>FEDERALIST No. 52 (Hamilton or Madison)                       .



The House of Representatives

From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788.



HAMILTON OR MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:

FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers,

I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts

of the government. I shall begin with the House of

Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the

government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the

elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the

electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded

as a fundamental article of republican government. It was

incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish

this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the

occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper

for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the

legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper

for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would

have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch

of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the

people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the

different States to one uniform rule, would probably have been as

dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been

difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention

appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option.

It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable

to the standard already established, or which may be established,

by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States,

because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not

alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that

the people of the States will alter this part of their

constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured

to them by the federal Constitution. The qualifications of the

elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State

constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of

uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by

the convention. A representative of the United States must be of

the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a

citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election,

be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the

time of his service, must be in no office under the United

States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part

of the federal government is open to merit of every description,

whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without

regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of

religious faith. The term for which the representatives are to be

elected falls under a second view which may be taken of this

branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this article, two

questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections

will, in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary

or useful. First. As it is essential to liberty that the

government in general should have a common interest with the

people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it

under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and

an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are

unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and

sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree

of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does

not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must

depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be

connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always

to be followed whenever it can be found. The scheme of

representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in

person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient

polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect

instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research

too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves

to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the

greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this

character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons in Great

Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution,

anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield

instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question

among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent

date prove that parliaments were to SIT only every year; not that

they were to be ELECTED every year. And even these annual

sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch,

that, under various pretexts, very long and dangerous

intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy

this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of

Charles II. , that the intermissions should not be protracted

beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III.

, when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was

still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the

fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be

held FREQUENTLY. By another statute, which passed a few years

later in the same reign, the term ``frequently,'' which had

alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles

II. , is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted

that a new parliament shall be called within three years after

the termination of the former. The last change, from three to

seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early

in the present century, under on alarm for the Hanoverian

succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest

frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that

kingdom, for binding the representatives to their constituents,

does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue

from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial

elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the

parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of

the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary

reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over

their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections,

under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the

requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their

constituents. Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated

entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom

repeated, except on the accession of a new prince, or some other

contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George II.

was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about

thirty-five years. The only dependence of the representatives on

the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply

occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the

chance of some event which might produce a general new election.

The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights

of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was

extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects

of their deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistake not,

have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been

established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform,

must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from

this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As

far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the

people of that country have been able under all these

disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of

biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty,

which might depend on a due connection between their

representatives and themselves. Let us bring our inquiries nearer

home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims

particular attention, at the same time that it is so well known

as to require little to be said on it. The principle of

representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was

established in all of them. But the periods of election were

different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any

reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of the

representatives of the people, prior to the Revolution, that

biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public

liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the

commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the obstacles

to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion

of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of

its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement This remark holds

good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections

were least frequent, as to those whose elections were most

frequent Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting

the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first

also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence.

In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed,

elections under the former government were septennial. This

particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any

peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably

accidental; and still less of any advantage in SEPTENNIAL

elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are

inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a

very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be

in no danger from BIENNIAL elections. The conclusion resulting

from these examples will be not a little strengthened by

recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the federal

legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative

authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament;

and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial

assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a received and

well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the

case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its

duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely

may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on

another occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will

not only be restrained by its dependence on its people, as other

legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched

and controlled by the several collateral legislatures, which

other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no

comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed

by the more permanent branches of the federal government for

seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of

Representatives from their duty to the people, and the means of

influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches

of the government above cited. With less power, therefore, to

abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one

side, and will be doubly watched on the other. PUBLIUS.



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