From: [c--am--r] at [optilink.COM] (Clayton Cramer)
Newsgroups: alt.news-media,misc.legal,talk.politics.misc
Subject: Re: Waco Coverup Evidence (videotape)
Date: 24 Aug 93 00:06:00 GMT
Here's the article, in the form that it appeared in the San
Jose Mercury-News recently. The references to the figures,
of course, don't mean anything, because I can't turn the neat
little graphs into ASCII. See the table at the end from which
the charts were drawn:
CALIFORNIA'S HANDGUN WAITING PERIOD LAW, 1952-1990:
DID IT WORK?
How effective are handgun waiting periods in preventing
murder? *Do they decrease the murder rate?* Since a national
waiting period for handgun purchases has been touted as a
possible solution to America's murder problem, it is
appropriate to examine how such waiting period laws have
actually worked.
Unfortunately, we don't have the option of comparing
equivalent populations, one with waiting periods, and one
without, for the simple reason that the factors that
determine murder rates are not perfectly understood. The
best we can hope for is to examine the year to year changes
in murder rates before and after a waiting period is created
or extended.
In much the same way that the populations of adjoining
states are not exactly comparable, the demographics of a
state change from year to year. But while the population
characteristics of two adjoining states may be dramatically
different in subtle and unobvious ways, the demographics
*within* a state change very slowly from year to year, as
people age, change their behavior, or move in or out of the
state. As a consequence, while looking at a state's crime
rates through time is still a technique with limitations, it
is nowhere near as prone to problems of non-comparability as
comparing different states.
What result should we expect a waiting period to have?
There are two purposes usually given for firearms waiting
periods: time for a background check on the purchaser; and a
"cooling off" period, while passions abate. As instant
background checks become feasible, and the waiting period is
no longer needed for that purpose, the argument for a
handgun waiting period relies on the claim that waiting
periods save lives because of the "cooling off" of passions.
What evidence does California's experience provide to judge
the accuracy of such a statement?
California is very nearly a perfect example of a laboratory
for waiting period laws. California is sufficiently large,
and its urban populations are so remote from its borders
with adjoining states, that a waiting period is enforced not
only by state law, but also by the limits of geography. In
addition to the Gun Control Act of 1968, which prohibited
interstate purchases of handguns,[1] most of California's
murders happen in a small number of urban counties that are
at least six to eight hours driving time from other states.
Even assuming that a seller could be found *immediately* over
the border in Nevada, Oregon, or Arizona, willing to break
federal law, the travel time alone imposes a waiting period.
California has also had a waiting period for handgun sales
since at least 1923. The California Legislature increased
the handgun waiting period from one to three days in 1955,
to five days in 1965, and to the current 15 days in 1975.[2]
Figure 1, "California Handgun Waiting Periods & Murder
Rates" plots the murder rate per 100,000 Californians during
the period 1952 through 1990.[3] (The use of a murder *rate*,
which counts murders relative to the size of the population,
eliminates changes in the number of murders caused by
changes in the number of people living in California.)
The increase from one to three days in 1955, and from three
to five days in 1965, had no apparent effect on rising
murder rates. Indeed, the California murder rate went from
a bit above 2/100,000 people in 1952, to over 10/100,000 by
1975. While it is certainly true that murder rates rose
throughout the United States during this period, as Figure 1
shows, California's murder rate rose *even faster* than the
murder rate for the rest of the United States.
The first full year of the fifteen day waiting period, 1976,
showed a 1% decline in murder rates - followed by
continually rising murder rates, peaking in 1980. In fact,
murder rates didn't start to decline until 1981, five full
years after the new waiting period took effect. Can the
advocates of waiting periods take heart from the fact that
California's murder rates *eventually* fell?
No. Murder rates in the rest of the United States roughly
rise and fall in parallel with the California murder rates.
