were true, and requested documents to
determine whether the State Department might have in fact
provided funds to a company controlled by drug traffickers.
Justice refused to answer the inquiry.
The indictment of Luis Rodriguez on drug charges 18 months
later demonstrated that the concerns raised by Senator Kerry to
the Justice Department and other agencies in May 1986 concerning
his companies were well founded, as the State Department had in
fact chosen companies operated by drug traffickers to supply the
Contras.56
C. DIACSA
DIACSA was an aircraft dealership and parts supply company
partly owned by the Guerra family of Costa Rica. DIACSA's
president, Alfredo Caballero, was under DEA investigation for
cocaine trafficking and money laundering when the State
Department chose the company to be an NHAO supplier. Caballero
was at that time a business associate of Floyd Carlton-the pilot
who flew cocaine for Panama's General Noriega.
In an affidavit filed in federal court in January, 1985, DEA
Special Agent Daniel E. Moritz described working as an undercover
money launderer "for the purpose of introducing myself into a
criminal organization involved in importing substantial
quantities of cocaine into the United States from South
America."57 That organization was the Carlton/Caballero
partnership. According to Agent Moritz, the cocaine traffickers
used DIACSA offices "as a location for planning smuggling
ventures, for assembling and distributing large cash proceeds of
narcotics transactions, and for placing telephone calls in
furtherance of the smuggling ventures."58
From March 1985 until January 1986, Moritz received
approximately $3.8 million in U.S. currency from members of this
organization "to be distributed, primarily in the form of wire
transfers around the world." Most of the $3.8 million was
delivered in DIACSA's offices.
Moritz met both Alfredo Caballero and Floyd Carlton in March of
1985. Moritz had previously learned from a confidential informant
that Carlton was a "major cocaine trafficker from Panama who
frequented DIACSA and was a close associate of Alfredo
Caballero." The informant added that "Caballero provided aircraft
for Floyd Carlton Caceres' cocaine smuggling ventures" and that
Caballero allowed Carlton and "members of his organization to use
DIACSA offices as a location for planning smuggling ventures, for
assembling and distributing large cash proceeds of narcotics
transactions and for placing telephone calls in furtherance of
the smuggling ventures." Alfredo Caballero was described by the
informant "as the man in charge of operations for Floyd Carlton
Caceres' cocaine transportation organization."59
Other members of the group were Miguel Alemany-Soto, who
recruited pilots and selected aircraft and landing strips, and
Cecilia Saenz-Barria. The confidential informant said that Saenz
was a Panamanian "in charge of supervising the landing and
refueling of the organization's aircraft at airstrips on the
Panama/Costa Rica border" and that he "arranges for bribe
payments for certain Costa Rican officials to ensure the
protection of these aircraft as they head north loaded with
cocaine."60
During 1984 and 1985, the principal Contra organization, the FDN,
chose DIACSA for "intra-account transfers." The laundering of
money through DIACSA concealed the fact that some funds for the
Contras were through deposits arranged by Lt. Col. Oliver
North.61
The indictments of Carlton, Caballero and five other
defendants, including Alfred Caballero's son Luis, were handed
down on January 23, 1985. The indictment charged the defendants
with bringing into the United States on or about September 23,
1985, 900 pounds of cocaine. In addition, the indictment charged
the defendants with laundering $2.6 million between March 25,
1985 and January 13, 1986.62
Despite the indictments, the State Department made payments on
May 14, 1986 and September 3, 1986, totaling $41,120.90 to DIACSA
to provide services to the Contras.63
In addition, the State Department was still doing business with
DIACSA on its own behalf six months after the company's
principals had been indicted. Court papers filed in the case in
July 1986, show that the U.S. Embassies of Panama and Costa Rica
were clients of DIACSA. While DIACSA and its principals were
engaged in plea bargaining negotiations with the Justice
Department regarding the cocaine trafficking and money laundering
charges, U.S. Embassy personnel in Panama and Costa Rica were
meeting with one of the defendants to discuss purchasing Cessna
planes from the company.64
Each of the defendants in the DIACSA case was ultimately
convicted on charges of importing cocaine into the United States.
The sentences they received ranged from ten years for one non-
cooperating defendant, to nine years for Floyd Carlton, to three
years probation for Luis Caballero and five years probation for
his father, DIACSA's owner, Alfredo Caballero, as a consequence
of their cooperation with the government.65
D. VORTEX
When the State Department signed a contract with Vortex to
handle Contra supplies, Michael B. Palmer, then the company's
Executive Vice-President signed for Vortex. At the time, Palmer
was under active investigation by the FBI in three jurisdictions
in connection with his decade-long activity as a drug smuggler,
and a federal grand jury was preparing to indict him in
Detroit.66
The contract required Vortex to receive goods for the Contras,
store, pack and inventory them. At the time the contract was
signed, Vortex's principal assets were two airplanes which Palmer
previously used for drug smuggling.67
Vortex was selected by NHAO assistant director Philip Buechler,
following calls among Buechler, Palmer, and Pat Foley, the
president of Summit Aviation.68
VII. THE CASE OF GEORGE MORALES AND FRS/ARDE
In 1984, the Contra forces under Eden Pastora were in an
increasingly hopeless situation. On May 30,1984, Pastora was
wounded by a bomb at his base camp at La Penca, Nicaragua, close
to the Costa Rica border. That same day, according to ARDE
officer Karol Prado, aid to ARDE from the United States was cut
off.69
Despite continued pressure from the United States, Pastora
refused to place his ARDE forces under a unified command with the
largest of the Contra organizations-the Honduras-based FDN. The
CIA considered Pastora to be "disruptive and unpredictable."70
By the time the Boland Amendment cut off legal military aid to
the Contras, the CIA had seen to it that Pastora did not receive
any assistance, and his forces were experiencing "desperate
conditions."71
Although there are discrepancies among the parties as to when
the initial meeting took place, Pastora's organization was
approached by George Morales, a Colombian drug trafficker living
in Miami who had been indicted on narcotics trafficking charges.
