Newsgroups: talk.politics.misc,alt.activism,alt.conspiracy
From: [l--ue--o] at [shell.portal.com] (Louis Alberto Bueno)
Subject: The ATF-Waco Report
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 1993 04:58:37 GMT

	Well, it's official.

	The Treasury Department released today (Thursday, September 30) a
potentially scathing report on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
raid of the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas.

	The ATF officials who had botched the initial raid this past
February lied to their superiors, the police and the news media, as well as
altering written reports to conceal their own errors.  The 300-page report
pointed out that the raid itself was "botched" insofar as that even after
agents knew that the element of surprise had been lost and that they were
not prepared for a shootout with the Branch Davidians, they proceeded
anyway.  (This last part is very important, as the ATF team leaders had
been specifically instructed not to move in if the element of surprise was
lost because the agents were not readily armed for the type of armed
standoff which ensued with the BDs.)

	As a result, four agents were killed and 20 wounded in a 45-minute
shootout, in which six BDs died as well.  As everyone here knows well, this
led to a 51-day standoff that ended in a fiery blaze that totally consumed
the BD compound, which resulted in the death of 85 BDs, among which were 29
children.

	The report notes that Charles Sarabyn, assistant to Phillip
Chojancki (the special agent in charge of the Houston ATF office), had been
informed by an undercover agent, Robert Rodriguez, that David Koresh had
been tipped off to the raid FORTY minutes before it occurred by one of his
followers who had spoken to a TV cameraman who was preparing to cover the
assault.

	Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, remarking on this, said the
commanders "erred by failing to abort the mission," adding, "I don't know
what went on in the man's mind when he made the decision ... in absolute
violation of the instructions."

	Days after the shootout, Sarabyn and Chojancki told their superiors
that they had no prior knowledge that Koresh would be prepared for the
raid, even though field agents who were on the scene were telling
investigators and Texas Rangers that the two agents in charge were lying.

	Stephen Higgins, who was acting head of the ATF at the time (who
has retired prior to the release of this report), went on national TV a
week later after the shootout and firmly denied that Koresh had any prior
knowledge of an impending raid.  He said "We would not send our agents into
a situation where we didn't think we had the element of surprise."

	Higgins was criticized in the report for failing to actively pursue
media claims that his field commanders were being "less than truthful"
about the raid.  Only after being confronted with more than 60 witnesses
did Sarabyn admit he knew Koresh was ready for the ATF.  The report said
Higgins should not have taken the field commanders' claims at face value,
considering the amount of circumstancial evidence.

	Another cover-up that was revealed in the report is that the two
supervising agents had also doctored the raid plan before submitting it to
the Texas Rangers, who were investigating the botched raid at the time. The
two agents claimed that they were only sought "to revise the plan to make
it more thorough and complete," even though it's apparent that they were
only seeking to cover up their own mistakes in the affair.

	The report went on to criticize the ATF for not seeking alternative
plans to seperate Koresh from his arsenal of weapons before arresting him,
as well as stating that there are "serious, systemic defects in ATF's
ability to plan for and to conduct large-scale tactical operations."

	Other quotes from the 300-page report:

	"Unfortunately, the investigation also found disturbing evidence of
flawed decision-making, inadequate intelligence gathering,
miscommunication, supervisory failures and deliberately misleading
post-raid statements."

	"Despite knowing in advance that the element of surprise was lost,
the raid commanders made the decision to go forward.  This decision was
brutally exploited by Branch Davidian leader David Koresh and his
followers."

	"Higgins must accept responsibility for continuing to take public
positions on the issue when repeated questions from the media and
information readily available to him should have made it clear that he was
on shaky ground. Higgins never adequately questioned his subordinates to
determine the facts until early April."

	"ATF's management, perhaps out of misplaced desire to protect the
agency from criticism, offered accounts based on Chojnacki and Sarabyn's
statements, disregarding clear evidence that those statements were false."

	"The problems here rest as much in the planning process as in the
plan itself.  Not only were the planners, led by Sarabyn, too quick in
concluding that a massive mid-morning raid was the best possible
enforcement option, but they chose a plan whose window of opportunity might
have been far smaller than they realized."

	And finally, from Bentsen himself:

	"Mistakes and errors in judgment were made.  Numerous officials
were less than truthful about the facts."


Siempre,

--Louis