From: Christopher B Reeve <[cr 39] at [andrew.cmu.edu]>
Organization: Sophomore, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon,
Pittsburgh, PA

Costs of the WOD

"The official figure for the drug war for fiscal year 1990 was
$9.5 billion [Corn, David.  (5/14/90).  Justice's War on Drug
Treatment.  The Nation: 659 - 662.].  The federal budget for
drug programs has quadrupled in five years.  And the Pentagon
budget for drug interdiction has doubled over the last year
[Shenon, Philip.  (4/22/90).  The score on Drugs: It Depends on
How You See the Figures.  New York Times: 6E.].  In 1989, there
was an estimated $986 million being spent on anti-marijuana
enforcement alone [Wenner, Jann S.  (6/22/90).  Drug War: A New
Vietnam.  New York Times: 15.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns,
Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like
Failure, 14)

"The Bush administration proposed that for fiscal year 1991 the
basic split of funds - 70 percent for enforcement and 30 percent
for treatment - be maintained [Berke, Richard L.  (1/25/90).
Bush to Seek $1.2 Billion for a Bigger Drug War.  New York
Times: A12.] ... Bennett reaffirmed the administration's lack of
faith in education as a means of doing anything about drugs in
his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February
1990.  When Bennett was secretary of education under Reagan, he
even sought a cut in drug education funds [Berke, Richard L.
(2/3/90).  Bennett Doubts Value of Drug Education.  New York
Times: 1.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and
the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 15)

"The time, resources, and energy devoted to policing
complaintless crimes, like drug use and trafficking, also
deflects police time and resources away from other more serious
crimes, crimes that are associated with just as much violence
and that are arguably more destructive to the social fabric -
white collar crimes, corporate crimes, environmental crimes, and
political crimes [Reiman, Jeffrey.  (1984).  The Rich Get Richer
and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class and Criminal Justice.
New York: Wiley; Hills, Stuart (Ed.).  (1987).  Corporate
Violence: Injury and Death for Profit.  Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and
Littlefield.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy,
and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 16)

"In 1988, the cost to the taxpayer for state and federal prisons
alone was over $16 billion.  For the whole enterprise - courts,
corrections, jails, and police - the cost was $25 billion
[Crittenden, Ann.  (12/29/89).  Prison Can Be a Dumb Solution.
New York Times: 29A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
29 - 30)

Poverty / Unemployment

"The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice noted as long ago as 1967 that 'the
application of these laws [against complaintless crimes] often
tends to discriminate against the poor and subcultural groups in
the population.'  The report concluded that because of this
differential enforcement, 'poverty itself becomes a crime'
[President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice.  (1967).  The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.]." (Christina
Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing
Succeeds Like Failure, 18)

  "By criminalizing the use of certain drugs, the society labels
as criminals a group of people who would not for any other
reason be so labelled.  In 1985, for example, 45 percent of the
total arrests for drug law violations were for the possession of
marijuana [Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1986.
(1987).  U.S. Department of Justice.  Washington D.C.: GAO.].
In 1988, 391,600 people were arrested for marijuana offenses
[Wenner, Jean S.  (6/22/90).  Drug War: A New Vietnam.  New York
Times: 15.].  More recently, the deputy chief of New York's
Tactical Narcotics Team admitted that the vast majority of
arrests in New York had been of small-scale dealers and users
[Marriott, Michel.  (2/20/89).  After 3 Years, Crack Plague in
New York Grows Worse.  New York Times.].  Small-time dealers and
users then become criminals and face discrimination in
employment and housing that helps ensure that continued drug
involvement will be an attractive, if not the only, alternative.
  The criminal label remains with the convicted person forever,
no matter what his or her behavior.  Longitudinal research on
heroin users in London, however, has indicated the futility of
labeling users as criminals early on in their lives, since drug
use tends to decline on its own with increasing age [see Hamm,
Mark S.  (1988).  Drug Policy and Applied Research: A Study of
Users, Abusers and Politicians.  Journal of Crime and Justice,
11(2): 103-121.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy,
and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 25 - 26)

