92 U.S. 542
2 Otto 542, 23 L.Ed. 588
(Cite as: 92 U.S. 542)

                          UNITED STATES
                               v.
                        CRUIKSHANK ET AL.
                       October Term, 1875

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District
of Louisiana.

This was an indictment for conspiracy under the sixth section of
the act of May 30, 1870, known as the Enforcement Act (16 Stat.
140), and consisted of thirty-two counts.

The first count was for banding together, with intent 'unlawfully
and feloniously to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate' two
citizens of the United States, 'of African descent and persons of
color,' 'with the unlawful and felonious intent thereby' them 'to
hinder and prevent in their respective free exercise and enjoyment
of their lawful right and privilege to peaceably assemble together
with each other and with other citizens of the said United States
for a peaceable and lawful purpose.'

The second avers an intent to hinder and prevent the exercise by
the same persons of the 'right to keep and bear arms for a lawful
purpose.'

The third avers an intent to deprive the same persons 'of their
respective several lives and liberty of person, without due process
of law.'

The fourth avers an intent to deprive the same persons of the 'free
exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property' enjoyed by white citizens.

The fifth avers an intent to hinder and prevent the same persons
'in the exercise and enjoyment of the rights, privileges,
immunities, and protection granted and secured to them respectively
as citizens of the said United States, and as citizens of the said
State of Louisiana, by reason of and for and on account of the race
and color' of the said persons.

The sixth avers an intent to hinder and prevent the same persons
in 'the free exercise and enjoyment of the several and respective
right and privilege to vote at any election to be thereafter by law
had and held by the people in and of the said State of Louisiana.'

The seventh avers an intent 'to put in great fear of bodily harm,
injure, and oppress' the same persons, 'because and for the reason'
that, having the right to vote, they had voted.

The eighth avers an intent 'to prevent and hinder' the same persons
'in their several and respective free exercise and enjoyment of
every, each, all, and singular and several rights and privileges
granted and secured' to them 'by the constitution and laws of the
United States.'

The next eight counts are a repetition of the first eight, except
that, instead of the words 'band together,' the words 'combine,
conspire, and confederate together' are used. Three of the
defendants were found guilty under the first sixteen counts, and
not guilty under the remaining counts.

The parties thus convicted moved in arrest of judgment on the
following grounds:----

1. Because the matters and things set forth and charged in the
several counts, one to sixteen inclusive, do not constitute
offences against the laws of the United States, and do not come
within the purview, true intent, and meaning of the act of
Congress, approved 31st May, 1870, entitled 'An Act to enforce the
right of citizens of the United States,' &c.

2. Because the matters and things in the said indictment set forth
and charged do not constitute offences cognizable in teh Circuit
Court, and do not come within its power and jurisdiction.

3. Because the offences created by the sixth section of the act of
Congress referred to, and upon which section the aforesaid sixteen
counts are based, are not constitutionally within the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States, and because the matters and
things therein referred to are judicially cognizable by State
tribunals only, and legislative action thereon is among the
constitutionally reserved rights of the several States.

4. Because the said act, in so far as it creates offences and
imposes penalties, is in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, and an infringement of the rights of the several
States and the people.

5. Because the eighth and sixteenth counts of the indictment are
too vague, general, insufficient, and uncertain, to afford the
accused proper notice to plead and prepare their defence, and set
forth no specific offence under the law.

6. Because the verdict of the jury against the defendants is not
warranted or supported by law.

On this motion the opinions of the judges were divided, that of the
presiding judge being that the several counts in question are not
sufficient in law, and do not contain charges of criminal matter
indictable under the laws of the United States; and that the motion
in arrest of judgment should be granted. The case comes up at the
instance of the United States, on certificate of this division of
opinion.

Sect. 1 of the Enforcement Act declares, that all citizens of the
United States, otherwise qualified, shall be allowed to vote at all
elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous
servitude.

Sect. 2 provides, that, if by the law of any State or Territory a
prerequisite to voting is necessary, equal opportunity for it shall
be given to all, without distinction, &c.; and any person charged
with the duty of furnishing the prerequisite, who refuses or
knowingly omits to give full effect to this section, shall be
guilty of misdemeanor.

Sect. 3 provides, that an offer of performance, in respect to the
prerequisite, when proved by affidavit of the claimant, shall be
equivalent to performance; and any judge or inspector of election
who refuses to accept it shall be guilty, &c.

Sect. 4 provides, that any person who, by force, bribery, threats,
intimidation, or other unlawful means, hinders, delays, prevents,
or obstructs any citizen from qualifying himself to vote, or
combines with others to do so, shall be guilty, &c.

Sect. 5 provides, that any person who prevents, hinders, controls,
or intimidates any person from exercising the right of suffrage,
to whom it is secured by the fifteenth amendment, or attempts to
do so, by bribery or threats of violence, or deprivation of
property or employment, shall be guilty, &c.

The sixth section is as follows:----

'That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or
go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of
another, with intent to violate any provisions of this act, or to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent
to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right
or privilege granted or secured to him by the constitution or laws
of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same,
such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion
of the court,--the fine not to exceed $5,000, and the imprisonment
not to exceed ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter
ineligible to, and disabled from holding, any office or place of
honor, profit, or trust created by the constitution or laws of the
United States.'

This case was argued at the October Term, 1874, by Mr.
Attorney- General Williams and Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips for
the plaintiff in error; and by Mr. Reverdy Johnson, Mr. David
Dudley Field, Mr. Philip Phillips, and Mr. R. H. Marr for the
defendants in error.

