Date: Wed, 17 Jul 1996 20:34:55 -0400 (EDT)
From: Carol Moore <[c--oo--e] at [CapAccess.org]>
Subject: RE: House Waco Report Due (fwd)

Below is a rough transcription of a recent
press conference announcing preliminary findings
of the 10 days of House Waco hearings last July.
The final report--which should be about two big
books--will be available from the Govt. Printing
office in August.  As you can see, there is
no mention of the biggest coverups--that BATF 
agents shot from helicopters and killed 4
Davidians, killed and unarmed Davidian at the
front door, assassinated another approaching
Mt. Carmel after the shootout, and that FBI
and BATF agents conspired to sabotage negotiations
so they would have an excuse to destroy a
building that contained evidence of BATF
crimes that would have sent some agents to
prison...

Carol Moore, member Committee for Waco Justice,
author THE DAVIDIAN MASSACRE 
[c--oo--e] at [capaccess.org]  or [c--oo--e] at [upx.net]
-------------------------
JULY 11, 1996 NEWS CONFERENCE ON HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE
HEARINGS INTO BATF/FBI ACTIONS AGAINST THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
   
    REP. MCCOLLUM:  Good morning, I'm Congressman Bill
McCollum, representing the Eighth District of Florida and
chairman of the Crimes Subcommittee.  I'm here together
with good friend Bill Zeliff (chair of House Oversight
Subcommittee). He and I co-chaired, as you know, the Waco
hearings with our respective subcommittees.
        And we're here today to announce the findings and
recommendations that we're proposing as a part of the final
report on Waco to our respective committees.  There have
been tens of thousands, actually, of pages of documents
that have been reviewed and data that's been assembled
since the 10 days of hearings of nearly a year ago.  And,
during that time, we've come to a lot of very significant
findings; findings of fact. Some of these are very serious
findings with respect to criticisms, if you will, of both
the secretary of the Treasury at that time Lloyd Bentsen,
and Attorney General Janet Reno.
        And I hope that you will bear with us, and have the
patience, as we walk through some of these findings for
you. Others are in your materials, and we're not going to
highlight every one of them.
        The process on our side now, on the Judiciary
Committee side of this, will be for this report, as it is
assembled, to be reviewed by the members of the
subcommittee on crime. And once they've reviewed it, they
can submit additional views or dissenting views, and the
report will be published.
        Now, the other committee operates differently. And
what's going to happen next is I'm going to turn this over
to Bill Zeliff, and Bill is going to tell you about how it
works on his committee. And he's also going to walk you
through the criticisms, the findings of fact, the
recommendations with respect to the Treasury Department and
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; and a couple
of other items.
        And then, he's going to turn it back over to me,
and I'm going to walk you through the criticisms, the
findings of fact, and the recommendations with respect to
the Justice Department, the attorney general and the FBI. 
So, Bill, take it away.
        REP. ZELIFF: Bill, thank you.  This process and
this event actually took place three and a half years ago.
And we spent a lot of time, over the past year-10 full days
of hearings-and it's historic. And the lessons that will
come from it will be historic, as well.
        And what we owe the American people is
accountability; what happened, who did it, and what have we
learned from this, so that this tragic event will not
happen again. And that's what this is all about.
        There was a lot of rationalization of the deed that
had taken place. And there were a lot of reasons that
people gave for it, as to why certain things were done. And
we believe that much of that rationalization just didn't
add up; it didn't stack up.
        So, as we pondered through 200 pages of this
report, thousands and thousands of pages of documents, 600
footnotes, we believe that we have a very, very solid
report of findings.
       And in our committee what we'll be doing is next
Thursday going to subcommittee vote on July 18th, with
markup by full committee on July 25th, and by early August
hopefully to have a final report in everybody's hands. But,
we wanted to give you a heads-up, we wanted to include you
all in this process, to let you know where we are. And
these are our recommendations to our two subcommittees.
        I'm going to start out with the first department
and this is the Department of Treasury. Treasury Secretary
Lloyd Bentsen and Deputy Secretary Roger Altman failed in
their duties by not even meeting with the director of ATF
in the month or so that they were in office prior to
February 28th and the raid on the Davidians' residence by
not requesting any briefing on ATF operations during that,
time and by not involving themselves with the activities of
ATF we feel is irresponsible. Neither Bentsen nor Altman
met with ATF Director  Stephen Higgins during the entire
month that they were in office, and that was a major
problem. Bentsen testified before the subcommittee that he
was in London at the time of the raid discussing monetary
exchange rates and some very serious subjects at the time.
