From: [k--ar--s] at [cc.memphis.edu]
Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns
Subject: RKBA Quotes 1/4
Date: 16 Aug 95 02:29:25 -0500
An Arsenal of Commonplace Quotations in context (rev. 8/15/95)
compiled, annotated, and arranged chronologically by Ken Barnes
---------------------------------------------------------------
"A popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives."
-=(James Madison, letter to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822)=-
ANTIQUITY
"When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are
in peace."
--Luke ch.11 v.21-22 (King James translation, 1611 AD)
"He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one."
--Luke ch.22 v.36 (King James translation, 1611 AD)
<<Jesus speaks to his disciples concerning self-defense.>>
"Quid comitatus nostri, quid gladii volunt? Quos habere certe
non liceret, si uti illis nullo pacto liceret. Est igitur haec,
iudices, non scripta, sed nata lex, quam non didicimus, accepimus,
legimus, verum ex natura ipsa adripuinus, hausimus, expressimus, ad
quam non docti, sed facti, non instituti, sed imbuti sumus, ut, si
vita nostra in aliquas insidias, si in vim et in tela aut latronum
aut inimicorum incidisset, omnis honesta ratio esset expediendae
salutis; silent enim leges inter arma nec se exspectari iubent, cum
ei, qui exspectare velit, ante iniusta poena luenda sit quam iusta
repetenda: etsi persapienter et quodam modo tacite dat ipsa lex
potestatem defendendi, quae non hominem occidi, sed esse cum telo
hominis occidendi causa vetat, ut, cum causa, non telum quaereretur,
qui sui defendendi causa telo esset usus, non hominis occidendi causa
habuisse telum iudicaretur. [What is the meaning of the bodyguards
that attend us and the swords that we carry? We should certainly not
be permitted to have them, were we never permitted to use them.
There does exist therefore, gentlemen, a law which is a law not of
the statute-book, but of nature; a law which we possess not by
instruction, tradition, or reading, but which we have caught, imbibed,
and sucked in at Nature's own breast; a law which comes to us not
by nature but by constitutionm not by training, but by intuition--
the law, I mean, that should our life have fallen into any snare,
into the violence and weapons of robbers or foes, every method of
winning a way to safety would be morally justifiable. When arms
speak, the laws are silent; they bid none to await their word,
since he who chooses to await it pays an undeserved penalty ere
he can exact a deserved one. And yet most wisely, and, in a way,
tacitly, the law itself authorizes self-defense; it forbids not
homicide, but the carrying of a weapon with a view to homicide,
and consequently when the circumstances of the case and not the
carrying of the weapon was being investigated, the man who had
employed a weapon in self-defense was not held to have carried
that weapon with a view to homicide.] * * *
Si id iure fieri non potuit, nihil habeo quod defendam; sin hoc
et ratio doctis et necessitas barbaris et mos gentibus et feris etiam
beluis natura ipsa praescripsit, ut omnem semper vim, quacumquae ope
possent, a corpore, a capite, a vita sua propulsarent, non potestis
hoc facinus improbum iudicare quin simul iudicetis omnibus, qui in
latrones inciderint, aut illorum telis aut vestris sententiis esse
percundum. [But if it is a truth instilled into civilized beings
by reason, into barbarians by necessity, into mankind by custom,
and even into brute beasts by Nature herself, that always and in all
circumstances they should repel violence, by whatever means were in
their power, from their persons, their heads, and their lives,
--then you cannot judge this to have been a wicked act without at
the same time judging that all who have fallen upon robbers deserve
to perish, if not by_their_weapons, then by_your_votes."
--Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.E.),_Pro T. Anno Milone
Oratio,_[Speech on behalf of Titus Annius Milo], c. 52 B.C.E.
"...quemadmodum gladius neminem occidit, occidentis telum est."
[...a sword never kills anybody; it's a tool in the killer's hand.]
--(Lucius Annaeus) Seneca "the Younger" (ca. 4 BC-65 AD),
_Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales,_[_Letters to Lucilius on Morals,_]
Letter 87, c.63-65 <<origin of "Guns don't kill people..."?>>
"Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum."
[Who desires peace should prepare for war.]
--(Flavius) Vegetius (Renatus),_De Rei Militari III,_c. 375 AD
<<compare George Washington's first "State of the Union"
address, given below>>
16TH CENTURY
"E' principali fondamenti che abbino tutti li stati, cosi nuovi,
come vecchi o misti, sono le buone legge e le buone arme. E, perche
non puo essere buone legge dove non sono buone arme, e dove sono
buone arme conviene sieno buone legge, io lascero indrieto el
ragionare delle legge e parlero delle arme. [The chief foundations
of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and
good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not
well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good
laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak
of the arms.]
