From: [s--sh--e] at [cco.caltech.edu] (Tom Renner) Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns Subject: Massacre of Branch Davidians 3/5 Date: 12 Feb 1994 11:02:32 GMT FBI-JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVERUP THE 51 DAY SIEGE AND APRIL 19, 1993 ASSAULT ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS On the evening of February 28, 1993, the Treasury Department and BATF agreed to turn over control of the scene to the FBI. By that time Special Agent-in-Charge Jeffrey Jamar of the San Antonio office, who had been put in charge of the operation, had already driven up to Waco. The FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and several Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT) also began arriving that day. (JDR:9,27)[205] Meanwhile, Koresh and the Branch Davidians were convinced that BATF's attack was the opening of the Fifth Seal: that those six Branch Davidians slaughtered February 28th were killed for "preaching God's word" and the surviving Branch Davidians only would have to "rest a little longer" until the remainder were also put to death. Thus would begin the countdown to Apocalypse and the Second Coming of Christ. They also believed that the siege was an opportunity to spread Koresh's message to the world that God was giving humanity its last opportunity to repent.[206] The FBI regarded the Branch Davidians' resistance as "a direct challenge to lawful federal warrants and to duly authorized law enforcement officials" (JDR:12) and had little sympathy with either the Branch Davidians' religious beliefs--or their complaints about BATF's excessive use of force. Doubtless, Koresh was looking for a way to come out that would be consistent with his religious views and his sense of dignity. However, during 51 days of the siege, negotiators' efforts to convince them to surrender were continually undermined by HRT Commander Richard Rogers' persuading siege commander SAC Jeffrey Jamar to allow him to escalate pressure tactics and psychological warfare. As early as March 1, 1993, there were predictions that the government's intentions towards the Branch Davidians were violent. Former McLennan County District Attorney Vic Feazell, who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the Branch Davidians for the shootout with George Roden, criticized federal agents for "storm trooper" tactics in laying siege to Mount Carmel and predicted a grim end to the standoff. "The feds are preparing to kill them," he said, noting the mobilization of military equipment. "That way they can bury their mistakes. And they won't have attorneys looking over what they did later at a trial."[207] In this section the Committee for Waco Justice report describes the FBI's violations of constitutional rights and use of excessive force in its handling of both the siege and the April 19th destruction of Mount Carmel and the subsequent FBI and Justice Department coverup. The report then presents the Committee for Waco Justice conclusions: that the FBI effectively massacred the Branch Davidians and that the Attorney General should appoint an Independent Counsel to identify and prosecute responsible agents and officials for official misconduct, violations of rights, and negligent--or even intentional-- homicide. We will present further recommendations in the last section of this report. It should be noted that none of the testimony given to the Justice Department "review teams" or to Congress was given under oath. Also, the Justice Department report does not include information which might affect the prosecutions of the Branch Davidians now on trial. (The Justice report specifies where material is being withheld by using the notation [material redacted as required by statute].) The "Justice Department report" issued October 8, 1993, consists of 5 separate documents. Assistant to the Attorney General Richard Scruggs compiled the largest report, the Justice Department factual report. Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann issued the short report "Lessons of Waco: Proposed Changes in Law Enforcement." Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr. issued an "Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas." Finally, nine outside experts submitted recommendations compiled in "Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco." The tenth outside expert, Alan A. Stone, M.D., submitted a separate report one month later. WHITE HOUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND FBI CHAINS OF COMMAND FEBRUARY 28 - APRIL 19, 1993 WHITE HOUSE Bill Clinton - President Thomas McLarty - Chief of Staff Bernard Nussbaum - White House Counsel Vince Foster - Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsay - Presidential Advisor George Stephanopolous - Communications Director JUSTICE DEPARTMENT Stuart M. Gerson - Acting Attorney General (>From Feb. 28-March 12) Webster Hubbell - Assistant to Acting Attorney General Gerson, liaison between Clinton and Justice Department ______________ Janet Reno- Attorney General (>From March 12) Richard Scruggs - Assistant to the Attorney General Philip B. Heymann - Deputy Attorney General Webster Hubbell - Associate Attorney General Carl Stern, Director of the Office of Public Affairs Mark Richard - Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ronald Ederer - U.S. Attorney (James DeAtley, his assistant) Bill Johnston - Assistant United States Attorney in Waco John Phinizy - Assistant Untied States Attorney in Waco LeRoy Jahn - Assistant United States Attorney in Waco and lead Prosecutor of Branch Davidians FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Officials in Washington William S. Sessions - Director Floyd Clarke - Deputy Director Doug Gow - Associate Deputy Director for Investigations Larry Potts - Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative Division Danny Coulson - Deputy Assistant Director of Criminal Investigative Division E. Michael Kahoe -- Section Chief of Criminal Investigative Division Violent Crimes Agents in Waco Jeff Jamar - Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Waco Operation SAC Robert Ricks, SAC Richard Schwein, SAC Richard Swensen, aides to Jamar Richard M. Rogers - Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge and commander of Hostage Rescue Team Byron Sage - Supervisory Special Resident Agent, Chief negotiator, in charge of 24 negotiators. 1. FBI CONTROL OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA According to Mad Man at Waco authors Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, the FBI used its daily press briefings as a way of "controlling" the media and the public's perceptions of David Koresh so that they would consider him an unpredictable psychopath. The FBI's other goal was "inflaming the already beleaguered cult leader." a. FBI Restricted the Press and Media The FBI imposed a number of harsh rules on the media. It prohibited reporters from getting closer than three miles to Mt. Carmel, claiming the Branch Davidians' .50 caliber rifles could hit anyone closer. The FBI strictly controlled its daily press briefings, prevented agents and officials from granting media interviews. Speaking at the September 10, 1993, Freedom of Information Foundation panel on "Mt. Carmel: What Should the Public Know," John O. Lumpkin of the Associated Press described other examples of government restrictions on the media. The FBI refused to allow Koresh to speak to the media. It refused to divulge information such as: on whose authority they made the original raid, who was alive or dead at Mount Carmel, the contents of the warrant against David Koresh, and why building walls were bulldozed into the fire. Months after the end of the siege, FBI representatives continued to refuse to talk to the press. Lumpkin said, "it is my personal opinion. . .the argument could be made [that] the situation could have turned out differently, and certainly not tragically, if there had been much more open access instead."[208] Lumpkin asserted that because of FBI control of information, the public still does not know the truth about what happened in Waco. He said a reporter told him it reminded him of U.S. government control of the American press in Vietnam. Panelist Shelly Katz, a Time Magazine photographer stationed in Waco during the siege, said this was the worst suppression of media he had seen in 27 years of journalism. b. FBI Intimidated the Press and Media Federal agents intimidated the media by arresting members on flimsy pretexts. Federal agents assaulted and arrested a reporter who had merely asked about a Branch Davidian arrested after the BATF raid and illegally confiscated his film. When journalist Louis Beam, who had valid press credentials for the right-wing publication Jubilee, asked whether the country was "witnessing a fascist takeover," he was whisked out of the press room. When he tried to return the next month he was arrested on charges of criminal trespass.[209] After state troopers arrested two news photographers and confiscated their film near the ruins of Mount Carmel on April 22, 1993, Tony Pederson, managing editor of the Houston Chronicle, protested: "In a situation already marred by tragic loss of life and questionable actions, this seems to be a rather sorry follow-up. One has to wonder seriously if the Bill of Rights has been suspended in McLennan County."[210] During the Freedom of Information Foundation media panel Dick DeGuerin asserted that the press should have done civil disobedience and continued getting arrested until they were allowed to get closer to the scene of the action. c. FBI Lied to the Press and Media Louis Alaniz, a Christian sympathizer who snuck into Mount Carmel for several days during the siege and left just before the fire, said the Branch Davidians listened to the FBI press conferences. "What really got them is they constantly heard the story changing-another lie, another lie, another lie. These people were saying, `Why are they saying all this about us?' I didn't see anything that [the FBI] was telling the press that was true."[211] We will discuss these various lies as we proceed. One glaring example was media spokesperson SAC Bob Ricks' telling the public that operations were costing $2 million a day.[212] During the April 22, 1993, Senate Appropriations Committee hearings it was revealed that actual costs for the operation as of April 22, 1993, were $6,792,000, an average of $130,000 a day.[213] Another example was the FBI's describing the rickety wooden buildings of Mount Carmel Center as a "fortress" built for war. They alleged that the old concrete building around and on top of which the new building had been built was a "concrete bunker;" that the tornado shelter under construction was an "underground bunker;" and that the underground bus which was used as a tunnel to the tornado shelter, and a practice shooting range, was particularly sinister. The disinformation grew as the siege continued, to end in a crescendo of falsehoods immediately after the April 19th fire. d. Press and Media Repeated Government Propaganda During the media panel attorney Dick DeGuerin condemned journalists for engaging in "pack journalism" and for regurgitating BATF and FBI propaganda by repeating charged words like "cult," "compound," "fortified bunkers," "Ranch Apocalypse," etc. He also criticized journalists for merely waiting for the Treasury and Justice Department reports as if they would be a final "Warren Commission Report" and not doing any investigative reporting to find out the truth. The FBI's tight control of the news left many media people with only government allegations and disinformation about child abuse, arms buildups, mass suicide, etc. to write about. Few bothered to dig deeper to discover the dubious sources of these allegations. Even fewer examined their own prejudices against deeply committed religious groups. Much of the media merely repeated Cult Awareness Network propaganda and gave CAN spokespersons ample "cult busting" forums. e. Press and Media Practiced Self-Censorship Worse than merely repeating government propaganda was the self-censorship in which some media engaged, including suppressing criticism of the government. In his media panel comments, Dick DeGuerin chastised the national media for ignoring two important stories: BATF's refusing Koresh's invitation to view his guns before the raid and BATF's taking Koresh's gun dealer and business partner Henry McMahon into "protective custody" after the raid and forbidding him to speak to the press or the FBI. The national media still has not reported either story. The producers of Pensacola's television show "Lawline" even sent copies of their April 21, 1993, interview with McMahon, titled "Fiasco in Waco," to television stations all over the country. However, stations ignored McMahon's allegations.