Newsgroups: talk.politics.misc,alt.politics.clinton
Subject: Re: Clinton's Wiretapping Initiative
From: [c j p] at [pitt.edu] (Casimir J Palowitch)
Date: 16 Apr 93 22:33:32 GMT

Reprinted from Effector Online 5.06 without permission of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (full text and membership info ftp.eff.org pub/EFF):

-------------begin reprint from Effector Online 5.06-------------
...
       The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement 
on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of 
millions of Americans.  The first part of the plan is to begin a 
comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues 
such as export controls which have effectively denied most people 
easy access to robust encryption as well as law enforcement issues 
posed by new technology.

       However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has 
already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before

any public comment or discussion has been allowed.  Apparently, the 
Administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone 
equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed 
by the National Security Agency. The so-called "Clipper Chip" is an 
80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into 
chips manufactured by a military contractor.  Two separate escrow 
agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn them over 
law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant.  The 
encryption scheme used is to be classified, but they chips will be 
available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their 
communications products.

       This proposal raises a number of serious concerns .

       First, the Administration appears to be adopting a solution 
before conducting an inquiry.  The NSA-developed Clipper chip may 
not be the most secure product. Other vendors or developers may 
have better schemes. Furthermore, we should not rely on the 
government as the sole source for Clipper or any other chips.  Rather,
independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets 
based on open standards.

       Second, an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested.
Yet the Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm 
classified.  EFF believes that any standard adopted ought to be public 
and open.  The public will only have confidence in the security of a 
standard that is open to independent, expert scrutiny.  

       Third, while the use of the split-key, dual-escrowed 
system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and 
law enforcement needs, the details of this scheme must be explored 
publicly before it is adopted.  What will give people confidence in the
safety of their keys?  Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive 
individual's fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal 
inquiries?  

       In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the 
importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into 
digital privacy and security.  However, the "Clipper chip" solution 
ought to be considered as part of the inquiry, not be adopted before 
the discussion even begins.
--------------end reprinting from Effector Online 5.06-------------

If you are as concerned about this as I am, please join with groups like
the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility and others who are lobbying for protection of electronic
privacy.  Please call your Congresspersons and tell them to vote this
down, and prevent sanctioned government wiretapping.

-
-- 
** Casimir J. (Casey) Palowitch  -  In 1996, there will be two kinds  **
**      Slavic Cataloger         -  of computer professional : those  **
**  U. of Pgh. Library Systems   -    who know NeXTStep, and those    **
**       [c j p] at [pitt.edu]           -              without Jobs.         **