According to the State Department report to the Congress of
July 26, 1986:
Information developed by the intelligence community
indicates that a senior member of Eden Pastora's
Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS) agreed in late 1984
with (Morales) that FRS pilots would aid in
transporting narcotics in exchange for financial
assistanceIthe FRS official agreed to use FRS
operational facilities in Costa Rica and Nicaragua to
facilitate transportation of narcotics. (Morales)
agreed to provide financial support to the FRS, in
addition to aircraft and training for FRS pilots. After
undergoing flight training, the FRS pilots were to
continue to work for the FRS, but would also fly
narcotics shipments from South America to sites in
Costa Rica and Nicaragua for later transport to the
United States. Shortly thereafter (Morales) reportedly
provided the FRS one C-47 aircraft and two crated
helicopters. He is reported to have paid the sum of
$100,000 to the FRS, but there was no information
available on who actually received the money.72
The State Department said it was aware of only one incident of
drug trafficking resulting from this agreement between the
Contras and Morales and that was the case of Contra pilot Gerardo
Duran. Duran was arrested in January 1986, in Costa Rica for his
involvement in transporting cocaine to the United States.73
Duran
was an FRS pilot from 1982 to 1985 and operated an air taxi
service in Costa Rica. According to Marco Aguado and Karol Prado,
Duran would fly supplies to the Contras on the Southern Front and
he would charge for each flight.74
Robert Owen, courier for Lt. Col. Oliver North, testified to
the Iran/Contra Committees that he told North he thought Karol
Prado was involved in trafficking drugs out of Panama, and that
Pastora's pilot, Marco Aguado, was also involved.75 The
Subcommittee was unable to validate Owen's claims. Prado
vehemently denied these allegations stating that he believed the
drug trafficking allegations against Pastora were the result of a
CIA effort to discredit him.76
Morales testified that his involvement with the Contras started
in 1984 at the urging of Marta Healey, the widow of one of his
drug pilots, Richard Healey.77 Marta Healey's first husband was
Adolfo "Popo" Chamorro, the second in command to Eden Pastora in
the FRS. She came from a prominent Nicaraguan family.
At the time of his first contract, Morales was under indictment
for marijuana smuggling. He testified that he thought by
assisting the Contra cause his indictment would be dropped. Marta
Healey introduced Morales to Popo Chamorro, Marco Aguado and
Octaviano Cesar at a meeting in Miami. According to Morales, he
wanted to make a deal: He would help the Contras with their
needs, and "they in exchange would help me with my objective,
which was solving my indictment." Morales believed the Contra
leaders would help him solve his legal problems because of their
contacts with the CIA.78
On October 31, 1987 in San Jose, Costa Rica, the Subcommittee
videotaped the depositions of three Contra leaders with intimate
knowledge of the Morales relationship with Pastora's organization
in video depositions. The three were Karol Prado, Pastora's head
of communications; Marco Aguado, Pastora's air force chief; and
Octaviano Cesar who, along with his brother Alfredo, were
political allies of Pastora's at the time. A fourth, Adolfo
"Popo" Chamorro, who was Pastora's second in command in ARDE,
testified in closed session of the Subcommittee in April 1988.
Chamorro's testimony was taken in closed session by the consent
of the Subcommittee at his request. Dick McCall, of Senator
Kerry's personal staff, in an arrangement worked out with
Chamorro and his attorneys, subsequently interviewed him in
Miami.
Each denied knowing that Morales was under indictment for drug
trafficking when they first met him at Marta Healey's house in
Miami. Popo Chamorro said that as far as he knew Morales was just
another rich Miami resident with strong anti-Communist
feelings.79
In addition, all three denied receiving more than $10,000 in
cash from Morales. The Subcommittee found that $10,000 was given
to Popo Chamorro to cover the cost of transporting a C-47 owned
by
Morales, which he donated to ARDE, from Haiti to Ilopango Air
Force Base in El Salvador.80
While denying receiving funds personally, Prado, Aguado and
Cesar each confirmed elements of Morales' story.
According to Prado, Octaviano Cesar and his brother Adolfo
allied themselves politically with Pastora in the Summer of 1984.
A decision was then made to send Popo Chamorro and Octaviano
Cesar to the United States to look for funds.81 In September,
Popo Chamorro returned to Costa Rica with photographs of a DC-4
and a Howard plane, and told Pastora that they would get six more
planes, including a Navajo Panther from George Morales.82
Pastora told Chamorro that the C-47 was the most practical
plane for the Contras at the time and Popo returned to Miami to
arrange for its transfer. Chamorro provided the Subcommittee with
an aircraft purchase order, dated October 1, 1984. The notarized
purchase order provided that for the sum of one dollar, a
McDonnell-Douglas DC-3, the civilian designation for a C-47,
would be transferred to Marco Aguado. The order was signed by
George Morales, as the seller, and by Marco Aguado, as the
purchaser.
In addition, Chamorro gave the Subcommittee a list of flights
made by that C-47 to ferry arms from Ilopango to Costa Rica and
La Penca. Between October 18, 1984 and February 12, 1986, some
156,000 pounds of material were moved from Ilopango to air fields
in Costa Rica. Of the 24 flights during this period, eleven were
to La Penca on the Nicaraguan side of the Rio San Juan.83
The Subcommittee substantiated key elements of the Morales
story, although it did not find evidence that Cesar, Chamorro, or
Prado were personally involved in drug trafficking. First, all
witnesses agreed that Morales gave ARDE a C-47. Evidence of an
association between them is also provided by a Customs document.
This document, provided to the Committee by the U.S. Customs
Service, shows that Morales entered the United States from the
Bahamas on October 13, 1984, with Marco Aguado, Octaviano Cesar
and Popo Chamorro. They carried $400,000 in cash and checks which
were declared by Aguado, Chamorro and Cesar. They claimed that
the checks and money were returned to Morales after clearing
Customs.84
Aguado summarized the relationship between the Southern Front
Contras and the drug traffickers in terms of the exploitation of
the Contra movement by individuals involved in narcotics
smuggling. According to Aguado, the trafficking organizations,
"took advantage of the anti-communist sentiment which existed in
Central America I and they undoubtedly used it for drug
trafficking." Referring to the Contra resupply operations, Aguado
said the traffickers used "the same connections, the same air
strips, the same people. And maybe they said that it was weapons
for Eden Pastora, and it was actually drugs that would later on
go to the U.S.... They fooled people ... Unfortunately, this kind
of ac-
tivity, which is for the freeing of a people, is quite similar to
the activities of the drug traffickers."85
Octaviano Cesar testified that when he dealt with Morales he
was:
Thinking in terms of the security of my country. It
just didn't enter my mind that I would become involved
in such a mess, because it never entered into my mind
to get in that [drug] business I
I went a couple of times inside in Nicaragua and I
saw people there. Young kids 15, 16 years old, they
were carrying 30, 40 rounds of ammunition against the
Sandinistas I And that's why I did it. I'm not proud of
it, but I just didn't have any choice. I mean, the U.S.
Congress didn't give us any choice. They got these
people into a war. The people went inside of Nicaragua,
80 miles inside. They had thousands of supporters,
campesinos there helping them I Now, when those people
retreat, those campesinos were murdered by the
Sandinistas. I don't want that, but that's the reality
of life.86
In addition, Cesar told the Subcommittee that he told a CIA
officer about Morales and his offer to help the Contras.
