From: [h--b--y] at [pilot.njin.net] (Hubey)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.bosna-herzgvna,soc.culture.british,soc.culture.europe,alt.current-events.bosnia,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: More disinformation from the usual sources (was Re: Young Staffers)
Date: 27 Jun 93 16:06:33 GMT

                The Balkan Quagmire Myth
                By J.P. Mackley
                The Washington Post, March 7, 1993

        Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina - In recent weeks, politicians and
diplomats alike have offered vast quantities of rhetoric that have served
in place of hard intelligence in arguments against U.S.-led military
intervention. Opponents of military action have variously determined the
Serbs to be unbeatable, the Balkan conflict a Vietnam-like quagmire and the
terrain too mountainous to be vulnerable, even to high-tech U.S. airpower.
        A favorite argument supporting Serb invincibility is that Serb
forces tied up 16 German divisions in World War II. The truth is that the
Germans destroyed the entire Yugoslav Army and occupied that country in a
matter of days. Not until the end of the war, after the allies occupied
Italy and began to send massive aid and air support, did Tito's partisans
became a viable force.
        People who argue that U.S. forces might now find themselves locked
in mortal combat with a formidable Yugoslav army must have missed the
battle of Vukovar in 1991. During that action, 1,000 to 1,500 unorganized,
ragtag Croatians, equipped with only infantry arms, held off 25,000
Yugoslav troops backed by heavy artillery, hundreds of tanks and MiGs for
three months - until their ammunition ran out.
        After witnessing combat in Vietnam and Desert Storm, spending a
major part of the past 18 months in disintegrating Yugoslavia, talking with
hundreds of reporters and military people and visiting most of the battle
areas, my conclusion is that by almost any American standard, the Serbs
aren't very good militarily. No unit of the Yugoslav army or air force,
regular or irregular, could compete successfully with a similar size and
type of U.S. military unit in anything but a drinking contest. Indeed, the
Serbs do their best fighting against unarmed women and the elderly.
        Two weeks ago, when I traveled across Bosnia with Rep. Frank
McCloskey, D-Ind., we were accompanied by a Marine artillery captain who
later reported his findings to Marine Corps headquarters. After touring a
number of abandoned Serb positions, Capt. Scott Buren concluded that the
Serbs were using the same tactics that were used to fight the American
Civil War. Buren said that it would be a simple matter for U.S. Marines to
handle the Serbs by air or on the ground.
        If the United States did not choose to send in ground troops, U.S.
fighter pilots could still clear the air over Bosnia in less time than it
took in Iraq and with far less trouble. But merely enforcing the "no-fly
zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina won't do much to influence the outcome of the
war either way because Serb aircraft have not been a meaningful factor in
the ground war. The Serbs have some MiG-29s, but they are flying
lower-maintenance, less-fuel-consuming 1960s-vintage MiG-21s and MiG-23s,
and the Russians didn't let them have strategic bombers. Aside from the
psychological terror of sudden sonic booms, and the occasional dropping of
U.S.- and U.K.-made cluster bomb units on civilian targets, Serb aircraft
have been tactically ineffective.
        Yugoslav pilots simply don't fly the training hours they need to
stay "hot." A good example of their bombing ability is the bridge between
Bosanki Brod, a town in Bosnia, and Slovonski Brod, the neighboring town in
Croatia. Serb MiGs bombed that 150-foot bridge daily for three months, hit
it only six times and failed even to make it unusable. It was finally blown
up by retreating Croatians and Muslims.
        Serb forces are structured on the same Soviet model used by Iraqi
forces. Although the Iraqis have far more infantry, both they and the Serbs
are heavily dependent on tanks and artillery and don't have much stomach
for going toe-to-toe with armed adversaries. Although the fighting in
Bosnia is usually described as fierce, it is more accurately described as
brutal. With few exceptions, there has not been much large-scale combat
between any of the opposing forces during the entire war in Yugoslavia.
        Neither the Serbs, the Croatians nor the Muslims have the
organizational ability or communications to orchestrate battle maneuvers on
much of a scale. Except for the city siege situations and a few large
battles, the combat has been mostly spontaneous, more resembling heavily
armed anarchy than organized warfare.

        Warfare in former Yugoslavia falls into four categories:

        1) siege situations in which heavily armored Serbs employ artillery
           fire to cut off and wear down defenders occupying fixed
           positions;

        2) house-to-house fighting where largely unorganized small groups
           spray automatic fire at each other until the side that runs out
           of ammunition retreats;

        3) largely unopposed movements against villages full of civilians;

        4) small-unit commando raids.