Indeed, there is a 0.93 correlation between the California
murder rate, and the murder rate for the rest of the United
States -- astonishingly high. From 1974 onward, the strong
similarity in these curves suggests that factors beyond the
reach of California's laws were by far the most important
determiner of California's murder rate. The California
murder rate fell 36% from 1980 to 1985, but the murder rate
for the rest of the U.S. (the U.S. murder rate with
California's population and murders removed) fell 26% during
the same period.[4]
In much the same way, the murder rate for the rest of the
U.S. rose 13% from 1985 to 1990; during the same period, the
California murder rate also rose 13%. In both cases, a
small "hump" of murders appeared in 1986, there were
declines in 1987 and 1988, then the murder rate increased in
1989 and 1990. Indeed, where California murder rates were
always *lower* than for the rest of the United States before
the 15 day waiting period took effect in 1976, California's
murder rate from 1976 onward was always *higher* than for the
rest of the United States.
What conclusions can we reach from the data? Positive
correlation (that two events happen together with high
frequency) does not prove causality (that one event causes
the other event). As an example, higher ice cream cone
sales are positively correlated with increased rape rates -
but this doesn't mean that ice cream cone sales cause rape.
Rather, one underlying cause of both ice cream cone sales
and rape is hot weather. (It is *probably* because there are
more unlocked windows in the hot summer months, allowing
easier access to victims at home). It is also true that
zero correlation between two events does not *disprove*
causality -- but if no correlation (positive or negative)
between two events can be shown, it should certainly make us
skeptical that a causal relationship exists.
There are a number of possibilities that might explain the
astonishingly high 0.91 correlation between handgun waiting
periods and murder rates in California:
1. Waiting periods may be completely useless for reducing
murder rates. This doesn't mean that a waiting period
doesn't *occasionally* prevent a murder from happening; there
are probably cases where delay may cause reflection, and the
passions of the moment may subside. So what are the
circumstances that would cancel out the murders prevented by
a waiting period?
+ For every murder thus prevented, a victim was similarly
prevented from buying a handgun for self-defense.
+ That so-called "crimes of passion" are not readily
deterred by waiting periods because of substitution of
other weapons.
+ That murderers are already armed, and thus waiting
periods do not delay them.
+ That murderers don't bother buying handguns legally.
2. Waiting periods may be of some limited utility for
reducing murder rates, but were overwhelmed by other
factors.
3. Waiting periods may *increase* murder rates, but the effect
that we see may have been caused by other factors, and the
waiting period made only a minor contribution.
4. Waiting periods may increase murder rates, and the effect
was dramatic enough to explain what we see.
5. Waiting periods may be ineffective, and the political
energy devoted to them (both in support and in opposition),
meant that more effective strategies for reducing murder
simply fell by the wayside, and the murder rate was
unaffected.
Unfortunately, it is impossible, based on the available
data, to determine which of these five possibilities is
correct. In a sense, though, it doesn't really much matter
which of these propositions is the answer to the question.
If possibility #2 above (the most positive interpretation of
the data for advocates of handgun waiting periods) is true,
the effectiveness of handgun waiting periods as *crime
control* is so slight that it doesn't jump out at us from the
data. The political energy devoted to waiting periods thus
makes no sense -- especially since opposition to the Brady
Bill centers on the waiting period aspect of the law.
(Contrary to popular perceptions, the National Rifle
Association has supported, and continues to reluctantly
support an instant background check law as an alternative to
a national waiting period. Their support for such laws is
reluctant, partly because of skepticism that *any* background
check law is going to solve the fundamental causes of
violence in our society.)
The most plausible explanation for the continued popularity
of waiting periods for gun purchase, in spite of their
ineffectiveness, is that they represent a cheap consensus
among politicians. A major division exists in our society
about the best method for solving the problems of murder and
other violent crimes. Conservatives generally favor longer
sentences for violent felonies. This requires more prisons;
prisons cost money. Liberals generally favor more spending
on welfare programs and education as a method of reducing
violent crime; these aren't cheap, either. Politicians are
reluctant to anger taxpayers by use of either strategy. But
creating and lengthening waiting periods for handgun
purchase, because they require no expenditure of public
funds, are an especially tempting "solution" to the violent
crime problem - even when the evidence suggests that they
are *at best*, of only minor value, and at worst, completely
ineffective.
