>FEDERALIST No. 85 (Hamilton)                                  .



Concluding Remarks

From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:

ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,

 announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for

 discussion two points: ``the analogy of the proposed government to

 your own State constitution,'' and ``the additional security which

 its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and

 to property.'' But these heads have been so fully anticipated and

 exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be

 possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form,

 what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the

 question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.

It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the

 convention to the act which organizes the government of this State

 holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to

 the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are

 the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the

 omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision

 respecting the liberty of the press. These and several others which

 have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much

 chargeable on the existing constitution of this State, as on the one

 proposed for the Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to

 consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he

 finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there

 be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the

 zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who

 profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under which

 they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan,

 for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or

 perhaps more vulnerable.

The additional securities to republican government, to liberty

 and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under

 consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the

 preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and

 insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single

 States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders

 and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the

 diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the

 dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the

 prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not

 fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited

 situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of

 government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of

 titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition

 of those practices on the part of the State governments which have

 undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted

 mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have

 occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.

Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned

 to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust

 at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I

 gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be

 conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and

 have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to

 disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been

 not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents

 of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the

 liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought

 against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton

 and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who

 feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual

 changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and

 the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible

 men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations

 which have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the

 public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all

 honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have

 occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I

 did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a

 struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has

 in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been

 neither often nor much.

Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of

 these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily

 vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has

 not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary

 to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer

 these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience

 and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober

 dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can

 give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay,

 constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society,

 to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no

 particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or

 prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his

 posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him

 beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the

 object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of

 the community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him

 remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction

 to the plan which he is to approve or reject.

I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the

 arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and

 that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has

 been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our

 political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior

 to any the revolution has produced.

Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has

 not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small

 triumph to its enemies. ``Why,'' say they, ``should we adopt an

 imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is

 irrevocably established?'' This may be plausible enough, but it is

 only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of

 these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been

 stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically

 defective, and that without material alterations the rights and the

 interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This,

 as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the

 concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of

 the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment,

 that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is,

 upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and

 circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as

 promises every species of security which a reasonable people can

 desire.

I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme

 of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national

 affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive

 experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never

 expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the

 deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a

 compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense

 and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The

 compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common

 bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as

 many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection

 spring from such materials?

The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately

 published in this city,1 are unanswerable to show the utter

 improbability of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in

 any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late

 convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the

 arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an

 extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of

 every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light

 in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered,

 and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot

 resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this

 aspect.

It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it

 will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments

 to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the

 present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and

 must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete

 establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the

 concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the

 Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as

 it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine

 States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine2 in

 favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption

 of an entire system.

This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must

 inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which

 thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their

 interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see,

 in any body of men charged with its original formation, very

 different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of

 those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority

 on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute

 the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and

 arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in

 such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and

 hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and

 casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The

 degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the

 number of particulars and the number of parties.

But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established,

 would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly.

 There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in

 relation to any other point no giving nor taking. The will of the

 requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue.

 And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united

 in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must

 infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison

 between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of

 establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.

In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it

 has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of

 the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any

 portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my

 own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments

 which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be

 applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of

 its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight

 in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight

 in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing

 thirteen States at any rate, independent of calculations upon an

 ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion

 constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit

 of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their

 constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which

 proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is

 futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States

 concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article

 of the plan, the Congres will be obliged ``on the application of the

 legislatures of two thirds of the States Uwhich at present amount to

 ninee, to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be

 valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution,

 when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or

 by conventions in three fourths thereof.'' The words of this

 article are peremptory. The Congress ``shall call a convention.''

 Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.

 And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to

 a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed

 to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in

 amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room

 to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are

 merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people.

 We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to

 erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.

If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am

 myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those

 rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test

 of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the

 same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must

 agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct

 road to their own object.

The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of

 the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to

 the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid

 and ingenious: ``To balance a large state or society Usays hee,

 whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so

 great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is

 able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The

 judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide

 their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of

 inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they INEVITABLY fall

 into in their first trials and experiments.''3 These judicious

 reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers

 of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against

 hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States

 from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious

 demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but

 from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of political

 fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal

 tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer

 continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation,

 without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.

 The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by

 the voluntary ocnsent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the

 completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can

 reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have,

 in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States,

 and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground,

 to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new

 attempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in

 other States, are enemies to a general national government in every

 possible shape.



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