[214] After the April 19th fire there were other incidents of self-censorship. Ron Engelman hosted a mid- morning talk show on KGBS radio in Dallas from February through June, 1993. The Branch Davidians listened to his show and even requested that he be made a negotiator. (JDR:Appendix C:3) Even after the fire, Engelman's callers wanted to talk about the destruction of the Branch Davidians. Management demanded Engelman move his show to 6 a.m., take a co-host and make the show "light and fluffy." Engelman refused and resigned.[215] NBC, which had aired the television movie "Ambush at Waco" about the BATF raid on Mount Carmel, originally planned to do a sequel about the ending of the siege. However, it canceled the sequel, claiming it would be "too violent." Perhaps NBC network executives did not want to offend government officials by vividly portraying government tanks gassing the Branch Davidians and ramming away at the building until it caught fire, killing more than 80 people. While some newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington Times called the Justice report a "whitewash," others applauded it. An October 12, 1993 Washington Post editorial declared: "In hindsight, it is tempting to say that anything that turned out so badly must have been the result of serious error. But it is difficult to cast blame after reviewing the evidence. . .[A]n earnest effort was being made to talk the group's members out of the buildings. . .The finding of mass suicide and/or murder is a reasonable one." 2. POSSIBLE ILLEGAL USE OF TANKS The Justice report is not as forthcoming as the Treasury report regarding the FBI's obtaining military tanks without violating posse comitatus prohibitions on the use of the military as a police force. First, the report does not reveal whether the FBI used the allegation of a "drug nexus" at Waco to obtain the tanks from the military on a no charge, "nonreimbursable" basis. However, a Legal Times reporter wrote, "Much of the equipment used at Waco was provided by the Army, under an agreement that all costs would be reimbursed."[216] Next the report states: "the FBI requested Bradley fighting vehicles from the U.S. Army. Nine of these-- without barrels, pursuant to an agreement between the FBI and the Army to avoid posse comitatus prohibitions--were ultimately provided." However, when Koresh claimed he had weapons that could blow these vehicles into the air, the FBI "sought and obtained from the Army two Abrams (M1A1) tanks and five M728 Combat Engineering Vehicles (CEVs)." (JDR:123-124) The report does not state if these also were "without barrels," but many claim that the tanks do have barrels--which even the Justice Department itself admits would be illegal. Upon learning that tanks had been brought to Waco, "the President called [Acting Attorney General Stuart] Gerson, requesting an explanation for the deployment of military vehicles. Gerson assured the President that no assault was planned. . .[and] that it was legal for the FBI to use the military vehicles for safety purposes." (JDR:239) Evidently, this means that it was illegal to use the tanks for actions like the April 19th assault. However, no government agency seems willing to challenge what the Justice report itself infers is the illegal use of the tanks. Fire survivor Ruth Riddle expressed shock at the use of the tanks. "Who ever heard of Americans using tanks against Americans on American soil?"[217] 3. FBI IMPATIENT WITH CONCILIATORY MEASURES The federal government has successfully negotiated past sieges. The 1973 siege at Wounded Knee lasted 70 days and, despite the fact that two FBI agents had been killed, the siege ended peacefully. Similarly, a Native American takeover of Alcatraz (after it was no longer used as a prison) was allowed to play itself out peacefully. BATF and the FBI had negotiated a peaceful surrender after 3 days with the Covenant of the Sword and Arm of the Lord group in 1985. And despite the deaths of Samuel and Vicki Weaver, after Bo Gritz became a third party negotiator, Randy Weaver did surrender without further bloodshed. Nevertheless, FBI Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard Rogers--evidently an individual with little patience for negotiations--convinced siege commander SAC Jeffrey Jamar to allow him to use pressure tactics against the Branch Davidians. Justice Department outside expert Alan A. Stone, M.D. notes that "pushed by the tactical leader [i.e., Rogers] the commander on the ground [i.e., Jamar] began to allow tactical pressures." (JDR:Stone:9) These tactical pressures--cutting off power, harassing the Branch Davidians with bright lights and loud music, destroying property--went against the recommendations of FBI behavioral scientist and many negotiators. Dr. Stone criticized these actions: "I have concluded that the FBI command failed to give adequate consideration to their own behavioral science and negotiation experts. They also failed to make use of the Agency's own prior successful experience in similar circumstances. They embarked on a misguided and punishing law enforcement strategy that contributed to the tragic ending at Waco." (JDR:Stone:1) He holds: "What went wrong at Waco was not that the FBI lacked expertise in behavior science or in the understanding of unconventional religious groups. Rather, the commander on the ground and others committed to tactical-aggressive, traditional law enforcement practices disregarded those experts and tried to assert control and demonstrate to Koresh that they were in charge. . .[T]he FBI's own experts recognized and predicted in memoranda that there was the risk that the active aggressive law enforcement mentality of the FBI--the so-called `action imperative'-- would prevail in the face of frustration and delay." (JDR:Stone:14-15) (It should be noted that the Justice report quotes statements from audio tapes of negotiations. The full transcripts of these tapes must be investigated by independent reviewers.) a. Smerick and Young Advised Against Tactical Pressures The FBI consulted its own behavioral scientists, whose specialty was applying psychology to law enforcement situations, but ignored their recommendations. Pete Smerick and Mark Young recommended in several March 5th to 9th memos that this was not a typical hostage situation since the Branch Davidians insisted on staying with their leader. They wrote that "tactical presence. . .if carried to excess, could eventually be counter productive and could result in loss of life." They advised, "If the followers could be made to see that the government had no intention of engaging them in an apocalyptic final battle, then perhaps they would begin to question the validity of Koresh's predictions about the inevitability of such a battle." Smerick and Young recommended that the FBI "establish some trust with Koresh" and even suggested "moving back from the compound, not to show law enforcement weakness, but to sap from Koresh the source of his powerful hold over his followers--his prediction that the government was about to start a war against them."[218] They concluded by saying that the FBI could "always resort to tactical pressure, but it should be the absolute last option we should consider." In their last memorandum Smerick and Young did recommend mild pressures, like sporadic cutting off of power, sudden movements of equipment and manpower, and downplaying Koresh's importance to the press, but only if exercised with "extreme caution." (JDR:179-183) After reviewing Smerick and Young's recommendations, Alan A. Stone, concludes "decision-making at Waco failed to give due regard to the FBI experts who had the proper understanding of how to deal with an unconventional group like the Branch Davidians." (JDR:Stone:28) b. FBI Rejected Family and Third Party Intervention FBI commanders rejected two important negotiation tactics: allowing direct communication between families and Branch Davidians and allowing third parties to negotiate a surrender. While the FBI would send in video and audio tapes from families, in order to "drive a wedge" between Koresh and his followers, they forbid them to speak directly to family members. Months after the massacre, Balenda Gamen, mother of fire survivor David Thibodeau, recalled: "I originally came to Waco because I was challenged by the FBI when they said to me `there is no room for family in this operation. Perhaps we'll do it in the future.' When I heard those words I knew that the writing was on the wall for this community. They had a very good chance of never coming out."[219] Despite Gamen and other family members' continual entreaties to the FBI and Janet Reno via fax and registered letter that they be allowed to negotiate directly with relatives inside Mount Carmel, the FBI would only allow them to send in and receive occasional audio and video tapes. During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearings Reno admitted that she had never heard about the families' attempts to reach her. A number of third party negotiators were considered and rejected. On March 6th FBI Director William Sessions had discussions with Koresh's former attorney Gary Coker--who happens to be a personal friend of Sessions from his days in Waco[220]--about negotiating with Koresh. However, FBI commanders refused to allow Coker to act as a negotiator because they thought he merely was looking for a client. (JDR:131). Sessions himself offered to negotiate, but Acting Attorney General Gerson forbid it. (JDR:239-241) On March 7th David Koresh declared he would surrender if some theologian could convince him his interpretation of the Seven Seals was incorrect, but the FBI made no attempt to pursue that avenue. (JDR:58) During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing SAC Jamar declared that having theologicians--especially renowned ones--negotiate with Koresh would just make him more egomaniacal. After the Branch Davidians expressed respect for McLennan County Sheriff Jack Harwell, the FBI allowed him to participate in some mid-March negotiations. They did not give him a free hand as a third party negotiator. (JDR:133-134) They also rejected the Branch Davidians' request for radio talk show host Ron Engelman as a negotiator and Bo Gritz' offer to be a third party negotiator. On March 16th frustrated Branch Davidians used flashlights to send a Morse code to reporters reading, "SOS, SOS, SOS, SOS. FBI broke negotiations. Want negotiations from the press."[221] The FBI soon started flashing bright lights at the compound at night, perhaps in part to end such communications. Only after the Branch Davidians were in Mount Carmel for a full month did the FBI allow David Koresh and Steve Schneider to meet with their attorneys. As we will see in a later section, peaceful efforts by third parties--attorneys and theologians--did result in a credible promise by Koresh to lead the Branch Davidians out of Mount Carmel despite FBI tactical pressure. c. Conflicts between Tactical Agents and Negotiators The Justice report admits that negotiators criticized the tactical commanders for undercutting negotiations: "the negotiators felt that the negotiating and tactical components of the FBI's strategy were more often contradictory than complementary. . .negotiators emphasized to Branch Davidians the `dignity' and fair treatment the group would receive upon its exit from the compound. By contrast, the negotiators felt that the efforts of the tactical personnel were directed toward intimidation and harassment. . .some of the negotiators lamented the absence of joint strategy sessions with the on-site commander and the tactical commander." (JDR:139-140) The Justice report alleges that negotiators did not believe negotiations alone could have avoided the April 19th fire. (JDR:142) Alan A. Stone, who made special efforts to conduct his own interviews, found many of these individuals had a different opinion. "FBI's behavioral scientists and negotiators. . .share my belief that mistakes were made. . .[and]. . .expressed their determination to have the truth come out, regardless of the consequences." (JDR:Stone:4) Nancy Ammerman, another outside expert, agreed that the FBI did have negotiators and experts giving them good advice. However, this advice was not heeded because these individuals were "outranked and outnumbered by the tactical types."[222] The tactical leaders had more pull than the negotiators because of the FBI's action-oriented ethos and because negotiators usually were stationed several miles from the site, while the Hostage Rescue Team and Richard M. Rogers were stationed at the site with SAC Jamar. Also, some of the FBI negotiators were as hardnosed as the tactical agents, insulting Branch Davidians over the phone, calling Koresh a "child molester," and abruptly hanging up when they quoted Scriptures. One "negotiator" betrayed his true feelings when, after urging Branch Davidians to come out over a loudspeaker, he inadvertently left the microphone on and was heard to say: "I've been in the FBI for 27 years and I've never seen anything like these people. They think they can get away with murder. Well, they'll have another thing coming as soon as they come out of there."