From: [o--iv--r] at [cs.unc.edu] (Bill Oliver)
Newsgroups: misc.writing
Subject: Political Phil. Gun Control: Uses (was: Fun with Guns)
Date: 14 Jun 1995 12:10:20 -0400


This article is extracted from "The Political Functions of Gun Control" by
Raymond Kessler, in the Firearms and Violence collection.

Kessler notes five political functions of gun control laws, and gives
historical examples of their application.

The five functions he lists are:

1) Gun control increases citizen dependence on government.

One of the functions of the state is to control "disruptive" behavior, some
of which is defined as criminal.  However, since government does not
provide a bodyguard for every citizen and cannot deter, incapacitate, or
rehabilitate every criminal, the protection offered by government is
supplemented by the activities of groups (e.g. neighborhood patrols) and
private individuals.  In all American jurisdictions, private citizens are
authorized to use force to defend themselves, their families, and their
property under certain circumstances...  

... [C]onsider a jurisdiction that severely limits possession of firearms.
Those who are law-abiding will, by definition, no possess proscribed
weapons.  If alternative weapons, devices, or techniques are not available
(or are not perceived to be effective), the more law-abiding citizens will
have to look to government, rather than themselves, for protection.  In
general, the more citizens are dependent on government, the more likely
they are to accept expanded police powers and abuses to deal with crime and
the less likely they are to challenge the status quo.

2,3) Gun control helps prevent opposition to, and facilitates repressive
action by, government.

These political functions have been at least implicitly recognized by
individuals and commissions seeking solutions to the problems of riots and
terrorism.  The Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism of the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommends
legislation designed to reduce the possibility of illegal acquisition and
utilization of firearms by "subversive groups" and effective search
policies to implement laws making the carrying of concealed weapons a
serious offense.

...If government wants to make a strong, unpopular political move against a
population or segments thereof, it would be wise policy to disarm the
population first.  An armed population may deter government action; a
disarmed population is less of a deterrent....Gun control is obviously one
way to limit the coercive resources of opponents or, to use Gurr's terms,
to influence the "coercive balance."(1)

... There are other more individualized ways in which gun control laws may
assist government in dealing with either violent efforts at political
change or, as described later, peaceful reform movements.  Firearms
violations may be trumped up to harass and discredit opponents and justify
their arrest, detention, trial, and punishment [see Soviet section].
Searches for weapons... can provide a cover for invading political
headquarters and the homes of dissidents [for harassment and intelligence
acquisition].

4) Gun control lessens the pressure for political reform.

Another strategy the government can use to defuse potentially explosive
situations is to grant reforms beneficial to dissatisfied groups.  Gurr
points out that if dissidents have arms and sympathy from some of the
military and police, the coercive capacity of the dissidents may increase
to the point where they can "obtain major concessions without having
full-fledged revolutionary organizations or even revolutionary motives."
If these groups are poorly armed,... they pose less of a threat [and thus
the government must make fewer concessions.]

There is another manner in which gun control might lessen the pressures for
reform.  As a panacea for violent crime, gun control can be touted as the
only solution or at  least as an alternative to the solutions of
eliminating poverty, unemployment, racism, and other possible causes of the
violence...

5) Gun control can be selectively enforced.

Because gun control offenses involve possessing, carrying, selling and so
forth, they are crimes in which the persons involved are participating
voluntarily and do not feel victimized.  The individuals possessing weapons
or those involved in illegal firearms transactions are generally not going
to inform on themselves.  These are thus "complaintless" crimes, which are
not easily detected.  The police must seek out these offenses by aggressive
techniques such as entrapment and the utilization of undercover agents and
informers.  Law enforcement personnel can thus choose the individuals or
groups they want to investigate.