Senator KERRY. Did you have occasion to say to
someone in the CIA that you were getting money from him
and you were concerned he was a drug dealer? Did you
pass that information on to somebody?
Mr. CESAR. Yes, I passed the information on about
the-not the relations-well, it was the relations and
the airplanes; yes. And the CIA people at the American
military attache's office that were [sic] based at
Ilopango also, and any person or any plane landed
there, they had to go--
Senator KERRY. And they basically said to you that it
was all right as long as you don't deal in the powder;
is that correct? Is that a fair quote?
Mr. CESAR. Yes.87
After the La Penca bombing of May 30, 1984, all assistance was
cut off by the CIA to ARDE, while other Contra groups on both
fronts continued to receive support from the U.S. government
through a variety of channels. The United States stated that the
cut-off of ARDE was related to the involvement of its personnel
in drug trafficking. Yet many of the same drug traffickers who
had assisted ARDE were also assisting other Contra groups that
continued to receive funding. Morales, for example, used Gerardo
Duran as one of his drug pilots, and Duran worked for Alfonso
Robello and Fernando "el Negro" Chamorro, who were associated
with other Contra groups, as well as for ARDE.88
In a sworn deposition which was taken in San Jose Costa Rica by
the Subcommittee on October 31, 1987, Karol Prado, Pastora's
treasurer and procurement officer, vehemently denied allegations
concerning the personal involvement of ARDE leadership in drug
trafficking. Prado said that because of Pastora's problems with
the U.S. government, it was his belief that the CIA was
attempting to discredit the former Sandinista Commandante and his
supporters in ARDE with allegations that they were involved in
drug trafficking.89
Thomas Castillo, the former CIA station chief in Costa Rica,
who was indicted in connection with the Iran/Contra affair,
testified before the Iran/Contra Committees that when the CIA
became aware of narcotics trafficking by Pastora's supporters and
lieutenants, those individuals' activities were reported to law
enforcement officials.90 However, Morales continued to work with
the Contras until January 1986. He was indicted for a second time
in the Southern District of Florida for a January 1986 cocaine
flight to Bahamas and was arrested on June 12, 1986.
Morales testified that he offered to cooperate with the
government soon after he was arrested, and that he was willing to
take a lie detector test. He said his attorneys repeated the
offer on his behalf several times, but on each occasion the U.S.
Attorney, Leon Kellner, refused.91
Leon Kellner and Richard Gregorie, then the head of the
criminal division of the Miami U.S. Attorney's office, met with
the staff of the Committee in November 1986. They said that
Morales' story was not credible and that Morales was trying to
get his sentence reduced by cooperating with a Senate committee.
As Morales had not yet been sentenced, both Kellner and Gregorie
discouraged the staff from meeting with Morales at that time, and
the staff respected their request. Kellner and Gregorie said that
Morales was like the many Miami cocaine traffickers who use the
"I was working for the CIA" defense.92
Following his testimony before the Subcommittee, Morales
renewed his offer to work with the government. This time, federal
law enforcement officials decided to accept the offer. Morales
provided the government with leads that were used by law
enforcement authorities in connection with matters remaining
under investigation. In November 1988, the DEA gave Morales a
lengthy polygraph examination on his testimony before the
Subcommittee and he was considered truthful.93
VII. JOHN HULL
John Hull was a central figure in Contra operations on the
Southern Front when they were managed by Oliver North, from 1984
through late 1986.94 Before that, according to former Costa
Rican CIA station chief Thomas Castillo's public testimony, Hull
had helped the CIA with military supply and other operations on
behalf of the Contras.95 In addition, during the same period,
Hull received $10,000 a month from Adolfo Calero of the FDN-at
North's direction.96
Hull is an Indiana farmer who lives in northern Costa Rica. He
came to Costa Rica in mid-1970's and persuaded a number of North
Americans to invest in ranch land in the northern part of the
country.97 Using their money and adding some of his own, he
purchased thousands of acres of Costa Rican farm land. Properties
under his ownership, management or control ultimately included at
least six airstrips. To the many pilots and revolutionaries who
passed through the region, this collection of properties and
airstrips became known as John Hull's ranch.
On March 23, 1984, seven men aboard a U.S. government owned DC-
3 were killed when the cargo plane crashed near Hull's ranch,
revealing publicly that Hull was allowing his property to be used
for airdrops of supplies to the Contras.98 But even before this
public revelation of Hull's role in supporting the Contras,
officials in a variety of Latin American countries were aware of
Hull's activities as a liaison between the Contras and the United
States government. Jose Blandon testified, for example, that
former Costa Rican Vice President Daniel Oduber suggested he
(Blandon) meet with Hull in 1983, to discuss the formation of a
unified southern Contra command under Eden Pastora.99
Five witnesses testified that Hull was involved in cocaine
trafficking: Floyd Carlton, Werner Lotz, Jose Blandon, George
Morales, and Gary Betzner. Betzner was the only witness who
testified that he was actually present to witness cocaine being
loaded onto planes headed for the United States in Hull's
presence.
Lotz said that drugs were flown into Hull's ranch, but that he
did not personally witness the flights. He said he heard about
the drug flights from the Colombian and Panamanian pilots who
allegedly flew drugs to Hull's airstrips. Lotz described the
strips as "a stop for refuel basically. The aircraft would land,
there would be fuel waiting for them, and then would depart. They
would come in with weapons and drugs." Lotz said that Hull was
paid for allowing his airstrips to be used as a refueling
stop.100
Two witnesses, Blandon and Carlton recounted an incident
involving the disappearance of a shipment of 538 kilos of cocaine
owned by the Pereira or Cali cocaine cartel. Teofilo Watson, a
member of Carlton's smuggling operation, was flying the plane to
Costa Rica for the Cartel. The plane crashed and Watson was
killed. The witnesses believed that the crash occurred at Hull's
ranch and that Hull took the shipment and bulldozed the plane, a
Cessna 310, into the river.
