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Subject: 95-345.ZO Opinion
Date: 24 Jun 1996 15:53:53 GMT
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
Nos. 95-345 and 95-346
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
95-345 v.
GUY JEROME URSERY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the sixth circuit
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
95-346 v.
$405,089.23 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 24, 1996]
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In separate cases, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits the Government from both
punishing a defendant for a criminal offense and
forfeiting his property for that same offense in a
separate civil proceeding. We consolidated those cases
for our review, and now reverse. These civil forfeitures
(and civil forfeitures generally), we hold, do not consti-
tute -punishment- for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
I
No. 95-345: Michigan Police found marijuana growing
adjacent to respondent Guy Ursery's house, and discov-
ered marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a growlight
within the house. The United States instituted civil
forfeiture proceedings against the house, alleging that
the property was subject to forfeiture under 84 Stat.
1276, as amended, 21 U. S. C. 881(a)(7) because it had
been used for several years to facilitate the unlawful
processing and distribution of a controlled substance.
Ursery ultimately paid the United States $13,250 to
settle the forfeiture claim in full. Shortly before the
settlement was consummated, Ursery was indicted for
manufacturing marijuana, in violation of 841(a)(1). A
jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to 63
months in prison.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by a
divided vote reversed Ursery's criminal conviction,
holding that the conviction violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 59 F. 3d 568 (1995). The court based its
conclusion in part upon its belief that our decisions in
United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989), and
Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), meant
that any civil forfeiture under 881(a)(7) constitutes
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Ursery, in the court's view, had therefore been -pun-
ished- in the forfeiture proceeding against his property,
and could not be subsequently criminally tried for
violation of 21 U. S. C. 841(a)(1).
No. 95-346: Following a jury trial, Charles Wesley
Arlt and James Wren were convicted of: conspiracy to
aid and abet the manufacture of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U. S. C. 846; conspiracy to launder
monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 371;
and numerous counts of money laundering, in violation
of 1956. The District Court sentenced Arlt to life in
prison and a 10-year term of supervised release, and
imposed a fine of $250,000. Wren was sentenced to life
imprisonment and a 5-year term of supervised release.
Before the criminal trial had started, the United
States had filed a civil in rem complaint against various
property seized from, or titled to, Arlt and Wren, or
Payback Mines, a corporation controlled by Arlt. The
complaint alleged that each piece of property was subject
to forfeiture both under 18 U. S. C. 981(a)(1)(A), which
provides that -[a]ny property . . . involved in a transac-
tion or attempted transaction in violation of- 1956 (the
money-laundering statute) -is subject to forfeiture to the
United States-; and under 21 U. S. C. 881(a)(6), which
provides for the forfeiture of (i) -[a]ll . . . things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for- illegal drugs, (ii) -all proceeds traceable to
such an exchange,- and (iii) -all moneys, negotiable
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used
to facilitate- a federal drug felony. The parties agreed
to defer litigation of the forfeiture action during the
criminal prosecution. More than a year after the
conclusion of the criminal trial, the District Court
granted the Government's motion for summary judgment
in the civil forfeiture proceeding.
Arlt and Wren appealed the decision in the forfeiture
action, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the forfeiture violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 33 F. 3d 1210 (1994). The court's
decision was based in part upon the same view as that
expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in Ursery's case-that our decisions in Halper, supra,
and Austin, supra, meant that, as a categorical matter,
forfeitures under 981(a)(1)(A) and 881(a)(6) always
constitute -punishment.-
We granted the Government's petition for certiorari in
each of the two cases, and we now reverse. 516 U. S.
___ (1996).
II
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: -[N]or shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.- U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. The
Clause serves the function of preventing both -successive
punishments and . . . successive prosecutions.- United
States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 696 (1993), citing North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). The protection
against multiple punishments prohibits the Government
from - `punishing twice, or attempting a second time to
punish criminally for the same offense.' - Witte v.
United States, 515 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 6)
(emphasis omitted), quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U. S. 391, 399 (1938).