        The Serbian Army has absolutely no infantry to protect its tanks
and artillery; that infantry disappeared when Croatians, Albanians and
Macedonians deserted from the Yugoslav army. There is a definite chain of
command from Slobodan Milosevic on down, but only a small portion of the
80,000 Serb troops respond to any sort of command. What drives the majority
are the inflammatory emotions generated by plum brandy and relentless
nationalistic propaganda. In the Serbian military, command, control and
communication systems are virtually nonexistent.
        All of the equipment in use by the Serbs in Bosnia is antiquated by
any but Third World standards. Most of it was introduced in the late 1960s.
The Serbs are using low-tech T-33 and T-55 tanks, and their mortars and
artillery pieces lack any kind of sophisticated fire control systems. Their
antiaircraft capability is largely artillery of the type the North
Vietnamese used 20 years ago. Saddam Hussein had better air defenses.
        Fortunately, a Desert Storm scenario isn't necessary in Bosnia. One
U.S. armored division and one mechanized infantry division backed by
airpower could probably clean up Bosnia in 30 days if they were sent in to
fight. But sending the 82nd Airborne into Bosnia, as Lord Owen suggests,
merely to bolster U.N. troops already mired in a Beirut-type defensive
posture would risk American lives needlessly.
        A better plan would be to declare a "no-artillery zone" throughout
Yugoslavia. Ninety percent of both civilian and military casualties in
Bosnia are caused by Serb artillery - large, high visibility items (not
short-range mortar tubes like the Viet Cong used in the jungle) and tank
main guns, firing harassment and interdiction. Any heavy gun discovered
firing by electronic surveillance could be targeted from the air, no matter
if it were Serb, Croatian or Muslim. Even the Russians, whose historical
support for Serbia has worried Western negotiators, could not object to an
equal opportunity moratorium on artillery fire.
        A "no artillery zone" ultimatum would quickly cool the hot war.
Even neutralizing the concentrations of artillery around the cities under
siege would provide Croatian and Muslim infantry with a level playing
field. Since the Serbs have demonstrated no taste for equal combat, it is
unlikely that the combat would continue.
        As in Desert Storm, ground troops would play only a slight role. In
Iraq, generally, they occupied the territory, policed the prisoners and
mopped up a few hold-out units after the high-tech airpower got through.
For the very first time in the history of warfare, electronic targeting and
smart weapons annihilated an enemy army on the ground.
        Some in the Pentagon argue that Bosnia is not Iraq, and they are
right; in many ways airpower could be even more effective against the
Serbs. The Iraqis had an entire desert in which to hide tanks and
artillery, whereas the Serb heavy weapons and tanks are limited to flat
areas near roads in the rocky and mountainous terrain. And in wintertime
Bosnia, unlike the Iraqi desert, numerous fires in troop areas and lots of
running tank engines generate heat signatures for air-to-ground missiles to
lock on to.
        In Iraq, supplies could come from anywhere across thousands of
miles of desert. But all of the supplies - every liter of fuel - feeding
the Serb effort in Bosnia have to come across a half dozen bridges spanning
either the Danube or the Drina rivers. Diesel fuel, which propels the tanks
and trucks, is a perishable commodity and freshly refined supplies are
constantly required. If the movement of fuel and spare parts across those
rivers stops, so does the ability of mechanized Serbia to wage war.
        It may be useful to note that the same officers who grossly
overestimated the Iraqis - who were, in any case, far larger and better
organized and equipped than the entire Serb army - are now prolonging
debate over disintegrating Yugoslavia by overinflating the capabilities of
the Serbs. But those who delay taking decisive actions to end hostilities
are playing right into Milosevic's hands.
        When Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced U.S. support
for continuation of the Vance/Owen negotiations, analysts on Belgrade
television saw it as a victory for Milosevic. Serbian voters, convinced of
Milosevic's ability literally to get away with murder, overwhelmingly
returned him to office, and so far he has not been proven wrong. If the
United States suddenly silenced the heavy guns, blocked Serb supply routes
and made it clear that continuing would cost more lives than Serbia can
afford to give, Milosevic's political base could dissipate.
        Neither the resumption of U.S. airlifts nor further negotiations
are likely to relieve the suffering of the Bosnian Muslims or reduce the
growing threat to Serbia's other neighbors. The problem is that Milosevic
will not keep his word. He has never kept his word. And the policies,
aggression and duplicity that have allowed the Serbs to choose their own
seats at the negotiating table may ultimately engage the United States in
an international conflict impervious to any but military solutions.

(Mackley served with the infantry in Vietnam and has spent the last year
developing a network of foreign press bureaus in Croatia and Bosnia.)

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-- 
 --mark--

<When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean--
				neither more nor less.> Humpty Dumpty