Carlton testified that the Colombians were furious when they
discovered the cocaine missing. He said they sent gunmen after
Hull and in fact kidnapped a member of Hull's family to force the
return of the cocaine. When that failed they became convinced
that Carlton himself stole the cocaine and they sent gunmen after
him. The gunmen dug up Carlton's property in Panama with a
backhoe looking for the lost cocaine, and Carlton fled for his
life to Miami.101
Gary Betzner started flying for Morales' drug smuggling network
in 1981. Betzner testified that his first delivery of arms to the
Contras was in 1983, when he flew a DC-3 carrying grenades and
mines to Ilopango Air Force Base in El Salvador. His co-pilot on
the trip was Richard Healey, who had flown drugs for Morales.102
Betzner said the weapons were unloaded at Ilopango by
Salvadoran military personnel and an American whom he assumed
worked for the U.S. Department of Defense. Betzner testified that
he and Healey flew the plane on to Colombia where they picked up
a load of marijuana and returned to their base at Great Harbor
Cay in the Bahamas.103
According to Betzner, the next Contra weapons and drugs flight
took place in July 1984. Morales asked him to fly a load of
weapons to Hull's ranch and to pick up a load of drugs. Betzner
flew a Cessna 402-B to John Hull's ranch. According to Betzner,
he was met at the airstrip by Hull and they watched the cargo of
weapons being unloaded, and cocaine, packed in 17 duffel bags,
and five or six two-foot square boxes being loaded into the now-
empty Cessna. Betzner then flew the plane to a field at Lakeland,
Florida.104
Yet another guns for drugs flight was made two weeks later. On
this trip, Betzner said he flew a Panther to an airstrip called
"Los Llanos," about ten miles from Hull's properties and not far
from the Voice of America transmitter in northern Costa Rica.
Betzner testified that Hull met him again and the two watched
while the weapons were unloaded and approximately 500 kilos of
cocaine in 17 duffel bags were loaded for the return flight to
Florida.105
Hull became the subject of an investigation by the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida in the spring of
1985. In late March 1985, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Feldman
and two FBI agents went to Costa Rica to investigate Neutrality
Act violations by participants in the Contra resupply network
that were also under investigation at the time by Senator Kerry.
Both the Feldman and Kerry inquiries had been prompted in part by
statements made to reporters by soldiers of fortune imprisoned in
Costa Rica who alleged John Hull was providing support for the
Contras with the help of the National Security Council.106
Feldman and the FBI agents met with U.S. Ambassador to Costa
Rica, Lewis Tambs, and the CIA Chief of Station, Thomas Castillo,
who told him John Hull knew Rob Owen and Oliver North and gave
the impression that Hull had been working for U.S. interests
prior to March of 1984. In addition, one of the embassy security
officers, Jim Nagel, told one of the FBI agents accompanying
Feldman, that regarding Feldman's inquiries, "I these were
agencies with other operational requirements and we shouldn't
interfere with the work of these agencies."107 When Feldman
attempted to interview Hull, Feldman learned that Hull was told
by the embassy staff not to talk to him without an attorney
present.108
Feldman concluded that U.S. Embassy officials in Costa Rica
were taking active measures to protect Hull. After Feldman
interviewed two of the mercenaries, Peter Glibbery and Steven
Carr, regarding their allegations of Hull's involvement in
criminal activity, Feldman learned that Kirk Kotula, Consul in
San Jose, was "trying to get Carr and the rest of these people to
recant their statements regarding Hull's involvement with the CIA
and with any other American agency.109 Feldman added "I it was
apparent we were stirring up some problem with our inquiries
concerning John Hull."110 Feldman concluded that because Hull
was receiving protection from some US officials, that it would
not be possible to interview him. Feldman therefore took no
further steps to do so.111
In an effort to stop the investigation against him and to cause
the Justice Department to instead investigate those urging an
investigation of Hull, Hull prepared falsified affidavits from
jailed mercenaries in Costa Rica to U.S. Attorney Kellner. In the
affidavits the mercenaries accused Congressional staff of paying
witnesses to invent stories about illegal activities associated
with the clandestine Contras supply network. The Justice
Department ultimately concluded that the affidavits had been
forged. Kellner testified that he "had concerns about them and I
didn't believe them.112
To this day, the Justice Department has taken no action against
John Hull for obstruction of justice or any related charge in
connection with his filing false affidavits with the U.S. Justice
Department regarding the Congressional investigations.
In the period in which he was providing support to the Contras,
Hull obtained a loan from the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation for $375,000 which ultimately proved to have been
obtained with false documentation.
In 1983, Hull and two associates, Mr. William Crone and Mr.
Alvaro Arroyo approached OPIC for a loan to finance a joint
venture wood products factory that would make wheelbarrow and ax
handles for the U.S. market. In fact, according to testimony from
Crone and OPIC officials, no contributions from Hull, Arroyo or
himself were made to the joint venture. On the basis of the
applica-
tion, some supporting documentation and a site visit, on March
30 1984, OPIC advanced $375,000.113
By the end of 1985, after one interest payment, the loan lapsed
into default, and OPIC officials began to recognize that the
project was a fraud, and that Hull had made false representations
in making the application to OPIC.114 OPIC officials found that
the money which was disbursed by their Agency was deposited in
Hull's Indiana bank account and the funds were withdrawn by Hull
in cash. When OPIC inquired in 1986 as where the funds were
going, Hull told OPIC officials that he would be using the cash
to buy Costa Rican money on the black market to get a more
favorable exchange rate.115
In fact, Costa Rica has a favorable exchange rate for foreign
investment and the excuse Hull offered does not make sense. What
appears to have happened is that Hull simply took the money,
inasmuch as no equipment was purchased for the factory, no
products were shipped from it, and Hull's partner, Crone,
testified that he never saw the money. Indeed, prospective
purchasers complained that they paid Hull for products in advance
but never received delivery.116
On the basis of the subsequent OPIC investigation of the loan
to Hull's company, in April 1987, the case was referred to the
Justice Department for a criminal fraud investigation.117 While
nothing has yet happened for almost two years, the Justice
Department maintains the investigation is still ongoing.118
OPIC foreclosed on the properties which Hull had put up as
collateral for the loan. Following the foreclosure to recover
their monies, OPIC sold the property at auction. However, in
order to prevent a sale far below the market price, OPIC bid at
the auction and wound up purchasing its own property for
$187,500.
OPIC then attempted to sell the property directly. An
advertisement was placed in The Wall Street Journal which
attracted a single offer from an investment banker in
Philadelphia. An agreement was negotiated whereby the company
purchasing the property from OPIC was required to make no down
payment, and only to repay OPIC its $187,500 from the future
proceeds of the sale of timber cut on the land. The corporation
which purchased the property has no other assets other than the
land. If the agreement is fulfilled by the purchasers of the
land, OPIC will realize repayment of $187,500, half of the
original $375,000 loaned to Hull.119
The Subcommittee also heard testimony investors who had allowed
Hull to purchase property for them and then to manage the
property, who testified that he did not deliver on his promises,
he failed to purchase the properties he said he would, and in one
case,
took farm equipment off a farm he was paid to manage and
converted it for his own use.120
In mid-January 1989, Hull was arrested by Costa Rican law
enforcement authorities and charged with drug trafficking and
violating Costa Rica's neutrality.