1. Citizens are the members of the political community to which
they belong. They are the people who compose the community, and
who, in their associated capacity, have established or submitted
themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of
their general welfare and the protection of their individual as
well as their collective rights. The duty of a government to afford
protection is limited always by the power it possesses for that
purpose.

2. There is in our political system a government of each of the
several States, and a government of the United States. Each is
distinct from the others, and has citizens of its own, who owe it
allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must
protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the
United States and a citizen of a State; but his rights of
citizenship under one of these governments will be different from
those he has under the other.

3. The government of the United States, although it is, within the
scope of its powers, supreme and beyond the States, can neither
grant nor secure to its citizens rights or privileges which are not
expressly or by implication placed under its jurisdiction. All that
cannot be so granted or secured are left to the exclusive
protection of the States.

4. The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful
purposes, with the obligation on the part of the States to afford
it protection, existed long before the adoption of the
Constitution. The first amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting
Congress from abridging the right to assemble and petition, was not
intended to limit the action of the State governments in respect
to their own citizens, but to operate upon the national government
alone. It left the authority of the States unimpaired, added
nothing to the already existing powers of the United States, and
guaranteed the continuance of the right only against Congressional
interference. The people, for their protection in the enjoyment of
it, must, therefore, look to the States, where the power for that
purpose was originally placed.

5. The right of the people peaceably to assemble, for the purpose
of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any
thing else connected with the powers or duties of the national
government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such,
under the protection of and guaranteed by the United States. The
very idea of a government republican in form implies that right,
and an invasion of its presents a case within the sovereignty of
the United States.

6. The right to bear arms is not granted by the Constitution;
neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its
existence. The second amendment means no more than that it shall
not be infringed by Congress, and has no other effect than to
restrict the powers of the national government.

7. Sovereignty, for the protection of the rights of life and
personal liberty within the respective States, rests alone with the
States.

8. The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
and from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws; but it adds nothing to the rights of one
citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional
guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the
fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of
society. The duty of protecting all its citizens in the enjoyment
of an equality of rights was originally assumed by the States, and
it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United
States is to see that the States do not

deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more. The
power of the national government is limited to the enforcement of
this guaranty.

9. In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 178, this court decided that
the Constitution of the United States has not conferred the right
of suffrage upon any one, and that the United States have no voters
of their own creation in the States. In United States v. Reese et
al., supra, p. 214, it held that the fifteenth amendment has
invested the citizens of the United States with a new
constitutional right, which is, exemption from discrimination in
the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude. The right to vote in the States
comes from the States; but the right of exemption from the
prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The first
has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United
States, but the last has been.

10. The counts of an indictment which charge the defendants with
having banded and conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and
intimidate citizens of the United States, of African descent,
therein named; and which in substance respectively allege that the
defendants intended thereby to hinder and prevent such citizens in
the free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges granted
and secured to them in common with other good citizens by the
constitution and laws of the United States; to hinder and prevent
them in the free exercise of their right peacefully to assemble for
lawful purposes; prevent and hinder them from bearing arms for
lawful purposes; deprive them of their respective several lives and
liberty of person without due process of law; prevent and hinder
them in the free exercise and enjoyment of their several right to
the full and equal benefit of the law; prevent and hinder them in
the free exercise and enjoyment of their several and respective
right to vote at any election to be thereafter by law had and held
by the people in and of the State of Louisiana, or to put them in
great fear of bodily harm, and to injure and oppress them, because,
being and having been in all things qualified, they had voted at
an election theretofore had and held according to law by the people
of said State,--do not present a case within the sixth section of
the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. 141). To bring a case
within the operation of that statute, it must appear that the right
the enjoyment of which the conspirators intended to hinder or
prevent was one granted or secured by the constitution or laws of
the United States. If it does not so appear, the alleged offence
in not indictable under any act of Congress.

11. The counts of an indictment which, in general language, charge
the defendants with an intent to hinder and prevent citizens of the
United States, of African descent, therein named, in the free
exercise and enjoyment of the rights, privileges, immunities, and
protection, granted and secured to them respectively as citizens
of the United States, and of the State of Louisiana, because they
were persons of African descent, and with the intent to hinder and
prevent them in the several and free exercise and enjoyment of
every, each, all, and singular the several rights and privileges
granted and secured to them by the constitution and laws of the
United States, do not specify any particular right the enjoyment
of which the conspirators intended to hinder or prevent, are too
vague and general, lack the certainty and precision required by the
established rule of criminal pleading, and are therefore not good
and sufficient in law.

12. In criminal cases, prosecuted under the laws of the United
States, the accused has the constitutional right 'to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation.' The indictment must set
forth the offence with clearness and all necessary certainty, to
apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged; and
every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be
accurately and clearly alleged. It is an elementary principle of
criminal pleading, that, where the definition of an offence,
whether it be at common law or by statute, includes generic terms,
it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence
in the same generic terms as in the definition, but it must state
the species,--it must descend to particulars. The object of the
indictment is,--first, to furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make
his defence, and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and,
second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may
decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction,
if one should be had. For this, facts are to be stated, not
conclusions of law alone. A crime is made up of acts and intent;
and these must be set forth in the indictment, with reasonable
particularity of time, place, and circumstances.

13. By the act under which this indictment was found, the crime is
made to consist in the unlawful combination with an intent to
prevent the enjoyment of any right granted or secured by the
Constitution, &c. All rights are not so granted or secured. Whether
one is so or not is a question of law, to be decided by the court.
The indictment should, therefore, state the particulars, to inform
the court as well as the accused. It must appear from the
indictment that the acts charged will, if proved, support a
conviction for the offence alleged.



MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes here with a certificate by the judges of the
Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana that they were divided
in opinion upon a question which occurred at the hearing. It
presents for our consideration an indictment containing sixteen
counts, divided into two series of eight counts each, based upon
sect. 6 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. That section is as
follows:----

'That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or
go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of
another, with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent
to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right
or privilege granted or secured to him by the constitution or laws
of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same,
such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion
of the court,--the fine not to exceed $5,000, and the imprisonment
not to exceed ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter
ineligible to, and disabled from holding, any office or place of
honor, profit, or trust created by the constitution or laws of the
United States.' 16 Stat. 141.

The question certified arose upon a motion in arrest of judgment
after a verdict of guilty generally upon the whole sixteen counts,
and is stated to be, whether 'the said sixteen counts of said
indictment are severally good and sufficient in law, and contain
charges of criminal matter indictable under the laws of the United
States.'

The general charge in the first eight counts is that of 'banding,'
and in the second eight, that of 'conspiring' together to injure,
oppress, threaten, and intimidate Levi Nelson and Alexander
Tillman, citizens of the United States, of African descent and
persons of color, with the intent thereby to hinder and prevent
them in their free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges
'granted and secured' to them 'in common with all other good
citizens of the United States by the constitution and laws of the
United States.'

The offences provided for by the statute in question do not consist
in the mere 'banding' or 'conspiring' of two or more persons
together, but in their banding or conspiring with the intent, or
for any of the purposes, specified. To bring this case under the
operation of the statute, therefore, it must appear that the right,
the enjoyment of which the conspirators intended to hinder or
prevent, was one granted or secured by the constitution or laws of
the United States. If it does not so appear, the criminal matter
charged has not been made indictable by any act of Congress.

We have in our political system a government of the United States
and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these
governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of
its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its
jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same
time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State, but
his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be
different from those he has under the other. Slaughter- House
Cases, 16 Wall. 74.

Citizens are the members of the political community to which they
belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who, in
their associated capacity, have established or submitted themselves
to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general
welfare and the protection of their individual as well as their
collective rights. In the formation of a government, the people may
confer upon it such powers as they choose. The government, when so
formed, may, and when called upon should, exercise all the powers
it has for the protection of the rights of its citizens and the
people within its jurisdiction; but it can exercise no other. The
duty of a government to afford protection is limited always by the
power it possesses for that purpose.

Experience made the fact known to the people of the United States
that they required a national government for national purposes. The
separate governments of the separate States, bound together by the
articles of confederation alone, were not sufficient for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people in respect to
foreign nations, or for their complete protection as citizens of
the confederated States. For this reason, the people of the United
States, 'in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty'
to themselves and their posterity (Const. Preamble), ordained and
established the government of the United States, and defined its
powers by a constitution, which they adopted as its fundamental
law, and made its rule of action.

The government thus established and defined is to some extent a
government of the States in their political capacity. It is also,
for certain purposes, a government of the pepole. Its powers are
limited in number, but not in degree. Within the scope of its
powers, as enumerated and defined, it is supreme and above the
States; but beyond, it has no existence. It was erected for special
purposes, and endowed with all the powers necessary for its own
preservation and the accomplishment of the ends its people had in
view. It can neither grant nor secure to its citizens any right or
privilege not expressly or by implication placed under its
jurisdiction.

The people of the United States resident within any State are
subject to two governments: one State, and the other National; but
there need be no conflict between the two. The powers which one
possesses, the other does not. They are established for different
purposes, and have separate jurisdictions. Together they make one
whole, and furnish the people of the United States with a complete
government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home
and abroad. True, it may sometimes happen that a person is amenable
to both jurisdictions for one and the same act. Thus, if a marshal
of the United States is unlawfully resisted while executing the
process of the courts within a State, and the resistance is
accompanied by an assault on the officer, the sovereignty of the
United States is violated by the resistance, and that of the State
by the breach of peace, in the assault. So, too, if one passes
counterfeited coin of the United States within a State, it may be
an offence against the United States and the State: the United
States, because it discredits the coin; and the State, because of
the fraud upon him to whom it is passed. This does not, however,
necessarily imply that the two governments possess powers in
common, or bring them into conflict with each other. It is the
natural consequence of a citizenship which owes allegiance to
two sovereignties, and claims protection from both. The citizen
cannot complain, because he has voluntarily submitted himself to
such a form of government. He owes allegiance to the two
departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must
pay the penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws.
In return, he can demand protection from each within its own
jurisdiction.

The government of the United States is one of delegated powers
alone. Its authority is defined and limited by the Constitution.
All powers not granted to it by that instrument are reserved to the
States or the people. No rights can be acquired under the
constitution or laws of the United States, except such as the
government of the United States has the authority to grant or
secure. All that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the
protection of the States.

We now proceed to an examination of the indictment, to ascertain
whether the several rights, which it is alleged the defendants
intended to interfere with, are such as had been in law and in fact
granted or secured by the constitution or laws of the United
States.

The first and ninth counts state the intent of the defendants to
have been to hinder and prevent the citizens named in the free
exercise and enjoyment of their 'lawful right and privilege to
peaceably assemble together with each other and with other citizens
of the United States for a peaceful and lawful purpose.' The right
of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed
long before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.
In fact, it is, and always has been, one of the attributes of
citizenship under a free government. It 'derives its source,' to
use the language of Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 211, 'from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by
civilized man throughout the world.' It is found wherever
civilization exists. It was not, therefore, a right granted to the
people by the Constitution. The government of the United States
when established found it in existence, with the obligation on the
part of the States to afford it protection. As no direct power over
it was granted to Congress, it remains, according to the ruling in
Gibbons v. Ogden, id. 203, subject to State jurisdiction. Only
such existing rights were committed by the people to the protection
of Congress as came within the general scope of the authority
granted to the national government.