  "It should come as a surprise to no one that urban inner-city
ghettos are filled with drug dealers.  It is predictable that
the segment of the population facing the most obstacles to
attaining the rewards of the social system would opt for a fast
and easy route to the affluence that all are taught to expect.
The question for them becomes, Why be poor forever?
  The virtual abandonment, economically and socially, of already
marginalized segments of the population has ensured that drug
trafficking will be an attractive economic alternative, and that
drug taking will provide one of the few cheap sources of
recreation and escape from lack of opportunity, discrimination,
and poverty." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and
the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 62)

"It is interesting to note that the conservative approach to
explaining the causes of criminal behavior has always been based
on a rationalistic model.  According to the conservative model,
in deciding whether or not to commit illegal acts, individuals
rationally weigh the benefits of crime and the potential costs
(arrests, imprisonment, etc.).  If the benefits of the crime
outweigh the costs, the individual will most likely choose to
commit the crime.  The conservative response, however, has
always been to inccrease the costs of the crime (e.g.,
administer harsher penalties), never to decrease the benefits
(e.g., provide meaningful employment, job training and
retraining, or an adequate social service net).  In fact,
government economic policy has done just the opposite.  It has
increased the relative benefits of crime - first, by having no
employment policy, thereby ensuring that some segments of the
population are condemned to lives of drudgery; and second, by
criminalizing drugs and therefore driving up the profits to be
gained by selling them." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
63)

"The War on Drugs has helped to create a political environment
in which this abondonment [of the lower class] can proceed not
only without real opposition, but without need of even
apologizing for it." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
64)

"According to the Census Bureau, 36 percent of black families
with a child under age eighteen are classified as living in
poverty.  This compares to 12 percent of white families [Byrd,
Robert.  (8/3/90).  24 Percent of Infants Born to Single Women.
Montgomery Advertiser: 1.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
68)

"What, then, is to be done with this segment of the population
that is no longer needed?  First, their abandonment must be
legitimated to the wider society; second, any resistance to this
abandonment must be diluted or stamped out.  As has been argued
in this section, the War on Drugs has facilitated both.  There
is scant sympathy for the marginalized since their problems and
alienation are now largely perceived to be drug-related, and,
therefore, self-induced.  Illegal drugs and enforcement tactics
against the marginalized have insured their virtual political
neutralization." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy,
and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 79)

Corruption

"In early 1990, a police officer in Montgomery, Alabama, Brad
Sims, was convicted on charges that he sold crack cocaine to a
police informant.  Sims's defense attorney argued at his trial
that Sims had been set up by other officers because he knew of
their involvement in protecting drug dealers.  Sims was
convicted.  In February 1989, however, four policemen were
forced to resign from the Montgomery, Alabama, Narcotics and
Intelligence Bureau after they failed to turn in money seized in
a drug raid set up to test their honesty [McCartney, Tracey, and
John Gerome.  (2/15/90).  Sting Ends in Officers' Resignations.
Montgomery Advertiser: 1.].  Sims (who is black) was denied a
new trial even though three of the four officers (who are white)
were involved in the search of his home that turned up $360 in
marked money that was the basis of his conviction [Foss,
Shelton.  (2/20/90).  New Trial for Sims Ruled Out.  Montgomery
Advertiser: 3A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy,
and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 21)

"In 1988, three former DEA agents were charged with laundering
more than $608,000 accumulated apparently while they were
dealing in drugs.  The narcotics trafficking and money
laundering by the three men went on during and after their
employment with the DEA [New York Times.  (11/25/88).  3 Former
Drug Agents Charged in Fraud Scheme: 21A.].  In December 1989,
there were press reports of declining morale in the DEA due to
pending trials of seven veteran DEA agents in four cases in Los
Angeles, Miami, and Washington.  The agents were accused of
being deeply involved in illicit drug trafficking while they
were employed to fight it.  Agents in the Los Angeles case were
charged with taking drugs from traffickers and stash houses and
then travelling around the world arranging drug deals and hiding
the proceeds [Berke, Richard.  (12/17/89).  Corruption in Drug
Agency Called Crippler of Inquiries and Morale.  New York Times:
1A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War
on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 22)