Just as laws against marijuana were selectively enforced against unpopular
groups, gun control laws that are seemingly nondiscriminatory and
apolitical can be selectively enforced against persons who are perceived to
constitute a threat to government(2) 
... At the same time, pro-government extremists could be given de facto
immunity from gun control and other laws to promote their intimidation of
and attacks on opposition groups.  For instance, in 1969, hundreds of
demonstrators were machine-gunned by right-wing extremists in Mexico City.
Both possession of automatic weapons and murder are forbidden by law in
Mexico. "Nevertheless, the police made no arrests -- either on the scene or
when the attackers later invaded hospitals to finish off the wounded."(3)




EXAMPLES

1) England and France

In England, from the 1500s through the early 1800s, various governments
took numerous steps to disarm religious and political opponents.  Further,
some of the controversy over the composition, size, utilization, and arming
of the militia was related to the political function of gun control.(4)

...Even the  game laws in England had political functions.  These laws had
an inhibiting effect on the ownership of firearms, since mere possession of
hunting weapons was sometimes the basis for prosecution. The purpose of the
fame laws was at least in part to keep the masses disarmed.  The eminent
eighteenth-century jurist Sir William Balckstone noted that one of the
reasons for the existence of these laws was that they aided in the
"prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to government by
disarming the bulk of the people..."(5)

Later, in response to radical demonstrations in 1819, Parliament passed the
notorious Six Acts, which, among other things, empowered magistrates to
search homes for weapons, confiscate them, and arrest their owners. [Much
of this was in reaction to the French Revolution...] Referring to the Acts,
Wellington wrote," Our example will render some good in France as well as
Germany, and we must hope that the world will escape the universal
revolution which seems to menace us all."(6)


Although space limitations prohibit detailed analysis, the French
experience during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries paralleled
that of England in many respects... 


2) Nazi Germany

....[A]ccording to a commentary of Nazi firearm laws, after the Fuhrer's
takeover the government decisively took away "weapons still remaining in
the hands of people inimical to the State..."(7)

by 1938 the government felt secure enough to pass new gun laws, which would
permit some segments of the population to obtain firearms.  For instance,
under the 1938 "Law of weapons" and subsequent decrees, licenses to obtain
or carry firearms could be issued to persons whose reliability was not in
doubt and who could prove a need for them.  Among the classes who were to
be denied licenses were "gypsies", persons
	
	for whom police surveillance has been declared admissible, or 
	upon whom the loss of civil rights has been imposed, for the 
	duration of the police surveillance or the loss of civic rights;
	[and] persons who have been convicted of treason or high 
	treason, or against whom facts are under consideration which
	justify the assumption that they are acting in a manner 
	inimical to the state.(8)

Jews were also excluded from eligibility for firearms licenses, and since
they could not depend on the government for protection, unarmed Jews were
left virtually defenseless against official and unofficial violence.
Another Nazi firearms law denied licenses to trade in, assemble, or repair
firearms or ammunition "if the applicant, or the persons intended to become
the commercial or technical managers of the operation or trade, or any one
of them, is a Jew."(8) Later, when German Jews and those from occupied
countries were forced into ghettos in Poland, both individual and
collective punishment were meted out when any resident was found in
possession of weapons.  Although there was violent resistance by  many
Jews, they were often plagued by lack of arms.(9)

[Gun control laws were also harsh in occupied countries and were enforced
selectively -- collaborators were allowed to possess weapons.] The
Library of Congress concluded:

	This sampling of German statutes, decrees and other documents
	concerning firearms indicated two parts: first, the profound
	importance the German invaders attached to the possession of
	firearms.  Second, the importance of these proclamations and
	decrees as a technique used by the Germans to obtain and limit
	weapons in the possession of the nationals of the invaded 
	country... A totalitarian society, and particularly a totalitarian
	society occupying a country against its will, simply cannot
	permit the private possession of weapons to any great extent
	except by those who have proven their loyalty.(8)


3) Soviet Union

In the soviet Union, peaceful dissident political activity is subject to
severe sanctions, and the acquisition and possession of firearms are
"subject to severe restrictions and limitations by the state." (10)
The laws essentially ban the private ownership of handguns(11).  In 1978
Soviet dissident Alexander Podrabnik was the subject of an alleged
blackmail attempt by the Soviet government when the KGB(Soviet Secret
Police) arrested his brother Kirill on a trumped-up charge of illegal
possession of firearms.  Because Alexander was known and respected around
the world in the human rights movement and psychiatric profession, the KGB
was reluctant to move directly against him.  There tactics were to
pressure him into emigrating.  When he refused, the KGB planted a pistol
and ammunition in his brother Kirill's apartment.  After Kirill was
arrested, the KGB promised to drop the charges if Alexander would leave
the country. Podrabnick was later tried, convicted, and sentenced to five
years internal exile for is expose of psychiatric abuses in the Soviet
Union.(12)

Soviet dissidents are often subjected to harassment and assault by
vigilantes. Although there is no hard evidence, the dissidents suspect
government acquiescence in if not encouragement of the vigilante activity
and doubt the police will do anything about it(13). The vigilante action
and gun control laws place the dissident in a "can't win" situation.  If
they arm for protection, they will be arrested for violating the gun laws.
If they do not arm, they may not be able to defend themselves and deter
the vigilantes.  The easiest solution is, of course, the one that would
please the government -- stop dissenting.