In the decisions that we review, the Courts of Appeals
held that the civil forfeitures constituted -punishment,-
making them subject to the prohibitions of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Government challenges that
characterization of the forfeitures, arguing that the
courts were wrong to conclude that civil forfeitures are
punitive for double jeopardy purposes.
A
Since the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has
authorized the Government to seek parallel in rem civil
forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions based upon
the same underlying events. See, e.g., Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, 12, 1 Stat. 39 (goods unloaded at night or
without a permit subject to forfeiture and persons
unloading subject to criminal prosecution); 25, id., at 43
(persons convicted of buying or concealing illegally
imported goods subject to both monetary fine and in rem
forfeiture of the goods); 34, id., at 46 (imposing crimi-
nal penalty and in rem forfeiture where person convicted
of relanding goods entitled to drawback); see also The
Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14-15 (1827) (-Many cases exist,
where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal
penalty-); cf. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U. S. 663, 683 (1974) (discussing adoption of
forfeiture statutes by early Congresses). And, in a long
line of cases, this Court has considered the application
of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeitures,
consistently concluding that the Clause does not apply
to such actions because they do not impose punishment.
One of the first cases to consider the relationship
between the Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeiture
was Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,
282 U. S. 577 (1931). In Various Items, the Waterloo
Distilling Corporation had been ordered to forfeit a
distillery, warehouse, and denaturing plant, on the
ground that the corporation had conducted its distilling
business in violation of federal law. The Government
conceded that the corporation had been convicted of
criminal violations prior to the initiation of the forfeiture
proceeding, and admitted that the criminal conviction
had been based upon -the transactions set forth . . . as
a basis for the forfeiture.- Id., at 579. Considering the
corporation's argument that the forfeiture action violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause, this Court unanimously
held that the Clause was inapplicable to civil forfeiture
actions:
-[This] forfeiture proceeding . . . is in rem. It is the
property which is proceeded against, and, by resort
to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as
though it were conscious instead of inanimate and
insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the
wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against,
convicted, and punished. The forfeiture is no part of
the punishment for the criminal offense. The provi-
sion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in
respect of double jeopardy does not apply.- Id., at
581 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In reaching its conclusion, the Court drew a sharp
distinction between in rem civil forfeitures and in
personam civil penalties such as fines: Though the latter
could, in some circumstances, be punitive, the former
could not. Ibid. Referring to a case that was decided
the same day as Various Items, the Court made its point
absolutely clear:
-In United States v. La Franca, [282 U. S.] 568, we
hold that, under 5 of the Willis-Campbell Act, a
civil action to recover taxes, which in fact are
penalties, is punitive in character and barred by a
prior conviction of the defendant for a criminal
offense involving the same transactions. This,
however, is not that case, but a proceeding in rem
to forfeit property used in committing an offense.-
Id., at 580.
Had the Court in Various Items found that a civil
forfeiture could constitute a -punishment- under the
Fifth Amendment, its holding would have been quite
remarkable. As that Court recognized, -[a]t common
law, in many cases, the right of forfeiture did not attach
until the offending person had been convicted and the
record of conviction produced.- Ibid. In other words, at
common law, not only was it the case that a criminal
conviction did not bar a civil forfeiture, but, in fact, the
civil forfeiture could not be instituted unless a criminal
conviction had already been obtained. Though this
Court had held that common-law rule inapplicable where
the right of forfeiture was -created by statute, in rem,
cognizable on the revenue side of the exchequer,- The
Palmyra, supra, at 14, it never had suggested that the
Constitution prohibited for statutory civil forfeiture what
was required for common-law civil forfeiture. For the
Various Items Court to have held that the forfeiture was
prohibited by the prior criminal proceeding would have
been directly contrary to the common-law rule, and
would have called into question the constitutionality of
forfeiture statutes thought constitutional for over a
century. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 327-328 (1936) (Evidence of a
longstanding legislative practice -goes a long way in the
direction of proving the presence of unassailable grounds
for the constitutionality of the practice-).
