From: Christopher B Reeve <[cr 39] at [andrew.cmu.edu]>
Organization: Sophomore, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon,
Pittsburgh, PA

Progress of the WOD

"A 1988 report by the American Bar Association noted:
  Police, prosecutors and judges told the committee that they have
  been unsuccessful in making a significant impact on the
  importation, sale and use of illegal drugs, despite devoting
  much of their resources to the arrest, prosecution and trial of
  drug offenders. [American Bar Association.  (1988).  Criminal
  Justice in Crisis: Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association.
  pages 6, 44.]
The authors of the report concluded that the drug problem was
'severe, growing worse, and ... law enforcement has been unable
to control it.'
  City officials have also noted that the problems associated
with criminalized drug use and drug trafficking are severe and
growing worse.  In a survey of elected officials conducted by
the National Leage of Cities in January 1990, 58 percent of the
chief officials of cities surveyed maintained that problems
associated with drugs had grown worse during the previous year.
An additional 31 percent reported that drug problems had
remained the same [New York Times.  (1/9/90).  The Drug War:
Toll Increases in U.S. Cities: 6.]
  Almost every indicator points to the ineffectiveness of
enforcement strategies to do more than temporarily decrease drug
use and the problems associated with illegal drug use and
trafficking.  Temporary decreases, however, are widely hailed by
the administration as evidence of the success of enforcement
strategies." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and
the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 2)

"One of the real beauties of the War on Drugs is that failure
and progress can be claimed as an excuse to continue and expand
the war.  Evidence of expanding drug abuse can be used to
frighten the public into allowing even greater efforts and
expenditures in the drug war.  Evidence of limited successes can
be used to support the notion that progress is being made,
victory is in sight, if only the fight is continued." (Christina
Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing
Succeeds Like Failure, 10 - 11)

"'If we measure the success of the current Federal drug abuse
control strategy by looking at the number of drug users and
amounts of drugs entering the country,' the report said, 'we
must conclude that our present strategy, which emphasizes supply
reduction, is not very effective' [Berke, Richard L.  (6/9/89).
U.S. Attack on Airborne Drug Smuggling Called Ineffective.  New
York Times: A10.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
42)

"The logic behind continued prison construction and the
continuation of the War on Drugs seems to be something like
this: Prisons have been a failure, so more prisons will be a
success; punishment has been a failure, so more punishment will
be a success; criminalization and enforcement have been a
failure, so more criminilization and enforcement will be a
success.  It's not the kind of logic that appeals to every
intellect, but it is apparently sufficient for many." (Christina
Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing
Succeeds Like Failure, 173)

Statisticts and Figures in the WOD

"Joseph Treaster, writing in the New York Times [Treaster,
Joseph B.  (7/1/90).  Cocaine Epidemic Has Peaked, Some Suggest.
 New York Times: 11], noted that many researchers he interviewed
at a NIDA conference in July 1990 felt that price increases were
most likely due not to a decrease of supply, or disruption of
the market due to interdiction, but to attempts of traffickers
to drive up the price by holding back on the product.  Bush and
Bennett, however, used the price increases for cocaine as
evidence of the success of the War on Drugs [Christian Science
Monitor.  (9/7/90).  Progress Cited in War on Drugs: 7].
  Both the Reagan and Bush administrations have played a shell
game with the figures about drugs, widely publicizing figures
when they appeared to favor administration policies and
conveniently ignoring them when they did not.  In 1982, for
example, Reagan's advisor on drug policy, Dr. Carlton Turner,
argued that decreasing prices for cocaine, marijuana, and heroin
did not indicate greater availability but less demand for the
drugs [Freemantle, Brian.  (1986).  The Fix.  New York: Tom
Doherty Associates.  page 52.].  There have been other instances
of manipulating the figures for drug use for political reasons.
Edward Jay Epstein (1977), for example, has documented how the
Nixon administration vastly exaggerated the heroin epidemic of
the early 1970s in order to assist Nixon's reelection [Epstein,
Edward Jay.  (1977).  Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political
Power in America.  New York: Putnam's]." (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 4)