4) Asia

In December 1979, the Soviets occupied Afganistan under two puppet
regimes.  When the loyalty of some Afgan military battalions was
questioned, the Soviet commanders ordered that they be disarmed.
[Before full military aid from the US became available, the rebels
were surprisingly effective even though their basic weapon was a 
bolt-action local knockoff of the Lee-Enfeild rifle]. After general
strikes, nightly firefights, and ambushes the government declared martial
law in the capital city.  All residents of Kabul were ordered to surrender
their firearms to police within twenty-four hours(14).

[More recently, the same order was used in the face of nationalist
demonstrations in the Soviet republic of Georgia.  All privately
held weapons were confiscated in response to riots.]

In the Philippines, one of the countermeasures used by the government in
dealing with the "Huk" rebellion of the 1950s was gun control.  To 
preclude the possible flow of additional arms and ammunition to subversive
hands, the government increased the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition(15). In 1972, in response to alleged conspiracies
to overthrow the government by violence and subversion, President Marcos
instituted marital law and announced that "the carrying of firearms
outside residences without permission of the Armed Forces of the
Phillipines is punishable with death."  While this edict was later
modified, subsequent measures completely outlawed private possession of
most large caliber handguns and other firearms(16)i....  Allegations of
violations of firearms law and rebellion were used against at least one
prominent political opposition leader, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino
[who was later assassinated]. (17)

The government of Malaysia has been engaged in an armed struggle with
communist insurgents since 1948... After widespread violence in 1975,
amendments to the 1960 Internal Security Act included one of the world's
most severe gun control laws.  A death sentence is mandatory for
individuals convicted of possessing firearms in designated "security
areas" or in circumstances which give rise to a "reasonable presumption"
that the person intends to act or has recently acted in a "manner
prejudicial to public security."(18,19)  Since enactment, at least seven
communist insurgents have been executed and others await execution.

5) South Africa

In the Republic of South Africa, 4.4 million whites exercise almost
complete economic and political control over 19.4 million Africans, 2.4
million Colored (mixed race), and 0.7 million Asians.  Although whites
comprise only 16 percent of the population, they alone elect the
government (which is entirely white), consume 60 percent of the nation's
income, and occupy 86.5 percent of the land(20).

The white population, particularly the Afrikaners..., have fashioned
"white power into an enduring force based on the Bible and the gun";
officially enforced segregation (apartheid) and the Afrikaners' traditional
way of life are aimed at keeping blacks politically powerless.  Because
of fear of the Africans and Coloreds, whites have developed an internal
security apparatus that rivals the Soviet Union in its single-minded and
ruthless repression of dissidents(21).Although the government uses a wide
variety of means of stifling dissent, such as banning, detention without
trial, and torture, it is not above the unnecessary shooting and killing
of unarmed demonstrators (including children) for political purposes.(22)
A white south African observed that police "think they can shoot, arrest
and beat the black back into submission, and on the past record, you have
to conclude that they are right."(23)

For many segments of the white population, the severe measures taken by
the government against nonwhites are not enough to provide security. "Fear
of revolution pervades much of South African life."(24)  The white
community is one of the worlds most heavily armed...  While the government
and white citizens spend millions to arm themselves, the government has
mounted against nonwhites "one of the world's most effective gun control
campaigns."(25) Even the black superhero of a black-oriented comic book
series published by whites speaks out against firearms ownership; some
liberals in South Africa suspect that the comics are aimed at promoting
black subservience to white authorities.(25)

...If nonwhites were not hindered from obtaining firearms, they could 
arm themselves and, because of their superiority in numbers, perhaps
obtain concessions.  Even though the whites have the military hardware,
they are still outnumbered by more than five to one, and armed rebellion
might encourage military intervention by surrounding nations to assist the
black insurrectionists.