Following its decision in Various Items, the Court did
not consider another double jeopardy case involving a
civil forfeiture for 40 years. Then, in One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232 (1972) (per
curiam), the Court's brief opinion reaffirmed the rule of
Various Items. In Emerald Cut Stones, after having
been acquitted of smuggling jewels into the United
States, the owner of the jewels intervened in a proceed-
ing to forfeit them as contraband. We rejected the
owner's double jeopardy challenge to the forfeiture,
holding that -[i]f for no other reason the forfeiture is not
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it involves neither two criminal
trials nor two criminal punishments.- 409 U. S., at 235.
Noting that the forfeiture provisions had been codified
separately from parallel criminal provisions, the Court
determined that the forfeiture clearly was -a civil
sanction.- Id., at 236. The forfeitures were not criminal
punishments because they did not impose a second in
personam penalty for the criminal defendant's wrong-
doing.
In our most recent decision considering whether a civil
forfeiture constitutes punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, we again affirmed the rule of Various
Items. In United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984), the owner of the
defendant weapons was acquitted of charges of dealing
firearms without a license. The Government then
brought a forfeiture action against the firearms under 18
U. S. C. 924(d), alleging that they were used or were
intended to be used in violation of federal law.
In another unanimous decision, we held that the
forfeiture was not barred by the prior criminal proceed-
ing. We began our analysis by stating the rule for our
decision:
-Unless the forfeiture sanction was intended as
punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially
criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is
not applicable. The question, then, is whether a
924(d) forfeiture proceeding is intended to be, or by
its nature necessarily is, criminal and punitive, or
civil and remedial.- 89 Firearms, supra, at 362
(citations omitted).
Our inquiry proceeded in two stages. In the first
stage, we looked to Congress' intent, and concluded that
-Congress designed forfeiture under 924(d) as a reme-
dial civil sanction.- 465 U. S., at 363. This conclusion
was based upon several findings. First, noting that the
forfeiture proceeding was in rem, we found it significant
that -actions in rem have traditionally been viewed as
civil proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent upon the
seizure of a physical object.- 89 Firearms, id., at 363,
citing, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U. S., at 684. Second, we found that the forfeiture
provision, because it reached both weapons used in
violation of federal law and those -intended to be used-
in such a manner, reached a broader range of conduct
than its criminal analogue. Third, we concluded that
the civil forfeiture -further[ed] broad remedial aims,-
including both -discouraging unregulated commerce in
firearms,- and -removing from circulation firearms that
have been used or intended for use outside regulated
channels of commerce.- 89 Firearms, supra, at 364.
In the second stage of our analysis, we looked to
-`whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate' Congress' intention to
establish a civil remedial mechanism,- 465 U. S., at 365,
quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249
(1980). Considering several factors that we had used
previously in order to determine whether a civil proceed-
ing was so punitive as to require application of the full
panoply of constitutional protections required in a
criminal trial, see id., at 248, we found only one of those
factors to be present in the 924(d) forfeiture. By itself,
however, the fact that the behavior proscribed by the
forfeiture was already a crime proved insufficient to turn
the forfeiture into a punishment subject to the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Hence, we found that the petitioner
had -failed to establish by the `clearest proof' that
Congress has provided a sanction so punitive as to
`transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty.'- 89 Firearms, supra, at 366,
quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148,
154 (1956). We concluded our decision by restating that
civil forfeiture is -not an additional penalty for the
commission of a criminal act, but rather is a separate
civil sanction, remedial in nature.- 89 Firearms, supra,
at 366.
B
Our cases reviewing civil forfeitures under the Double
Jeopardy Clause adhere to a remarkably consistent
theme. Though the two-part analytical construct
employed in 89 Firearms was more refined, perhaps,
than that we had used over 50 years earlier in Various
Items, the conclusion was the same in each case: in rem
civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from
potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as
fines, and does not constitute a punishment under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. See Gore v. United States, 357
U. S. 386, 392 (1958) (-In applying a provision like that
of double jeopardy, which is rooted in history and is not
an evolving concept . . . a long course of adjudication in
this Court carries impressive authority-).
