From: [s--rb--k] at [galaxy.ucr.edu] (aaron greewnood)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns,alt.rush-limbaugh,alt.politics.perot,alt.politics.clinton,alt.politics.usa.republican,talk.politics.misc,soc.culture.usa
Subject: FEDERALIST NO 70-1
Date: 26 Aug 1994 10:12:41 -0700

*There are two slightly different versions of No. 70 posted.
The difference is only a few words. 

FEDERALIST No. 70

The Executive Department Further Considered
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, March 18, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:
THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a
 vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican
 government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of
 government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of
 foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the
 same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles.
 Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of
 good government. It is essential to the protection of the community
 against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady
 administration of the laws; to the protection of property against
 those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes
 interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of
 liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of
 faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman
 story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in
 the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of
 Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who
 aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the
 community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government,
 as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the
 conquest and destruction of Rome.
There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples
 on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the
 government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad
 execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in
 theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.
Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will
 agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only
 remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this
 energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients
 which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does
 this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by
 the convention?
The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are,
 first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision
 for its support; fourthly, competent powers.
The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub lican sense
 are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due
 responsibility.
Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most
 celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice
 of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a
 numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered
 energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have
 regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while
 they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best
 adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to
 conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their
 privileges and interests.
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.
 Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally
 characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent
 degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in
 proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
 diminished.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the
 power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or
 by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part,
 to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of
 counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve
 as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the
 constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if
 I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the
 executive authority wholly to single men.1 Both these methods
 of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but
 the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They
 are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in
 most lights be examined in conjunction.
The experience of other nations will afford little instruction
 on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches
 us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen
 that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to
 abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs
 to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and
 between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the
 Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages
 derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those
 magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more
 frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert
 to the singular position in which the republic was almost
 continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the
 circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a
 division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in
 a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of
 their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were
 generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the
 personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their
 order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the
 republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it
 became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the
 administration between themselves by lotgone of them remaining at
 Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the
 command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no
 doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and
 rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the
 republic.
But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching
 ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good se se, we shall
 discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of
 plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.
Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common
 enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of
 opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are
 clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger
 of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and
 especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are
 apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the
 respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and
 operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately
 assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of
 a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most
 important measures of the government, in the most critical
 emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split
 the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions,
 adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the
 magistracy.
Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency
 in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom
 they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to
 disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an
 indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves
 bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to
 defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their
 sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many
 opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths
 this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great
 interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit,
 and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make
 their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps
 the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford
 melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or
 rather detestable vice, in the human character.
Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from
 the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the
 formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore
 unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive.
 It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the
 legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a
 benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in
 that department of the government, though they may sometimes
 obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and
 circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a
 resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end.
 That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no
 favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of
 dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and
 unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They
 serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure
 to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of
 it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive
 which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition,gvigor
 and expedition, and this without anycounterbalancing good. In the
 conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark
 of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended
 from its plurality.
It must be confessed that these observations apply with
 principal weight to the first case supposedgthat is, to a plurality
 of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the
 advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but
 they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to
 the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally
 necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful
 cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the
 whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the
 mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to
 tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of
 habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.
But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the
 Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first
 plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. 
 Responsibility is of two kindsgto censure and to punishment. The
 first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective
 office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a
 manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than
 in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But
 the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of
 detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst
 mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment
 of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought
 really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much
 dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public
 opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The
 circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or
 misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a
 number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of
 agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been
 mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose
 account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.
``I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in
 their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better
 resolution on the point.'' These and similar pretexts are
 constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that
 will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict
 scrunity into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there
 be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task,
 if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how
 easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to
 render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those
 parties?
In the single instance in which the governor of this State is
 coupled with a councilgthat is, in the appointment to offices, we
 have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration.
 Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some
 cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in
 the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame
 has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on
 their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people
 remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their
 interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so
 manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to
 descend to particulars.
It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of
 the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest
 securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated
 power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their
 efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure
 attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the
 uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the
 opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
 misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their
 removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which
 admit of it.
In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a
 maxim which has obtained for the sake of the pub lic peace, that he
 is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred.
 Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to
 the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the
 nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no
 responsibility whatever in the executive departmentgan idea
 inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not
 bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable
 for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own
 conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard
 the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.
But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally
 responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the
 British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only
 ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy
 of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited
 responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree
 as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the
 American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly
 diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief
 Magistrate himself.
The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally
 obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that
 maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the
 hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should
 be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the
 advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous
 disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at
 all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion,
 in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius
 pronounces to be ``deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that ``the
 executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE'';2 that
 it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy
 and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all
 multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to
 liberty.
A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of
 security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is
 nattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination
 difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security.
 The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more
 formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of
 them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of
 so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views
 being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader,
 it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused,
 than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very
 circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and
 more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of
 influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of
 Rome, whose name denotes their number,3 were more to be dreaded
 in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person
 would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that
 body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the
 council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy
 combination; and from such a combination America would have more to
 fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to
 a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are
 generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are
 often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost
 always a cloak to his faults.
I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be
 evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the
 principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the
 members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of
 government, would form an item in the catalogue of public
 expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal
 utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the
 Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the
 States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the
 UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the
 distinguishing features of our constitution.
PUBLIUS.
1 New York has no council except for the single purpose of
 appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor
 may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their
 resolutions do not bind him.
2 De Lolme.
3 Ten.

*There are two slightly different versions of No. 70 included here.