Although there is a "Black Power" movement in south Africa, it has
"proven no match for the guns and economic pressure" the white power
structure uses to destroy it.(26)  Even though blacks outnumber whites,
Hoagland concludes that the "odds against a black population that is
barred form obtaining arms seems enormous."  When asked why blacks and
Coloreds do not revolt, a Colored leader responded,"The white man has all
the tanks, the jets and the guns.  We don't have anything.  In a revolt,
the blood that would be shed would be the blood of nonwhites."  A white
opponent of apartheid responded:"Power does not grow out of the barrel of
a gun if you do not have a gun."(26)


6) United States

In the United States, the experience of blacks from slavery through the
1960s was one of the clearest and best-documented examples of the political
functions of gun control.

Seventeenth through Early Twentieth Centuries.

In his study of slave revolts, Aptheker concludes that a ruling class,
often subjected to periods of crisis arising from doubt of its ability to
maintain its power, may be expected to develop complete and thorough
systems of control.(27)  America's slaveocracy developed a number of
methods of suppression and oppression: one of these was gun control.  In
fact, the first recorded legislation concerning blacks in Virginia (1640)
excluded them from owning guns.(28)  Throughout the South, the intense
fear of slave revolts resulted in additional legislation, which included
provisions further restricting the access of slaves to firearms.  The
political functions of these laws were often indicated in their titles,
for example, "An Act for the better preventing of Insurrections by
Negroes."  In 1850 an Alabama legislator recognized the political
functions of gun control when he attempted to minimize fears of the slave
population by pointing out that the slaves were disarmed, unaccustomed to
the use of arms, and thus could be easily suppressed.(27)

...

At the close of the Civil War, Frederick Douglass was concerned that
legislatures in the South still had power to pass laws discriminating
against blacks and predicted that, in addition to other disabilities,
freedmen would be restricted in their access to firearms.(29)  Immediately
after the war, provisional governments set militia organizations that
excluded former slaves and were used to disarm freedmen.  [These militia
were dissolved in some states, but .. ]  One contemporary observer stated,
"It is no longer with them [anti-Reconstruction forces] the number of
votes but the number of guns."  When white supremacists captured the
legislatures, they confirmed Douglass' fears. (30)

The use of firearms by blacks had "social and political implications," and
among the laws designed to maintain what Southern legislators "considered
due subordination of freedmen" were prohibitions against Negroes handling
firearms.  for blacks, firearms had been both a symbol and a means of
keeping their freedom and political power; they were also instruments of
suppression by whites seeking to reestablish the old order.  In the end,
the whites triumphed, and the blacks were effectively disarmed.  Since
they were forbidden to possess firearms, blacks "were rendered defenseless
against assault," and in "parts of the country remote from observation,
the violence and cruelty engendered by Slavery found free scope for 
exercise upon the defenseless Negro."(31)

Public officials "sttod by while murders, beatings and lynchings were
openly perpetrated."(28)  From the 1870s until well into this century, the
handgun laws of "Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, and Texas
deprived citizens of the means of self-defense, cloaking the specially
deputized Klansmen in the safety of their monopoly of arms."(32)

The Black Panthers

The 1960s saw the beginnings of a militant black power movement and one of
the most controversial segments of that movement was the Black Panther
Party (BPP). In response to perceived oppression by white society and
alleged brutality by its agents, the police, the BPP organized for radical
reform and black consciousness-raising and armed themselves for
self-defense.(33)  The Panthers were anti-racist, anti-capitalist,
anti-imperialist, and openly hostile to the police.  The opposed the Viet
Nam war, offered aid to the Viet Cong, and talked openly about obtaining
weapons to use in violent revolution(34).