[223] 4. FBI RELIED ON EXPERTS AND CULT BUSTERS URGING TACTICAL PRESSURE The Justice report states, "The FBI has questioned whether its negotiations with Koresh could even be characterized as `negotiations' at all, but rather as Koresh's attempt to convert the agents before it was too late and God destroyed them." (JDR:17) Yet despite Koresh's obsession with the Seven Seals, they never allowed anyone who was an expert on the subject to have direct contact with him. Nancy Ammerman believes FBI agents had such a negative view of Koresh's religious views for three reasons: some individuals didn't understand religion, others were antagonistic towards religion in general, and others were antagonistic towards Koresh's specific views, which differed from their own.[224] She noted FBI officials' and agents' "tendency to discount the influence of religious beliefs and to evaluate situations largely in terms of a leader's individual criminal/psychological motives" and that their "consensus" was that "when they encountered people with religious beliefs, those beliefs were usually a convenient cover for criminal activity." (JDR:Ammerman:5) For example, siege Commander SAC Jamar expressed his contempt for Koresh when he declared at the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing that Koresh had merely "corrupted people" and "corrupted religion to his own ends" and that there was "no way to convince Koresh that he was not the Messiah." It is evident from the Justice report's description of its consultations with seven theologians (JDR:186-189) that the only one they took seriously was Dr. Glenn Hilburn of Baylor University. Not surprisingly, the report mentions that "Baylor University has one of the largest `cult' reference and research facilities in the country." However, even Dr. Hilburn had little substantive impact on FBI thinking or actions. (JDR:186-189) Several times the Justice report mentions theologian Philip Arnold--an expert on the Seven Seals and apocalyptic groups--but never acknowledges his crucial impact on Koresh's decision to come out. We will review that in detail in a later section. A study of the Justice report makes it clear that psychologists, psychiatrists (JDR:158-185) and "cult busters" (JDR:190-193) who reinforced the FBI's own prejudices had the greatest impact on the FBI's decisions. a. Psychologists and Psychiatrists The FBI was particularly attentive to the advice of psychologists and psychiatrists who asserted that Koresh was mentally unbalanced and would not surrender voluntarily. Dr. Park Dietz held that, "continuing to negotiate in good faith would not resolve the situation, because Koresh would not come out." (JDR:168) Dr. Anthony J. Pinizotto said, "Koresh displayed psychopathic behavior, that he was a `con artist' type, and he had narcissistic tendencies." Dr. Mike Webster opined, "Koresh appeared to be manifesting anti- social traits." (JDR:170) Dr. Perry and social worker Joyce Sparks, who interviewed children released from Mount Carmel, agreed that "Koresh was stalling for time, to prepare for his `final battle' with authorities." (JDR:171-174) Dr. Joseph L. Krofcheck (with FBI psychological profiler Clinton R. Van Zandt) held that Koresh appeared to be a "functional, paranoid-type psychotic," that he was unlikely to "give up the power and omnipotence he enjoyed inside the compound," that there was the possibility of a "mass-breakout. . .with women carrying a baby in one arm while firing a weapon from the other," and that "the only way the FBI could influence Koresh's exit from the compound would be some form of tactical intervention." (JDR:176-179) b. Cult Busters There is evidence that in response to Nancy Ammerman's sharp criticisms, to Rick Ross's being indicted for "unlawful imprisonment" in the summer of 1993, and to the New Alliance Party suit against the FBI for its abuse of the word "cult," the FBI and Justice Department have tried to cover up its association with professional or amateur "cult busters." The Justice report asserts the FBI "did not solicit advice from any `cult experts' or `cult deprogrammers.'" (JDR:190) In mid-April the FBI asked Dr. Murray S. Miron, a Professor of Psycholinquistics at Syracuse University, to analyze five letters that Koresh sent out of Mount Carmel. After reading the first and third letters, he concluded that they bore "all the hallmarks of rampant, morbidly virulent paranoia. . .In my judgement, we are facing a determined, hardened adversary who has no intention of delivering himself or his followers into the hands of his adversaries. It is my belief that he is waiting for an assault." (JDR:174-176) What the FBI either did not know--or did not admit--is that Dr. Miron is an outspoken cult critic. Reportedly, during the 1970s he had been involved with the Citizens Freedom Foundation, the anti-cult group which evolved into the Cult Awareness Network. During the week of April 14-21--even while he was consulting with the FBI-- Miron published an article called "The Mark of the Cult" in the Syracuse New Times. The article contains stereotypical anti-cult propaganda: "The totalitarianism of the cult banishes dissent and fosters dependence upon fallible, power-mad leaders. It is the system of every dictator, whether benign or benevolent."[225] In typically media-savvy cult buster fashion, Miron managed to make himself one of the few FBI consultants quoted in major media right after the fire--thus using his FBI connections to promote his anti-cult propaganda. He told the Los Angeles Times, "I advised the FBI that all of his promises as to giving up were only subterfuges, deceptions and delaying tactics."[226] He told the Washington Post, "There was every indication in my mind that he was not prepared to commit suicide."[227] His comments occupied eight paragraphs of a New York Times article: "Dr. Miron said that Mr. Koresh had become so delusional" that he and his followers may have believed that after they set the fire "either that they were invulnerable and that the fires would consume the authorities while leaving them untouched, or that they were about to ascend to glory no matter what happened to their bodies."[228] Rick Ross' contention that he was in close contact with BATF and the FBI is backed up by Nancy Ammerman's September 10, 1993 one page addendum to her report. (Which the Justice Department did not bother to include in its report.) In it she wrote, "The interview transcripts document that Mr. Rick Ross was, in fact, closely involved with both the ATF and the FBI. . .He clearly had the most extensive access to both agencies of any person on the `cult expert' list, and he was apparently listened to more attentively." However, after reviewing Ross's contacts with the FBI, the Justice report states: "The FBI did not `rely' on Ross for advice whatsoever during the standoff." (JDR:192) The Justice report claims that the FBI determined Breault was talking to the media and therefore only accepted his affidavits and electronic mail from him, but decided "not to contact him." (JDR:192) However, Breault asserts: "as soon as the siege began. . .the FBI tried for hours to contact us. . .they almost sent the police to drag us to police headquarters. Just before they took that drastic action, the negotiators broke through." Breault gave them detailed information about the Seven Seals, Koresh and his followers. Breault also writes: "The FBI contacted us throughout the siege. They showed us Koresh's letters."[229] Clearly, either Breault is lying or the FBI and Justice Department are trying to cover up their reliance on him. During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing FBI Director William Sessions admitted that the FBI had consulted "cult experts," though he got confused about the advice they had given the FBI. And SAC Jamar admitted, "we had a white paper on cults that was very, very useful to us." The white paper outlined the traits of cults with one "dynamic, manipulative, egomaniacal, psychopathic leader" and Jamar asserted that the traits fit Koresh "to a T." Jamar did not tell the committee what individual--or organization--gave him the white paper. However, considering that it contained typical anti-cult stereotypes, one might guess either Dr. Murray Miron or Rick Ross gave Jamar the white paper. Despite the Justice report denials, it is evident that there was a definite cult buster influence on--and justification for-- decisions to replace negotiations with pressure tactics against the Branch Davidians. 5. FBI PRESSURE TACTICS REPLACED NEGOTIATIONS Alan A. Stone, M.D. writes: "By March 21st, the FBI was concentrating on tactical pressure alone. . .This changing strategy at the compound from (1) conciliatory negotiation to (2) negotiation and tactical pressure and then to (3) tactical pressure alone." (JDR:Stone:10) Below is a description of these escalating tactical pressures and the Branch Davidians' response to them, grouped into Dr. Stone's three phases. a. Conciliatory Negotiations--February 28-March 6 During this period 23 of the 35 individuals to leave Mount Carmel did so. The FBI did not punish Koresh after he reneged on his promise to surrender on March 2nd because "God had spoken to him and told him to wait." And they dealt gingerly with his various threats of violence against federal agents. When the U.S. Attorney's office enraged the Branch Davidians by charging with murder the two elderly women who had left Mount Carmel, negotiators quickly convinced them to drop the charges. However, much to the Branch Davidians dismay, the FBI did cut off their phones to everyone but the FBI and sent armored vehicles onto Mount Carmel Center's property. (JDR:21-57) The FBI also "bugged" Mount Carmel. "A federal law enforcement official said that tiny recording devices had been sent in. . .with deliveries of milk, news magazines, a typewriter and various other items requested.[230] The Justice report admits there was "court- ordered electronic surveillance." (JDR:107-108) A Sunday Times of London article asserted that the FBI even used aircraft to pick up conversations, infrared devices to pinpoint individual's positions, and tiny fibre-optic microphones and cameras inserted in walls to relay audio and visual images back to the command center.[231] This information has not been confirmed. b. Negotiation and Tactical Pressure--March 7-21 During this period 11 more people left Mount Carmel. While negotiators remained conciliatory, they did try to drive a wedge between Koresh and his followers by ridiculing Steve Schneider because his wife had born Koresh's child and by playing family and negotiation tapes over loudspeakers. The FBI began exposing the "negative part of [Koresh's] personality"--including his most inflammatory threats--during press conferences because "it is important for the American people to know what we are dealing with."[232] The FBI turned the electricity on and off as a pressure tactic, turning it off for good on March 13th. These pressures made the Branch Davidians more distrustful. Koresh and Schneider called this "bad faith" by the government and Steve Schneider claimed on March 13th that "the government wanted to kill all of them and burn down the building." (JDR:68) On March 15th negotiators made it clear they would refuse to listen to any more "Bible babble." However, they did allow a "cordial and positive" face-to-face meeting between chief negotiator Byron Sage and McLennan County Sheriff Jack Harwell and Branch Davidians Steve Schneider and Wayne Martin. (JDR:70) After the FBI sent in lawyers' letters and an audio tape from theologian Phil Arnold, Koresh told the FBI on March 19th that "he was ready to come out and face whatever might happen to him." He even joked, "When they give me the lethal injection, give me the cheap stuff." (JDR:70-75) Between just March 19th and 21st alone ten people left Mount Carmel. c. Tactical Pressure Only--March 22-April 19 Despite these obvious successes, SAC Jamar, influenced by HRT commander Rogers, decided it was time to increase tactical pressures and "demonstrate the authority of law enforcement." (JDR:135) On the evening of March 21st the FBI started blaring music over its loudspeaker system and kept it up despite Branch Davidian complaints. At 11:45 p.m. Koresh sent out the message, "Because of the loud music, nobody is coming out." The next day Schneider claimed "that the music had been counterproductive." On March 22nd the FBI promised Koresh that if he surrendered immediately he could communicate with his followers in jail, hold religious services and make a worldwide religious broadcast. He angrily threw their letter away. (JDR:78-80) The last Branch Davidian left Mount Carmel on March 23rd. The Justice report states the negotiating team recommended escalating harassment and the eventual gassing of the compound. (JDR:138) (As we know, not all of them agreed that was the best approach.) Except for finally allowing Koresh and Schneider to meet with their attorneys, over these four weeks the FBI's strategy consisted mostly of harassing, insulting and punishing the Branch Davidians. During the March 24th press briefing, as the Branch Davidians listened, "the FBI increased its `verbal assault' against Koresh, calling Koresh a liar and coward, and accusing him of hiding behind his children." (JDR:83) It may have been during this time that an FBI spokesperson declared that Koresh was just a "cheap thug who interprets the Bible through the barrel of a gun."