"The fact that the administration, through a media campaign, can
alter the number of people who approve of drug taking or who are
willing to admit using drugs demonstrates very little except the
power of the media on the one hand and the increasing fear of
surveillance and thus the admission of durg use on the other."
(Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on
Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 11)

"Survey responses only show a decline in the number of those
admitting drug use, not necessarily a decline in actual usage.
  Government surveys, for example, indicated a decline in drug
use among high school seniors in 1989.  But one out of every two
seniors indicated that they had tried an illicit drug.  And as
the survey's authors noted, the figures did not include students
who had dropped out of high school, who are commonly thought to
be more involved in illicit drug use.  In some major
metropolitan areas, this dropout rate is estimated to be as high
as 50 percent [Criminal Justice Newsletter.  (3/15/89).  Survey
Shows Declining Rate of Drug Use by High School Seniors.].
The dropout rate for teenagers overall is 27 percent [Isikoff,
Michael.  (2/19 - 25/90).  Youths Deal a Snub to Drugs.
Washington Post National Weekly Edition: 19.]." (Christina
Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing
Succeeds Like Failure, 11)

"Nor was it even considered that the quality of the cocaine on
the street is directly related to cocaine emergencies.
  Bennett's deputy chief of staff maintained that the data on
cocaine emergencies indicated that drug abuse was no longer
'spiraling out of control' and (with the elegance that has
characterized official statements in the Reagan and Bush
administrations) that 'bodies [were] not piling up as a result
of cocaine or any other drug [Montgomery Advertiser.  (5/24/90).
 Drug Deaths Decline: 4A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
12 - 13)

"In a survey of almost 400,000 junior high and high school
students conducted by the Parents' Resource Institute for Drug
Education, and released in September 1989, it was reported that
the percentage of students reporting use had dropped but that
those using cocaine were getting higher.  Even though the number
of students who reported using cocaine decreased, the percentage
reporting 'very high' or 'bombed/stoned' from cocaine increased
[Skorneck, Carolyn.  (9/27/89).  Student Cocaine Use Drops.
Montgomery Advertiser: 4A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns,
Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like
Failure, 13)

"Figures are frequently cited to indicate that drug and alcohol
use is costing industry billions of dollars per year in lost
productivity [Bensinger, Peter B.  (4/19/90).  Fighting Drugs
Won't Abuse Workers.  USA Today: 12A.].  Almost never are the
methods of determining these figures given.  Dr. John Morgan, a
professor at the City University of New York Medical School,
reviewed the evidence behind these figures and has pointed out
that the most widely quoted statistics in this regard come from
a 1984 report by the Research Triangle Institute (RTI).  Morgan
termed the reasoning of the RTI analysis 'unclear' and the
figures 'questionable.'  He concluded that 'zealous advocates of
drug use testing have misused data and statistics and quoted
'studies' lacking proper analysis in order to support their own
idealogy' [Morgan, John P.  (May/June 1989).  Impaired
Statistics and the Unimpaired Worker.  Drug Policy Letter: 4.].
And, as Zimmer [Zimmer, Lynn.  (1989).  Employment Drug Testing
and Its Effectiveness in the War against Drugs.  Paper Presented
at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology,
Reno, Nevada.] has pointed out, the companies most likely to
test are large companies, firms that already have mechanisms in
place for dealing with unsatisfactory performance.  Drug testing
does not even detect impairment or unsatisfactory performance,
only recent drug use [Jacoby, Tamar.  (11/14/88).  Drug Testing
in the Dock.  Newsweek: 66.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns,
Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like
Failure, 97 - 98)