======================================================================
Clayton E. Cramer is a software engineer with a
telecommunications manufacturer in Northern California. His
first book, _By The Dim And Flaring Lamps: The Civil War
Diary of Samuel McIlvaine_, was published in 1990. Research
assistance for this article was provided by Charles R. Hardy.
Notes
[1] 18 USC sec. 922.
[2] Cal. Penal Code Ann. 12071 (1991).
[3] California murder rates for 1952-1989 in this article
come from California Dept. of Justice, _Crimes Reported,
1952-1989, Number and Rate per 100,000 Population_.
California murder rates for 1990 are from California Dept.
of Justice, _California Criminal Justice Profile 1990_, 5.
U.S. murder rates were derived from population and raw
murder figures in FBI _Uniform Crime Reports for the United
States_, 1952-1990.
[4] This is an important distinction, because California's
population is large enough, especially in the latter part of
the period studied, that its murders significantly influence
the U.S. murder rate. Hence, throughout this article, we
are comparing the California murder rate, with the murder
rate of the U.S. minus California.
Year,Waiting Period (in days),California Murder Rate,US - Cal. Murder Rate
'52,1,2.40,4.75
'53,1,2.28,4.62
'54,1,3.33,4.28
'55,1,3.20,4.21
'56,3,3.49,4.18
'57,3,3.50,4.77
'58,3,3.71,4.77
'59,3,3.37,4.96
'60,3,3.91,5.17
'61,3,3.70,4.78
'62,3,3.94,4.56
'63,3,3.71,4.57
'64,3,4.16,4.89
'65,3,4.76,5.10
'66,5,4.69,5.65
'67,5,5.40,6.16
'68,5,5.99,6.89
'69,5,6.93,7.23
'70,5,6.76,7.81
'71,5,8.03,8.54
'72,5,8.69,8.84
'73,5,8.92,9.24
'74,5,9.30,9.67
'75,5,10.20,9.42
'76,15,10.09,8.45
'77,15,11.10,8.41
'78,15,11.39,8.49
'79,15,12.65,9.17
'80,15,14.33,9.63
'81,15,12.98,9.42
'82,15,11.24,8.79
'83,15,10.49,7.97
'84,15,10.63,7.58
'85,15,10.55,7.64
'86,15,11.23,8.23
'87,15,10.59,7.98
'88,15,10.41,8.18
'89,15,10.87,8.40
'90,15,11.88,9.03
--
Clayton E. Cramer {uunet,pyramid}!optilink!cramer My opinions, all mine!
Anyone that calls what comes out of a third trimester abortion "fetal tissue"
and not a baby, needs some glasses.
Newsgroups: alt.news-media,alt.society.civil-liberty,misc.legal,talk.politics.guns,talk.politics.misc
Subject: Re: Waco Coverup Evidence (videotape)
Summary:
Expires:
References: <24h758$[d 6 u] at [paperboy.osf.org]> <[1993 Aug 20 113910 19891] at [lds.loral.com]> <252pt5$[s n v] at [transfer.stratus.com]>
Sender:
Followup-To:
Distribution:
Organization: DSC/Optilink Access Products
Keywords: guns, stupidity, whacko
In article <252pt5$[s n v] at [transfer.stratus.com]> [c d t] at [sw.stratus.com] (C. D. Tavares) writes:
>In article <[1993 Aug 20 113910 19891] at [lds.loral.com]>, [k--d--l] at [lds.loral.com] (Colin Kendall 6842) writes:
>> The best way to find out whether gun contol works would be to find
>> groups of identical cities, and enact gun control in some of them and
>> not others, and observe the results. Unfortunately, there are no
>> identical cities.
>
>Uh, there sure are. They're the same city, before and after gun control.