[233] The FBI harassed the Branch Davidians by blaring loud music night and day and playing back audio tapes of negotiation, family members and released members greetings tapes. It shined bright lights all night long. Some of the harassment was quite violent. The FBI declared deadlines by which Branch Davidians were to exit on March 23rd, 24th, 27th, and 28th. When these were not met, the FBI removed and often crushed and destroyed automobiles, vans, go-carts and motorcycles. Also, "Bradleys [tanks] were run up and down in front of the compound in what negotiators believed was a show of force" (JDR:Dennis:44); individuals who left the building without permission were "flashbanged," i.e. had loud smoke grenades thrown near them; helicopters brazenly buzzed the building; and loudspeakers blared sounds of screeching rabbits being slaughtered and played the song "These Boots are Made for Walking" which contains the line, "and if you play with matches you know you're going to get burned." (JDR:79-109) Louis Alaniz, who snuck into Mount Carmel for several days, described "these Bradley's running around and the guys in them shooting the finger at these kids, and one incident where they actually mooned some of the girls. These people were scared. They only thing they saw was a bunch of people coming and shooting at them."[234] Outside expert Dr. Robert Cancro told reporters: "the threats implicit in the use of armored vehicles, razor wire, and a tightening perimeter tend to negate the positive and friendly tone attempted by negotiators. . .Even a person who isn't paranoid would interpret that as lack of consistency and good faith in negotiations. A paranoid individual needs more reassurance, not less."[235] Edward Dennis wrote, "Some negotiators believe that as a result of these actions the Davidians concluded that the negotiators had no influence over the decision makers and that the FBI was not trustworthy." (JDR:Dennis:45) Dick DeGuerin told reporters, "They're still intimidated by the FBI. We're not coming out until we know the media are going to be there."[236] And Balenda Gamen explained why many Branch Davidians did not exit or send their children out after this point: "Because we're a very arrogant, proud nation of people. You challenge Americans to defend their property, and they're probably going to do that. The bottom line is, if you truly believe in what you are doing that passionately, you don't send your children out to the enemy."[237] According to Louis Alaniz, "Koresh kept members in line by threatening to force them to leave the compound."[238] To show his lack of concern about the government's harassment, at one point Steve Schneider declared "you can burn us down, kill us, whatever." (JDR:87) According to news reports Koresh told the FBI, "If they want blood, then our blood is here for them to shed. . .We are not afraid of the government. If we have to die for what we stand for, we're going to. I don't mind if I die."[239] Dick DeGuerin said, "There was a collective feeling that the harassment was making them more stubborn."[240] During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearings SAC Jamar dismissed Representative Don Edwards question about whether these pressures only brought the Branch Davidians closer, saying there was "no way to drive them closer than they were." When Representative William Hughes asked SAC Jamar which experts had recommended they use pressure tactics like blasting loud noises all night long, Jamar did not answer; he merely repeated his claim the purpose of the noise was sleep deprivation. Outside expert Nancy Ammerman also could not get a straight answer about who had recommended these pressure tactics. She notes that Drs. Miron, Krofcheck and Dietz were the most frequently consulted experts. She then complains: "It is unclear which of these consultants (if any) recommended the psychological warfare tactics (Tibetan chants, sounds of rabbits dying, rock music, flood lights, helicopters hovering, etc.). None of the persons associated with [National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes] with whom I have talked claims to have favored these tactics, but no one was willing to say who recommended them or how the decision was made to use them." (JDR:Ammerman:2) Who gave these orders should be investigated. 6. FBI DESTROYED CRIME SCENE DESPITE COMPLAINTS One form of harassment which had important legal implications was the FBI's moving and destroying vehicles. This enraged the Branch Davidians because they believed the vans and automobiles would prove that they had done relatively little firing at the agents hiding behind them and that BATF was responsible for most of the shooting, including of its own agents. The vehicles might also provide evidence that helicopters had shot from the air. As early as March 6th Steve Schneider had expressed fear that the government wanted to destroy evidence that would prove BATF's guilt. He told negotiators: "It wouldn't surprise me if they wouldn't want to get rid of the evidence. Because if this building is still standing, you will see the evidences of what took place." (JDR:53) Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman said, "There is no question that the FBI is destroying evidence. If nothing else they've moved the location of physical objects from a crime scene before they had been photographed." DeGuerin agreed. "They're destroying evidence with the bulldozers."[241] The Texas Rangers were put in charge of investigating the February 28th raid. For ten days, SAC Jamar refused to allow the Texas Rangers to finish investigating the area behind Mount Carmel Center where the shootout between BATF agents and three Branch Davidians occurred. By then footprints which might help clarify who shot first had been eliminated by rain. Both Texas Rangers and BATF opposed FBI removal of the vehicles from the compound. (JDR:229) On March 23rd Assistant U.S. Attorney William Johnston wrote Janet Reno to complain. (JDR:81) The FBI then agreed to "photograph, graph and grid the portion of the compound where the vehicles sought to be moved were located" in order to preserve evidence. (JDR:255) However, the Justice report does not mention if the FBI told the Branch Davidians about this new policy. 7. FBI PLAN TO GAS, DISASSEMBLE MOUNT CARMEL The FBI Hostage Negotiation Training Manual asserts, "Time is always in our favor," and urges personnel not to grow impatient in hostage situations.[242] London Times bureau chief James Adams, author of a number of books on covert warfare, wrote about the government's handling of the standoff: "Every professional in the hostage rescue business knows that the best chance of survival for all the innocents held captive is to play out a waiting game. The theory, which has been proved again and again, is that the longer you wait, the better the chances of a peaceful resolution." In his article he quotes counter-terrorism expert Noel Koch who wrote, "If nothing is happening, that is good. The heart of negotiation is patience, and if it takes 41 or 151 days it should make no difference. To depart from that central idea is crazy." Adams questions whether the deaths were necessary and ends by saying, "those responsible must be held accountable."[243] In early April Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard Rogers, who was continuing to push for more aggressive action, gave visiting FBI officials "a briefing on the use of CS gas and suggested an operation plan for such use," a plan which was soon approved by FBI Director Sessions. (JDR:256-258) The plan was to "introduce the liquid CS into the compound in stages. . .eventually walls would be torn down to increase the exposure of those remaining inside." (JDR:262-263) The report notes, "While it was conceivable that tanks and other armored vehicles could be used to demolish the compound, the FBI considered that such a plan would risk harming the children inside." (JDR:260) Nevertheless, Rogers' plan clearly included defacto demolition of Mount Carmel. "If all subjects failed to exit the structure after 48 hours of tear gas, then a modified CEV would proceed to open up and begin disassembling the structure at the location that was least exposed to the gas. The CEV would continue until all the Branch Davidians were located." (JDR:277-78) The FBI had their plan--and they probably did not intend to let anything stand in their way of convincing Attorney General Janet Reno to approve it. 8. FBI REFUSED TO BELIEVE FINAL KORESH PROMISE TO SURRENDER As noted above, in mid-March, after the FBI sent in the letters from lawyers and an audio tape from theologian Phil Arnold, Koresh stated that he was ready to come out. However, FBI harassment made him change his mind. A few weeks later the FBI allowed Koresh and Schneider to meet with their attorneys and they brought Koresh a 30 minute tape by Drs. Phil Arnold and Jim Tabor. There is solid evidence that as a result of these contacts, in mid-April David Koresh did indeed receive his "message from God" and that he and all Branch Davidians would have left Mount Carmel had the FBI waited only a few more days. a. DeGuerin and Zimmerman Visited Mount Carmel The FBI initially refused to allow the Branch Davidians to consult with attorneys. In mid-March U.S. District Judge Walter S. Smith Jr. rejected requests from lawyers contacted by Branch Davidian family members to enter the compound and negotiate for them, writing, "One simply cannot point a gun, literally or figuratively, at constitutional authority and at the same time complain that constitutional rights are being denied."[244] (Judge Smith is now presiding over the Branch Davidians' trial.) However, a number of attorneys, including "radicals" like Kirk Lyons of North Carolina's Cause Foundation, had filed habeas corpus suits, and the FBI may have feared some appellate judge might let them have access to Koresh.[245] Koresh's mother retained Houston criminal defense attorney Dick Deguerin who was well known for clients he'd defended in highly publicized homicides, including Muneer Deeb who was acquitted on charge of killing three teenagers in Waco.[246] The Schneider family retained another respected criminal attorney, Jack Zimmerman. Both DeGuerin and Zimmerman have frequently told the press that the Branch Davidians had very "triable" cases, might have been acquitted by juries on the grounds of self-defense, and were committed to leaving Mount Carmel and facing juries. Koresh even allowed DeGuerin to meet with New York attorneys to discuss film and book rights to Koresh's story. b. Drs. Arnold and Tabor Convinced Koresh to Write "Seven Seals" Dr. Philip Arnold, executive director of Houston's Reunion Institute and an expert in apocalyptic studies and the Seven Seals, read a newspaper transcript of David Koresh's February 28th sermon on KRLD and immediately resolved to be of assistance.[247] He drove to Waco and explained his expertise to SAC Bob Ricks, chief aid to SAC Jeffrey Jamar. However, Ricks put Arnold off several times saying, "You could never talk Book of Revelation with him. You've never heard anything like this." An FBI agent did take Arnold's number and contacted him a few days later. Arnold returned to Waco and spoke with the agent over the phone but was never contacted by the FBI again. This is not surprising considering negotiators March 15th decision to refuse to listen to any more "Bible babble." Dr. Arnold has lamented that the FBI "took that to be a big joke, all that talk about the Seven Seals. The Seven Seals was [Koresh's] language, and if you didn't speak that language, there was no way of showing him what he had to do."