[The federal government considered them a threat, and] Attorney General
Mitchell ruled that the Panthers were a threat to national security and
thus subject to FBI wiretapping.(35)

A number of observers concluded that at least some of the government
activity against the Panthers was not justified by legitimate law
enforcement concerns and was aimed at destroying the Panthers as a
political force(36).  The BPP was one of the main targets of the FBI's
nationwide counterintelligence operation known as COINTELPRO.  Though some
of COINTELPRO's activities were politically neutral, one of its objectives
was to neutralize, disrupt, and destroy various groups such as the BPP.
The programs unexpressed major premise was that "a law enforcement agency
has the duty to do whatever is necessary to combat perceived threats to
the existing social and political order."(37)  

As the BPP and police engaged in a steadily escalating cycle of
confrontation and violence, the Panthers sought and obtained arms --
partly at least for self-defense.(38)  obtaining weapons, however,
rendered the Panthers vulnerable to both bona fide and politically
motivated enforcement of firearms laws.  Although the Panthers were
raided, arrested, prosecuted, and punished for a wide variety of alleged
offenses, enforcement of firearms laws played a large part in the campaign
against the BPP.  Between 1967 and 1969, BPP members were charged with at
least 130 firearms and weapons offenses(39).  In additions, anti-Panther
sentiment was a factor in the enactment of some new firearms laws.

The BPP was formed in Oakland in 1966, and by 1967 a bill was introduced
in the California legislature to prohibit the carrying of loaded weapons
withing incorporated areas in the state.  The bill -- later enacted --
was, in fact, and anti-Panther bill instigated by the Oakland police and
given impetus by the appearance of numerous armed Panthers in Contra Costa
County (33).  The Panther response to the bill recognized the political
functions of gun control.  The party condemned the bill as "fascist" and
contended that its aim was to keep "black people disarmed and powerless at
the same time that racist police agencies are intensifying the ...
repression of black people."(40) 

When carrying weapons legally, the Panthers were sometimes harassed and
falsely charged with weapons offenses.  In a number of cases, undercover
agents offered and/or provided illegal guns to BPP numbers.  For example,
in April 1969, undercover agents sold machine guns to party members and
then arested them.(41)

The mayor of Seattle turned down a request by the Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms Unit of the IRS that the city cooperate in an "information
gathering" raid on Panther headquarters where illegal firearms were
allegedly being stored.  While the raid never occurred, a number of actual
raids were based on searches for weapons and resulted in seizures of
weapons and arrests for weapons offenses.  Some of these raids were
justified or facilitated by COINTELPRO information.  The most
controversial raid, however, occurred on December 4, 1969, in Chicago.

Since at least 1960 the relationship between Chicago police and the black
community had been one of increasing tension and distrust. In 1969,
police-community relations had reached crisis proportions, and violence
between Panthers and police has escalated steadily.(42)  A paid
COINTELPRO informer who had infiltrated the BPP urged the party to obtain
more weapons and, when they did so, reported to authorities that illegal
weapons could be found at a particular Panther apartment.  The informant
also provided a diagram of the apartment and other intelligence.  A search
warrant for sawed-off shotguns and illegal weapons was then obtained.  The
Comission of Inquiry concluded that it was probable that the real purpose
of the raid was to conduct a surprise attack and that the execution of the
search warrant for weapons was merely a guise(43).

The Commission determined that, contrary to police testimony, the first
shot was fired accidently by a police officer and that only one shot was
fired by the Panthers.  After the police had fired between 80 and 100
shots, the shooting stopped.  Some of the raiders began seizing not only
Panther weapons but also Party books and files.  Two policement had
suffered minor injuries.  Dead were Chicago BPP leader Fred Hampton and
member Mark Clark.  The body of Fred Hampton was found on his bed.  He had
been shot four times -- twice in the head.  There was evidence that at the
time of the raid Hampton was in an unconscious, drugged state.  The
Commission of Inquiry concluded that there was probable cause to believe
the Hampton was murdered -- shot by an officer or officers who could see
his prostrate form lying on his bed.(44)


Federal Gun Laws aimed at Blacks

Robert Sherril's analysis of the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 suggests
that congress passed the Act because of its anticipated political
functions.  Sherrill points out that in the 1960s, white America became
concerned about the "black problem."  The black population had a high rate
of illegitimacy, was blamed for the welfare problem, and was growing
faster than the white population.  The high index crime rates for blacks
caused concern, and the intelligence of blacks was openly questioned(45).