In the case that we currently review, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized as much,
concluding that after 89 Firearms, -the law was clear
that civil forfeitures did not constitute `punishment' for
double jeopardy purposes.- 33 F. 3d, at 1218. Never-
theless, that court read three of our decisions to have
-abandoned- 89 Firearms and the oft-affirmed rule of
Various Items. According to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, through our decisions in United States
v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989), Austin v. United States,
509 U. S. 602 (1993), and Department of Revenue of
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. ___ (1994), we
-changed [our] collective mind,- and -adopted a new test
for determining whether a nominally civil sanction
constitutes `punishment' for double jeopardy purposes.-
33 F. 3d, at 1218-1219. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit shared the view of the Ninth Circuit,
though it did not directly rely upon Kurth Ranch. We
turn now to consider whether Halper, Austin, and Kurth
Ranch accomplished the radical jurisprudential shift
perceived by the Courts of Appeals.
In Halper, we considered -whether and under what
circumstances a civil penalty may constitute `punish-
ment' for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.-
Halper, supra, at 436. Based upon his submission of 65
inflated Medicare claims, each of which overcharged the
Government by $9, Halper was criminally convicted of
65 counts of violating the false-claims statute, 18
U. S. C. 287 (1982 ed.), as well as of 16 counts of mail
fraud, and was sentenced to two years in prison and
fined $5,000. Following that criminal conviction, the
Government successfully brought a civil action against
Halper under 31 U. S. C. 3729 (1982 ed. and Supp. II).
The District Court hearing the civil action determined
that Halper was liable to the Government for over
$130,000 under 3729, which then provided for liability
in the amount of $2,000 per violation, double the
Government's actual damages, and court costs. The
court concluded that imposing the full civil penalty
would constitute a second punishment for Halper's
already-punished criminal offense, however, and there-
fore reduced Halper's liability to double the actual
damages suffered by the Government and the costs of
the civil action. The Government directly appealed that
decision to this Court.
This Court agreed with the District Court's analysis.
We determined that our precedent had established no
absolute and irrebuttable rule that a civil fine cannot be
-punishment- under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Though it was well established that -a civil remedy does
not rise to the level of `punishment' merely because
Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of the
Government's actual damages,- we found that our case
law did -not foreclose the possibility that in a particular
case a civil penalty . . . may be so extreme and so
divorced from the Government's damages and expenses
as to constitute punishment.- 490 U. S., at 442.
Emphasizing the case-specific nature of our inquiry, id.,
at 448, we compared the size of the fine imposed on
Halper, $130,000, to the damages actually suffered by
the Government as a result of Halper's actions, estimat-
ed by the District Court at $585. Noting that the fine
was more than 220 times greater than the Government's
damages, we agreed with the District Court that
-Halper's $130,000 liability is sufficiently disproportion-
ate that the sanction constitutes a second punishment in
violation of double jeopardy.- Id., at 452. We remanded
to the District Court so that it could hear evidence
regarding the Government's actual damages, and could
then reduce Halper's liability to a nonpunitive level.
Ibid.
In Austin, we considered whether a civil forfeiture
could violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
-[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed . . . .- U. S. Const., Amdt. 8. Aware that
Austin had sold two grams of cocaine the previous day,
police searched his mobile home and body shop. Their
search revealed small amounts of marijuana and cocaine,
a handgun, drug paraphernalia, and almost $5,000 in
cash. Austin was charged with one count of possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute, to which he pleaded
guilty. The Government then initiated a civil forfeiture
proceeding against Austin's mobile home and auto shop,
contending that they had been -used- or were -intended
for use- in the commission of a drug offense. See 21
U. S. C. 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). Austin contested the
forfeiture on the ground of the Excessive Fines Clause,
but the District Court and the Court of Appeals held the
forfeiture constitutional.
We limited our review to the question -whether the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applies to forfeitures of property under 21 U. S. C.
881(a)(4) and (a)(7).- Austin, supra, at 604. We
began our analysis by rejecting the argument that the
Excessive Fines Clause was limited solely to criminal
proceedings: The relevant question was not whether a
particular proceeding was criminal or civil, we deter-
mined, but rather was whether forfeiture under 881
(a)(4) and (a)(7) constituted -punishment- for the
purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Austin, supra, at
610. In an effort to answer that question, we briefly
reviewed the history of civil forfeiture both in this
country and in England, see id., at 611-618, taking a
categorical approach that contrasted sharply with
Halper's case-specific approach to determining whether
a civil penalty constitutes punishment. Ultimately, we
concluded that -forfeiture under [881(a)(4) and (a)(7)]
constitutes `payment to a sovereign as punishment for
some offense,' and, as such, is subject to the limitations
of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.-
Id., at 622.
In Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U. S. ___ (1994), we considered whether a state tax
imposed on marijuana was invalid under the Double
Jeopardy Clause when the taxpayer had already been
criminally convicted of owning the marijuana which was
taxed. We first established that the fact that Montana
had labeled the civil sanction a -tax- did not end our
analysis. We then turned to consider whether the tax
was so punitive as to constitute a punishment subject to
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Several differences
between the marijuana tax imposed by Montana and the
typical revenue-raising tax were readily apparent. The
Montana tax was unique in that it was conditioned on
the commission of a crime and was imposed only after
the taxpayer had been arrested: thus, only a person
charged with a criminal offense was subject to the tax.
We also noted that the taxpayer did not own or possess
the taxed marijuana at the time that the tax was
imposed. From these differences, we determined that
the tax was motivated by a - `penal and prohibitory
intent rather than the gathering of revenue.' - Id., at
___ (slip op., at 16). Concluding that the Montana tax
proceeding -was the functional equivalent of a successive
criminal prosecution,- we affirmed the Court of Appeals'
judgment barring the tax. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17).
We think that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
misread Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch. None of
those decisions purported to overrule the well-established
teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89
Firearms. Halper involved not a civil forfeiture, but a
civil penalty. That its rule was limited to the latter
context is clear from the decision itself, from the
historical distinction that we have drawn between civil
forfeiture and civil penalties, and from the practical
difficulty of applying Halper to a civil forfeiture.
In Halper, we emphasized that our decision was
limited to the context of civil penalties:
-What we announce now is a rule for the rare case,
the case such as the one before us, where a fixed-
penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportion-
ate to the damages he has caused. The rule is one
of reason: Where a defendant previously has sus-
tained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty
sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no
rational relation to the goal of compensating the
Government for its loss, but rather appears to
qualify as `punishment' in the plain meaning of the
word, then the defendant is entitled to an account-
ing of the Government's damages and costs to
determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a
second punishment.- 490 U. S., at 449-450 (empha-
sis added).
The narrow focus of Halper followed from the distinction
that we have drawn historically between civil forfeiture
and civil penalties. Since at least Various Items, we
have distinguished civil penalties such as fines from civil
forfeiture proceedings that are in rem. While a -civil
action to recover . . . penalties, is punitive in character,-
and much like a criminal prosecution in that -it is the
wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against . . . and
punished,- in an in rem forfeiture proceeding, -it is the
property which is proceeded against, and by resort to a
legal fiction, held guilty and condemned.- Various Items,
282 U. S., at 580-581. Thus, though for Double Jeopardy
purposes we have never balanced the value of property
forfeited in a particular case against the harm suffered
by the Government in that case, we have balanced the
size of a particular civil penalty against the Govern-
ment's harm. See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,
350 U. S. 148, 154 (1956) (fines not -so unreasonable or
excessive- as to transform a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S.
537 (1943) (fine of $315,000 not so disproportionate to
Government's harm of $101,500 as to transform the fine
into punishment). Indeed, the rule set forth in Halper
developed from the teaching of Rex Trailer and Hess.
See Halper, supra, at 445-447.