>
>Try comparing their own crime rates with their own crime rates, before
>and after. And for a lark, try comparing that change with the change
>in the crime rates in surrounding areas and on a national basis. The
>comparison will give you pause.
>
>Clayton Cramer published such a comparison for the state of California
>in a recent issue of American Rifleman. It showed a drastic jump in
>the crime rates AFTER every increase in the California waiting period,
>until the California rate was something like 15(?) times the rate of
>the surrounding areas. Maybe somebody has it online here.
Here's the article, in the form that it appeared in the San
Jose Mercury-News recently. The references to the figures,
of course, don't mean anything, because I can't turn the neat
little graphs into ASCII. See the table at the end from which
the charts were drawn:
CALIFORNIA'S HANDGUN WAITING PERIOD LAW, 1952-1990:
DID IT WORK?
How effective are handgun waiting periods in preventing
murder? *Do they decrease the murder rate?* Since a national
waiting period for handgun purchases has been touted as a
possible solution to America's murder problem, it is
appropriate to examine how such waiting period laws have
actually worked.
Unfortunately, we don't have the option of comparing
equivalent populations, one with waiting periods, and one
without, for the simple reason that the factors that
determine murder rates are not perfectly understood. The
best we can hope for is to examine the year to year changes
in murder rates before and after a waiting period is created
or extended.
In much the same way that the populations of adjoining
states are not exactly comparable, the demographics of a
state change from year to year. But while the population
characteristics of two adjoining states may be dramatically
different in subtle and unobvious ways, the demographics
*within* a state change very slowly from year to year, as
people age, change their behavior, or move in or out of the
state. As a consequence, while looking at a state's crime
rates through time is still a technique with limitations, it
is nowhere near as prone to problems of non-comparability as
comparing different states.
What result should we expect a waiting period to have?
There are two purposes usually given for firearms waiting
periods: time for a background check on the purchaser; and a
"cooling off" period, while passions abate. As instant
background checks become feasible, and the waiting period is
no longer needed for that purpose, the argument for a
handgun waiting period relies on the claim that waiting
periods save lives because of the "cooling off" of passions.
What evidence does California's experience provide to judge
the accuracy of such a statement?
California is very nearly a perfect example of a laboratory
for waiting period laws. California is sufficiently large,
and its urban populations are so remote from its borders
with adjoining states, that a waiting period is enforced not
only by state law, but also by the limits of geography. In
addition to the Gun Control Act of 1968, which prohibited
interstate purchases of handguns,[1] most of California's
murders happen in a small number of urban counties that are
at least six to eight hours driving time from other states.
Even assuming that a seller could be found *immediately* over
the border in Nevada, Oregon, or Arizona, willing to break
federal law, the travel time alone imposes a waiting period.
California has also had a waiting period for handgun sales
since at least 1923. The California Legislature increased
the handgun waiting period from one to three days in 1955,
to five days in 1965, and to the current 15 days in 1975.[2]
Figure 1, "California Handgun Waiting Periods & Murder
Rates" plots the murder rate per 100,000 Californians during
the period 1952 through 1990.[3] (The use of a murder *rate*,
which counts murders relative to the size of the population,
eliminates changes in the number of murders caused by
changes in the number of people living in California.)
The increase from one to three days in 1955, and from three
to five days in 1965, had no apparent effect on rising
murder rates. Indeed, the California murder rate went from
a bit above 2/100,000 people in 1952, to over 10/100,000 by
1975. While it is certainly true that murder rates rose
throughout the United States during this period, as Figure 1
shows, California's murder rate rose *even faster* than the
murder rate for the rest of the United States.
The first full year of the fifteen day waiting period, 1976,
showed a 1% decline in murder rates - followed by
continually rising murder rates, peaking in 1980. In fact,
murder rates didn't start to decline until 1981, five full
years after the new waiting period took effect. Can the
advocates of waiting periods take heart from the fact that
California's murder rates *eventually* fell?