This kind of disconnect is totally unacceptable. 
      Treasury: senior Treasury officials routinely failed
in their duty to monitor the actions of ATF officials and
as a result were uninvolved in the planning of the February
28th raid. This failure eliminated a layer of scrutiny of
the plan during which flaws in it might have been uncovered
and corrected. The investigation of Koresh was classified
as sensitive and significant. This classification is
supposed to ensure a higher degree of oversight, not a
lower one, but a higher degree of oversight from senior
officials. At Waco, that completely got missed.
      Senior Treasury officials didn't even know of the
impending raid until 48 hours before it was to occur. How
could they, when they hadn't even met with senior ATF
officials until late into their terms? 
      After the raid failed, Assistant Treasury Secretary
Ronald Noble attempted to lay the blame entirely on ATF,
despite the fact that Treasury Department officials,
including Noble, failed to properly supervise ATF
activities during the raid. Mr. Noble testified that he
told ATF commanders that the raid was not to take place if
the element of surprise was lost. Others testified that he
never mentioned the element of surprise. On raid day, the
message not to go ahead with the raid if the Davidians knew
that the ATF was coming didn't get through to the
commanders at Waco. This kind of confusion wouldn't have
taken place if Treasury had provided proper oversight of
ATF operations.
      Our recommendations for Treasury are as follows:
Congress should consider moving jurisdiction over the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to the Department
of Justice. This law enforcement function is not currently
a good fit in a department that focuses on the economy. The
lack of Treasury Department oversight in this case may
indicate department-wide lack of involvement in law
enforcement activities. A better fit may be to move ATF to
the executive branch department charged currently with law
enforcement.
      Now, on conclusions and findings as to the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The ATF's investigation of
the Branch Davidians lacked the minimum professionalism
expected of a major federal law enforcement agency. The
undercover house was not properly run and the secrecy of
the operation was compromised. The photographs from the
undercover house were not developed or reviewed. The
undercover operation was not maintained for a sufficient
period of time to be effective. Although probable cause
likely existed to suspect Koresh of crimes, the ATF agents
responsible for preparing the affidavits knew or should
have know that many of the statements they were making were
false.
     Probable cause existed due to hand grenade shipments,
reports of explosion on the property, and reports of
automatic weapons fire on the property. And remember,
totality of the circumstances is the test. The standard is,
was there reason to believe that a crime had occurred?
      Problems with the affidavit: the information was
stale and irrevelent. And it was downright wrong and
misleading.  In making the decision not to arrest Koresh
outside the compound, ATF agents exercised poor judgment,
made erroneous assumptions, and ignored the foreseeable
perils of their course of action. The ATF refused an offer
from Koresh to inspect his home. He invited them in. Many
doing surveillance of the residence did not even know what
Koresh looked like. Testimony during the hearing
established a pattern of Koresh leaving the residence. ATF
could have avoided this tragedy by taking simple steps of
catching Koresh outside his home. 
      ATF agents misrepresented to Defense Department
officials that the Branch Davidians were involved in
illegal drug manufacturing. Because of its deceptions the
ATF was able to obtain training without having to reimburse
the Defense Department as otherwise would have been
required had no drug nexus been aligned.
      When ATF first requested military assistance, no drug
use at the residence was alleged. The ATF mentioned drug
production by the Branch Davidians only after learning that
military assistance could be provided without the need for
reimbursement. This is the money that's used in our
nation's drug war and we feel was very improper. 
      The information to create the drug nexus relied on
stale information from a disgruntled former Davidian. And
this really gets me. And again, as I mentioned earlier, the
sad thing is as we are working today and tomorrow trying to
get money for our nation's drug war, this money was used
improperly.
      The decision to provide a military-style raid was
made more than two months before surveillance, undercover,
and infiltration efforts had begun. 
      The ATF's initial raid plan was significantly flawed.
The plan was poorly conceived, utilized a high risk
tactical approach when other tactics could have been
successfully used, was drafted and commanded by ATF agents
who were less qualified than other available agencies,
agents at the time, and used agents who were not
sufficiently trained for the operation.