"In 1988, four coastguardsmen were convicted of drug trafficking
and passing confidential information to drug smugglers.  In May
1990, indictments were pending against ten more coastguardsmen
[USA Today.  (5/23/90).  Drug Probe: 3A.]." (Christina
Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing
Succeeds Like Failure, 22)

"In August 1990, a fifteen-year veteran of the Internal Revenue
Service was charged with passing on key information about an
investigation into a drug-smuggling ring to one of the
participants in the ring, and helping the members of the drug
ring launder some of the illegal drug profits [Atlanta Journal
Constitution.  (8/11/90).  Atlantan among 19 Indicted in Cocaine
Ring: A5.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and
the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 22)

"In Illinois over the three-year period 1987-1989, a total of
sixty-six employees of the Department of Corrections were
arrested on drug and other illegal contraband charges.  In
Chicago in the spring of 1989, three deputies were charged in
federal indictments along with nineteen others with running a
drug ring to supply inmates in the county jail.  Two prison
guards in Connecticut were arrested for drug smuggling in 1989.
A federal-state task force in Michigan began investigating
reports in 1989 that state corrections officials had allowed
visitors to smuggle illicit drugs into the prisons and had
protected inmates from searches in return for payments of up to
$1,000 a week by dealers [Malcolm, Andrew H.  (12/30/89).
Explosive Drug Use in Prisons Is Creating a New Underworld.  New
York Times: 1.].
  In June 1990, seven guards in a D.C. prison were charged with
distributing marijuana, crack, or powdered cocaine to inmates.
According to federal prosecutors, guards were recruiting inmates
to make drug sales and arrange payments outside the prison
[Montgomery Advertiser.  (6/24/90).  Prison Guards Charged:
5A.]."  (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the
War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 22 - 23)

"Notables who have been convicted in money-laundering deals
include former Representative Robert Hanrahan (R-Ill.),
right-wing Republican Pat Swindall, and a leading fund-raiser
for Jerry Brown's 1980 presidential race, Richard Silberman
[Morley, Jefferson.  (10/2/89).  Contradictions of Cocaine
Capitalism.  The Nation: 341 - 347.]." (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 23)

"The administration has even considered drug involvement by
friendly military and political leaders to be a useful for of
political leverage.  If these officials cease to be cooperative
(as in the case of Noriega), threats of public exposure can be
brought to bear.  When cooperation is not forthcoming, the
charge of narco-military control can always be trotted out.  As
Peter Bourne [Bourne, Peter.  (3/25/88).  U.S. Schizophrenia on
Drug Runners.  New York Times: 39.] has written, 'the
cooperation of tainted leaders in the hemisphere on a host of
political issues ultimately transcends our concern about drugs
exported to this country.'" (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
151)

Courts / Prisons

"In 1988, drug cases represented 44 percent of criminal trials
in federal courts.  Soon, over half the criminal cases will be
drug cases [Wermiel, Stephen.  (2/6/90).  Drug Cases Crowd Out
Civil Federal-Court Trials as Judge Calls Business Litigation a
'Stepchild.'  Wall Street Journal: A20.]." (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 29)

"It is estimated that drug offenders represent 20.5 percent of
the parolee population [Whitt, Richard.  (9/5/89).  System at
Work: More Dealers Being Imprisoned, More Being Freed.  Atlanta
Constitution: A9.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
30)

"in some states that have adopted draconian penalties for drug
offenses the overload of an already overburdened prison system
has meant an increase in early release.  In Florida, for
example, prisoners served 52 percent of their sentences in 1986.
 In 1990, they served an average of 33 percent.  Many of the new
inmates were sent to prison for possession, a felony in Florida.
 Even Florida officials admitted that the result of increasingly
harsh penalties for drugs was that at least some violent
offenders were being released to make room for nonviolent drug
users.  In 1989, one out of every three 'early releases' in
Florida committed additional crimes [Isikoff, Michael.  (1/14 -
/20/90).  Florida's Crackdown on Crime Is Setting Criminals
Free.  Washington Post National Weekly Edition: 31.]."
(Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on
Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 114)