The first amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from
abridging 'the right of the people to assemble and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.' This, like the other
amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended
to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their
own citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone.
Barron v. The City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 250; Lessee of Livingston
v. Moore, id. 551; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 434; Smith v. Maryland, 18
id. 76; Withers v. Buckley, 20 id. 90; Pervear v. The Commonwealth,
5 Wall. 479; Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 7 id. 321; Edwards v.
Elliott, 21 id. 557. It is now too late to question the correctness
of this construction. As was said by the late Chief Justice, in
Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 325, 'the scope and
application of these amendments are no longer subjects of
discussion here.' They left the authority of the States just where
they found it, and added nothing to the already existing powers of
the United States.

The particular amendment now under consideration assumes the
existence of the right of the people to assemble for lawful
purposes, and protects it against encroachment by Congress. The
right was not created by the amendment; neither was its continuance
guaranteed, except as against congressional interference. For their
protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the
States. The power for that purpose was originally placed there, and
it has never been surrendered to the United States.

The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing
else connected with the powers or the duties of the national
government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such,
under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The
very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on
the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of
grievances. If it had been alleged in these counts that the
object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a
purpose, the case would have been within the statute, and within
the scope of the sovereignty of the United States. Such, however,
is not the case. The offence, as stated in the indictment, will be
made out, if it be shown that the object of the conspiracy was to
prevent a meeting for any lawful purpose whatever.

The second and tenth counts are equally defective. The right there
specified is that of 'bearing arms for a lawful purpose.' This is
not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second
amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has
been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by
Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect
than to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the
people to look for their protection against any violation by their
fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes, to what is called, in
The City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, the 'powers which relate
to merely municipal legislation, or what was, perhaps, more
properly called internal police,' 'not surrendered or restrained'
by the Constituton of the United States.

The third and eleventh counts are even more objectionable. They
charge the intent to have been to deprive the citizens named, they
being in Louisiana, 'of their respective several lives and liberty
of person without due process of law.' This is nothing else than
alleging a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder citizens of the
United States, being within the territorial jurisdiction of the
State of Louisiana. The rights of life and personal liberty are
natural rights of man. 'To secure these rights,' says the
Declaration of Independence, 'governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.' The
very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union
under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their
boundaries in the enjoyment of these 'unalienable rights with which
they were endowed by their Creator.' Sovereignty, for this purpose,
rests alone with the States. It is no more the duty or within the
power of the United States to punish for a conspiracy to
falsely imprison or murder within a State, than it would be to
punish for false imprisonment or murder itself.

The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against
another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any
encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong
to every citizen as a member of society. As was said by Mr. Justice
Johnson, in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 244, it secures
'the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private
rights and distributive justice.' These counts in the indictment
do not call for the exercise of any of the powers conferred by this
provision in the amendment.

The fourth and twelfth counts charge the intent to have been to
prevent and hinder the citizens named, who were of African descent
and persons of color, in 'the free exercise and enjoyment of their
several right and privilege to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings, then and there, before that time, enacted or
ordained by the said State of Louisiana and by the United States;
and then and there, at that time, being in force in the said State
and District of Louisiana aforesaid, for the security of their
respective persons and property, then and there, at that time
enjoyed at and within said State and District of Louisiana by white
persons, being citizens of said State of Louisiana and the United
States, for the protection of the persons and property of said
white citizens.' There is no allegation that this was done because
of the race or color of the persons conspired against. When
stripped of its verbiage, the case as presented amounts to nothing
more than that the defendants conspired to prevent certain citizens
of the United States, being within the State of Louisiana, from
enjoying the equal protection of the laws of the State and of the
United States.

The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;
but this provision does not, any more than the one which precedes
it, and which we have just considered, add any thing to the
rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against
another. The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of
republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to
protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if
within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the States;
and it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the
United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This
the amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national
government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.

No question arises under the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866 (14
Stat. 27), which is intended for the protection of citizens of the
United States in the enjoyment of certain rights, without
discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, because, as has already been stated, it is nowhere
alleged in these counts that the wrong contemplated against the
rights of these citizens was on account of their race or color.

Another objection is made to these counts, that they are too vague
and uncertain. This will be considered hereafter, in connection
with the same objection to other counts.

The sixth and fourteenth counts state the intent of the defendants
to have been to hinder and prevent the citizens named, being of
African descent, and colored, 'in the free exercise and enjoyment
of their several and respective right and privilege to vote at any
election to be thereafter by law had and held by the people in and
of the said State of Louisiana, or by the people of and in the
parish of Grant aforesaid.' In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 178,
we decided that the Constitution of the United States has not
conferred the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the United
States have no voters of their own creation in the States. In
United States v. Reese et al., supra, p. 214, we hold that the
fifteenth amendment has invested the citizens of the United States
with a new constitutional right, which is, exemption from
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. From this it
appears that the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of
national citizenship; but that exemption from discrimination in the
exercise of that right on account of race, &c., is. The right
to vote in the States comes from the States; but the right of
exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United
States. The first has not been granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States; but the lat has been.