     The ATF sought sophisticated military combat training
before going on with the raid. Video shot before the raid
show agents preparing for a dynamic entry. The fact that
agents refused the opportunity to inspect the residence at
Koresh's invitation or arrest him outside the residence
point to the ATF predisposition to a dynamic entry. 
      The senior ATF commanders, Phillip Chojnacki and
Chuck Sarabyn, either knew or should have known that
Davidians had become aware of the impending raid and were
likely to resist with deadly force. ATF undercover agent
Robert Rodriguez, who was with Koresh on the morning of
February 28th, called Sarabyn from the undercover house and
told him that Koresh knew that law enforcement was on its
way to the residence. Sarabyn and Chojnacki told Rodriguez
-- let's see, Sarabyn told Chojnacki that Rodriguez had
said, and also that Sarabyn had questioned Rodriguez, and
that no change in routine had occurred and no one was
arming themselves. 
      Former ATF director Stephen Higgins and former ATF
director Daniel Hartnett bear a major portion of this
responsibility for the failure of the raid as well, because
they neglected to become involved in the planning of the
raid and failed to instill in the senior raid commanders an
understanding of the need to ensure that secrecy was
maintained in an operation of this type. Higgins and
Hartnett participated in only one meeting each with respect
to the planned raid, and that was the largest raid in the
history of ATF. They never required the plan to be reduced
to writing, as required by standard operating procedures at
ATF, and they did not specifically inform the agents to
abort the raid if secrecy was lost.    There was no
justification of the rehiring of the two senior ATF raid
commanders after they were fired. The fact that senior
Clinton administration officials approved their rehiring
indicates a lack of sound judgment on their part. Even the
Treasury Department report states that raid commanders
Chojnacki and Sarabyn appeared to have engaged in a
concerted effort to conceal their errors in judgment after
the fact.
     The department, you must remember, settled a case the
two had before the Merit Systems Protection Board. The
Department of Treasury hired them back. The decision to
fire these two individuals was more than justified. We
believe very strongly that they should not have been
rehired.
      Line ATF agents-and we really want to stress
this-that were involved in the February 28th raid acted
heroically and with a high degree of professionalism.
      Recommendations for ATF:
      If the false statement in the affidavits filed in
support of the search-and-arrest warrants were made with
the knowledge of their falsity, criminal charges should be
brought against the people making those statements. The
affidavit in support of the warrants contained numerous
errors. If their sworn statement was made with knowledge of
the falsity of these statements, criminal charges should be
brought against the person or persons involved who swore
out the affidavits.
      The ATF, a second recommendation: ATF should be
constrained from independently investigating drug-related
crimes. ATF based part of their investigation of the Branch
Davidians on unfounded allegations that the Davidians were
manufacturing illegal drugs.
     Evidence presented to the subcommittees points to the
fact that ATF deliberately misled the military regarding
the existence of a drug lab in the Davidian residence just
to get free military assistance.
      Third recommendation: The ATF should revise its
national response plan to ensure that its best-qualified
agents are placed in command and control positions at all
times.
      Fourth, senior officials at ATF headquarters should
assert greater command and control over significant
operations. An operation of this size with over 70 agents
involved, should always have the direct oversight, input,
and approval of senior ATF agents. This was the biggest
raid in ATF's history. In this particular case, none of
that happened.
      And at this point, I'll turn it back over to Bill
McCollum to talk about Justice and the FBI.
      REP. MCCOLLUM: Thank you, Bill.  I've got to say at
the onset of this that I was very reluctant to from the
very beginning to find fault with Attorney General Reno.
I've known her for a long time. I've respected her a great
deal. And you're going to see and hear that the findings
that I'm about to read to you are very serious
fault-finding indeed. But the evidence, having reviewed all
of this, is simply compelling of the fault that we have
found and the recommendations we're making.
      As to the Department of Justice, number one, the
decision by Attorney General Janet Reno to approve the
FBI's plan to end the standoff on April 19 was premature,
wrong, and highly irresponsible. In authorizing the assault
to proceed, Attorney General Reno was seriously negligent.
The attorney general knew or should have known that the
plan to end the standoff would endanger the lives of the
Davidians inside the residence, including the children. The
attorney general knew or should have known that there was
little risk to the FBI agents, society as a whole or to the
Davidians from continuing the standoff, and that the
possibility of a peaceful resolution continued to exist.
