>FEDERALIST No. 45 (Madison)                                   .



The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State

Governments Considered

For the Independent Fournal.



MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:

HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal

government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be

considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous

to the portion of authority left in the several States. The

adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering

in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary

for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted

themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences

of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the

particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be

essential to the security of the people of America against

foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against

contentions and wars among the different States; if it be

essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive

factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against

those military establishments which must gradually poison its

very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the

happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous, to

urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects

of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may

derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual

States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the

American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands

spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not

that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and

safety, but that the government of the individual States, that

particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent

of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of

sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old

World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the

people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another

shapegthat the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed

to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is

too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the

public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is

the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government

whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the

attainment of this object. Were the plan of the convention

adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the

plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public

happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far

as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the

happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be,

Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice

is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue

will be endangered, is the question before us. Several important

considerations have been touched in the course of these papers,

which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the

federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State

governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am

persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by

the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale. We have

seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies,

the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the

members, to despoil the general government of its authorities,

with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself

against the encroachments. Although, in most of these examples,

the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration

as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the

fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the

proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active

sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In

the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a

degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable

likeness to the government framed by the convention. The Lycian

Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted,

must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does

not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to

degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we

know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity

of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally

the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the

more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which the

component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and

powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful

ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the

head, and to each other. In the feudal system, we have seen a

similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of

proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns

and the people, and the sympathy in some instances between the

general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the

local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments.

Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and

subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns

possessed the affections of the people, the great kingdoms in

Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes

as there were formerly feudatory barons. The State government

will have the advantage of the Federal government, whether we

compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on

the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side

will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the

predilection and probable support of the people; to the

disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures

of each other. The State governments may be regarded as

constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst

the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization

of the former. Without the intervention of the State

legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be

elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his

appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves

determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and

exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of

Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will

be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men,

whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an

election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal

branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or

less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently

feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a

disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On

the other side, the component parts of the State governments will

in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct

agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to

the local influence of its members. The number of individuals

employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much

smaller than the number employed under the particular States.

There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side

of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative,

executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States,

the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers

of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers,

for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having

particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people,

must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence,

those of every description who will be employed in the

administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the

three great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from

the judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members

of the corresponding departments of the single government of the

Union; compare the militia officers of three millions of people

with the military and marine officers of any establishment which

is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of

possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the

advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government

is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have

theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on

the seacoast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter

will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very

numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side.

It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise,

the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes

throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will

not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue;

that an option will then be given to the States to supply their

quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the

eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union,

will generally be made by the officers, and according to the

rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely

probable, that in other instances, particularly in the

organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States

will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.

Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal

revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the

influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with

that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale.

Within every district to which a federal collector would be

allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even

more, officers of different descriptions, and many of them

persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the

side of the State. The powers delegated by the proposed

Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those

which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and

indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external

objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with

which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be

connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend

to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,

concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and

the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. The

operations of the federal government will be most extensive and

important in times of war and danger; those of the State

governments, in times of peace and security. As the former

periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the

State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the

federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers

may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will

be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over

the governments of the particular States. If the new Constitution

be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the

change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of

NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL

POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power;

but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which

no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and

peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other

more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress

by the articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not

enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode

of administering them. The change relating to taxation may be

regarded as the most important; and yet the present Congress have

as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite

supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare, as

the future Congress will have to require them of individual

citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the States

themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on

them. Had the States complied punctually with the articles of

Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as

peaceable means as may be used with success towards single

persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an

opinion, that the State governments would have lost their

constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire

consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued,

would be to say at once, that the existence of the State

governments is incompatible with any system whatever that

accomplishes the essental purposes of the Union. PUBLIUS.





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