No. Murder rates in the rest of the United States roughly
rise and fall in parallel with the California murder rates.
Indeed, there is a 0.93 correlation between the California
murder rate, and the murder rate for the rest of the United
States -- astonishingly high. From 1974 onward, the strong
similarity in these curves suggests that factors beyond the
reach of California's laws were by far the most important
determiner of California's murder rate. The California
murder rate fell 36% from 1980 to 1985, but the murder rate
for the rest of the U.S. (the U.S. murder rate with
California's population and murders removed) fell 26% during
the same period.[4]
In much the same way, the murder rate for the rest of the
U.S. rose 13% from 1985 to 1990; during the same period, the
California murder rate also rose 13%. In both cases, a
small "hump" of murders appeared in 1986, there were
declines in 1987 and 1988, then the murder rate increased in
1989 and 1990. Indeed, where California murder rates were
always *lower* than for the rest of the United States before
the 15 day waiting period took effect in 1976, California's
murder rate from 1976 onward was always *higher* than for the
rest of the United States.
What conclusions can we reach from the data? Positive
correlation (that two events happen together with high
frequency) does not prove causality (that one event causes
the other event). As an example, higher ice cream cone
sales are positively correlated with increased rape rates -
but this doesn't mean that ice cream cone sales cause rape.
Rather, one underlying cause of both ice cream cone sales
and rape is hot weather. (It is *probably* because there are
more unlocked windows in the hot summer months, allowing
easier access to victims at home). It is also true that
zero correlation between two events does not *disprove*
causality -- but if no correlation (positive or negative)
between two events can be shown, it should certainly make us
skeptical that a causal relationship exists.
There are a number of possibilities that might explain the
astonishingly high 0.91 correlation between handgun waiting
periods and murder rates in California:
1. Waiting periods may be completely useless for reducing
murder rates. This doesn't mean that a waiting period
doesn't *occasionally* prevent a murder from happening; there
are probably cases where delay may cause reflection, and the
passions of the moment may subside. So what are the
circumstances that would cancel out the murders prevented by
a waiting period?
+ For every murder thus prevented, a victim was similarly
prevented from buying a handgun for self-defense.
+ That so-called "crimes of passion" are not readily
deterred by waiting periods because of substitution of
other weapons.
+ That murderers are already armed, and thus waiting
periods do not delay them.
+ That murderers don't bother buying handguns legally.
2. Waiting periods may be of some limited utility for
reducing murder rates, but were overwhelmed by other
factors.
3. Waiting periods may *increase* murder rates, but the effect
that we see may have been caused by other factors, and the
waiting period made only a minor contribution.
4. Waiting periods may increase murder rates, and the effect
was dramatic enough to explain what we see.
5. Waiting periods may be ineffective, and the political
energy devoted to them (both in support and in opposition),
meant that more effective strategies for reducing murder
simply fell by the wayside, and the murder rate was
unaffected.
Unfortunately, it is impossible, based on the available
data, to determine which of these five possibilities is
correct. In a sense, though, it doesn't really much matter
which of these propositions is the answer to the question.
If possibility #2 above (the most positive interpretation of
the data for advocates of handgun waiting periods) is true,
the effectiveness of handgun waiting periods as *crime
control* is so slight that it doesn't jump out at us from the
data. The political energy devoted to waiting periods thus
makes no sense -- especially since opposition to the Brady
Bill centers on the waiting period aspect of the law.
(Contrary to popular perceptions, the National Rifle
Association has supported, and continues to reluctantly
support an instant background check law as an alternative to
a national waiting period. Their support for such laws is
reluctant, partly because of skepticism that *any* background
check law is going to solve the fundamental causes of
violence in our society.)