Inasmuch, therefore, as it does not appear in these counts that the
intent of the defendants was to prevent these parties from
exercising their right to vote on account of their race, &c., it
does not appear that it was their intent to interfere with any
right granted or secured by the constitution or laws of the United
States. We may suspect that race was the cause of the hostility;
but it is not so averred. This is material to a description of the
substance of the offence, and cannot be supplied by implication.
Every thing essential must be charged positively, and not
inferentially. The defect here is not in form, but in substance.

The seventh and fifteenth counts are no better than the sixth and
fourteenth. The intent here charged is to put the parties named in
great fear of bodily harm, and to injure and oppress them, because,
being and having been in all things qualified, they had voted 'at
an election before that time had and held according to law by the
people of the said State of Louisiana, in said State, to wit, on
the fourth day of November, A.D. 1872, and at divers other
elections by the people of the State, also before that time had and
held according to law.' There is nothing to show that the elections
voted at were any other than State elections, or that the
conspiracy was formed on account of the race of the parties against
whom the conspirators were to act. The charge as made is really of
nothing more than a conspiracy to commit a breach of the peace
within a State. Certainly it will not be claimed that the United
States have the power or are required to do mere police duly in the
States. If a State cannot protect itself against domestic violence,
the United States may, upon the call of the executive, when the
legislature cannot be convened, lend their assistance for that
purpose. This is a guaranty of the Constitution (art. 4, sect. 4);
but it applies to no case like this.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the first, second, third,
fourth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth counts do not contain charges of a
criminal nature made indictable under the laws of the United
States, and that consequently they are not good and sufficient in
law. They do not show that it was the intent of the defendants, by
their conspiracy, to hinder or prevent the enjoyment of any right
granted or secured by the Constitution.

We come now to consider the fifth and thirteenth and the eighth and
sixteenth counts, which may be brought together for that purpose.
The intent charged in the fifth and thirteenth is 'to hinder and
prevent the parties in their respective free exercise and enjoyment
of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection granted and
secured to them respectively as citizens of the United States, and
as citizens of said State of Louisiana,' 'for the reason that they,
. . . being then and there citizens of said State and of the United
States, were persons of African descent and race, and persons of
color, and not white citizens thereof;' and in the eighth and
sixteenth, to hinder and prevent them 'in their several and
respective free exercise and enjoyment of every, each, all, and
singular the several rights and privileges granted and secured to
them by the constitution and laws of the United States.' The same
general statement of the rights to be interfered with is found in
the fifth and thirteenth counts.

According to the view we take of these counts, the question is not
whether it is enough, in general, to describe a statutory offence
in the language of the statute, but whether the offence has here
been described at all. The statute provides for the punishment of
those who conspire 'to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and
enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by
the constitution or laws of the United States.' These counts in the
indictment charge, in substance, that the intent in this case was
to hinder and prevent these citizens in the free exercise and
enjoyment of 'every, each, all, and singular' the rights granted
them by the Constitution, &c. There is no specification of any
particular right. The language is broad enough to cover all.

In criminal cases, prosecuted under the laws of the United States,
the accused has the constitutional right 'to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation.' Amend. VI. In United
States v. Mills, 7 Pet. 142, this was construed to mean, that the
indictment must set forth the offence 'with clearness and all
necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with which
he stands charged;' and in United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 174,
that 'every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be
accurately and clearly alleged.' It is an elementary principle of
criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offence, whether
it be at common law or by statute, 'includes generic terms, it is
not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence in the
same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the
species,--it must descend to particulars. 1 Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pl.,
291. The object of the indictment is, first, to furnish the accused
with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make his defence, and avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause; and, second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction, if one should be had. For this, facts are to be
stated, not conclusions of law alone. A crime is made up of acts
and intent; and these must be set forth in the indictment, with
reasonable particularity of time, place, and circumstances.

It is a crime to steal goods and chattels; but an indictment would
be bad that did not specify with some degree of certainty the
articles stolen. This, because the accused must be advised of the
essential particulars of the charge against him, and the court must
be able to decide whether the property taken was such as was the
subject of larceny. So, too, it is in some States a crime for two
or more persons to conspire to cheat and defraud another out of his
property; but it has been held that an indictment for such an
offence must contain allegations setting forth the means proposed
to be used to accomplish the purpose. This, because, to make such
a purpose criminal, the conspiracy must be to cheat and defraud in
a mode made criminal by statute; and as all cheating and defrauding
has not been made criminal, it is necessary for the indictment to
state the means proposed, in order that the court may see that
they are in fact illegal. State v. Parker, 43 N. H. 83; State v.
Keach, 40 Vt. 118; Alderman v. The People, 4 Mich. 414; State v.
Roberts, 34 Me. 32. In Maine, it is an offence for two or more to
conspire with the intent unlawfully and wickedly to commit any
crime punishable by imprisonment in the State prison (State v.
Roberts); but we think it will hardly be claimed that an indictment
would be good under this statute, which charges the object of the
conspiracy to have been 'unlawfully and wickedly to commit each,
every, all, and singular the crimes punishable by imprisonment in
the State prison.' All crimes are not so punishable. Whether a
particular crime be such a one or not, is a question of law. The
accused has, therefore, the right to have a specification of the
charge against him in this respect, in order that he may decide
whether he should present his defence by motion to quash, demurrer,
or plea; and the court, that it may determine whether the facts
will sustain the indictment. So here, the crime is made to consist
in the unlawful combination with an intent to prevent the enjoyment
of any right granted or secured by the Constitution, &c. All rights
are not so granted or secured. Whether one is so or not is a
question of law, to be decided by the court, not the prosecutor.
Therefore, the indictment should state the particulars, to inform
the court as well as the accused. It must be made to appear--that
is to say, appears from the indictment, without going further--
that the acts charged will, if proved, support a conviction for the
offence alleged.