Dico, adunque, che l'arme con le quali uno principe defende el suo
stato, o le sono proprie o le sono mercennarie, o ausiliarie o miste.
Le mercennarie et ausiliarie sono inutile e pericolose; e, se uno
tiene lo stato suo fondato in sulle arme mercennarie, non stara
mai fermo ne sicuro; perche le sono disunite, ambiziose, sanza
disciplina, infedele; gagliarde fra li amici, fra' nimici vile;
non timore di Dio, non fede con li uomini; e tanto si differisce la
ruina, quanto si differisce l'assaulto; e nella pace se' spogliato
da loro, nella guerra da'nimici. La cagione di questo e, che le non
hanno altro amore ne altra cagione che la tenga in campo, che un poco
di stipendio, il quale non e sufficiente a fare che voglino morire
per te. Vogliono bene esser tua soldati mentre che tu non fai
guerra; ma, come la guerra viene, o fuggirsi o andarsene. La qual
cosa doverrei durare poca fatica a persuadere, perche ora la ruina
di Italia non e causata da altro, che per essere in spazio di molti
anni riposatasi in sulle arme mercennairie. Le quali feciono gia per
qualcuno qualche progresso, e parevano gagliarde infra loro; ma, come
venne el forestiero, le monstrorono quello che elle erano. Onde che
a Carlo re di Francia fu licito pigliare la Italia col gesso; e chi
diceva come e' n'erano cagione e' peccati nostri, diceva el vero;
ma non erano gia quelli che credeva, ma questi che io ho narrati:
e, perche elli erano peccati di principi, ne hanno patito la pena
ancora loro. [I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince
defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries,
auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and
dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will
stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and
without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly
before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity
to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is;
for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.
The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping
the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make
them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your
soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take
themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little
trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing
else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries,
and although they formerly made some display and appeared valiant
amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed what
they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed
to seize Italy with chalk in hand (with which to chalk up the billets
for his soldiers); and he who told us that our sins were the cause
of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but
those which I have related. And as they were the sins of princes,
it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.]
Io voglio dimostrare meglio la infelicita di queste arme.
E' capitani mercennarii, o sono uomini eccellenti, o no: se sono,
non te ne puoi fidare, perche sempre aspireranno all grandezza
propria, o con lo opprimere te che li se'patrone, o con opprimere
altri fuora della tua intenzione; ma, se non e virtuoso, ti rovina
per lo ordinario. [I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of
these arms. The mercenary captains are either capable men or they
are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always
aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are
their master, or others contrary to your intentions; but if the
captain is not skillful, you are ruined in the usual way.]
E se si responde che qualunque ara le arme in mano fara questo,
o mercennario o no, replicherei come l'arme hanno ad essere operate
o da uno principe o da una reppublica. El principe debbe andare in
persona, e fare lui l'offizio del capitano; la reppublica ha a
mandare sua cittadini; e, quando ne manda uno che non riesca valente
uomo, debbe cambiarlo; e, quando sia, tenerlo con le leggi che non
passi el segno. E per esperienza si vede a' principi soli e
repubbliche armate fare progressi grandissimi, et alle arme
mercennarie non fare mai se non danno. E con piu difficulta viene
alla obedienza di uno suo cittadino una repubblica armate di arme
proprie, che una armata di arme esterne. Stettono Roma e Sparta
molti secoli armate e libere. Svizzeri sono armatissimi e liberissimi.
* * * [And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act
in the same way, whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms
have to be resorted to, either by a prince or a republic, then the
prince ought to go in person and perform the duty of captain; the
republic has to send its citizens, and when one is sent who does
not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and when one
is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the
command. And experience has shown princes and republics, single-
handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing
except damage; and it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed
with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens than it
is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood
for many ages armed and free. The Swiss are completely armed and
quite free. * * *]
Carlo VII, padre del re Luigi XI, avendocon la sua fortuna e
virtu libera Francia dalli Inghilesi, conobbe questa necessita di
armarsi di arme proprie, et ordino nel suo regno l'ordinanza delle
gente d'arme e delle fanterie. Di poi, el re Luigi suo figliuolo
spense quella de' fanti, e comincio a soldare Svizzeri: il quale
errore, seguitato dalli altri, e, come si vede ora in fatto, cagione
de' pericoli di quello regno. Perche, avendo dato reputazione a
Svizzeri, ha invilito tutte l'arme sua; perche la fanterie ha spento
e le sua gente d'arme ha obligato alle arme d'altri; perche, sendo
assuefatte a militare con Svizzeri, non pare loro di potere vincere
sanza essi. Di qui nasce che Franzesi contro a Svizzeri non bastano,
e sanza Svizzeri conto ad altri non pruovano. Sono dunque stati
li eserciti di Francia misti, parte mercennarii, e parte proprii:
le quali arme tutte insieme sono molto migliori che le semplici
ausiliarie o semplici mercennarie, e molto ineriore alle proprie.