Because of the massive riots by blacks, reports of snipers, and threats of
revolution.... many Americans, both liberal and conservative, were
apprehensive of black insurrection and guerilla warfare.... After the 1967
riot in Plainfield, New Jersey, Governor Hughes ordered a warrantless
house-to-house search  of black areas by the National Guard to find
forty-six carbines allegedly stolen from a nearby arms factory.  No
carbines were found, but many residences were left in shambles(46). 
In an editorial entitled "Disarm the Sniper," the New York Times called
for federal regulation of the domestic gun traffic.(47)
The National Advisory commission on civil disorders recommended further
restrictions on the sale of firearms and the emergency closing of stores
selling firearms during civil disorders. (48)

In reaction to this domestic crisis, Congress panicked and passed the Gun
Control Act of 1968 -- a law they hoped would close the routes by which
blacks were getting guns.  Congress assumed that ghetto blacks were
getting cheap imported military surplus and mail-order guns and thus
decided to cut off these sources while leaving over-the-counter
acquisition open to the affluent.  although the Gun Control Act cam
shortly after the murders of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.,
the Act did nothing about the types of guns used in those assassinations.
Sherrill thus concludes that the law was directed against "the other
threat of the 1960s more omnipresent than the political assassin -- namely
the black rioter."  In sum, Sherrill's thesis is, quite simply, that the
Act was passed not to control guns, but to control blacks.

[While Sherrill's assessment may exaggerate the role of white fear in the
passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968, ] there is another piece of
firearms legislation whose roots in white reaction to the riots and
threats of black militants were quite explicit.  Section (a) (2) of the
Civil Obedience Act of 1968 provides criminal penalties for "Whoever
transports or manufactures for transportation in commerce any firearm, or
explosive or incendiary device knowing or having reason to know that the
same will be used unlawfully in furtherance of a civil disorder..."

The Act was offered on the floor of the Senate by conservative Democrat
Russell Long of Louisiana as an amendment to the Civil rights Act of 1968.
In the Senator's remarks and articles he placed in the record there is
frequent mention of riots and black militant leaders H. Rap Brown and
stokley Carmichael, and references to "open revolt," "violent and bloody
revolution," "aggressive guerilla warfare," and the stockpiling of arms
for use in next summer's riots.  Long stated that his proposal of the
Civil Obedience Act stemmed from the "riotous conditions that have plagued
the United States for the past four years, and which were predicted for
the summer of 1967."(49)

Although there was at the time some exaggeration of the use of firearms by
and the political consciousness of rioters, as well as of the potential
for black revolt, those perceptions helped secure reform beneficial to
blacks (e.g. the Fair Housing Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968)
as well as new criminal laws such as the Civil Obedience Act.  

If Sherrill's thesis and the above analysis are correct, the parallel with
the slaveowner's response to slave revolts is striking.  In both cases more 
firearms control follows outbreaks of violence by blacks.  The difference
is, of course, that by the  1960s, gun laws directed only at blacks would
have been held unconstitutional and would have damaged the nation's image
abroad.  There can be little doubt, however, that all concerned knew quite
well that the rioters and snipers were overwhelmingly black.

Black crime, rioting, and revolutionary movements indicate problems in the
black community and white dominated society that certain vested interests
would prefer to ignore.  If this crime, rioting, and threats of revolt can
be minimized by gun control without the necessity of major reform
beneficial to blacks, it is a victory for those who have an interest in
the political and economic status quo.  If the black population is armed
and potentially volatile, it cannot be ignored as it was for so many
years.  Such a population places tremendous pressure on government to
grant beneficial reforms and can defend itself against white vigilantes as
it did in the South in the 1960s.





1) T.R. Gurr. Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press. Princeton, N.J.,
1970.

2) John Kaplan. Marijuana: The New Prohibition.  World. N.Y. 1970.

3) J Salter, and D.B.Kates. The Necessity of Access to Firearms by
Dissenters and Minorities Whom Government is Unwilling or Unable to
Protect., in Kates, ed. Restricting Handguns: The Liberal Skeptics Speak
Out. North River Press, Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y., 1979.

4)L Boynton. The Elizabethan Militia. Routledge and Kegan Paul. London.
1967.

5) Sir William Blackstone. Commentaries on the Laws of England. 1783.
Garland, N.Y., 1978.

6) F.B. Artz. Reaction and revolution, 1814-1832. Harper, N.Y. 1934.


7) Library of Congress. Gun control Laws in Foreign Countries.