But it is needless to pursue the argument further. The conclusion
is irresistible, that these counts are too vague and general. They
lack the certainty and precision required by the established rules
of criminal pleading. It follows that they are not good and
sufficient in law. They are so defective that no judgment of
conviction should be pronounced upon them.

The order of the Circuit Court arresting the judgment upon the
verdict is, therefore, affirmed; and the cause remanded, with
instructions to discharge the defendants.



MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD dissenting.

I concur that the judgment in this case should be arrested, but for
reasons quite different from those given by the court.

Power is vested in Congress to enforce by appropriate
legislation the prohibition contained in the fourteenth amendment
of the Constitution; and the fifth section of the Enforcement Act
provides to the effect, that persons who prevent, hinder, control,
or intimidate, or who attempt to prevent, hinder, control, or
intimidate, any person to whom the right of suffrage is secured or
guaranteed by that amendment, from exercising, or in exercising
such right, by means of bribery or threats; of depriving such
person of employment or occupation; or of ejecting such person from
rented house, lands, or other property; or by threats of refusing
to renew leases or contracts for labor; or by threats of violence
to himself or family,--such person so offending shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined
or imprisoned, or both, as therein provided. 16 Stat. 141.

Provision is also made, by sect. 6 of the same act, that, if two
or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise,
upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with
intent to violate any provision of that act, or to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or
hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege
granted or secured to him by the constitution and laws of the
United States, or because of his having exercised the same, such
persons shall be deemed guilty of felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, and be further
punished as therein provided.

More than one hundred persons were jointly indicted at the April
Term, 1873, of the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Louisiana, charged with offences in violation of the
provisions of the Enforcement Act. By the record, it appears that
the indictment contained thirty-two counts, in two series of
sixteen counts each: that the first series were drawn under the
fifth and sixth sections of the act; and that the second series
were drawn under the seventh section of the same act; and that the
latter series charged that the prisoners are guilty of murder
committed by them in the act of violating some of the provisions
of the two preceding sections of that act.

Eight of the persons named in the indictment appeared on the
10th of June, 1874, and went to trial under the plea of not guilty,
previously entered at the time of their arraignment. Three of those
who went to trial--to wit, the three defendants named in the
transcript--were found guilty by the jury on the first series of
the counts of the indictment, and not guilty on the second series
of the counts in the same indictment.

Subsequently the convicted defendants filed a motion for a new
trial, which motion being overruled they filed a motion in arrest
of judgment. Hearing was had upon that motion; and the opinions of
the judges of the Circuit Court being opposed, the matter in
difference was duly certified to this court, the question being
whether the motion in arrest of judgment ought to be granted or
denied.

Two only of the causes of arrest assigned in the motion will be
considered in answering the questions certified: (1.) Because the
matters and things set forth and charged in the several counts in
question do not constitute offences against the laws of the United
States, and do not come within the purview, true intent, and
meaning of the Enforcement Act. (2.) Because the several counts of
the indictment in question are too vague, insufficient, and
uncertain to afford the accused proper notice to plead and prepare
their defence, and do not set forth any offence defined by the
Enforcement Act.

Four other causes of arrest were assigned; but, in the view taken
of the case, it will be sufficient to examine the two causes above
set forth.

Since the questions were certified into this court, the parties
have been fully heard in respect to all the questions presented for
decision in the transcript. Questions not pressed at the argument
will not be considered; and, inasmuch as the counsel in behalf of
the United States confined their arguments entirely to the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and sixteenth counts of the first series
in the indictment, the answers may well be limited to these counts,
the others being virtually abandoned. Mere introductory allegations
will be omitted as unimportant, for the reason that the questions
to be answered relate to the allegations of the respective counts
describing the offence.

As described in the thirteenth count, the charge is, that the 
defendants did, at the time and place mentioned, combine, conspire,
and confederated together, between and among themselves, for and
with the unlawful and felonious intent and purpose one Levi Nelson
and one Alexander Tillman, each of whom being then and there a
citizen of the United States, of African descent, and a person of
color, unlawfully and feloniously to injure, oppress, threaten, and
intimidate, with the unlawful and felonious intent thereby the said
persons of color, respectively, then and there to hinder and
prevent in their respective and several free exercise and enjoyment
of the rights, privileges, and immunities, and protection, granted
and secured to them respectively as citizens of the United States
and citizens of the State, by reason of their race and color; and
because that they, the said persons of color, being then and there
citizens of the State and of the United States, were then and there
persons of African descent and race, and persons of color, and not
white citizens thereof; the same being a right or privilege granted
or secured to the said persons of color respectively, in common
with all other good citizens of the United States, by the Federal
Constitution and the laws of Congress.

Matters of law conceded, in the opinion of the court, may be
assumed to be correct without argument; and, if so, then discussion
is not necessary to show that every ingredient of which an offence
is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged in the
indictment, or the indictment will be bad, and may be quashed on
motion, or the judgment may be arrested before sentence, or be
reversed on a writ of error. United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 174.

Offences created by statute, as well as offences at common law,
must be accurately and clearly described in an indictment; and, if
the offence cannot be so described without expanding the
allegations beyond the mere words of the statute, then it is clear
that the allegations of the indictment must be expanded to that
extent, as it is universally true that no indictment is sufficient
which does not accurately and clearly allege all the ingredients
of which the offence is composed, so as to bring the accused within
the true intent and meaning of the statute defining the offence.
Authorities of great weight, besides those referred to by me, in
the dissenting opinion just read, may be found in support of
that proposition. 2 East, P. C. 1124; Dord v. People, 9 Barb. 675;
Ike v. State, 23 Miss. 525; State v. Eldridge, 7 Eng. 608.