It is difficult to see how the rule of Halper could be
applied to a civil forfeiture. Civil penalties are designed
as a rough form of -liquidated damages- for the harms
suffered by the Government as a result of a defendant's
conduct. See Rex Trailer, supra, at 153-154. The civil
penalty involved in Halper, for example, provided for a
fixed monetary penalty for each false claim count on
which the defendant was convicted in the criminal
proceeding. Whether a -fixed-penalty provision- that
seeks to compensate the Government for harm it has
suffered is -so extreme- and -so divorced- from the
penalty's nonpunitive purpose of compensating the
Government as to be a punishment may be determined
by balancing the Government's harm against the size of
the penalty. Civil forfeitures, in contrast to civil
penalties, are designed to do more than simply compen-
sate the Government. Forfeitures serve a variety of
purposes, but are designed primarily to confiscate
property used in violation of the law, and to require
disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct. Though it
may be possible to quantify the value of the property
forfeited, it is virtually impossible to quantify, even
approximately, the nonpunitive purposes served by a
particular civil forfeiture. Hence, it is practically
difficult to determine whether a particular forfeiture
bears no rational relationship to the nonpunitive
purposes of that forfeiture. Quite simply, the case-by-
case balancing test set forth in Halper, in which a court
must compare the harm suffered by the Government
against the size of the penalty imposed, is inapplicable
to civil forfeiture.
We recognized as much in Kurth Ranch. In that case,
the Court expressly disclaimed reliance upon Halper,
finding that its case-specific approach was impossible to
apply outside the context of a fixed civil-penalty provi-
sion. Reviewing the Montana marijuana tax, we held
that because -tax statutes serve a purpose quite differ-
ent from civil penalties, . . . Halper's method of deter-
mining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive
simply does not work in the case of a tax statute.-
Kurth Ranch, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 17) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 2-3) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (Halper inapplica-
ble outside of - `fixed-penalty provision[s]' - that are
meant -to recover the costs incurred by the Government
for bringing someone to book for some violation of law-).
This is not to say that there is no occasion for analysis
of the Government's harm. 89 Firearms makes clear the
relevance of an evaluation of the harms alleged. The
point is simply that Halper's case-specific approach is
inapplicable to civil forfeitures.
In the cases that we review, the Courts of Appeals did
not find Halper difficult to apply to civil forfeiture
because they concluded that its case-by-case balancing
approach had been supplanted in Austin by a categorical
approach that found a civil sanction to be punitive if it
could not -fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose.- See Austin, 509 U. S., at 610; see also
Halper, supra, at 448. But Austin, it must be remem-
bered, did not involve the Double Jeopardy Clause at all.
Austin was decided solely under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, a constitutional
provision which we never have understood as parallel to,
or even related to, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The only discussion of the Double
Jeopardy Clause contained in Austin appears in a
footnote that acknowledges our decisions holding that
-[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause has been held not to
apply in civil forfeiture proceedings . . . where the
forfeiture could properly be characterized as remedial.-
Austin, supra, at 608, n. 4. And in Austin we expressly
recognized and approved our decisions in One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232
(1972), and United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984). See Austin, supra, at
608, n. 4.
We acknowledged in Austin that our categorical ap-
proach under the Excessive Fines Clause was wholly
distinct from the case-by-case approach of Halper, and
we explained that the difference in approach was based
in a significant difference between the purposes of our
analysis under each constitutional provision. See Austin,
supra, at 622, n. 14. It is unnecessary in a case under
the Excessive Fines Clause to inquire at a preliminary
stage whether the civil sanction imposed in that particu-
lar case is totally inconsistent with any remedial goal.
Because the second stage of inquiry under the Excessive
Fines Clause asks whether the particular sanction in
question is so large as to be -excessive,- see Austin, 509
U. S., at 622-623 (declining to establish criteria for
excessiveness), a preliminary-stage inquiry that focused
on the disproportionality of a particular sanction would
be duplicative of the excessiveness analysis that would
follow. See id., at 622, n. 14 (-[I]t appears to make
little practical difference whether the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to all forfeitures . . . or only to those
that cannot be characterized as purely remedial,-
because the Excessive Fines Clause -prohibits only the
imposition of `excessive' fines, and a fine that serves
purely remedial purposes cannot be considered `excessive'
in any event-). Forfeitures effected under 21 U. S. C.
881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are subject to review for excessive-
ness under the Eighth Amendment after Austin; this
does not mean, however, that those forfeitures are so
punitive as to constitute punishment for the purposes of
double jeopardy. The holding of Austin was limited to
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
and we decline to import the analysis of Austin into our
double jeopardy jurisprudence.