IX. THE SAN FRANCISCO FROGMAN CASE, UND-FRAN AND PCNE
The San Francisco Frogman case was one of the first cases in
which allegations linking specific Contra organizations to drug
smugglers surfaced. In a July 26, 1986 report to the Congress on
Contra-related narcotics allegations, the State Department
described the Frogman case as follows:
"This case gets it nickname from swimmers who brought cocaine
ashore on the West Coast from a Colombian vessel in 1982-1983. It
focused on a major Colombian cocaine smuggler, Alvaro Carvajal-
Minota, who supplied a number of West Coast smugglers. It was
alleged, but never confirmed, that Nicaraguan citizen Horacio
Pereira, an associate of Carvajal, had helped the Nicaraguan
resistance. Pereira was subsequently convicted on drug charges in
Costa Rica and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment. Two other
Nicaraguans, Carlos Cabezas and Julio Zavala, who were among the
jailed West Coast traffickers convicted of receiving drugs from
Carvajal, claimed long after their conviction that they had
delivered large sums of money to resistance groups in Costa Rica
and that Pereira, who was not charged in the case, has said the
profits from the drug sale would finance resistance
activities."121
The allegations made by Cabezas and Zavala involved two
Southern Front Contra groups-UDN-FARN, a military group
associated with Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro, and PCNE, a Contra
political group in the South. Cabezas claimed that he helped move
25 to 30 kilos of cocaine from Costa Rica to San Francisco,
generating $1.5 million. According to Cabezas, part of that money
was given to Troilo and Fernando Sanchez to help Eden Pastora's
and Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro's operations on the Southern
Front in 1982 and l983.122
After the trial, the U.S. government returned $36,020 seized as
drug money to one of the defendants, Zavala, after he submitted
letters from Contra leaders claiming the funds were really their
property. The money that was returned had been seized by the FBI
after being found in cash in a drawer at Zavala's home with drug
transaction letters, an M-1 carbine, a grenade, and a quantity of
Cocaine.123
The Subcommittee found that the Frogman arrest involved cocaine
from a Colombian source, Carvajal-Minota. In addition, Zavala and
Cabezas had as a second source of supply, Nicaraguans living in
Costa Rica associated with the Contras. FBI documents from the
Frogman case identify the Nicaraguans as Horacio Pereira, Troilo
Sanchez and Fernando Sanchez.124
Pereira was convicted on cocaine charges in Costa Rica in 1985
and sentenced to 12 years in prison.125 An important member of
the Pereira organization was Sebastian "Huachan" Gonzalez, who
also was associated with ARDE in Southern Front Contra
operations. Robert Owen advised North in February 1985, that
Gonzalez was trafficking in cocaine.126 Jose Blandon testified
that Eden Pastora knew that Gonzalez was involved in drug
trafficking while he was working with ARDE. Gonzalez later left
the Contra movement and fled from Costa Rica to Panama, where he
went to work for General Noriega.127
During the Pereira trial, evidence was also presented by the
Costa Rica prosecutor showing that drug traffickers had asked
leader Ermundo Chamorro the brother of UDN-FARN leader Fernando
"El Negro" Chamorro, for assistance with vehicles to transport
cocaine and for help with a Costa Rica police official.128
Troilo and Fernando Sanchez were marginal participants in the
Contra movement and relatives of a member of the FDN
Directorate.129
X. THE CUBAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION
Several groups of Miami-based Cuba Americans provided direct
and indirect support for the Southern Front during the period
that the Boland Amendment prohibited official U.S. government
assistance. Their help, which included supplies and training, was
funded in part with drug money.130 The State Department described
the allegations in its July 1986 report to Congress as follows:
There have been allegations that Rene Corbo and other
Cuban Americans involved in anti-Sandinista activities
in Costa Rica were connected with Miami-based drug
traffickers. Corbo reportedly recruited a group of
Cuban American and Cuban exile combatants and military
trainers in the Miami area who operated inside
Nicaragua and in the northern part of Costa Rica. Two
Cuban exiles in this group, Mario Rejas Lavas and
Ubaldo Hernandez Perez, were captured by the
Sandinistas in June 1986. They were reportedly members
of the UNO/FARN group headed by Fernando "El Negro"
Chamorro. There is no information to substantiate
allegations that this group from Miami has been a
source of drug money for the UNO/FARN or any other
resistance organization.131
On May 6, 1986, Committee staff met with representatives of the
Justice Department, FBI, DEA, CIA and State Department, to advise
them of allegations of gun running and drug trafficking in
connection with this group.
In August 1986, the Committee requested information from the
Justice Department regarding the allegations concerning Corbo and
fellow Cuban Americans Felipe Vidal, Frank Castro, and Luis
Rodriguez and Frank Chanes (two of the principals in Frigorificos
de Puntarenas and Ocean Hunter), concerning their involvement in
narcotics trafficking. The Justice Department refused to provide
any information in response to this request, on the grounds that
the information requested remained under active investigation,
and that the Committee's "rambling through open investigations
gravely risks compromising those efforts."132
Less than three months earlier, the Justice Department had
advised both the press and the Committee that the allegations had
been thoroughly investigated and were without foundation. 133
At no time did the Justice Department disclose to the Committee
in response to its inquiry that extensive information had in fact
been developed by the FBI from 1983 through 1986 suggesting that
many of the allegations the Committee was investigating were
true.
At the May 6, 1986 meeting with Committee staff, the CIA
categorically denied that weapons had been shipped to the Contras
from the United States on the flights involving Rene Corbo,
noting that the material on which they were basing these
assertions was classified, and suggested that the allegations
that had been made to the contrary were the result of
disinformation.134
In fact, as the FBI had previously learned from informants,
Cuban American supporters of the Contras had shipped weapons from
south Florida to Ilopango, and from there to John Hull's
airstrips in Costa Rica.135 The persons involved admitted to the
FBI that they had participated in such shipments, making general
statements about them beginning in 1985. On June 4, 1986 and June
16, 1986, Rene Corbo, one of the principals in the shipments,
explicitly told the FBI that he had participated in shipping
weapons to the Contras in violation of U.S. Neutrality laws.136
The Cuban-American contingent supporting the Contra effort on
the Southern Front work with Pastora until May 30,1984 bombing at
La Penca. After the assassination attempt on Pastora they shifted
their allegiance to Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro of UDN-FARN. By
mid-June 1984, the drug smuggling through the Southern Front
zones controlled by the Contras had grown sufficiently
obvious that Robert Owen warned Lt. Col. Oliver North at the NSC
that the "Cubans (are) involved in drugs."137
Notes taken by Colonel Robert L. Earl during his tenure at the
NSC described how in August 1986, the CIA was worried about
I disreputable characters in the Cuban-American
community that are sympathetic to the Contra cause but
causing more problems than help and that one had to be
careful in how one dealt with the Cuban-American
community and its relation to this, that although their
motives were in the right place there was a lot of
corruption and greed and drugs and it was a real
mess.138
In August 1988, Corbo and Castro were indicted in a Neutrality
Act case involving the Contras brought by the U.S. Attorney for
Miami and prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Feldman.