      Number two, the attorney general knew or should have
known that the reasons cited for ending the standoff on
April 19th lacked merit.
     Every one of them lacked merit. The negotiations had
not reached an impasse. There was no threat of a Davidian
breakout. The FBI Hostage Rescue Team did not need to stand
down for rest and retraining for at least two weeks after
the April 19th date. And if and when it did, the FBI and
local law enforcement SWAT teams could have been brought in
to maintain the perimeter. Sanitary and other living
conditions inside the Davidian residence had not
deteriorated during the standoff and there was no evidence
that they were likely to deteriorate in the near future.
And while physical and sexual abuse of minors had occurred,
there was no basis to conclude that minors were being
subjected to any greater risk of physical or sexual abuse
during the standoff than prior to February 28th. The final
assault put the children at the greatest risk.
      Number three, and I think this may be the most
important one in the sense of where I just cannot accept
the judgment and why the attorney general came to the
conclusion to go forward. Number three, the CS riot control
agent insertion and assault plan was fatally flawed. The
attorney general believed that it was highly likely that
the Davidians would open fire, and she knew or should have
known that the rapid insertion contingency would be
activated, that the Davidians would not react in the manner
suggested by the FBI, and that there was the possibility
that a violent and perhaps suicidal reaction would occur
within the residence. The attorney general should have
rejected the plan and demanded the preparation of an
alternative.
      And number four, following the FBI's April 19 assault
on the Branch Davidian compound, Attorney General Reno
offered her resignation. In light of her ultimate
responsibility for the disastrous assault and its resulting
deaths, the president should have accepted it.
      As to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I'm only
going to highlight a couple of these so we can go to your
question and answers,but there are, as you know, several
very serious findings of fact. Number one that I'm going to
highlight to you is the first one. The CS riot control
agent assault of April 19th should not have taken place.
The possibility of a negotiated end to the standoff
presented by Koresh should have been pursued even if it had
taken several more weeks. CS riot control agent is capable
of causing immediate, acute and severe physical distress to
exposed individuals, especially young children, pregnant
women, the elderly, and those with respiratory conditions.
      In view of the risk posed by insertion of CS into
enclosed spaces, particularly the bunker, the FBI failed to
demonstrate sufficient concern for the presence of young
children, pregnant women, the elderly and those with
respiratory conditions. While it cannot be concluded with
certainty, it is unlikely that the CS riot control agent in
the quantities used by the FBI reached lethal toxic levels.
However, the presented evidence does indicate that CS
insertion into the enclosed bunker, at a time when women
and children were assembled inside an enclosed space, could
have been a proximate cause of or directly resulted in some
or all of the deaths attributed to asphyxiation in the
autopsy reports.
      Another finding I want to make sure that you are
aware of is that there is no evidence that the FBI
discharged a firearm on April 19th. And further, there is
no evidence that the FBI intentionally or inadvertently set
fires on April 19th. (Which means they found Davidians set
the fires--if they admit fact that FBI tanks did so, it
would cost the government $3 billion in civil suit damages.
C.Moore)
      As to the recommendations that go along with this,
there are numerous ones. I am not going to highlight many
of these at all for you, because it would take quite awhile
and we do want to get to your questions and answers. 
      I do want to point out that with regard to the CS
gas, though, we do recommend that the government should
further study and analyze the effects of CS gas, or the
riot control agent as we call it, on children, persons with
respiratory problems, pregnant women and the elderly. We
note that only limited scientific literature exists
concerning the effects of CS gas, and we are very, very
concerned about its use in other law enforcement
activities. 
      There are, as I said, a number of other
recommendations here, including one regarding expanding the
Hostage Rescue Team. But I think that for us to continue to
outline these for you, when you've got them to read, would
probably not be appropriate. 
      We, as I said before, are going to submit these
proposals to our respective committees. Our committee on
Judiciary will issue a report. Our rules are different from
the rules of the other committee. It will be printed after
the folks who are on our subcommittee on Crime on both
sides of the aisle have an opportunity to either give
additional views to be printed with that report, or to
dissent from this report. On the other hand, Mr. Zeliff's
committee, the full committee, will wind up actually voting
on this and participating in quite a discussion of it in
the next few weeks.  I think with that in mind, Bill, we're
ready for questions.