E basti lo esemplo detto; perche el regno di Francia sarebbe
insuperabile, se l'ordine di Carlo era accresciuto o preservato.
[Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, having by good fortune
and valour liberated France from the English, recognized the
necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established
in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry.
Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to
enlist the Swiss, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now
seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the
reputation of the Swiss, he has entirely diminished the value of his
own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his
men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are
so accustomed to fight along with Swiss, it does not appear that
they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French
cannot stand against the Swiss, and without the Swiss they do not
come off well against others. The armies of the French have thus
become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which
arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries
alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example
proves it, the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the
ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.]
Ma la poca prudenzia delli uomini comincia una cosa, che, per
sapere allora di buono, non si accorge del veleno che vi e sotto:
come io dissi sopra delle febbre etiche. Per tanto colui che in
uno principato non conosce e' mali quando nascono, non e' veramente
savio: e questo e dato a pochi. E, se si considerassi la prima
ruina dello Imperio romano, si troverra esser suto solo cominciare
a soldare e' Goti; perche da quello principio cominciorono ad
enervare le forze dello Imperio romano; e tutta quella virtu che si
levava da lui si dava a loro. [But the scanty wisdom of man, on
entering into an affair which looks well at first, cannot discern
the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hectic
fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize
evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight
is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire
should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with
the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of
the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had
raised it passed away to others.]
Concludo, adunque, che, sanza avere arme proprie, nessuno
principato e sicuro, anzi e tutto obligato alla fortuna, non avendo
virtu che nelle avversita lo difenda. E fu sempre opinione e
sentenzia delli uomini savi, _quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut
instabile, quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixa._ E l'arme proprie
son quelle che sono composte o di sudditi o di cittidini o di creati
tua: tutte l'altre sono o mercennarie o ausiliare. Et il modo ad
ordinare l'arme proprie sara facile a trovare, se si discorrera li
ordini de' quattro soprannominati da me, e se si vedra come Filippo,
padre di Alessandro Magno, e come molte repubbliche e principi si sono
armati et ordinati: a quali ordini io al tutto mi rimetto. [...]
[I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without
having its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on
good fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend
it. And it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men
that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not
founded on its own strength. (Machiavelli quotes Tacitus here. -KB)
And one's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects,
citizens, or dependants; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries.
And the way to take ready one's own forces will be easily found if
the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will
consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many
republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which
rules I entirely commit myself. ...]
Debbe adunque uno principe non avere obietto ne altro pensiero,
ne prendere cosa alcuna per sua arte, fuora della guerra et ordini
e disciplina di essa; perche quella e sola arte che si espette a chi
comanda. Et e di tanta virtu, che non solamente mantiene quelli che
sono nati principi, ma molte volte fa li uomini di privata fortuna
salire a quel grado; e per avverso si vede che, quando e'principi
hanno pensato piu alle delicatezze che alle arme, hanno perso lo
stato loro. E la prima cagione che ti fa perdere quello, e negligere
questa arte; e la cagione che te lo fa acquistare, e lo essere
professo di questa arte. [A prince ought to have no other aim or
thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its
rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him
who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those
who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private
station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when
princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their
states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this
art; and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of
the art.]
Francesco Sforza, per essere armato, di privato divento duca di
Milano; e' figliuoli, per fuggire e' disagi delle arme, di duchi
diventorono privati. Perche, intra le altre cagioni che ti arreca di
male lo essere disarmato, ti fa contennendo: la quale e una di quelle
infamie dalle quali el principe si debbe guardare, come di sotto si
dira. Perche da uno armato a uno disarmato non e proporzione alcuna;
e non e ragionevole che chi e armato obedisca volentieri a chi e
disarmato, e che il disarmato stia sicuro intra servitori armati.
Perche, sendo nell'uno sdegno e nell'altro sospetto, non e possibile
operino bene insieme. E pero uno principe che della milizia non si
intenda, oltre alle altre infelicita, come e detto, non puo essere
stimato da' sua soldati, ne fidarsi di loro. [Francesco Sforza,
through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan;
and the sons (of Sforza), through avoiding the hardships and troubles
of arms, from dukes became private persons. For among other evils
which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised, and
this is one of those ignominies against which a prince ought to
guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing
proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not
reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly
to him who is unarmed, or that an unarmed man should be secure among
armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the
other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together.
And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war,
over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be
respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them.]