The most plausible explanation for the continued popularity
of waiting periods for gun purchase, in spite of their
ineffectiveness, is that they represent a cheap consensus
among politicians. A major division exists in our society
about the best method for solving the problems of murder and
other violent crimes. Conservatives generally favor longer
sentences for violent felonies. This requires more prisons;
prisons cost money. Liberals generally favor more spending
on welfare programs and education as a method of reducing
violent crime; these aren't cheap, either. Politicians are
reluctant to anger taxpayers by use of either strategy. But
creating and lengthening waiting periods for handgun
purchase, because they require no expenditure of public
funds, are an especially tempting "solution" to the violent
crime problem - even when the evidence suggests that they
are *at best*, of only minor value, and at worst, completely
ineffective.
======================================================================
Clayton E. Cramer is a software engineer with a
telecommunications manufacturer in Northern California. His
first book, _By The Dim And Flaring Lamps: The Civil War
Diary of Samuel McIlvaine_, was published in 1990. Research
assistance for this article was provided by Charles R. Hardy.
Notes
[1] 18 USC sec. 922.
[2] Cal. Penal Code Ann. 12071 (1991).
[3] California murder rates for 1952-1989 in this article
come from California Dept. of Justice, _Crimes Reported,
1952-1989, Number and Rate per 100,000 Population_.
California murder rates for 1990 are from California Dept.
of Justice, _California Criminal Justice Profile 1990_, 5.
U.S. murder rates were derived from population and raw
murder figures in FBI _Uniform Crime Reports for the United
States_, 1952-1990.
[4] This is an important distinction, because California's
population is large enough, especially in the latter part of
the period studied, that its murders significantly influence
the U.S. murder rate. Hence, throughout this article, we
are comparing the California murder rate, with the murder
rate of the U.S. minus California.
Year,Waiting Period (in days),California Murder Rate,US - Cal. Murder Rate
'52,1,2.40,4.75
'53,1,2.28,4.62
'54,1,3.33,4.28
'55,1,3.20,4.21
'56,3,3.49,4.18
'57,3,3.50,4.77
'58,3,3.71,4.77
'59,3,3.37,4.96
'60,3,3.91,5.17
'61,3,3.70,4.78
'62,3,3.94,4.56
'63,3,3.71,4.57
'64,3,4.16,4.89
'65,3,4.76,5.10
'66,5,4.69,5.65
'67,5,5.40,6.16
'68,5,5.99,6.89
'69,5,6.93,7.23
'70,5,6.76,7.81
'71,5,8.03,8.54
'72,5,8.69,8.84
'73,5,8.92,9.24
'74,5,9.30,9.67
'75,5,10.20,9.42
'76,15,10.09,8.45
'77,15,11.10,8.41
'78,15,11.39,8.49
'79,15,12.65,9.17
'80,15,14.33,9.63
'81,15,12.98,9.42
'82,15,11.24,8.79
'83,15,10.49,7.97
'84,15,10.63,7.58
'85,15,10.55,7.64
'86,15,11.23,8.23
'87,15,10.59,7.98
'88,15,10.41,8.18
'89,15,10.87,8.40
'90,15,11.88,9.03
Newsgroups: alt.news-media,alt.society.civil-liberty,misc.legal,talk.politics.guns,talk.politics.misc
Subject: Re: Waco Coverup Evidence (videotape)
Summary:
Expires:
References: <24h758$[d 6 u] at [paperboy.osf.org]> <[1993 Aug 20 113910 19891] at [lds.loral.com]> <252pt5$[s n v] at [transfer.stratus.com]>
Sender:
Followup-To:
Distribution:
Organization: DSC/Optilink Access Products
Keywords: guns, stupidity, whacko
In article <252pt5$[s n v] at [transfer.stratus.com]> [c d t] at [sw.stratus.com] (C. D. Tavares) writes:
>In article <[1993 Aug 20 113910 19891] at [lds.loral.com]>, [k--d--l] at [lds.loral.com] (Colin Kendall 6842) writes:
>
>> Even if one could show a significant drop in gun crime *after* passing
>> such laws, it would still be meaningless, since it still wouldn't show
>> any kind of causation. Just as when the pro-gun people point to New
>> York or D.C. and say that gun control laws were passed and gun crime
>> subsequently increased, and triumphantly proclaim that the former is
>> the *cause* of the latter. This is a well-known logical fallacy. It's
>> called 'post hoc ergo propter hoc', meaning 'after this, therefore
>> because of this'.