Every offence consists of certain acts done or omitted under
certain circumstances; and, in the indictment for the offence, it
is not sufficient to charge the accused generally with having
committed the offence, but all the circumstances constituting the
offence must be specially set forth. Arch. Cr. Pl., 15th ed., 43.

Persons born on naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens thereof; and the fourteenth
amendment also provides, that no State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States. Congress may, doubtless, prohibit any
violation of that provision, and may provide that any person
convicted of violating the same shall be guilty of an offence, and
be subject to such reasonable punishment as Congress may prescribe.

Conspiracies of the kind described in the introductory clause of
the sixth section of the Enforcement Act are explicitly forbidden
by the subsequent clauses of the same section; and it may be that
if the indictment was for a conspiracy at common law, and was
pending in a tribunal having jurisdiction of common-law offences,
the indictment in its present form might be sufficient, even though
it contains no definite allegation whatever of any particular overt
act committed by the defendants in pursuance of the alleged
conspiracy.

Decided cases may doubtless be found in which it is held that an
indictment for a conspiracy, at common law, may be sustained where
there is an unlawful agreement between two or more persons to do
an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means; and
authorities may be referred to which support the proposition, that
the indictment, if the conspiracy is well pleaded, is sufficient,
even though it be not alleged that any overt act had been done in
pursuance of the unlawful combination.

Suffice it to say, however, that the authorities to that effect are
opposed by another class of authorities equally respectable, and
even more numerous, which decide that the indictment is bad
unless it is alleged that some overt act was committed in pursuance
of the intent and purpose of the alleged conspiracy; and in all the
latter class of cases it is held, that the overt act, as well as
the unlawful combination, must be clearly and accurately alleged.

Two reasons of a conclusive nature, however, may be assigned which
show, beyond all doubt, that it is not necessary to enter into the
inquiry which class of those decisions is correct.

1. Because the common law is not a source of jurisdiction in the
circuit courts, nor in any other Federal court.

Circuit Courts have no common-law jurisdiction of offences of any
grade or description; and it is equally clear that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not extend to any case or
any question, in a case not within the jurisdiction of the
subordinate Federal courts. State v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How.
503; United States v. Hudson et al., 7 Cranch, 32.

2. Because it is conceded that the offence described in the
indictment is an offence created and defined by an act of Congress.

Indictments for offences created and defined by statute must in all
cases follow the words of the statute: and, where there is no
departure from that rule, the indictment is in general sufficient,
except in cases where the statute is elliptical, or where, by
necessary implication, other constituents are component parts of
the offence; as where the words of the statute defining the offence
have a compound signification, or are enlarged by what immediately
precedes or follows the words describing the offence, and in the
same connection. Cases of the kind do arise, as where, in the
dissenting opinion in United States v. Reese et al., supra, p. 222,
it was held, that the words offer to pay a capitation tax were so
expanded by a succeeding clause of the same sentence that the word
'offer' necessarily included readiness to perform what was offered,
the provision being that the offer should be equivalent to actual
performance if the offer failed to be carried into execution by the
wrongful act or omission of the party to whom the offer was made.

Two offences are in fact created and defined by the sixth section
of the Enforcement Act, both of which consist of a conspiracy
with an intent to perpetrate a forbidden act. They are alike in
respect to the conspiracy; but differ very widely in respect to the
act embraced in the prohibition.

1. Persons, two or more, are forbidden to band or conspire
together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of the
Enforcement Act, which is an act of twenty-three sections.

Much discussion of that clause is certainly unnecessary, as no one
of the counts under consideration is founded on it, or contains any
allegations describing such an offence. Such a conspiracy with
intent to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person, is
also forbidden by the succeeding clause of that section, if it be
done with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and
enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by
the constitution or laws of the United States, or because of having
exercised the same. Sufficient appears in the thirteenth count to
warrant the conclusion, that the grand jury intended to charge the
defendants with the second offence created and defined in the sixth
section of the Enforcement Act.

Indefinite and vague as the description of the offence there
defined, is, it is obvious that it is greatly more so as described
in the allegations of the thirteenth count. By the act of Congress,
the prohibition is extended to any right or privilege granted or
secured by the constitution or laws of Congress; leaving it to the
pleader to specify the particular right or privilege which had been
invaded, in order to give the accusation that certainty which the
rules of criminal pleading everywhere require in an indictment; but
the pleader in this case, overlooking any necessity for any such
specification, and making no attempt to comply with the rules of
criminal pleading in that regard, describes the supposed offence
in terms much more vague and indefinite than those employed in the
act of Congress.

Instead of specifying the particular right or privilege which had
been invaded, the pleader proceeds to allege that the defendants,
with all the others named in the indictment, did combine, conspire,
and confederate together, with the unlawful intent and purpose the
said persons of African descent and persons of color then and
there to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate, and thereby
then and there to hinder and prevent them in the free exercise and
enjoyment of the rights, privileges, and immunities and protection
granted and secured to them as citizens of the United States and
citizens of the State, without any other specification of the
rights, privileges, immunities, and protection which had been
violated or invaded, or which were threatened, except what follows;
to wit, the same being a right or privilege granted or secured in
common with all other good citizens by the constitution and laws
of the United States.