[248] On March 17th Branch Davidians happened by chance to hear Dr. Arnold's five minute radio show during which he discussed the Book of Revelation. They immediately told the FBI they wanted to speak with him, but the FBI "denied the request." (JDR:Appendix C:3) Edward Dennis notes that Steve Schneider had specifically mentioned Phil Arnold as possibly being a "theologian [who] could convince the people that Koresh was wrong" about their being in the Fifth Seal of death. (JDR:Dennis:15) The FBI's only concession was to send in a March 19th tape of Arnold's radio show. (JDR:186) On April 1st Phil Arnold and Dr. Jim Tabor, a professor of religious studies at the University of North Carolina who also specializes in apocalyptic studies, did a telephone interview on the Ron Engelman show. During it they explained to Koresh that the "little season" that the Branch Davidians needed to wait was not merely a couple of months, but might be a much longer time. They also talked about how great prophets like Jeremiah, John, and Paul had gone to prison--and had produced great literature there. Dr. Arnold gave this tape to Dick DeGuerin who brought it to Koresh on April 4th. Koresh told his attorneys everyone would be coming out after Passover, which would last 10 days. On April 9th and 10th he delivered to the FBI two defiant letters filled with Biblical allusions-- ones which the FBI has used to excuse their assault on Mount Carmel. However, on April 14th Koresh wrote a very different letter. In it he revealed that God finally had spoken to him and that they all would come out as soon as he had completed a short book on the Seven Seals. The letter to Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin reads, in part: As far as our progress is concerned, here is where we stand: . . .I am presently being permitted to document, in structured form, the decoded messages of the Seven Seals. Upon the completion of this task, I will be freed of my "waiting period." I hope to finish this as soon as possible and to stand before man to answer any and all questions regarding my actions. I have been praying so long for this opportunity; to put the Seals in written form. Speaking the truth seems to have very little effect on man. I was shown that as soon as I am given over into the hands of man, I will be made a spectacle of, and people will not be concerned about the truth of God, but just the bizarrity of me - the flesh (person). I want the people of this generation to be saved. I am working night and day to complete my final work of the writing out of the "these Seals." I will demand the first manuscript of the Seals be given to you. Many scholars and religious leaders will wish to have copies for examination. I will keep a copy with me. As soon as I can see that people, like Jim Tabor and Phil Arnold have a copy I will come out and then you can do your thing with this Beast. I hope to keep in touch with you by letter, so please give your address. We are standing on the threshold of Great events! The Seven Seals, in written form are the most sacred information ever! David Koresh On April 16th Koresh told the FBI he had finished the First Seal (JDR:107) and "asked for a word processor and batteries to speed production of the other six chapters."[249] At an October 15, 1993, congressional briefing sponsored by the Ross & Green consulting group, Dr. Tabor said that Koresh and Ruth Riddle, who was typing it for him, worked until 9 p.m. Sunday night, April 18th, putting the final touches on the First Seal, which was also the longest. That meant they would be leaving Mount Carmel in a few days. Tabor said, "they were so happy that night, shades of the last supper." During the April 19th fire Ruth Riddle managed to jump from a hole in the second floor wall. She carried Koresh's First Seal on a computer disk. The FBI immediately confiscated the disk, but later released it. Having read it, Tabor declared, "It's intriguing. It's not my own faith system, but it's coherent, logical and quite moving to read. What he lived and died for." After the April 19th FBI assault and the death of Koresh and 80 or more other Branch Davidians, Drs. Arnold and Tabor severely criticized the FBI. "I think they were convinced from the start that he was evil, horrible and wicked. . .They didn't take his religion seriously enough. They needed to have input from people who are trained in biblical symbols." c. FBI and Cult Busters Ridiculed Koresh Promise According to Tabor, as soon as they got Koresh's April 14th letter, the FBI began ridiculing Koresh, saying things like, "How long will it take a high school dropout to write a book." The April 26, 1993, Time (which went to press before the fire) devoted a whole article to Koresh's promise to write the book, including a long paragraph explaining Dr. Arnold's views on Koresh's possible interpretation of the Seven Seals. However, it also described the FBI's frustrations because it had taken Koresh 4 days to write 30 pages. "So, FBI men sourly note, a surrender may be months off, even if Koresh keeps his word. . .`No one at our place is holding his breath.' said FBI special agent Dick Swensen." An FBI official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the Washington Post, "Were we going to sit there and wait for this guy to finish his treatises on the Seven Seals?. . .Were we going to sit there status quo for another month, another two months, another six months?"[250] Bob Ricks' statement on April 16th sums up the FBI attitude: "We are going to get them. . .to bring them before the bar of justice for the murder of our agents. They're going to answer for their crimes. That's the bottom line to this whole thing, they're going to come out."[251] d. FBI Excuses After the Fire After the April 19th fire the FBI claimed that it had evidence that Koresh's contacts with his attorneys were just stalling techniques. SACs Jamar claimed that listening devices heard cult members joking about DeGuerin's involvement being a ruse[252], a claim the Justice report repeats (JDR:143-144) Koresh attorney Dick DeGuerin "disputed claims by FBI spokesman Bob Ricks that cult members had called meetings with the attorneys `a fiasco'. `The real fiasco was the attack on the compound with tear gas and ripping the walls apart. . .If you consider that we got an absolute agreement signed that they would come out peacefully. . .'"[253] Jamar also told the press, "This latest business with the Seven Seals, we have intelligence that it was just one more stalling technique."[254] Dr. Phil Arnold challenged the FBI's allegation that electronic monitoring of Koresh's conversations proved he wasn't serious. He said Koresh's "vocabulary was not formed by high school, college or television. It's formed by the King James Version of the Bible, which he had memorized. It would take those of us who are similarly familiar or trained in its constant usage to be able to understand him on a depth level where the subtleties of the language come through."[255] Many have commented that the FBI's monitoring devices must not have been very good if they could not hear Koresh's loud dictating of his book to Ruth Riddle. The only evidence the Justice report presents that Koresh's writing his book on the Seven Seals was a stalling technique was provided by (defacto cult buster) Dr. Murray S. Miron. Concerning the all-important April 14th letter, "Dr. Miron noted that Koresh's discussion in the letter appeared to be a ploy designed to buy more time for Koresh." He concluded that he did not believe "there is in these writings any better, or at least certain, hope for any early end to the standoff." (JDR:175-176) Marc Breault alleges the FBI "showed us Koresh's letters, which were nothing more than scriptural ramblings written down. After reading those we became more and more convinced that Koresh had no intentions of coming out. We told the FBI as much. . .We told the FBI that Koresh was starting to lose his grip and that he would probably end the siege violently."[256] After DeGuerin, Arnold and Tabor held an October press conference to announce the release of Koresh's book, "Bill Carter, an FBI spokesman, said the agency could not comment on the tract because of pending cases against 11 Branch Davidians."[257] More disturbing than the FBI's reliance on Miron, and possibly Breault, to interpret Koresh's April 14th letter is strong evidence that the FBI never showed Attorney General Reno the April 14th letter so she could judge for herself whether Koresh intended to surrender! 9. FBI MISLED JANET RENO ON NEED FOR AND DANGERS OF ASSAULT On April 12, 1993, the FBI presented the tear gas plan to Attorney General Janet Reno for approval. "Why now? Why not wait?" she asked. On April 16th she still disapproved the plan--until an all important conversation with FBI Director William Sessions. Whatever he said to her swayed her to the point that she asked for a documented statement of why the plan should go forward. On April 17th she received the documents. "She read only a chronology, gave the rest of the materials a cursory review, and satisfied herself that `the documentation was there'." (JDR:272) She then approved the gassing plan. The next day she informed President Clinton of her decision. Below are the known and admitted arguments the FBI used to break down Reno's resistance to the plan. Despite Janet Reno's assertions to the contrary, we can see that the FBI clearly did mislead, and perhaps even bully, her into approving their plan. a. FBI Misinformed Reno about Progress of Negotiations On April 15th Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell had a two hour conversation with chief FBI negotiator Byron Sage. "Hubbell recalls that Sage said further negotiations with the subjects in the compound would be fruitless. . .Sage further advised Hubbell that Koresh had been disingenuous in his discussions with Sage about the `Seven Seals.'. . .Hubbell recalls Sage saying he believed there was nothing more he or the negotiators could do to persuade Koresh to release anyone else, or to come out himself. . .Hubbell advised the Attorney General about this conversation." (JDR:270-271) It is unknown if Sage told Hubbell about the April 14th letter or read him its contents. Outside expert Alan A. Stone, M.D. writes: "It is unclear from the reports whether the FBI even explained to the AG [Reno] that the agency had rejected the advice of their own experts in behavioral science and negotiation, or whether the AG was told that FBI negotiators believed that they could get more people out of the compound by negotiation. By the time the AG made her decision, the noose was closed and, as one agent told me, the FBI believed they had `three options - gas, gas, and gas.'" (JDR:Stone:10-11) This is not surprising, since Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard Rogers himself met with Reno. "Rogers and others offered the following additional reasons [for the assault]: Koresh had broken every promise he had made; negotiations had broken down; no one had been released since March 23rd; and it appeared that no one else would surrender." (JDR:269) In effect, HRT Commander Rogers, who had pushed SAC Jamar to use the tactical harassment that had so disrupted negotiations, now informed Attorney Janet Reno that negotiations were not working! Janet Reno told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing: "Throughout this 51-day process, Koresh continued to assert that he and the others inside would at some point surrender. However, the FBI advised that at no point did he keep his word on any of these promises." It is not known if Rogers' and higher FBI officials' impatience to end the standoff was related to their possible fear the upcoming Weaver trial would bring out facts about FBI misconduct in that case-- however, that should be investigated. b. FBI Withheld April 14th Promise to Surrender Letter from Reno Dr. James Tabor lamented at both the October 15 congressional briefing and the November 22, 1993, American Academy of Religion panel that, as far as he knew, the FBI never gave Janet Reno the details of Koresh's decision to write the his book about the Seven Seals or a copy of his April 14th letter. As we can see below, there is no evidence that the FBI showed this document--what Dick DeGuerin called "an absolute agreement signed that they would come out peacefully"--to Attorney General Janet Reno. Nor does it seem to have been shown to FBI Director Sessions or FBI Deputy Director Clarke before the April 19th assault- -or to reporters or even to outside experts after the fire. Evidence of this follows. * The Justice report states only, "The FBI provided the Attorney General with copies of the memoranda prepared by Dr. Miron and Dr. Krofcheck and SSA Van Zandt analyzing Koresh's April 9th letter." (JDR:274) * At the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing, FBI Director Sessions insisted that the last Koresh letter was related to Passover, which would have been much earlier in April. * At the same hearing, FBI Deputy Director Clarke mentions only Koresh's April 9th and 10th letters when he declares that Koresh had "his own game plan" and the "snare had been set." * On April 21, 1993, senior FBI officials held a background briefing for reporters to explain their decision to gas Mount Carmel. They included Koresh's April 9th and 10th letters as examples of "his irrational and `insane' behavior during negotiations."