"In a 1989 Washington Post / ABC News poll, almost three out of
ten people questioned favored sentences of life imprisonment or
death for those convicted of selling cocaine.  Eight out of ten
believed that illegal drug use would decline if 'we punished
drug users more heavily than we do now.'" (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 113)

"in a Washington Post / ABC News poll conducted in 1989, 82
percent of those surveyed said that they favored using the
military to control illegal drugs within the United States
[Morin, Richard.  (9/8/89).  Many in Poll Say Bush Plan Is Not
Stringent Enough.  Washington Post: A18.]" (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 123)

"In a poll conducted by the Washington Post / ABC News poll in
1989, 83 percent of the respondents favored encouraging people
to phone the police to report drug users even if it meant
turning in 'a family member who uses drugs' [Morin, Richard.
(9/8/89).  Many in Poll Say Bush Plan Is Not Stringent Enough.
Washington Post: A18.].  As was noted earlier, participants in
on PBS panel argued that they would turn their own children over
to the police if they suspected drug use [Public Broadcasting
System.  (1/6/90).  Drug Seminar.]." (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 124)

Drug Money / Prices

"As one ex-dealer noted to a New York Times reporter, 'The
police can arrest me.  But as soon as they take me away there
are two or three people who come in and take my place.  There's
too much money involved for it to be any other way' [Marriot,
Michel.  (6/1/89).  The 12 Worst Drug Bazaars: New York's
Continuing Blight.  New York Times: 1A.].  In fact, arrests of
drug dealers often serve only to destabilize the market, and
consequently they increase the violence of turf battles between
new dealers competing over territories." (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 8)

"In addition, stepped-up enforcement tends to distort the drug
market.  Stepped-up enforcement targeting marijuana, for
example, drove up prices to such an extent that crack cocaine
became a cheaper alternative [Passell, Peter.  (9/5/89).  How
the Traffickers Profited from the War on Marijuana.  New York
Times: E14.].  In some areas of New York City in mid-1989, crack
prices had decreased from $5 a vial to $3, and in addition,
tokes were being sold for pocket change [Marriott, Michel.
(6/1/89).  The 12 Worst Drug Bazaars: New York's Continuing
Blight.  New York Times: 1A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns,
Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like
Failure, 9)

"In one state, Alabama, the marijuana destroyed in 1989 by state
officials was worth more than any other legal cash crop grown in
the state [Harper, Sam.  (2/18/90).  Agents Take Dangerous
Forays in Effort to Eradicate Marijuana.  Montgomery Advertiser:
B1.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War
on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 9)

"As UCLA sociologist Jack Katz has noted, 'Recent studies
indicate that increases in enforcement pressures do not even
seem to raise the street price of drugs.  They are most likely
to increase and concentrate the wealth of the surviving drug
dealers' [Katz, Jack.  (6/5 - /11/89).  No Way to Fight Street
Crime.  Washington Post National Weekly Edition: 29.]."
(Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on
Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 10)

"As Robert B. Reich, a political economist at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, pointed out
to a New York Times reporter, 'narcotics is one oof America's
major industries right up there with consumer electronics,
automobiles, and steelmaking' [Labaton, Stephen.  (12/6/89).
The Cost of Drug Abuse: $60 Billion a Year.  New York Times:
27.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War
on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 19)