Vague and indefinite allegations of the kind are not sufficient to
inform the accused in a criminal prosecution of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, within the meaning of the
sixth amendment of the Constitution.

Valuable rights and privileges, almost without number, are granted
and secured to citizens by the constitution and laws of Congress;
none of which may be, with impunity, invaded in violation of the
prohibition contained in that section. Congress intended by that
provision to protect citizens in the enjoyment of all such rights
and privileges; but in affording such protection in the mode there
provided Congress never intended to open the door to the invasion
of the rule requiring certainty in criminal pleading, which for
ages has been regarded as one of the great safeguards of the
citizen against oppressive and groundless prosecutions.

Judge Story says the indictment must charge the time and place and
nature and circumstances of the offence with clearness and
certainty, so that the party may have full notice of the charge,
and be able to make his defence with all reasonable knowledge and
ability. 2 Story, Const., sect. 1785.

Nothing need be added to show that the fourteenth count is founded
upon the same clause in the sixth section of the Enforcement Act
as the thirteenth count, which will supersede the necessity of any
extended remarks to explain the nature and character of the offence
there created and defined. Enough has already been remarked to show
that that particular clause of the section was passed to protect
citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of every right or
privilege granted or secured to them by the constitution and
laws of Congress, and to provide for the punishment of those who
band or conspire together, in the manner described, to injure,
oppress, or intimidate any citizen, to prevent or hinder him from
the free exercise and enjoyment of all such rights or privileges,
or because of his having exercised any such right or privilege so
granted or secured.

What is charged in the fourteenth count is, that the defendants did
combine, conspire, and confederate the said citizens of African
descent and persons of color to injure, oppress, threaten, and
intimidate, with intent the said citizens thereby to prevent and
hinder in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and
privilege to vote at any election to be thereafter had and held
according to law by the people of the State, or by the people of
the parish; they, the defendants, well knowing that the said
citizens were lawfully qualified to vote at any such election
thereafter to be had and held.

Confessedly, some of the defects existing in the preceding count
are avoided in the count in question; as, for example, the
description of the particular right or privilege of the said
citizens which it was the intent of the defendants to invade is
clearly alleged; but the difficulty in the count is, that it does
not allege for what purpose the election or elections were to be
ordered, nor when or where the elections were to be had and held.
All that is alleged upon the subject is, that it was the intent of
the defendants to prevent and hinder the said citizens of African
descent and persons of color in the free exercise and enjoyment of
the right and privilege to vote at any election thereafter to be
had and held, according to law, by the people of the State, or by
the people of the parish, without any other allegation whatever as
to the purpose of the election, or any allegation as to the time
and place when and where the election was to be had and held.

Elections thereafter to be held must mean something different from
pending elections; but whether the pleader means to charge that the
intent and purpose of the alleged conspiracy extended only to the
next succeeding elections to be held in the State or parish, or to
all future elections to be held in the State or parish during the
lifetime of the parties, may admit of a serious question,
which cannot be easily solved by any thing contained in the
allegations of the count.

Reasonable certainty, all will agree, is required in criminal
pleading; and if so it must be conceded, we think, that the
allegation in question fails to comply with that requirement.
Accused persons, as matter of common justice, ought to have the
charge against them set forth in such terms that they may readily
understand the nature and character of the accusation, in order
that they, when arraigned, may know what answer to make to it, and
that they may not be embarrassed in conducting their defence; and
the charge ought also to be laid in such terms that, if the party
accused is put to trial, the verdict and judgment may be pleaded
in bar of a second accusation for the same offence.

Tested by these considerations, it is quite clear that the
fourteenth count is not sufficient to warrant the conviction and
sentence of the accused.

Defects and imperfections of the same kind as those pointed out in
the thirteenth count also exist in the sixteenth count, and of a
more decided character in the latter count than in the former;
conclusive proof of which will appear by a brief examination of a
few of the most material allegations of the charge against the
defendants. Suffice it to say, without entering into details, that
the introductory allegations of the count are in all respects the
same as in the thirteenth and fourteenth counts. None of the
introductory allegations allege that any overt act was perpetrated
in pursuance of the alleged conspiracy; but the jurors proceed to
present that the unlawful and felonious intent and purpose of the
defendants were to prevent and hinder the said citizens of African
descent and persons of color, by the means therein described, in
the free exercise and enjoyment of each, every, all, and singular
the several rights and privileges granted and secured to them by
the constitution and laws of the United States in common with all
other good citizens, without any attempt to describe or designate
any particular right or privilege which it was the purpose and
intent of the defendants to invade, abridge, or deny.

Descriptive allegations in criminal pleading are required to be
reasonably definite and certain, as a necessary safeguard to
the accused against surprise, misconception, and error in
conducting his defence, and in order that the judgment in the case
may be a bar to a second accusation for the same charge.
Considerations of the kind are entitled to respect; but it is
obvious, that, if such a description of the ingredient of an
offence created and defined by an act of Congress is held to be
sufficient, the indictment must become a snare to the accused; as
it is scarcely possible that an allegation can be framed which
would be less certain, or more at variance with the universal rule
that every ingredient of the offence must be clearly and accurately
described so as to bring the defendant within the true intent and
meaning of the provision defining the offence. Such a vague and
indefinite description of a material ingredient of the offence is
not a compliance with the rules of pleading in framing an
indictment. On the contrary, such an indictment is insufficient,
and must be held bad on demurrer or in arrest of judgment.

Certain other causes for arresting the judgment are assigned in the
record, which deny the constitutionality of the Enforcement Act;
but, having come to the conclusion that the indictment is
insufficient, it is not necessary to consider that question.