>FEDERALIST No. 24 (Hamilton)                                  .



The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

For the Independent Journal.



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:

To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal

 government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national

 forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I

 understand it right, is this, that proper provision has not been

 made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an

 objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and

 unsubstantial foundations.

It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general

 form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of

 argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in

 contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the

 general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing

 constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the

 moment it is recollected that the objection under consideration

 turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE

 authority of the nation, in the article of military establishments;

 a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State

 constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.

A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at

 the present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan

 reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two

 conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that

 standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it

 vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without

 subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the

 legislature.

If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be

 surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the

 case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the

 LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be

 a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people

 periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had

 supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in

 respect to this object, an important qualification even of the

 legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the

 appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer

 period than two yearsga precaution which, upon a nearer view of it,

 will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up

 of troops without evident necessity.

Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed

 would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would

 naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement

 and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It

 must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have,

 in all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have

 established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this

 point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to

 all this apprehension and clamor.

If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the

 several State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment

 to find that TWO ONLY of them%n1%n contained an interdiction of

 standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either

 observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms

 admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.

Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some

 plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would

 never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained

 unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the

 public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to

 deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be

 ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely

 to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact

 between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a

 solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the

 existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions

 against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure

 from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent

 which appears to influence these political champions.

If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey

 of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be

 increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the

 unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the

 prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous

 circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures

 in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of

 the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility,

 or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding

 these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and

 unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a

 fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their

 country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have

 been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a

 point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general

 sense of America as declared in its different forms of government,

 and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown

 to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of

 calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the

 frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so

 interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the

 question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so

 unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man

 could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too

 much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by

 alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments

 addressed to their understandings.

But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by

 precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer

 view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will

 appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in

 respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be

 improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of

 society, would be unlikely to be observed.

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet

 there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of

 confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into

 our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain.

 On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements,

 are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain.

 This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands,

 belonging to these two powers create between them, in respect to

 their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest.

 The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as

 our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to

 fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the

 art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication,

 rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain

 and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A

 future concert of views between these nations ought not to be

 regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity

 is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between

 France and Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason

 considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of

 political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish us not

 to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the

 reach of danger.

Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has

 been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western

 frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be

 indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and

 depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be

 furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by

 permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is

 impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The

 militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their

 occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in

 times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or

 compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of

 service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious

 pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the

 scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as

 ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps

 in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of

 peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small.

 Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the

 impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments,

 and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and

 prudence of the legislature.

In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay,

 it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their

 military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be

 willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to

 their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to

 increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which

 our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be,

 particular posts, the possession of which will include the command

 of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of

 the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be

 keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it

 would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any

 instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable

 powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of

 prudence and policy.

If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on

 our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a

 navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and

 for the defense of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons.

 When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its

 dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons

 for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their

 infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an

 indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the

 arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.

PUBLIUS.

FNA1@@1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed

 collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina

 are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: ``As

 standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY

 OUGHT NOT to be kept up.'' This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than

 a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland

 have, in each of their bils of rights, a clause to this effect:

 ``Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be

 raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE''; which

 is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature. New York

 has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about

 the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions

 of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions

 are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two States have

 bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that

 those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this

 respect.





.