No narcotics-related allegations were included in the August 1988
indictment.139
One of the three principals in Frigorificos de Puntarenas and
Ocean Hunter, Luis Rodriguez, was indicted on drug charges in
April 1988. The others, Frank Chanes and Moises Nunez,
participated in Contra military assistance operations in 1984 and
1985.140 Nunez was employed by both the drug money laundering
front, Frigorificos de Puntarenas, and by Glenn Robinette on
behalf of the Second-North Enterprise. Former CIA Costa Rica
Chief of Station Thomas Castillo told the Iran-Contra committees
that Nunez "was involved in a very sensitive operation" for the
Enterprise.141
XI. RAMON MILIAN RODRIGUEZ AND FELIX RODRIGUEZ
A particularly controversial allegation arose during the course
of the Subcommittee's investigation. This involved Ramon Milian
Rodriguez's offer to assist the Contras, following his arrest for
money laundering.
In a June 26, 1987 closed session of the Subcommittee, Milian
Rodriguez testified that in a meeting arranged by Miami private
detective Raoul Diaz with Felix Rodriguez, he (Milian) offered to
provide drug money to the Contras. Milian Rodriguez stated that
Felix accepted the offer and $10 million in such assistance was
subsequently provided the Contras through a system of secret
couriers.
Milian Rodriguez testified that he also offered to assist in
entrapping the Sandinistas in a drug sting-all in return for
dropping the charges then pending against him.
Felix Rodriguez strenuously denied Milian Rodriguez's version
of the meeting, stating that he reported Milian's offer to a
number of U.S. government agencies, including the FBI and CIA. No
action was taken by those agencies, and Milian Rodriguez's case
went to trial.
Raoul Diaz refused to respond to a Committee subpoena to
discuss his recollection of the meeting. Therefore, because of
the diffi-
culty the Subcommittee faced in ascertaining who was telling the
truth-Ramon Milian Rodriguez or Felix Rodriguez-Milian was asked
whether he would be willing to take a polygraph examination. He
agreed to submit to an examination on the question of providing
drug money to the Contras through Felix Rodriguez.
Senator Kerry, the Subcommittee Chairman, arranged for one of
the country's leading polygraph experts, Dr. Donald Raskin of the
University of Utah, to travel to Washington, D.C. to administer
the test. Dr. Raskin administered a partial examination of Milian
Rodriguez on June 3-4, 1988. On two critical questions, Ramon
Milian Rodriguez's answers were determined to be deceptive by Dr.
Raskin. The questions were as follows:
1. Did Felix Rodriguez ask you to arrange deliveries of money
for the Contras during the meeting at Raoul's office?
Answer, yes.
2. Did you arrange approximately five deliveries of money for
the Contras on the basis of phone calls you personally received
from Felix Rodriguez?
Answer, yes.
On the third question, Dr. Raskin could not determine whether
or not Ramon Milian Rodriguez was being truthful in his response.
The question was as follows:
3. Did you arrange the deliveries of at least $5 million for
the Contras using the procedures that you and Felix worked out?
Answer, yes.
At that point, Milian Rodriguez stated that he did not want to
continue the examination. Based upon Dr. Raskin's oral evaluation
of Ramon Milian Rodriguez, the Chairman concluded that his
version of the meeting with Felix Rodriguez and his subsequent
relationship with Felix in providing drug money for the Contras
was not truthful. The Chairman reached no conclusion regarding
the issue of whether Ramon Milian arranged for the deliveries of
at least $5 million for the Contras.
During Felix Rodriguez' public testimony before the
Subcommittee on July 14, 1988, Senator Kerry stated that he did
not believe Ramon Milian Rodriguez' version of the meeting was
truthful.
However, Milian Rodriguez' testimony regarding the Cartels,
General Noriega's role in narco-trafficking, and his involvement
in setting up companies which were later used to support the
Contras, was corroborated by a number of witnesses, including
Jose Blandon, Floyd Carlton, Gerald Loeb, and a Miami attorney
who had supplied information on the Cartels in a closed session
deposition. In addition, Milian Rodriguez' testimony on many of
these points was corroborated by extensive documentary evidence
and by grand jury statements by his partners in federal criminal
proceedings.
_______________________________
1 Subcommittee deposition of Marcos Aguado, Part 3, p. 285.
2 "Allegations of Misconduct by the Nicaraguan Democratic
Resistance," State Department document #3079c, April 16, 1986.
3 State Department document 3079c
4 Allegations of Drug trafficking and the Nicaraguan Democratic
Resistance, State Department document #5136c, July 26,1986."
5 Iran-Contra testimony of Central American Task Force Chief,
August 5, 1987, 100-11, pp.
182-183.
6 Iran-Contra deposition of Central American Task Force Chief,
Appendix B, Vol. 3 pp. 1121
1230. Also North Diary page Q1704, March 26,1984, "Pastora
revealed as drug dealer."
7 See extensive FBI investigative materials released in discovery
in U.S. v. Corbo and U.S. v.
Calero, SD Florida, 1988, documenting information the FBI had
collected regarding these matters from 1984-1986.
8 National Public Radio, All Things Considered, May 5, 1986, Bill
Buzenberg; New York Times, May 6, 1986, p. A-6.
9 Memcoms of May 6,1986 meeting, Subcommittee files.
10 Winer MemCom, 5/6/86, Messick MemCom, 5/6/86; Marum Memcom;
5/6/86, Committee
Files; see Iran/Contra Deposition of FBI Agent Kevin Currier,
Appendix B, Vol. 8 pp. 205-206.
11 Foreign Relations Committee-Justice Department correspondence,
August 10,1985.
12 Subcommittee testimony of Jeffrey B. Feldman, October 5, 1988,
p. 24; Feldman MemCom,
November 17, 1987.
13 Subcommittee testimony of General Paul Gorman, Part 2,
February 8, 1988 p. 44.
14 Subcommittee testimony of David Westrate, Part 4, July 12,
1988, p. 144.
15 Interviews conducted by Senator John F. Kerry with current and
former Costa Rican law enforcement officials, San Jose, Costa
Rica, October 31,1987.