      Q  As to the timing of the action of the imminent
seige, do you discount Ms. Reno's fear that sexual abuse
had continued because Koresh considered himself the husband
of the young children?
      REP. MCCOLLUM: That is correct in the sense that we
found, and I think the evidence is very clear, that there
was no greater harm or risk or likelihood of sexual abuse
at the time that she considered this than there was prior
to February 28th. There was no evidence of any particular
or continued sexual abuse activity during that time and
none that was actually brought to her attention.  Somebody
else had one. Yes, sir?
      Q  You recommend that she resign?
      REP. MCCOLLUM: We have not recommended anything
relative to where it stands now. She did resign before.
That is the president's decision. We did make the
recommendations or the finding of fact that he should have
accepted the resignation when she offered it back then.
      Q  Mr. McCollum, as you know, the FBI has made a
number of changes in the way it responds to this sort of
problem now. Other than taking another look at CS gas, do
you think the FBI has basically done everything it should
have done in terms of changes?
      REP. MCCOLLUM: I think that what they did with
respect to the Freemen and what Louis Freeh has done over
at the FBI in the last few months has been very admirable.
We've not reviewed in our subcommittee the actual Freemen
aftermath, but from everything I knew about it, they
learned a lesson from Waco in a big way. They exercised the
patience they did not exercise at Waco, they brought in
outside experts, they took the time, they recognized, and
I think this is very significant, there was no threat of
immediate harm to society as a whole or anyone outside that
compound in the Freemen situation, as was the case in Waco,
by waiting, and they had great risk, if they'd gone in, to
children.
      REP. ZELIFF: I'd like to just add my two cents. I
certainly concur. As a matter of fact, I wrote Director
Freeh and congratulated him on the degree of
professionalism and the things that were learned. And I
think he's provided some tremendous leadership.
      Q  So most of your recommendations for doing things
differently apply to ATF?
      REP. ZELIFF: There are a lot of recommendations that
we made here, some of which have been accepted, some of
which have not. And you know, I think that you'll find in
the military, for example, they've already moved forward.
We need to move forward in terms of making National Guard
subject to Posse Comitatus. But the military has already
tightened down the operations in terms of getting involved
in things like the drug nexus and who approves that. 
      And so I think it's very healthy. The American people
asked us to come to grips with what happened, who was
responsible, and give recommendations to see it doesn't
happen again. These agencies appropriately have already
moved forward. They're not waiting for this report.
      REP. MCCOLLUM: Well there's also one or two other
things in the FBI particularly. I'm not at all sure that
they are now having the institutional desire to cooperate
and act as much in concert as we would like with the local
law enforcement folks. But the Freemen incident indicates
that there has been some movement in that direction. And
our recommendation, I think, is comporting with that.
      Also, the hostage rescue team we think needs to be
significantly expanded in its scope in the ability for it
in and of itself to be able to be more mobile and more
available and for longer periods of time. 
      And I don't think that we should minimize our
recommendation on the CS riot control agent. It's what the
FBI used. We haven't heard them say anything about whether
they would ever use that or not use it again. We'd like to
see a study. We don't think under the conditions that were
presented in Waco it should ever be used again.  Yes, sir.
      Q  Could you talk about possible charges against the
ATF supervisors who may have falsified the drug
information.
      REP. ZELIFF: If in fact, they knew it was false at
the time they did it.
      Q  Is this something you plan to pursue as far as an
investigation?
      REP. ZELIFF: The report -- I think the -- the folks
that are -- that are in process -- I think the -- the law
enforcement people that have responsibility for that, we're
asking them to take a look at that. (Spit it out: they're
going to "correct" any "errors." C.Moore)
      REP. MCCOLLUM: The U.S. attorney's office and the
attorney general's office really should look at this from
a prosecutorial standpoint. But the issue there is did they
knowingly do this? Did they intentionally or knowingly
falsify the statement? We cannot conclude yes or no on that
question. What we can conclude is there were an incredible
number-really an incredible number-of false statements in
the affidavit that the ATF used to support their search
warrant. But we still believe that they had probable cause
to actually conduct the search. But the warrant itself, the
affidavit itself was just terrible.
      Q  Will you make a criminal referral?
      REP. MCCOLLUM: We're not making any referrals, no.