[258] However, there is no indication they showed reporters the April 14th letter. (The only publication we found which mentioned or quoted the letter after the fire was Time, in it's May 3, 1993 issue. However, Time had been in touch with Dr. Phil Arnold and quoted him extensively in an earlier article.) * The Justice report does include the April 14th letter after the April 9th and 10th letters in an appendix. However, only Koresh's April 14th phone call is mentioned in the chronology for that date (JDR:105), while the April 9th letter is quoted extensively (JDR:99-100) and the April 10th letter is analyzed. (JDR:102) The Justice report only mentions the letter in the section where Dr. Miron dismisses it as a "ploy." The report inaccurately describes it as "Koresh's request that the FBI give him time to finish his manuscript about the Seven Seals." (JDR:174) * Outside expert Lawrence E. Sullivan quotes at length from Koresh's April 9th and 10th letters to the FBI, trying to find evidence that Koresh would have come out--yet he never mentions the April 14th letter! He does quote extensively from the earlier, defiant letters, ending, "In the briefing the letter seems to play the role of a last straw, measuring Koresh's intransigence and provoking the FBI to escalate their interventions." (JDR:Sullivan:5-6) Sullivan's reference to the "briefing" indicates that the letter was not discussed during the Justice Department's briefing of the outside experts! Even Edward Dennis, who was appointed to be the most prominent reviewer of the Justice report, refers only to the April 9th and 10th letters and Koresh's April 14th phone call. (JDR:Dennis:26) Only one outside expert, Nancy Ammerman, even refers to the letter. However, it is unknown if she got it from the Justice Department or directly from Dr. Philip Arnold. Whoever withheld the April 14th letter from the FBI Director and the Attorney General Reno ultimately may be responsible for the massacre of the Branch Davidians. c. FBI Told Reno CS Gas is Safe CS gas is a white crystalline powder that causes involuntary closure of eyes, burning of the skin, respiratory problems and vomiting. Amnesty International in October of 1992 said that CS is "particularly dangerous when. . .launched directly into homes or other buildings." The United States was one of 100 countries that signed an agreement banning the use of CS gas in war during the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris in January of 1993. FBI officials did not know this when they recommended it.[259] The goal of the gassing was to drive Branch Davidians out of the house. However, the U.S. Department of the Army manual on Civil Disturbances (October, 1975, FM19-15) notes: "Generally, persons reacting to CS are incapable of executing organized and concerted actions and excessive exposure to CS may make them incapable of vacating the area." Alan A. Stone was particularly critical of the FBI's decision to use CS gas against the Branch Davidians, especially the children: "When asked, the Justice Department was unaware whether the FBI had even questioned whether these intentional stresses would be particularly harmful to the many infants and children in the compound. Apparently, no one asked whether such deleterious measures were appropriate, either as a matter of law enforcement ethics or as a matter of morality, when innocent children were involved. . .I can testify from personal experience to the power of C.S. gas to quickly inflame eyes, nose, and throat, to produce choking, chest pain, gagging, and nausea in healthy adult males. It is difficult to believe that the U.S. government would deliberately plan to expose twenty- five children, most of them infants and toddlers, to C.S. gas for forty-eight hours. . .The official reports are silent about these issues and do not reveal what the FBI told the AG about this matter. . .Based on my own medical knowledge and review of scientific literature, the information supplied to the AG seems to minimize the potential harmful consequences for infants and children." (JDR:Stone:29-30) Dr. Stone quotes a case of an unprotected child's two to three hour exposure to CS gas which resulted in first degree facial burns, severe respiratory distress typical of chemical pneumonia and an enlarged liver. "The infant's reactions reported in this case history were of a vastly different dimension than the information given the AG suggested. . .Whatever the actual effects may have been, I find it hard to accept a deliberate plan to insert C.S. gas for forty-eight hours in a building with so many children. It certainly makes it more difficult to believe that the health and safety of the children was our primary concern." (JDR:Stone:35) As for whether CS gas is flammable, "one manufacturer of CS gas. . .said. . .he was not certain if the chemical--when spread as a fine powder throughout buildings and exposed to fire--would act as a catalyst for flames."[260] Chemical consultant Dr. Jay Young said that a mixture of CS gas and air could be ignited, but only if the ratio of the gas and air was within a very narrow range.[261] Attorney Jack Zimmerman, who spoke with military experts, asserted, "All three types of CS can spontaneously ignite if occurring in a high-enough concentration in a confined space that is exposed to open flame."[262] Nevertheless, "the FBI informed [Reno] that the tear gas would not cause a fire." (JDR:266) The two methods of delivery which the FBI used are also dangerous. The Mark-V system, "a liquid tear gas dispenser that shoots a stream of liquid tear gas (propelled by noncombustible carbon dioxide) approximately 50 feet for a duration of approximately 15 seconds," (JDR:287) might suffocate a child in direct line of fire. Even more dangerous were the "ferret liquid tear gas rounds", more than 400 of which were used to deliver gas. (JDR:277,292,294) The Justice report admits the ferret tear gas rounds, which it claims are not "pyrotechnic," are "launched by a M79 grenade launcher," and that, "when fired from 20 yards or less the rounds are capable of penetrating a hollow core door." (JDR:277) According to Dick DeGuerin, survivors claim that during the gas attack the grenades did in fact penetrate multiple walls before exploding. d. FBI Pushed Reno's Child Abuse "Hot Button" The Justice report states: "during the week of April 12, someone had made a comment in one of the meetings that Koresh was beating babies. When Reno inquired further, she had the clear impression that, at some point, since the FBI had assumed command and control of the situation they had learned that the Branch Davidians were beating babies. She had no doubt that the children were living in intolerable conditions. Moreover, she had been told that Koresh had sexually abused minors previously, and that he continued to have sex while recovering from his wounds." (JDR:275) Dr. Park Dietz wrote in a memorandum: "Koresh may continue to make sexual use of any female children who remain inside." (JDR:223) FBI Director Sessions went on at length during the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearings about Victoria Hollingsworth's allegation that her 13- or 14-year- old daughter, who she had left inside Mount Carmel when she left in March, was one of David Koresh's child brides. We must wonder if this is one of the things Sessions told Reno during the private phone conversation which evidently convinced her to accept the gassing plan. To our knowledge, no other government agent or official has made this specific allegation. Despite all this discussion of child abuse, the Justice report relates that in retrospect Reno "did not believe that anyone at the FBI deliberately played up the issue of child abuse." (JDR:275-276) e. FBI Threatened to Withdraw Hostage Rescue Team On April 14th Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard "Rogers advised that his team had received sufficient breaks during the standoff that they were not too fatigued to perform at top capacity in any tactical operation at the time. He added, however, that if the standoff continued for an extended length of time, he would propose that the HRT stand down for rest and retraining. When Reno asked about using SWAT teams to take the place of the HRT, she was told that the HRT's expertise in dealing with the powerful weapons inside the compound, driving the armored vehicles, and maintaining the security of the perimeter was essential." She was also discouraged from using the Army's "Delta Force" or other forces because of posse comitatus restrictions. (JDR:268) The FBI warned Reno that "Koresh might actually mount an offensive attack against the perimeter security, with Branch Davidians using children as shields. This would have required the best trained forces available to the FBI." (JDR:269) On April 15th FBI chief negotiator Byron Sage told Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell that "law enforcement personnel at Waco were getting tired and their tempers were fraying." Hubbell passed this information on to Reno. Upon hearing on April 16th that Reno had turned down the gassing plan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark Richard told Hubbell "that the FBI would not be pleased, that they would nonetheless accept the decision, and that they may then talk in terms of withdrawal." (JDR:271) Despite these threats to withdraw the FBI Hostage Rescue Team, the Justice report asserts Reno believes, "The FBI did not try to `railroad' her." (JDR:275-276) f. FBI De-emphasized Suicide BATF had used rumors that the Branch Davidians might commit suicide to excuse a paramilitary raid against the Branch Davidians. And the FBI had alluded to the possibility of mass suicide, as when SAC Bob Ricks told the press in March, "We're very concerned that part of Koresh's grand scheme is he would like to see a large number of his people die, which would be justification for his pronouncements of the fulfillment of the Scriptures."[263] However, when it came to promoting their gassing plan, mass suicide suddenly became a minor issue. "[T]he FBI told the Attorney General they regarded the possibility of mass suicide as remote." (JDR:274) Attorney General Reno told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing "she would not have given the go-ahead if she thought cult members would commit suicide. She said the FBI had interviewed former Branch Davidian members throughout the world and had concluded Mr. Koresh would not kill himself or lead a mass suicide effort."[264] She also asserted during the October 8, 1993, Justice Department press conference on Waco, "I don't think there were any misleading statements about suicide because we talked about it..."[265] FBI Director Sessions also has said "none of us expect them to commit suicide."[266] The Justice report does not mention if FBI agents ever told Sessions or Reno that: "one former resident who left during the standoff told investigators that on March 2nd Koresh intended to leave the compound with his followers and commit mass suicide, until Koresh changed his mind when God told him `to wait.'. . .On March 5th, 1993, released child Joan Vaega had a note pinned to her clothes stating that her mother (Marguerite Vaega) would be dead by the time other relatives had read the note." Nor is it known if FBI agents had told Sessions and Reno they were aware of Kiri Jewell's allegations about having been taught to commit suicide. (JDR:Dennis:37) Even if there was no mass suicide, the FBI's withholding such evidence of potential suicide from Sessions and Reno certainly misled them. Moreover, the FBI's mere plan to gas and demolish the building was as irresponsible as yelling "jump" to a person threatening to jump from a ledge or waving a red flag at a raging bull. Dr. Stone, who believes the Branch Davidians did commit suicide, wrote he is "convinced that the FBI's noose-tightening tactics may well have precipitated Koresh's decision to commit suicide and his followers to this course of mass suicide. The official reports have shied away from directly confronting the possible causal relationship." (JDR:Stone:15) g. FBI Assured Reno "This Is Not D-Day" The Justice report states: "The action was viewed as a gradual, step-by-step process. It was not law enforcement's intent that this was to be `D-Day.' Both the Attorney General and Director Sessions voiced concern for achieving the end result with maximum safety. [FBI Deputy Director Floyd] Clarke made it clear that the goal of the plan was to introduce the tear gas one step at a time to avoid confusing the Branch Davidians and thereby maintain the impression that they were not trapped." (JDR:267) Reno asserted at her April 19th press conference, "Today was not meant to be D-Day. We were prepared to carry it out tomorrow and the next day, and do everything we could to effect a peaceful resolution of this matter."