Precursors

  "Efforts to place restrictions on the chemicals used to process
drugs are doomed to fail also because of the almost endless
alternatives.  Just as the flow of drugs changes direction in
response to more stringent border interdiction, countries
importing large quantities of precursor chemicals change.  For
example, when Colombia and some other Latin Americn countries
imposed strict regulations on ether and acetone shipments in
1982, Mexico's imports of precursor chemicals increased 1,160
percent between 1983 and 1986 [Rohter, Larry.  (5/13/90).  Drug
Fight Targets U.S. Chemicals.  New York Times: 4A.].  Brazil and
Ecuador are also becoming increasingly important sources for
chemicals needed to refine cocaine [Moody, John.  (7/23/90).
The War That Will Not End.  Time: 33.].
  Even the drugs themselves can be synthesized, including drugs
usually derived from plants.  If coca leaves, for example,
should ever be in short supply, cocaine could be made
synthetically." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy,
and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 39)

"One chemist, who asked not to be named in an interview with the
New York Times, remarked:
  You might decide to curb the sale of corn, which can be
  fermented to make moonshine.  But the bootlegger would merely
  switch to barley or purnes or any of the thousands of natural
  substances containing carbohydrates.  Curbing the precursors of
  many drugs involves similar problems [Browne, Malcolm W.
  (10/24/89).  Problems Loom in Effort to Control Use of Chemicals
  for Illicit Drugs.  New York Times: 17.]." (Christina Jacqueline
  Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
  Like Failure, 39)

Purposes of the WOD

"Given the failure of the War on Drugs to accomplish its stated
goals and the negative consequences of the
criminalization-enforcement strategy, why has the administration
chosen to pursue this course?  The answer is this: While the War
on Drugs has been ineffective and destrictive in some ways, it
has been highly effective and highly successful in other, more
important ways.
  First, the focus on the dangers of illegal drugs diverts
attention away from the dangers of legal drugs, which are well
integrated into the culture and the economy and are represented
by powerful interests.  The serious consequences  of the legal
drugs (like tobacco, alcohol, and the more dangerous
prescription drugs) in terms of public health, violent behavior,
spiritual deterioration, family disruption, death, and disease
are downplayed in the quest for a so-called drug-free culture.
The drug-free culture is in fact one in which citizens are free
to consume their own culturally and economically integrated
drugs and the drugs of other cultures are excluded.  The
population is encouraged to absorb the social costs of the use
of legal dangerous drugs but not hte social costs of the use of
illegal drugs whose profits are not under control.
  Second, the War on Drugs has been highly successful in
diverting public attention away from fundamental social problems
that plague the society.  The Reagan and Bush administrations
have managed to convince a substantial proportion of the
American public that the dangers emanating from the use of
cocaine, marijuana, crack, and heroin are among the greatest
dangers threatening not only the health of the population but
the very fabric of their existence as a society.  Drug abuse is
portrayed as a cause rather than a symptom of severe social
problems, which are the predictable outgrowth of a social order
that has failed, even with all its wealth, to provide a
satisfying, enriching quality of life for its citizens.
  Third, by primarily focusing on drug use and trafficking by
members of the lower class and minority groups, the War on Drugs
has aided in legitimating hte virtual abandonment of minority
and marginalized segments of the population and has assisted in
making them appear as an enemy class deserving of marginality
and impoverishment.  Fourth, the War on Drugs has been used to
legitimate a massive expansion of domestic state power and
control." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the
War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 57 - 58)

"the primary intent of the War on Drugs is not to stop drug
trafficking or drug use.  The War on Drugs is a tool in a larger
war that is about increased authority and social control.
William Bennett, the Drug Czar (or as some say, the Drug
Bizarre), said himself that the issue was one of authority and
control.  The Wall Street Journal [Wall Street Journal.
(12/29/89).  The Devil You Know: A6.] echoed Bennett when it
editorialized: 'This nation is suffering a drug epidemic today
because of the loosening of societal control in general.'  The
real agenda, as the Drug Warriors have so plainly stated, is
increased social control.
  The Wall Street Journal editorial continued by arguing that the
remedy to the drug epidemic should include maintaining and
increasing the stigma of drug use.  Drug users, it was reasoned,
should be stigmatized more, not less, so that they may be
controlled more effectively." (Christina Jacqueline Johns,
Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like
Failure, 174)