16 Subcommittee testimony of Jose Blandon, Part 2, February 9,
1988 pp. 138-139.
17 Kerry interviews in Costa Rica, op. cit.
18 Subcommittee closed session with Werner Lotz, Part 4, April 8,
1988, p. 673; Blandon testimony, Part 2, p. 86; see also Carlton,
Part 2, p. 196.
19 Lotz testimony, Part 4, p. 674 and Subcommittee testimony of
Frances J. McNeil, Part 3 April 4, 1988, p. 58.
20 Blandon testimony, Part 2, p. 86 and McNeil, Part 3, p. 55,
and Subcommittee testimony of Floyd Carlton, Part 2, February 10,
p. 196.
21 Kerry interviews in Costa Rica, ibid.
22 Lotz testimony, op. cit., p. 690.
23 Lotz, Part 4, p. 690.
24 Lotz, Part 4, p. 678.
25 DEA Testimony before House Subcommittee on Crime, July
28,1988.
26 Ibid, pp. 683-684.
27 Ibid, pp. 680, 682.
28 Kerry interviews in Costa Rica, ibid.
29 Castillo deposition, ibid., p. 483.
30 Lotz, Part 4, p. 681- Letter of Eden Pastora to David Sullivan
and Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, April 10, 1986.
31 Subcommittee testimony of Gary Betzner, Part 3, April 7, 1988,
pp. 262-265.
32 Robert W. Owen, Iran-Contra testimony, May 14, 1987, p. 7; see
also memo from Owen to Oliver North, April 1, 1985, pp. 1, 3.
33 Subcommittee interviews with GAO analysts, September 28,1988.
34 Subcommittee interviews with GAO analysts, ibid.- interviews
with Ambassador Duemling, April 6, 1988.
35 Source for Payments to Suppliers: GAO Analysis of NHAO
Accounts, final figures provided by Department of State to the
Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism and International
Operations. January 4,1989.
36 Duemling statement to Senator Kerry, April 6, 1988.
37 Iran-Contra deposition of Robert Duemling, Appendix B, Volume
9, pp 47-78.
38 See Iran-Contra testimony of Adolfo Calero, Appendix B, Volume
3, p. 176.
39 U.S. Customs Service investigative report, "Guy Penilton Owen,
et al., N90201," file NOGGBDO30036, New Orleans, May 18, 1983,
pp. 6-8.
40 Subcommittee interview with Sheriff of Port Charlotte County,
Florida, May 1987.
41 See Commerce Department Shipper's Export Declaration for R/M
Equipment, Inc., file 0003688, Miami, Florida, February 28, 1985,
re shipments for"Armed Forces of Honduras."
42 Commerce Department's Shipper's Export Declaration for R/M
Equipment, Inc., file # 0003688, Miami, Florida, February
28,1985.
43 Customs report, NOGGGGGBDO300036, ibid., p. 13
44 Address book seized by Customs, Port Charlotte, Florida,
N2551, March 16,1987.
45 Subcommittee staff interview with Sheriffs investigators, Port
Charlotte County, Florida, May, 1987.
46 Grand jury statements of Carlos Soto on file in U.S. v.
Rodriguez, 99-0222, USDC, Northern District of Florida, September
29, 1987, and Subcommittee testimony of Ramon Milian-Rodriguez,
Part 2, February 11, 1988, pp. 260-261; documents seized in U.S.
v. Milian Rodriguez, SD Florida 1983.
47 Ibid.
48 U.S. v. Luis Rodriguez, 87-01044, US District Court for the
Northern District of Florida; U.S. v. Luis Rodriguez, 88-0222 CR-
King, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
49 Banking records of Frigorificos de Puntarenas subpoenaed by
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, May
1986; GAO Analysis NHAO Expenditures, May 1986.
50 Corporate Records, Florida Secretary of State, ocean Hunter,
Inc.
51 Grand jury statements of Soto, ibid., Ramon Milian-Rodriguez,
ibid.
52 Documents on file in U.S. v. Rodriguez, 99-0222, USDC,
Northern District of Florida, 1988, from grand jury statements of
Carlos Soto.
53 Documents on file in U.S. u. Luis Rodriguez, ibid., Northern
District of Florida.
54 FBI 302, Continental Bank Bombing, FBI Agent George Kiszynski,
MM174A-1298, released in U.S. v. Corbo, Southern District of
Florida, 1988.
55 GAO Analysis of NHAO Payments, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
of House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 1986; banking records
subpoenaed by Western Hemisphere Subcommittee.
56 U.S. V. Luis Rodriguez, ibid., Northern District of Florida;
GAO analysis of NHAO payments.
57 Affidavit of Daniel E. Moritz, Special Agent for the DEA
January 1985, U.S. v. Carleton et al., SD Florida, 85-70.
58 Ibid.
59 Moritz Affidavit, pp. 3-4, ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 See Iran-Contra testimony of Adolfo Calero, Appendix B Volume
3, p. 176
62 U.S. v. Carlton, et al., U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, January 23, 1986.
63 GAO Analysis, NHAO Accounts, provided to Subcommittee
September, 1988
64 Motion For Permission to Travel, U.S. v. Caballero, SD
Florida, 86-70-CR, July 16, 1986.
65 Court record, U.S. v. Carlton-Caceres, et al. SD Florida 86-
070.
66 Indictment, U.S. v. Palmer, Detroit U.S. Attorney's Office,
1986; Subcommittee testimony of Michael B. Palmer, Part 3, April
6,1988, pp. 208-213.
67 Palmer, Part 2, p. 205 and Palmer Subcommittee Deposition,
April 5, 1988, pp. 75-79, see generally Palmer indictment by
Detroit U.S. Attorney in June 1986, and documents released as
discovery in U.S. v. Vogel et al.
68 Palmer testimony, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
September 23,1988.
69 Subcommittee deposition of Karol Prado, Part 3, p. 278, see
also Iran/Contra Testimony of CIA Central American Task Force
Chief, August 5, 1987,100-11, pp. 192-183.
70 Castillo executive session, Iran/Contra Committees, ibid., pp.
9-10.
71 Subcommittee deposition of Octaviano Cesar, San Jose, Costa
Rica, October 31, 1987, Part 3, pp.278-281.
72 State Department document #5136c, p. 5.
73 Ibid.
74 Subcommittee testimony of Marco Aguado and Karol Prado, Part
3, p. 285.
75 Iran-Contra testimony of Robert Owen, Appendix B, Volume 20,
pp. 849-850.
76 Deposition of Karol Prado, ibid., p. 285.
77 Subcommittee testimony of George Morales, Part 3, April 7,
1988, p. 297.