In sum, nothing in Halper, Kurth Ranch, or Austin,
purported to replace our traditional understanding that
civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the
purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Congress long
has authorized the Government to bring parallel crimi-
nal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings, and this
Court consistently has found civil forfeitures not to
constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. It would have been quite remarkable for this
Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-estab-
lished practice, and to have overruled a long line of
precedent, without having even suggested that it was
doing so. Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties
under the Double Jeopardy Clause; Kurth Ranch with a
tax proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause; and
Austin with civil forfeitures under the Excessive Fines
Clause. None of those cases dealt with the subject of
this case: in rem civil forfeitures for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
C
We turn now to consider the forfeitures in these cases
under the teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut
Stones, and 89 Firearms. Because it provides a useful
analytical tool, we conduct our inquiry within the
framework of the two-part test used in 89 Firearms.
First, we ask whether Congress intended proceedings
under 21 U. S. C. 881, and 18 U. S. C. 981, to be
criminal or civil. Second, we turn to consider whether
the proceedings are so punitive in fact as to -persuade
us that the forfeiture proceeding[s] may not legitimately
be viewed as civil in nature,- despite Congress' intent.
89 Firearms, 465 U. S., at 366.
There is little doubt that Congress intended these
forfeitures to be civil proceedings. As was the case in
89 Firearms, -Congress' intent in this regard is most
clearly demonstrated by the procedural mechanisms it
established for enforcing forfeitures under the statute[s].-
465 U. S., at 363. Both 21 U. S. C. 881 and 18
U. S. C. 981, which is entitled -Civil forfeiture,- provide
that the laws -relating to the seizure, summary and
judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for
violation of the customs laws . . . shall apply to seizures
and forfeitures incurred- under 881 and 981. See 21
U. S. C. 881(d); 18 U. S. C. 981(d). Because forfeiture
proceedings under the customs laws are in rem, see 19
U. S. C. 1602 et seq., it is clear that Congress intended
that a forfeiture under 881 or 981, like the forfeiture
reviewed in 89 Firearms, would be a proceeding in rem.
Congress specifically structured these forfeitures to be
impersonal by targeting the property itself. -In contrast
to the in personam nature of criminal actions, actions in
rem have traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings,
with jurisdiction dependent upon seizure of a physical
object.- 89 Firearms, 465 U. S., at 363, citing Calero-
Toledo, 416 U. S., at 684.
Other procedural mechanisms governing forfeitures
under 981 and 881 also indicate that Congress
intended such proceedings to be civil. Forfeitures under
either statute are governed by 19 U. S. C. 1607, which
provides that actual notice of the impending forfeiture is
unnecessary when the Government cannot identify any
party with an interest in the seized article, and by
1609, which provides that seized property is subject to
forfeiture through a summary administrative procedure
if no party files a claim to the property. And 19
U. S. C. 1615, which governs the burden of proof in
forfeiture proceedings under 881 and 981, provides
that once the Government has shown probable cause
that the property is subject to forfeiture, then -the
burden of proof shall lie upon [the] claimant.- In sum,
-[b]y creating such distinctly civil procedures for forfei-
tures under [881 and 981], Congress has `indicate[d]
clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal sanction.'-
89 Firearms, supra, at 363, quoting Helvering v. Mitch-
ell, 303 U. S., at 402.
Moving to the second stage of our analysis, we find
that there is little evidence, much less the - `clearest
proof' - that we require, see 89 Firearms, supra, at 365,
quoting Ward, 448 U. S., at 249, suggesting that
forfeiture proceedings under 21 U. S. C. 881(a)(6) and
(a)(7), and 19 U. S. C. 981(a)(1)(A), are so punitive in
form and effect as to render them criminal despite
Congress' intent to the contrary. The statutes involved
in this case are, in most significant respects, indistin-
guishable from those reviewed, and held not to be
punitive, in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89
Firearms.
