From: [c--ur--s] at [usenet.ins.cwru.edu]
Newsgroups: freenet.govt.hermes.opinions,courts.usa.federal.supreme
Subject: No. 95-345.ZS Summary
Date: 24 Jun 1996 15:50:13 GMT

    

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. URSERY
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 95-345.   Argued April 17, 1996-Decided June 24, 1996

In No. 95-345, the Government instituted civil forfeiture proceedings
 under 21 U. S. C. 881(a)(7) against respondent Ursery's house,
 alleging that it had been used to facilitate illegal drug transactions. 
 Shortly before Ursery settled that claim, he was indicted, and was
 later convicted, of manufacturing marijuana in violation of
 841(a)(1).  In No. 95-346, the Government filed a civil in rem
 complaint against various property seized from, or titled to, respond-
 ents Arlt and Wren or Arlt's corporation, alleging that each item
 was subject to forfeiture under 18 U. S. C. 981(a)(1)(A) because it
 was involved in money laundering violative of 1956, and to forfei-
 ture under 21 U. S. C. 881(a)(6) as the proceeds of a felonious drug
 transaction.  Litigation of the forfeiture action was deferred while
 Arlt and Wren were prosecuted on drug and money-laundering
 charges under 846 and 18 U. S. C. 371 and 1956.  After their
 convictions, the District Court granted the Government's motion for
 summary judgment in the forfeiture proceeding.  The Courts of
 Appeals reversed Ursery's conviction and the forfeiture judgment
 against Arlt and Wren, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
 prohibits the Government from both punishing a defendant for a
 criminal offense and forfeiting his property for that same offense in
 a separate civil proceeding.  The courts reasoned in part that
 Halper v. United States, 490 U. S. 435, and Austin v. United States,
 509 U. S. 602, meant that, as a categorical matter, civil forfeitures
 always constitute -punishment- for double jeopardy purposes.  This
 Court consolidated the cases. 
Held:  In rem civil forfeitures are neither -punishment- nor criminal
 for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Pp. 3-23.
  (a) Congress long has authorized the Government to bring parallel
criminal actions and in rem civil forfeiture proceedings based upon
the same underlying events, see, e.g., The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1,
14-15, and this Court consistently has concluded that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not apply to such forfeitures because they do
not impose punishment, see, e.g., Various Items of Personal Property
v. United States, 282 U. S. 577, 581; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
v. United States, 409 U. S. 232, 235-236 (per curiam).  In its most
recent case, United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U. S. 354, the Court held that a forfeiture was not barred by a
prior criminal proceeding after applying a two-part test asking, first,
whether Congress intended the particular forfeiture to be a remedial
civil sanction or a criminal penalty, and, second, whether the forfei-
ture proceedings are so punitive in fact as to establish that they
may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature, despite any
congressional intent to establish a civil remedial mechanism. 
Pp. 5-9.
  (b) Though the 89 Firearms test was more refined, perhaps, than
the Court's Various Items analysis, the conclusion was the same in
each case: in rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct
from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines,
and does not constitute a punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
See Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 392.  The Courts of
Appeals misread Halper, Austin, and Montana Dept. of Revenue v.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. ___, as having abandoned this oft-affirmed
rule.  None of those decisions purported to overrule Various Items,
Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms or to replace the Court's
traditional understanding.  It would have been remarkable for the
Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-established practice,
and to have overruled a long line of precedent, without having even
suggested that it was doing so.  Moreover, the cases in question did
not deal with the subject of this case: in rem civil forfeitures for
double jeopardy purposes.  Halper involved in personam civil penal-
ties under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Kurth Ranch considered a
punitive state tax imposed on marijuana under that Clause.  And
Austin dealt with civil forfeitures under the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause.  Pp. 10-19.
  (c) The forfeitures at issue are civil proceedings under the two-
part 89 Firearms test.  First, there is little doubt that Congress
intended proceedings under 881 and 981 to be civil, since those
statutes' procedural enforcement mechanisms are themselves dis-
tinctly civil in nature.  See, e.g., 89 Firearms, 465 U. S., at 363. 
Second, there is little evidence, much less the -clearest proof- that
the Court requires, see e.g., id., at 365, suggesting that forfeiture
proceedings under those sections are so punitive in form and effect
as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary. 
These statutes are, in most significant respects, indistinguishable
from those reviewed, and held not to be punitive, in Various Items,
Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms.  That these are civil proceed-
ings is also supported by other factors that the Court has found
persuasive, including the considerations that (1) in rem civil forfei-
ture has not historically been regarded as punishment; (2) there is
no requirement in the statutes at issue that the Government demon-
strate scienter in order to establish that the property is subject to
forfeiture; (3) though both statutes may serve a deterrent purpose,
this purpose may serve civil as well as criminal goals; and (4) the
fact that both are tied to criminal activity is insufficient in itself to
render them punitive.  See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U. S.
242, 247-248, n. 7, 249.  Pp. 19-23.
No. 95-345, 59 F. 3d 568, and No. 95-346, 33 F. 3d 1210 and 56 F.
 3d 41, reversed.
 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. 
Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion.  Scalia, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined.  Stevens, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part.