  "International efforts to fight the War on Drugs have also
ensured that the profit margin on drugs is high.  The profits
are so large that the Colombian Mafia at one point reputedly
offered to pay off the Colombian $10 billion external debt [U.S.
Senate.  Committee on Foreign Relations.  Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations.  1989.
Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy.  Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office.].  The Kerry Commission Report
estimated that the Colombian drug cartels earn $8 billion
annually [U.S. Senate, 1989: 29], and Forbes magazine listed
Colombian cartel leaders Ochoa and Escobar as among hte richest
men in the world [7/25/88: 64; cited in U.S. Senate, 1989].  The
personal fortune of the Honduran drug trafficker Juan Ramon
Matta has been estimated at $1 billion [Rohter, Larry.
(4/16/89).  As Mexico Moves on Drug Dealers, More Move in.  New
York Times: 3A.].
  One Mexican drug ttrafficker, Felix Gallardo, is believed to
have smuggled two tons of cocaine into the United States every
month [Rohter, Larry.  (4/16/89).  As Mexico Moves on Drug
Dealers, More Move in.  New York Times: 3A.] and to have been
paying off the police officials arrested along with him in
monthly bribes of five figures.  Gallardo is thought to have
made hundreds of millions of dollars in his fifteen-year career
[Rohter, Larry.  (4/16/89).  As Mexico Moves on Drug Dealers,
More Move in.  New York Times: 3A.].
  The economies of a number of the more important drug-producing
and drug-trafficking countries depend on drug profits.
Freemantle [Freemantle, Brian.  (1986).  The Fix.  New York: Tom
Doherty Associates.  page 211.], for example, maintains that
nearly 36 percent of Colombia's gross national product comes
from drug profits and that drugs are Colombia's largest source
of foreign income.
  Eddy et al. [Eddy, Paul, Hugo Sabogal, and Sara Walden.
(1988).  The Cocaine Wars.  New York: W. W. Norton adn Company.
page 48.] detail the steps in the processing and distributing of
cocaine and the profits at each step based on a DEA report from
as long ago as 1979.  The basic ingredients needed to produce a
kilo of cocaine cost $625.  Once the coca leaves had been turned
into paste, then base, and finally one kilo of cocaine
hydrochloride, the value in Colombia was $9,550.  By the time
this kilo reached the United States, the value was $37,000.  The
distribution process increases the amount of the product.
First, the wholesaler cuts the cocaine to 50 percent purity and
sells two kilos for $37,000 each.  The distributor cuts it and
sells four kilos, and the street dealer (after cutting) sells
eight kilos at $70 or more a gram.  Thus, $625 worth of coca
leaves becomes $560,000 on the street.  As Eddy et al. [1988:
49] note, cocaine is 'the most valuable commodity on earth.'"
  A report by a Senate subcommittee on narcotics in early 1990
estimated that some $300 billion in worldwide drug money is
disguised through laundering every year [Barrett, Paul M.
(2/9/90).  Senate Panel Says Treasury Has Failed to Curb
Non-Bank Money Laundering.  Wall Street Journal: A12.].  The
assistant treasury secretary for enforcement, Salvatore R.
Martoche, has estimated that 80 percent of this is pure profit
[Isikoff, Michael.  (11/6 - /12/89).  Drafting Banks into the
War on Drugs.  Washington Post Natinoal Weekly Edition: 33.].
The profits from drug trafficking are said to be worth as much
as oil to the world banking system." (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 45)

"Lernoux, in fact, has maintained that the economy of Bolivia
would 'collapse without cocaine income.'  In Bolivia, Colombia,
and Peru, money earned through drug exports that is returned to
the country is greater than money returned from any of the legal
exports like coffee, tin, oil, and sugar [MacDonald, Scott B.
(1988).  Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade.
New York: Praeger.  page 5.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns,
Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like
Failure, 145)

"the international drug trade is presently estimated to be worth
$500 billion per year.  This is more than the international
trade in oil and less only than the worth of the international
arms trade [Lewis, Paul.  (2/21/90).  Drugs Pit Baker vs. third
World at U.N.  New York Times: A3.]" (Christina Jacqueline
Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds
Like Failure, 148)

Border Interdiction

"Harvard economist Mark Kleiman, in his book Marijuana: Costs of
Abuse, Costs of Control, has argued that efforts to interdict
marijuana coming over the border succeed only in stimulating the
domestic market and encouraging the development of more potent
strains of marijuana.  Kleiman also argues that the assumption
that every ton of marijuana confiscated is one less ton consumed
is a fantasy [Passell, Peter.  (9/5/89).  How the Traffickers
Profited from the War on Marijuana.  New York Times: E14.]."
(Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on
Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 9)