      REP. ZELIFF: It's not up to us to do that.
      REP. MCCOLLUM: No. That's not our role. We are making
a finding of fact, and we're recommending that the Justice
Department and, of course, the appropriate U.S. attorney
examine that issue.  Yes, ma'am.
      Q  Regarding your recommendation to transfer
oversight for ATF to the Department of Justice, would you
have the Department of Justice inspecting liquor and
collecting taxes?
      REP. MCCOLLUM: Probably not, we are not actually
recommending the transfer. What Bill Zeliff said-and I
think this is important because it comes under the
authorization of my subcommittee in part over in Crime and
Judiciary-is that we consider doing that. And what we're
doing now and have been doing in the Crime subcommittee is
looking at the big picture of reorganizing federal law
enforcement. We've already had two hearings on this
subject. It obviously won't be done in this Congress with
only a few weeks left. But we will have more, and we will
very seriously consider that issue in the context of the
bigger picture. And the findings that are here certainly
support that as a possibility. But there is no actual
recommendation that it, indeed, occur. 
      REP. ZELIFF: It just asks the Congress to take a look
at it.
      Q  Yeah. I was curious to as to whether the
subcommittee investigators got full access to the
information of the federal agencies. I know last summer
there was concern that the agencies were withholding
information or sending it in late. I wonder if you're
satisfied now that the agencies have fully opened their
doors to you.
      REP. ZELIFF: Not totally, but one of the things that
we didn't cover here-and it was a little bit more minor-but
we feel that there ought to be full audit, in terms of the
monies that were charged to the drug war. We couldn't get
any information from the Department of Defense on that. And
there were other areas as well. So we're asking to move
forward in some of those directions as well. I mean, we
didn't get all the information we were looking for.
      REP. MCCOLLUM: Yes, sir?
      Q  Why did the report take about a year to be
published? 
      REP. MCCOLLUM: Well, it took quite a while because we
collected a lot of documents afterwards. We chose to do
this hearing differently from Iran-Contra. Some of you may
remember that I served on that committee, in which there
was an exhaustive pre-hearing investigation that went on.
Instead, because of the nature of Waco and because it had
been festering for quite some time in the previous Congress
dominated by the other party, we decided we needed to bring
forward the hearing as soon as possible. And so we had not
done all of the homework we felt we needed to do.
      And we did it. We've gotten thousands of more
documents. And that's why the criticisms and the findings
of fact that are in here are very detailed in
documentation. And I'd hope when you get a chance to look
at the full report, you look at that and look at all the
footnotes.
      And look particularly at what we've said with respect
to these new things that I think are very important about
the fact that not a single one of the five reasons given by
the attorney general for proceeding with the assault were
justified or had any merit at all.
      REP. ZELIFF: I think it's very important to also
recognize that Bill and I have, on behalf of both
subcommittees, have now come to full agreement to the
recommendations we're making, and that's no small task. I
mean, we've had to go through the process and upside down
and sideways to come to that agreement. And we've looked at
the films many, many times more than I'd like to admit, I
guess. But in taking his concerns and my concerns and in
just doing the work that we're charged to do, and making
sure it's accurate.
      And we feel very good about the report, and we hope
you will too as you get through it.
      REP. MCCOLLUM: And we feel very good about the fact
when we say these findings of fact, and we've listed them
that way, they're there for a reason. The recommendations
are in a separate section for a reason. And that's because
we have -- we really feel that every single finding of fact
is highly documented and it is a finding of fact.  Yes,
ma'am?
      Q  Have you determined that it was Ms. Reno's
decision ultimately and not the president's? 
      REP. ZELIFF: Well, let me take that one, because what
our role in our responsibility as the committee of looking
for these facts is, is to tell the American people who was
accountable, who made the decisions, then to come back and
to come to grips with the recommendations to see that this
kind of thing didn't happen again.
      So in that role, we had to consider who made the
decision. We finally concluded at the end that it was Janet
Reno, and the recommendation at the time that she made, she
offered to resign, and we feel that the president should
have accepted it, based on the fact that we came to the
conclusion that she made the ultimate decision.
      REP. MCCOLLUM: Any other questions? Well, we want to
thank you for coming, and that'll be the end of the press
conference.  Thank you.
      REP. ZELIFF: Thank you.