[267] In her April telephone briefing of President Clinton, Reno "emphasized that the operation was intended to proceed incrementally, and that it might take two or three days before the Branch Davidians surrendered. The Attorney General told the President that Monday, April 19th was not `D-Day'." (JDR:280) The Justice report states that during planning of the assault, Reno said she "made it clear that if children were endangered, i.e. if they were held up to windows and threatened to be shot, the FBI was to `back off.'" She recalls her exact words were "Get the hell out of there. Don't take any risks with the children." (JDR:273) Reno told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing: "I directed that if at any point Koresh or his followers threatened to harm the children, the FBI should cease the action immediately. Likewise, if it appeared that, as a result of the initial use of teargas, Koresh was prepared to negotiate in good faith for his ultimate surrender, the FBI was to cease the operation." h. Reno's "Rules of Engagement" Authorized "D-Day" Despite Janet Reno's concern for the safety of the Branch Davidians and their children and her desire to "effect a peaceful resolution of this matter," she authorized rules of engagement which ensured the resolution would be violent. It is unknown if the FBI told Reno about Koresh's early threats to "blow the tanks to pieces" if agents attacked Mount Carmel again. He had threatened, "if something messes up on this side or on your side, then World War III again." (JDR:45) As late as April 18th, when tanks were moving Koresh's favorite automobile, agents reported seeing a sign in the window reading, "Flames await." (JDR:109) However, Reno did tell the House Judiciary Committee hearing she thought the possibility of the Branch Davidians firing on the tanks was the most important "contingency." If they did so, she had authorized the FBI "to return fire." She also said that she thereafter would leave decisions up to the FBI because she was not "an expert in tactical law enforcement." The Justice report states, "If during any tear gas delivery operations, subjects open fire with a weapon, then the FBI rules of engagement will apply and appropriate deadly force will be used," (JDR:288) and "It was also agreed that once she approved the overall plan, decisions would be made on the scene. Although she had the specific authority to stop the action and tell the FBI to leave, tactical decisions were to be made by law enforcement officers in Waco." (JDR:273) It is difficult to believe that Janet Reno meant that once the Branch Davidians fired, the FBI could do what it pleased, women and children be damned--yet, in effect, that is what she authorized. Evidently, Reno did not make the rules of engagement clear to President Clinton. He told reporters during his April 20th press conference: "The plan included a decision to withhold the use of ammunition, even in the face of fire, and instead to use tear gas that would not cause permanent harm to health, but would, it was hoped, force the people in the compound to come outside and to surrender. . .I was further told that under no circumstance would our people fire any shots at them even if fired upon." FBI agents have not admitted to firing any guns on April 19th--but they did fire over 400 dangerous ferret grenades. However, Reno's instructions gave the FBI enough leeway to begin the aggressive gassing and dismantling of Mount Carmel. Evidently, ground commanders Jeffrey Jamar and Richard Rogers did not fully explain to Reno or even their FBI superiors what kind of "tactical decisions" they might make if fired upon. Even FBI Assistant Director Larry Potts told reporters, "We thought we could induce the gas, get some people out and get the rest of the people to negotiate. We always had a fear that maybe there's going to be a few of the people who would fight with us to the very end."[268] On the other hand, Potts is also the official who doesn't remember approving Richard Rogers' changing the rules of engagement in the Weaver case. Whether this indicates incompetence on his part or duplicity on Rogers' part should be investigated. If Potts or his aide Danny Coulson communicated the Attorney General's final directives that the operation be a safe one and that negotiations remain an option to the siege commanders, the directives did not "take". According to one news report: "The F.B.I. has acknowledged that it foresaw a high probability of casualties. Bob Ricks, one of the agents in charge at Waco, said the day after the fire that the assault had two basic goals: rescuing the children, and doing so without injuries to any Federal agents. `We knew that the chances were great that the adults would not come out unharmed,' Mr. Ricks told the Dallas Morning News. `So we felt that if we got any of them out safely, that would be a great bonus.'"[269] And despite the Branch Davidians signalling they wanted to negotiate that morning, during the 10:30 a.m. FBI press conference on April 9th, SAC Ricks said, "We're not negotiating. We're saying come out. . .this matter is over."[270] 10. QUESTIONS ABOUT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HOSTILITY TOWARD THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS The Justice report devotes a section to describing President Clinton and the White House's involvement in the siege and the FBI decision to assault Mount Carmel. Clinton initially supported negotiations. When his chief counsel Bernard Nussbaum first told Clinton about the plan to gas Mount Carmel he reminded the President that the decision was "a Department of Justice call, not a White House call," and Clinton responded that he had great confidence in the Attorney General and the FBI. When Janet Reno called him on April 18th regarding the plan he told her he supported her decision. (JDR:241-248) What we wonder about is Clinton's hostility towards the Branch Davidians. In his April 20th news conference he growled that Janet Reno should not have to resign "because some religious fanatics murdered themselves." Two days later he asserted, "I do not think the United States government is responsible for the fact that a bunch of fanatics decided to kill themselves." Also, Janet Reno told the House Judiciary Committee hearing that early April 20th, "The second call I got was from the president of the United States, saying, `That-a-girl'."[271] If this was an exact quote, it would also seem to be a highly insensitive remark. One explanation might be Clinton's having been influenced by anti-cult propaganda, evidenced by this anti- cult comments quoted in an earlier section. Another explanation might be Clinton's past association with agents wounded and killed on February 28th. In a March 18th, 1993 speech before employees of the Treasury Department Clinton said, "My prayers and I'm sure yours are still with the families of all four of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents who were killed in Waco--Todd McKeehan and Conway Lebleu of New Orleans, Steve Willis of Houston, and Robert Williams from my hometown of Little Rock. Three of those four were assigned to my security during the course of the primary or general election." The Wall Street Journal reported that Clinton wanted "to know the condition of one particular ATF agent who was wounded at Waco: Jay William Buford, an acquaintance of his from Arkansas."[272] As we know, Resident Agent-in-Charge Buford was a primary investigator and planner in the botched February 28th raid on Mt. Carmel. Also, Clinton may have been angered by potential criticism of Clinton family friend Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell. He was deeply involved in Waco decision-making and the highest ranking official in the FBI Operations Center during the last fatal April 19th attack. The New York Times wrote in its October 12, 1993, editorial, "The Waco Whitewash," "the report is silent on the most glaring deficiency of the tragic episode: the lack of judgement at the top and the reasons for it." 11. CHRONOLOGY OF APRIL 19TH GASSING, DEMOLITION AND FIRE During the morning of April 19, 1993 five tanks[273] flying American flags began the attack on Mount Carmel Center. Ironically, the Branch Davidians were flying the Star of David on this day, the 50th anniversary of the Nazi attack on the Warsaw ghetto. This was also "Patriots' Day"- -the 217th anniversary of the first battle of the American Revolution, when a British expedition to raid Revolutionary Minutemen weapons stockpiles in Concord, Massachusetts resulted in the Battles of Lexington and Concord.[274] This chronology only outlines the FBI's prolonged and brutal attack on the Branch Davidians. Because the Committee for Waco Justice did not have the resources to obtain from news networks the full seven-hour footage of the tank attack and fire, and because the Justice report's account is very sketchy, this chronology may contain gaps and inaccuracies. Our chronology was assembled from what the Justice report text did reveal, from its infrared photos, and from newspaper accounts, survivors' reports, and news video tapes. Unless otherwise noted, all times and events are from the Justice report. The FBI took aerial infrared video tapes of the gassing, demolition and fire at Mount Carmel. On infrared photos, heat shows up as light, but the light may not show up for a minute or more after a fire first erupts. We include here two of the eight still shots of the infrared video tape from the Justice report. When the government finally releases all this footage, the public will finally see the true savagery of the assault that led to the deaths of 80 or more people. 5:55 a.m.--CEV1 goes to front left and CEV2 to right side of building. 5:59--FBI tells Steve Schneider gas attack is about to begin. He throws phone out the window. 6:00--FBI announces over loudspeakers "If you come out now, you will not be harmed." and "You are under arrest." 6:00--CEV1 ordered to inject gas using Mark-5 system. 6:00 Approx.--Bradley vehicle delivers ferret tear gas rounds into "unoccupied construction area near the main structure" (tornado shelter) [Justice report and video footage] 6:04--Agents allege the Branch Davidians are firing on the tanks. FBI opts to speed up delivery of gas and demolition of building. Tank punches first hole, 8 feet high and 10 feet wide in middle front building, left of the front door.[275] 6:07-6:31--CEVs poke holes in building and insert gas at front left and right side of building; 4 Bradleys deploy ferret tear gas rounds through the windows. Tanks run back and forth over buried bus tunnel leading to tornado shelter and collapse debris over the tunnel, denying access to it. [Videotape and Fire Report] 6:24--FBI told Davidians to hang out a white flag if phone is not working; they hold a white banner, pull it back and replace with dark blanket. FBI gives them two minutes to surrender. 6:45-7:04--Tanks deliver more ferret tear gas rounds to every part of the building. 7:30--CEV1 rips hole in front right first floor of building and inserts gas. 7:58--CEV2 breaches a hole in the second floor back right corner of building. CEV rips into second floor womens' quarters.[276] 9:10--Branch Davidians hang out banner, "We want our phones fixed." 9:17--CEV1 breaks through the front door and agents can see both the upstairs and the downstairs. 9:28-10:00--CEV1 enlarges the opening in middle front of building. CEV2 breaks down and a new CEV2, which is not equipped with tear gas, replaces it and breaches the rear side of the building near the gymnasium. 9:49--FBI says phone will be connected only if there is a clear signal it is for surrender purposes. The Davidians give no signal. 9:54--Graham Craddock gets the phone, indicates it has been severed. FBI does not reconnect it. 10:00--Attorney General Janet Reno leaves the Justice Department for a speech in Baltimore. 10:00-11:00--Bradleys continue delivering ferret tear gas rounds through various openings. 11:00--Janet Reno calls President Clinton. 11:30--Agents try to call into compound. New CEV-2 breaches back side of compound near the gymnasium. [Justice report] Tank rams middle front of building and something that looks like flame is seen comes from boom of tank. [Assistant to Attorney General R. Scruggs 10/8/93 press conference.] 11:40--Last ferret tear gas rounds delivered. Unknown time--Tank boom rams through window and wall of David Koresh's second story bed room. 11:45--12:05 p.m. Approx.--Tank rams whole north back of gymnasium, collapsing half of its roof at approximately 11:59. [Justice report account, infrared photos and news footage] Tank rams back wall of concrete room and dining room and blocks back exits. [Survivors' reports] Tank may have started a fire here. 11:59-12:02 Approx.--Largest tank smashes through front door. (See Infrared Photo #1) Survivors say tank knocked over lanterns and crushed a propane tank. Survivors say tank started a fire here. 12:00 Approx.