  "It is estimated that in 1990 the administration will spend
over $2 billion in an effort to seal off the border to drug
smuggling [Treaster, Joseph B.  (4/29/90).  Bypassing Borders,
More Drugs Flood Ports.  New York Times: 1.].  In response to
these high-tech interdiction methods, however, smugglers have
merely resorted to low-tech means.  Tramp steamers out of Haiti,
tomato trucks out of Mexico, and large cargo containers have
replaced planes and large ships as the preferred form of
transport [Magnuson, Ed.  (1/22/90).  More and More, a Real War.
 Time: 22.].  For example, in 1990 the U.S. Customs Service
noted an increase in the use of containers to smuggle drugs and
estimated that one-third to one-half of the cocaine entering the
country was smuggled in containers through commercial ports.
One senior DEA official interviewed by the New York Times was
quoted as saying, 'Everybody's concerned about small planes and
fast boats coming in with 500 or 1,000 kilos ... It's cargo
containers coming in with thousands of pounds.  You're talking
bulk.  You're talking containers, containers, containers'
[Treaster, Joseph B.  (4/29/90).  Bypassing Borders, More Drugs
Flood Ports.  New York Times: 1.].
  This DEA official noted as well that most of the discoveries of
drugs in containers were the result of informant tips, not
high-tech surveillance.  'Unless you have an informant providing
definitive information that a shipment has cocaine in it,' he
stated, 'it usually goes right through.'  When Customs tried
targeting containers from 'producing' countries, traffickers
merely set up shell companies and shipped drugs in containers
originating in other countries [Treaster, Joseph B.  (4/29/90).
Bypassing Borders, More Drugs Flood Ports.  New York Times:
1.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War
on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 36 - 37)

"In May 1990, for example, law enforcement officials found a
300-foot tunnel in Arizona, which they estimated had been used
to smuggle cocaine into a warehouse four blocks from the U.S.
Customs border checkpoint for at least six months [Squitieri,
Tom.  (5/21/90).  Tunnel Hot Line May Dig Up Drug Clues.  USA
Today: 3A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and
the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 37)

  "The U.S. border is simply too large and too porous to be
adequately sealed.  Florida, for example, has a coastline of 395
miles and 6,000 miles of inland waterways [Freemantle, Brian.
(1986).  The Fix.  New York: Tom Doherty Associates.  page 47.].
  In addition, if interdiction efforts along the border were
significantly stepped up, there would be a massive disruption in
the flow of trade.  For example, it is estimated that 8 million
large cargo containers passed through U.S. borders in 1989.
Roughly 3 percent of them were checked.  If this percentage was
increased substantially, the delays would cause havoc and
provoke an outcry due to the interference with trade [Magnuson,
Ed.  (1/22/90).  More and More, a Real War.  Time: 22.].
Customs officials estimate that even if they had the personnel,
they could never search more than 10 percent of incoming
containers without causing extensive disruption of trade through
U.S. ports [Treaster, Joseph B.  (4/29/90).  Bypassing Borders,
More Drugs Flood Ports.  New York Times: 1.].
  In 1969, the Nixon administration tried just such a blockade on
the U.S.-Mexican border.  Twoo thousand customs and patrol
agents were stationed along the 1,700-mile border with Mexico.
The operation caused traffic delays of up to half a day, and 5.5
million travelers were searched, without one dramatic seizure of
drugs.  The response of the Mexican government was so strongly
negative that the State Department finally had to warn the White
House that its Operation Intercept was threatening relations
with Latin America.  The blockade was lifted and the name of the
operation was promptly changed to Operation Cooperation
[Freemantle, Brian.  (1986).  The Fix.  New York: Tom Doherty
Associates.  page 148.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power,
Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure,
38)