78 Ibid., p. 300.
79 Closed session testimony of Adolfo "Popo" Chamorro, April 6,
1988, p. 13.
80 Ibid., p. 15.
81 Testimony of Karol Prado, Part 3, p. 278.
82 Ibid., pp. 278-279
83 Chamorro, ibid., pp. 11-12.
84 Depositions of Aguado, Prado and Cesar, Part 3, pp. 277-286
and Chamorro, ibid., pp. 16, 20.
85 Aguado, Part 3, p. 285
86 Cesar, Part 3, p. 286.
87 Ibid., p. 282.
88 See e.g. Letter from Eden Pastora to David Sullivan and
Elliott Abrams, Ibid.
89 Subcommittee testimony of Karol Prado, Part 3, p. 385. See
North Diary p. Q0450, July 24, 1984. The entry reads: "get
Alfredo Cesar on Drugs," see also Iran-Contra declassified
executive session testimony of Thomas Castillo, May 29, 1987, pp.
83-85 and Iran-Contra deposition of Thomas Castillo, Appendix B
Volume E, pp. 250-252.
90 Iran-Contra declassified executive session of Thomas Castillo,
p. 84.
91 Subcommittee testimony of George Morales, Part 1, July 16,
1987, p. 98.
92 David Keany and Andy Semmel of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff and Dick McCall of Senator Kerry's staff,
attended the meeting.
93 See correspondence from DEA Administrator to John C. Lawn to
Senator John F. Kerry, January 13, 1989.
94 North notebook pages Q 0344, 0414, 0415, 0426, 0431, 0543,
0550, 0932, 0955, 0977, 1156 1159; Iran-Contra Deposition of
Robert W. Owen, May 4, 1987, pp. 6-15 and October 1, 1987, pp. 3-
34; RWO Exhibit 12, 2/27/86; Iran-Contra testimony, May 14,1987,
p. 818.
95 Castillo executive session, ibid., p. 59.
96 Iran-Contra deposition of Robert W. Owen, Appendix B, Vol. 20,
pp. 650, 802
97 Testimony of Louell Hood and Douglas Siple, Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment and
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International
Operations, October 30, 1987, pp. 160-161.
98 "The CIA Blows an Asset," Newsweek, September 3, 1984, pp. 48-
49.
99 Subcommittee testimony of Jose Blandon, Part 2, p. 129.
100 Subcommittee deposition of Werner Lotz, Part 4, April 8,
1988, pp. 681-682, 691-696.
101 Subcommittee testimony of Floyd Carlton, Part 2, pp. 205-507;
Subcommittee testimony of Jose Blandon, Part 2, pp. 115-116.
102 Betzner, Part 3, pp. 253-254, 256.
103 Ibid., pp. 257-258
104 Ibid., pp. 262-267; see also Morales testimony, Part 3, pp.
301-304 and DEA polygraph of Morales.
105 Ibid., pp. 262-267.
106 Iran-Contra deposition of Jeffrey Feldman, Appendix B, Volume
10, April 30, 1987, pp. 77-78; Statements of Steven Carr and
Peter Glibbery to Senate staff, March 8,1986.
107 Feldman, ibid., pp.
108 Ibid. p. 86.
109 Ibid. pp. 86-88.
110 Ibid., p. 84.
111 Ibid., pp. 86-88.
112 Iran-Contra testimony of Leon Kellner, Appendix B, Vol. 10,
April 30, 1987, pp. 1094-1095.
113 Testimony of Eric Garfinkel, Vice President and General
Counsel, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy Trade, Oceans and Environment and
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International
Operations, Part 1, October 30, 1987 pp. 106-107.
114 Ibid., p. 107.
115 Ibid., p. 127.
116 Subcommittee interviews with prospective purchasers.
117 OPIC testimony, ibid., p. 107.
118 Subcommittee interviews with OPIC and Justice staff, January
1989.
119 OPIC documents provided the Subcommittee.
120 Subcommittee testimony of Crone, Sipple and Hood, ibid., pp.
147-167.
121 State Department Document #5136c, July 26, 1986
122 San Francisco Examiner, March 16, 1986.
123 Ibid.
124 November 8, 1982, FBI teletype from San Francisco to
Director, U.S. v. Zavala, et al.
125 CBS Evening News, June 2, 1986.
126 Iran/Contra Testimony of Robert Owen, May 14, 1987, Exhibit
RWO 7, p. 801.
127 Blandon, Part 2, pp. 132-133.
128 CBS Evening News, June 12, 1986.
129 Staff interview with Carlos Cabezas, March, 1988, and with
former Contras in San Francisco and Miami.
130 FBI 302's of Special Agent George Kiszynski, released in U.S.
v. Calero and U.S. v. Corbo , both Southern District of Florida,
including 3/8/85 interview of Frank Castro, 12/17/84 interview of
Raphael Torres Jimenez, 3/1/85 interview of Rene Corbo; 9/6/84
interview of Jose Coutin; see also grand jury testimony of Carlos
Soto in U.S. v. Luis Rodriquez, Northern District of Florida.
131 State Department Document #5136c, July 26, 1986.
132 Letter of John Bolton to Senator Richard G. Lugar and Senator
Claiborne Pell, August 11, 1986.
133 Statements of DOJ spokesman Pat Korten to National Public
Radio, May 5, 1986; New York Times, May 6, 1986; statements of
Korten, Kenneth Vergquist, and other Justice Department officials
to Committee staff prior to June 26, 1986 Executive Session; see
generally Kellner Deposition to Subcommittee, November 8, 1988,
noting his objections to statements by Justice regarding the
case.
134 Winer Memcom, May 6, 1986 meeting, Subcommittee files.
135 See generally the investigative files of Special Agent
Kisyznski released in U.S. v. Corbo and U.S. v. Calero; SD
Florida 1988; admissions of Ramon Milian Rodriguez to Customs in
May 1983, U.S. v. Milian Rodriguez, SD Florida, documents
released in connection with U.S. v. Luis Rodriguez, ibid.
136 FBI 302's of SA Kisyznski, released in U.S. v. Corbo, SD
Florida, 1988.
137 North Notebook Entry Q-0344.
138 Iran/Contra Deposition of Robert L. Earl. Appendix B, Vol. 9,
p. 1109.
139 U.S. v. Calero et al. and U.S. v. Corbo et al., ibid.
140 U.S. v. Luis Rodriguez, Northern District of Florida; FBI
302's of SA Kiszynski, ibid.
141 Iran-Contra Testimony of Owen, Appendix B, Vol. 20, pp. 733-
735; deposition of Thomas Castillo, Appendix B, vol 3, p. 180.
OCR work by [...]