--Removal of part of the southeast corner of exterior wall, ground floor level. [Fire Report, news report[277] and photos] 12:01--A loudspeaker message mocks Koresh: "David, we are facilitating you leaving the compound by enlarging the door. David, you have had your 15 minutes of fame. . .Vernon is no longer the Messiah. Leave the building now." 12:06 (12:08 in Justice Report)--Tank rams second story, right front. "A few minutes later, from the section of the building, a flicker of orange could be seen."[278] Video footage shows smoke coming from the building and what appears to be an agent riding on top of this tank. Survivor says tank started a fire here. 12:07:41--Infrared photo indicates fire on second floor, right front. 12:08:11--Infrared photo shows large fire on back wall near dining room. Tank can be seen sitting behind collapsed gymnasium wall. 12:09:25--Infrared photo shows fire in front door/piano area. 12:09--CNN announcer says "This is a roaring fire. This fire is really burning out of control."[279] 12:09:50--Infrared photo shows fire near window of chapel; fire in front door/piano area is well-developed. (See Infrared Photo #2) 12:10--An agent 300 yards from building reports seeing man start fire near piano, near front door. 12:10:22--Gymnasium engulfed in fire. [Fire Report] 12:10:40--Infrared photo shows room between chapel and collapsed gymnasium on fire and wall near dining hall fully inflamed. 12:13--FBI calls fire department. 12:20--A Houston Chronicle April 20, 1993, photo shows more than half of building fully engulfed in fire. 12:25--Agents report sounds of gunfire inside Mount Carmel Center. 12:34--Fire vehicles arrive. 12:40-1:20 Approx.--Tanks with plows push remaining walls and debris into rubble of Mount Carmel. 12:41--Fire vehicles approach remains of building. A Houston Chronicle April 20, 1993, photo shows most of Mount Carmel is completely destroyed. 12. FATAL DECISION TO ESCALATE TO DEMOLITION As we have seen, Attorney General Janet Reno directed that the operation was to proceed incrementally. She had specified that negotiations should remain an option and that the FBI should pull back if there was a chance the children would be harmed. However, she also had agreed that if the Branch Davidians fired on the tanks, the FBI would be allowed to return fire and the ground commanders could make tactical decisions. The Attorney General or, it is assumed, anyone delegated that power, could still call off the assault at any time. Again, it is unknown if she knew of FBI expectations that "the chances were great that the adults would not come out unharmed." The Justice report mentions, "On Monday morning, the Attorney General and several senior Justice Department representatives gathered with senior FBI officials in the FBI SIOC [Strategic Information Operations Center], where they monitored events throughout the morning via CNN footage and a live audio feed directly from the FBI forward command post in Waco." (JDR:285) The report does not mention who these officials in the Washington FBI Operations Center were--nor did a number of news reports we read. It was revealed during the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing that two of them were Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Richard. After Reno left for a speech at 10:00 a.m., they were the highest ranking officials in the FBI Operations Center. They remained in phone contact with ground commanders throughout the siege. Despite Justice Department claims that the ground commanders would make tactical decisions (JDR:273), it is difficult to believe that these high officials were not consulted at crucial junctures. a. FBI Believed April 19th Was "D-Day" It seems clear that FBI siege commander Jamar, HRT commander Rogers and chief negotiator Sage did have every intention of making April 19th "D-Day." The text of the script that chief negotiator Sage read to the Branch Davidians over the loud speaker throughout the gassing illustrates this. (Emphasis below is ours.) "We are in the process of placing tear gas into the building. This is not an assault. We are not entering the building. This is not an assault. Do not fire your weapons. If you fire your weapons, fire will be returned. Do not shoot. This is not an assault. The gas you smell is a non-lethal tear gas. This gas will temporarily render the building uninhabitable. Exit the compound now and follow instructions. You are not to have anyone in the tower. The tower is off limits. No one is to be in the tower. Anyone observed to be in the tower will be considered to be an act of aggression and will be dealt with accordingly. If you come out now, you will not be harmed. Follow all instructions. Come out with your hands up. Carry nothing. Come out of the building and walk up the driveway toward the Double-E Ranch Road. Walk toward the large Red Cross flag. Follow all instructions of the FBI agents in the Bradleys. Follow all instructions. You are under arrest. This standoff is over. We do not want anyone hurt. Follow all instructions This is not an assault. Do not fire any weapons. We do not want anyone hurt." b. FBI Alleged Branch Davidians Shoot Back It is questionable whether the Branch Davidians could have understood the FBI saying that "this is not an assault." Fire survivor Ruth Riddle explains, "I remember hearing crackling-type voices coming over the speaker. It was hard to make out what they were saying. Some kind of warning. And the next thing we knew they were ramming into the building."[280] Whether or not they could hear what the FBI was saying, the Branch Davidians must have considered the gas, the rampaging ferret rounds, and the tanks smashing into the building to be an assault--and the fulfillment of the 5th Seal, where they all would be killed. Some Branch Davidians may have decided to fight what the saw as a murderous assault by "Babylonians." Surviving Branch Davidians deny that they fired at the tanks. The New York Times reported that FBI "eavesdropping devices picked up someone saying `don't shoot until the very last minute' and `Stay low, stay ready and loaded' and `have you been gassed yet?'"[281] These alleged statements were not mentioned in the Justice report. No FBI agent who alleges hearing shots has been questioned under oath about their statements. As soon as FBI agents reported automatic and semi-automatic gun fire, the "FBI"--who actually made the decision is not revealed--immediately moved to apply the Reno-approved "rules of engagement," i.e., "appropriate deadly force will be used" and "opted to escalate the gassing operation." The Justice report emphasizes that: "In fact, the FBI did not fire a shot during the entire operation." (JDR:288-289) (Their emphasis.) The FBI obviously does not consider the more than 400 ferret tear gas rounds that grenade launchers shot into the building to be artillery, even though they are "capable of penetrating a hollow core door." The Justice report admits: "Some observers, including FBI employees who were not privy to the operations plan, have questioned whether it was proper for the FBI to escalate the operation once the Davidians opened fire, given that the HRT agents were not threatened by the gunfire while they were inside the CEVs and Bradleys" and then notes the Attorney General's prior approval, danger to tanks' drivers from rounds penetrating tank openings and the fact that the FBI had "exercised remarkable restraint" during 51 days. (JDR:289) Fire survivor David Thibodeau recalled he was listening to the Ron Engelman radio show in the chapel as the tanks gassed and rammed the building. When Engelman reported that the FBI alleged the Branch Davidians had fired on the tanks, Thibodeau's reaction was: "I knew it was over. I didn't hear any shots from my side of the building. . .I could see they were setting up the American people for a disaster. I was prepared to die at that point."[282] c. FBI Refused to Negotiate As we have seen, Reno told Congress she instructed the FBI that "if it appeared that, as a result of the initial use of teargas, Koresh was prepared to negotiate in good faith for his ultimate surrender, the FBI was to cease the operation." However, SAC Bob Ricks stated the FBI's opinion on negotiations during the 10:30 a.m. press conference on April 19th: "We're not negotiating. We're saying come out. . .this matter is over."[283] At 6:24 a.m., a half hour after Steve Schneider threw the phone out the window, FBI loudspeakers instructed the Davidians to fly a white flag to signal "their phone was not working and they wanted to reestablish phone contact." They did so, but quickly replaced it with a non-surrender dark blanket. Chief negotiator Sage then gave them two minutes to surrender. They did not. At 9:10 the Davidians hung out a white banner reading, "We want our phones fixed." It is not known if Janet Reno, who was at the Washington FBI Operations Center, saw the banner or inquired about the Branch Davidians' willingness to negotiate. At 9:49 the FBI negotiators announced over loudspeakers that "the phone would be reconnected only if the Davidians clearly indicated they intended to use the phone to make surrender arrangements." However, this would require an agent walking on foot near the building. "The FBI was unwilling to expose its agents such a risk (sic) absent a clear signal from the Davidians that they would use the reconnected phone to make surrender agents (sic) with the FBI. The Davidians never provided such a signal." Graeme Craddock retrieved the phone but never gave the "signal." (JDR:289-293) SAC Jeffrey Jamar told reporters that although the signs coming from the compound seemed to indicate that the cult members were willing to talk, "We tried to figure out a way to get a line, but we couldn't figure out a way to do it safely."[284] Obviously, it never occurred to the FBI to stop its gas attack and pull back its tanks. What does seem clear is that the FBI interpreted Reno's "ultimate" surrender to mean "immediate" surrender. --------------------------------------- Diagram from Treasury Department Report - Not to Scale Altered to include concrete room, water tower, buried bus, missing room names, tank damage --------------------------------------- Infrared photo page ---------------------------------------- Infrared photo page ---------------------------------------- d.FBI Did Begin Demolition of Mount Carmel The FBI did not expect gassing alone to work. One reporter wrote that SAC Bob Ricks "did not expect cult members to begin leaving the complex, despite the power of the tear gas."[285] In fact, the FBI described the next step--the plan to demolish Mount Carmel--to the press during an April 19th morning press briefing. Besides the gassing, "A secondary plan, according to authorities, was to knock the compound down building by building. Some of the armored vehicles that surrounded the Branch Davidian complex had been fitted with battering rams."[286] Just before noon, the FBI began demolition of the building. Edward Dennis calls this "an apparent deviation from the approved plan" because the FBI did not wait 48 hours before it "dismantled" the building. (JDR:Dennis:59) However, speeding up demolition was implicit in Reno's approving the new rules of engagement. Despite Dennis' acknowledgement that the tanks began demolition, Justice Department and FBI officials have been reluctant to admit that the tanks smashing through walls and into the building--what the FBI calls "breaching activities"--was in fact the beginning of demolition. They have given differing explanations for the accelerated tank rammings. During an April 21st press briefing, unnamed senior Justice Department officials told reporters, "agents began battering the walls of the compound to make bigger holes so long booms or `arms' attached to the vehicles could inject the gas deeper into the building to counteract high winds outside that appeared to be dispersing it."[287] And FBI Deputy Director Floyd Clarke told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing that in the final assault the FBI drove the tank in through the front door, the side of the building and the back of the building, "to give these people ways to exit the building, which some later used." Whether FBI ground commanders Jamar and Rogers unilaterally began demolition of Mount Carmel, or first consulted with officials in the Washington FBI Operations Center, has not be revealed. Justice Department officials did admit to the press that "the net result was that the actual operation may have appeared more threatening to Koresh and his followers than the more cautious plan approved by Reno. Asked yesterday if agents in Waco had exceeded the plan she approved, Reno said `I don't think so,' according to department spokesman Carl Stern."[288] We have not found a specific comment from Attorney General Reno herself on this issue.