Most significant is that 981(a)(1)(A), and 881(a)(6)
and (a)(7), while perhaps having certain punitive
aspects, serve important nonpunitive goals. Title 21
U. S. C. 881(a)(7), under which Ursery's property was
forfeited, provides for the forfeiture of -all real property
. . . which is used or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commis-
sion of- a federal drug felony. Requiring the forfeiture
of property used to commit federal narcotics violations
encourages property owners to take care in managing
their property and ensures that they will not permit
that property to be used for illegal purposes. See
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. ___, ___ (1996) (slip op.,
at 10) (-Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses . . .
by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering
illegal behavior unprofitable-); 89 Firearms, supra, at
364 (forfeiture -discourages unregulated commerce in
firearms-); Calero-Toledo, supra, at 687-688. In many
circumstances, the forfeiture may abate a nuisance. See,
e.g., United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F. 2d 870
(CA2 1990) (forfeiting apartment building used to sell
crack cocaine); see also Bennis, supra, at ___ (slip op., at
10) (affirming application of Michigan statute abating
car as a nuisance; forfeiture -prevent[s] further illicit
use of- property); cf. 89 Firearms, supra, at 364 (forfei-
ture -remov[ed] from circulation firearms that have been
used or intended for use- illegally); Emerald Cut Stones,
409 U. S., at 237 (forfeiture -prevented forbidden
merchandise from circulating in the United States-).
The forfeiture of the property claimed by Arlt and
Wren took place pursuant to 18 U. S. C. 981(a)(1)(A),
and 21 U. S. C. 881(a)(6). Section 981(a)(1)(A) provides
for the forfeiture of -any property- involved in illegal
money-laundering transactions. Section 881(a)(6)
provides for the forfeiture of -[a]ll . . . things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for- illegal drugs; -all proceeds traceable to
such an exchange-; and -all moneys, negotiable instru-
ments, and securities used or intended to be used to
facilitate- a federal drug felony. The same remedial
purposes served by 881(a)(7) are served by 881(a)(6)
and 981(a)(1)(A). Only one point merits separate
discussion. To the extent that 881(a)(6) applies to
-proceeds- of illegal drug activity, it serves the addi-
tional nonpunitive goal of ensuring that persons do not
profit from their illegal acts.
Other considerations that we have found relevant to
the question whether a proceeding is criminal also tend
to support a conclusion that 981(a)(1)(A) and 881
(a)(6) and (a)(7) are civil proceedings. See Ward, supra,
at 247-248, n. 7, 249 (listing relevant factors and noting
that they are neither exhaustive nor dispositive). First,
in light of our decisions in Various Items, Emerald Cut
Stones, and 89 Firearms, and the long tradition of
federal statutes providing for a forfeiture proceeding
following a criminal prosecution, it is absolutely clear
that in rem civil forfeiture has not historically been
regarded as punishment, as we have understood that
term under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, there
is no requirement in the statutes that we currently
review that the Government demonstrate scienter in
order to establish that the property is subject to forfei-
ture; indeed, the property may be subject to forfeiture
even if no party files a claim to it and the Government
never shows any connection between the property and a
particular person. See 19 U. S. C. 1609. Though both
881(a) and 981(a) contain an -innocent owner- excep-
tion, we do not think that such a provision, without
more indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the
question whether a statute is punitive under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Third, though both statutes may fairly
be said to serve the purpose of deterrence, we long have
held that this purpose may serve civil as well as
criminal goals. See, e.g., 89 Firearms, supra, at 364;
Calero-Toledo, supra, at 677-678. We recently reaf-
firmed this conclusion in Bennis v. Michigan, supra, at
___ (slip. op., at 10), where we held that -forfeiture . . .
serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive
purpose.- Finally, though both statutes are tied to
criminal activity, as was the case in 89 Firearms, this
fact is insufficient to render the statutes punitive. See
89 Firearms, 465 U. S., at 365-366. It is well settled
that -Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil
sanction in respect to the same act or omission,- Hel-
vering, 303 U. S., at 399. By itself, the fact that a
forfeiture statute has some connection to a criminal
violation is far from the -clearest proof- necessary to
show that a proceeding is criminal.
We hold that these in rem civil forfeitures are neither
-punishment- nor criminal for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The judgments of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in No. 95-345, and of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in No. 95-346,
are accordingly reversed.
It is so ordered.