>FEDERALIST No. 58 (Madison)                                   .

Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the

Progress of Population Demands Considered



MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:

THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which

I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of

members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress

of population may demand. It has been admitted, that this

objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The

following observations will show that, like most other objections

against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view

of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures

every object which is beheld. 1. Those who urge the objection

seem not to have recollected that the federal Constitution will

not suffer by a comparison with the State constitutions, in the

security provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of

representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first

instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to

the short term of three years. Within every successive term of

ten years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The

unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to readjust,

from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the

number of inhabitants, under the single exception that each State

shall have one representative at least; secondly, to augment the

number of representatives at the same periods, under the sole

limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every

thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of

the several States, we shall find that some of them contain no

determinate regulations on this subject, that others correspond

pretty much on this point with the federal Constitution, and that

the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a

mere directory provision. 2. As far as experience has taken place

on this subject, a gradual increase of representatives under the

State constitutions has at least kept pace with that of the

constituents, and it appears that the former have been as ready

to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for

them. 3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which

insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and

of their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the

latter. The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the

legislature is a representation of citizens, the other of the

States: in the former, consequently, the larger States will have

most weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the

smaller States. From this circumstance it may with certainty be

inferred that the larger States will be strenuous advocates for

increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature

in which their influence predominates. And it so happens that

four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole votes

in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives or

people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a

reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States

will be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a coalition which,

notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might

prevent it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place,

when not merely prompted by common interest, but justified by

equity and the principles of the Constitution. It may be

alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by like

motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would

be indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other

branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has

probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous

friends of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is among

the difficulties which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a

close and accurate inspection. The following reflections will,

if I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory

on this point. Notwithstanding the equal authority which will

subsist between the two houses on all legislative subjects,

except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted that

the House, composed of the greater number of members, when

supported by the more powerful States, and speaking the known and

determined sense of a majority of the people, will have no small

advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of

the two houses. This advantage must be increased by the

consciousness, felt by the same side of being supported in its

demands by right, by reason, and by the Constitution; and the

consciousness, on the opposite side, of contending against the

force of all these solemn considerations. It is farther to be

considered, that in the gradation between the smallest and

largest States, there are several, which, though most likely in

general to arrange themselves among the former are too little

removed in extent and population from the latter, to second an

opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is

by no means certain that a majority of votes, even in the

Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number

of representatives. It will not be looking too far to add, that

the senators from all the new States may be gained over to the

just views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too

obvious to be overlooked. As these States will, for a great

length of time, advance in population with peculiar rapidity,

they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the

representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States,

therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will

have nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations

mutually conditions of each other; and the senators from all the

most growing States will be bound to contend for the latter, by

the interest which their States will feel in the former. These

considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject, and

ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been

indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should

all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller

States, or their predominant influence in the councils of the

Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still remains

with the larger States, by which they will be able at all times

to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives

cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies

requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold

the pursegthat powerful instrument by which we behold, in the

history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble

representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of

its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it

seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other

branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in

fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with

which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of

the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for

carrying into effect every just and salutary measure. But will

not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the

Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and

will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or

its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial

of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the

one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions

will create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all

cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and

conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be

the interest which they will individually feel in whatever

concerns the government. Those who represent the dignity of their

country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly

sensible to every prospect of public danger, or of dishonorable

stagnation in public affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe

the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the

other branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money

bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility on the side of

the latter, although it could not have failed to involve every

department of the state in the general confusion, has neither

been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree of firmness

that can be displayed by the federal Senate or President, will

not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be

supported by constitutional and patriotic principles. In this

review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I

have passed over the circumstances of economy, which, in the

present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening

the temporary number of representatives, and a disregard of which

would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against

the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number

proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might

be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the federal

service a large number of such characters as the people will

probably elect. One observation, however, I must be permitted to

add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious

attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater

the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who

will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the

more numerous an assembly may be, of whatever characters

composed, the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion

over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the

greater will be the proportion of members of limited information

and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on characters of

this description that the eloquence and address of the few are

known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics,

where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single

orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with

as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his single

hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a

representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake

of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people.

Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of

sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in

supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a

certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government

of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the

contrary, AFTER SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF

SAFETY, OF LOCAL INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE

WHOLE SOCIETY, they will counteract their own views by every

addition to their representatives. The countenance of the

government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates

it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the

fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which

its motions are directed. As connected with the objection against

the number of representatives, may properly be here noticed, that

which has been suggested against the number made competent for

legislative business. It has been said that more than a majority

ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular

cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a

decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a

precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional

shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle

generally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations

are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In

all cases where justice or the general good might require new

laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the

fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It

would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would

be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege

limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take

advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to

the general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort

unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster

the baneful practice of secessions; a practice which has shown

itself even in States where a majority only is required; a

practice subversive of all the principles of order and regular

government; a practice which leads more directly to public

convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other

which has yet been displayed among us. PUBLIUS.





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