8) Library of Congress. Federal Firearms Legislation Hearings Before the
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the US Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Washington, DC, GPO, 1968.

9) Yuri Suhl, ed. They fought Back. Schocken Books, NY, 1967 and 
   B. Mark. Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. Shcoken Books. 1975.

10) Amnesty International, Report 1980.  Also Library of Congress, Gun
Control in Foreign Countries.

11) C.J. Hanley, "Gun Controls More Stringent Abroad", Kansas City Star, 2
Dec. 1980.

12) St. Louis Dispatch, 29 Jan 1978.

13) L.A. Times, 29 Sept 1980.


14) Time 3 Mar 1980.

15) J Vargas and R Tarciano.  Communism in Decline: The Huk Campaign.
SEATO, Bankok, 1957.

16) FD Pinpin. The first 107 Presidential Decrees Consequent to
Proclamation Nos 1081/1104. Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines, 1972.

17) NY Times, 9 May 1980.

18) US Dept of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. GPO,
Washington, 1981.

19) Amnesty Intl. Report 1980.

20)United Nations.  Women and Apartheid. Objective Justice 12 (Aug 1980);
J. Hoagland, south Africa . Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1972.

21) Washington Post, 11 Jan 1977, and 14 Jan 1977.

22) Amnest Intl. Report 1980, Washington Post (ref 21), A Reeves. "A
Massacre Recalled" Objective Status, 2, (Jan 1970), D. Herbstein. White
Man, We Want to Talk to You!, Andre Dutch, London, 1979.

23) Washington Post. 14 Jan 1977.

24) Washington Post 13 Jan 1977.

25) "Africa: The Caped Crusader" Newsweek, 14 June 1976.

26) Hoagland. South Africa..

27) H Aptheker.  American Negro Slave Revolts.  International Publishers.
N.Y. 1963.

28) Kennet and Anderson.  The Gun in America: The Origin of a National
Dilemma.  Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn, 1975.

29) Frederick Douglas, speech, May 9, 1865. in H. Hyman, ed. The Radical
Republicans and Reconstruction, 1861-1870. Bobs-Merrill, N.Y.

30) OA Singleterry. Negro militia and Reconstruction. McGraw-Hill, NY.
1957.

31) L Abbott.  "survey of the Freedman's Bureau Work." in Hyman, ed.
Radical Republicanism and Reconstruction.

32) D. Kates, "Hand Gun Prohibition in the United States" See also D.
Kates "Abolition, Deportation, Integration: attitudes Towards Slavery in
the Early Republic" Journal of Negro History 53 [Jan 1968]:37.

33) G. Marine.  The Black Panthers. New American Library, NY, 1969.

34) L.G. Heath. Off the Pigs! Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, NJ, 1976.

35)  Commission of Inquiry into the Black Panthers and the Police.
Search and Destroy.  Metropolitan Applied Research Center, Inc. NY, 1973.

36)LF Palmer, Jr. "Out to get the Panthers" The Nation, 29 (28 July
1969); 
RJ Golstein. Political Repression in Modern America. Schenkman, Cambridge,
Mass, 1978.

37) US Senate. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Senate Report No.
94-775, book III, GPO, Washington, DC, 1976.

38) E Cray. The Enemy in the Streets. Doubleday. Garden City, NY 1972.


39) MR Haskell and L Yablonsky. Criminology. Rand McNally, Chicago, 1978.

40) R Major.  A Panther is a Black Cat. William Morrow, NY 1971.

41) Waldroon, "Militants Stockpile Illegal Guns" in Golstein, Political
Repression.


42)Edward Epstein. "The Panthers and the Police: A Patterns for Genocide?"
The New Yorker, 13 Feb, 1971. Also Waldron, and Heath.

43) Commission of Inquiry, Search and Destroy.

44) Commission of Inquiry.  Also see Hampton v. Hanrahan for a review of
the legal action following the incident.  See also Goldstein, Political
Repression.

45) R. Sherrill.  The Saturday Night Special. Charterhouse. NY 1973.

46) National Advisory Commission Report.

47) NY Times 2 Aug 1967

48) National Advisory Committe Report.

49) US Congress, Senate. Congressional Record, 90th Congress, second
sess., vol 114. GPO, Wash DC, 1968.