>
>> Look. New York and D.C. had a problem with gun crime. It was
>> increasing. In an attempt to curb it, people passed gun control laws.
>> Gun crime continued to increase. This is not to say that if gun control
>> laws had not been passed, gun crime would have increased faster, or
>> more slowly, or stayed the same. Nobody knows.
>
>> It may be the case that if gun control laws had not been passed, things
>> would have gotten worse even faster. Nobody knows.
>
>Bullshit. So prove it's a logical fallacy. Find somewhere where they
>were having the same problem, passed gun control laws, and the problem
>got BETTER.
>
>You can't, because there ARE NONE. Not England, not Canada, not France.
>Cerainly not Mexico, Jamaica, or Ireland.
>
>Yet you point to NYC, DC, Chicago, L.A., say "causation is not proved,"
>as an attempt to imply that the strong correlation is therefore irrelevant.
>
>Do you work for a tobacco company, Mr. Kendall?
>
>(Hey, wasn't there a cigarette called "Loral?")
>
>> It may be the case that if gun control laws had not been passed, people
>> would have become angry and armed themselves and shot more criminals,
>> thus leading to a decrease in gun crime. Nobody knows.
>
>"Although shootings of criminals represent a small fraction of defensive uses
>of guns, Americans shoot criminals with a frequency that must be regarded as
>remarkable by any standard." ("Crime Control through the Private Use of
>Armed Force" Professor Gary Kleck, 2/88 *Social Problems*.) Dr. Kleck
>estimates that annually, "gun-wielding civilians in self-defense or some
>other legally justified cause" kill at least 1,500 felons, or 2.5 times as
>many as are shot dead by the police.
>
>And that's with the CURRENT laws.
>
>> The best way to find out whether gun contol works would be to find
>> groups of identical cities, and enact gun control in some of them and
>> not others, and observe the results. Unfortunately, there are no
>> identical cities.
>
>Uh, there sure are. They're the same city, before and after gun control.
>
>Try comparing their own crime rates with their own crime rates, before
>and after. And for a lark, try comparing that change with the change
>in the crime rates in surrounding areas and on a national basis. The
>comparison will give you pause.
>
>Clayton Cramer published such a comparison for the state of California
>in a recent issue of American Rifleman. It showed a drastic jump in
>the crime rates AFTER every increase in the California waiting period,
>until the California rate was something like 15(?) times the rate of
>the surrounding areas. Maybe somebody has it online here.
>
>But don't let US "pick" the cases. Why trust us? You pick one, and
>do your own unbiased study. We'll wait.
>
>> The next best way would be to use groups of *similar* cities. But
>> I fear that in this case, whichever side was disappointed as a
>> result of the study would just say, "Oh, well, you really can't
>> compare city X and city Y, the demographics are so different...".
>
>Try the same city or state, and try finding one that REMOVED some gun
>controls. Try the states of Mississippi or Florida, which recently
>introduced concealed carry for citizens. Try the city of Orlando,
>which publicly armed women against rape. Try Isleton, California.
>Try the city of Kennesaw, Georgia. Compare their violent crime
>rates before and after the change.
>
>Find one where the rates went UP.
>
>Find one where the change rate in the affected area DIDN'T compare
>favorably to that of the surrounding areas in the subsequent period.
>--
>
>[c d t] at [rocket.sw.stratus.com] --If you believe that I speak for my company,
>OR [c d t] at [vos.stratus.com] write today for my special Investors' Packet...
--
Clayton E. Cramer {uunet,pyramid}!optilink!cramer My opinions, all mine!
Anyone that calls what comes out of a third trimester abortion "fetal tissue"
and not a baby, needs some glasses.