Debbe per tanto mai levare el pensiero da questo esercizio della
guerra, e nella pace vi si debbe piu esercitare che nella guerra; il
che puo fare in dua modi: l'uno con le opere, l'altro con la mente.
E, quanto alle opere, oltre al tenere bene ordinati et esercitati li
sua, debbe stare sempre in sulle caccie, e mediante quelle assuefare
el corpo a' disagi; e parte imperare la natura de' siti, e conoscere
come surgono e' monti, come imoccano le valle, come iacciono e'
piani, et intendere la natura de' fiumi a de paduli, et in questo
porre grandissima cura. La quale cognizione e utile in dua modi.
Prima, s'impara a conoscere el suo paese, e puo meglio intendere
le difese di esso; di poi, mediante la cognizione e pratica di quelli
siti, con facilita comprendere ogni altro sito che di nuovo li sia
necessario speculare: perche li poggi, le valli, e' piani, e' fiumi,
e' paduli che sono, verbigrazia, in Toscana, hanno con quelli
dell'altre provincie certa similitudine: tal che dalla cognizione
del sito di una provincia si puo facilmente venire alla cognizione
dell'altre. E quel principe che manca di questa perizie, manca
della prima parte che vuole avere uno capitano; perche questa insegna
trovare el nimico, pigliare li alloggiamenti, condurre le terre con
tuo vantaggio. [He ought never, therefore, to have out of his
thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should addict himself
more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the
one by action, the other by study. As regards action, he ought above
all things to keep his men well organized and drilled, to follow
incessantly the chase, by which he accustoms his body to hardships,
and learns something of the nature of localities, and gets to find
out how the mountains rise, how the valleys open out, how the plains
lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and marshes, and in all
this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is useful in two
ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better able
to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and
observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other
which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the
hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for
instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other
countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country
one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the prince that
lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable that
a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his
enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle,
to besiege towns to advantage.]
Filopemene, principe delli Achei, intra le altre laude che dalli
scrittori li sono date, e che ne' tempi della pace non pensava mai se
non a' modi della guerra; e, quando era in campagna con li amici,
spesso si fermava e ragionava con quelli. -- Se li inimici fusino
in su quel colle, e noi ci trovassimo qui col nostro esercito, chi
di noi arrebe vantaggio? come si potrebbe ire, servando li ordini,
a trovarli? se noi volessimo ritiarci, coe aremmo a fare? se loro
si ritirassino, come aremmo a seguirli? -- E proponeva loro, andando,
tutti e' casi che in uno esercito possono occorrere; intendeva la
opinione loro, diceva la sua, corroboravala con le ragioni: tal
che per queste continue cogitazioni non posseva mai, guidando li
eserciti, nascere accidente alcuno, che lui non avessi el remedio.
[Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which
writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace
he never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he
was in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with
them: 'If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find
ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage?
How should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we
should wish to retreat, how ought we to set about it? If they should
retreat, how ought we to pursue?' And he would set forth to them,
as he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would
listen to their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons,
so that by these continual discussions there could never arise,
in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he could not
deal with.]
Ma, quanto allo esercizio della mente, debbe el principe leggere
le istorie, et in quelle considerare le azioni delli uomini
eccellenti, vedere come si sono governati nelle guerre, eseminare
le cagioni della vittoria e perdite loro, per potere queste fuggire
e quelle imitare; e sopra tutto fare come ha fatto per l'adrieto
qualche uomo eccellente, cha ha preso ad imitare se alcuno innanzi
a lui e stato laudato e gloriato, e di quello ha tenuto sempre e'
gesti et azioni appresso di se: come si dice che Alessandro Magno
imitava Achille, Cesare Alessandro, Scipione Ciro. E qualunque legge
la vita di Ciro scritta da Senofonte, riconosce di poi nella vita
di Scipione quanto quella imitazione li fu di gloria, e quanto nella
castita, affabilita, umanita, liberalita Scipione si conformassi
con quelle cose che di Ciro de Senofonte sono sute scritte. Questi
simili modi debbe osservare uno pricipe savio, e mai ne' tempi
pacifici stare ozioso, ma con industria farne capitale, per potersene
valere nelle avversita, accio che, quando si muta la fortuna, lo
truovi parato a resisterle. * * * [But to exercise the intellect
the prince should read histories, and study there the actions of
illustrious men, to see how they have borne themselves in war,
to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so as to avoid
the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an illustrious
man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and famous
before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his
mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar
Alexander, [and] Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus,
written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio
how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability,
humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things which have
been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe
some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase
his resources with industry in such a way that they may be available
to him in adversity, so that if fortune changes it may find him
prepared to resist her blows. * * *]
Alcuni principi, per tenere securamente lo stato, hanno disarmato
e' loro sudditi; alcuni altri hanno tenuto divise le terre subiette;
alcuni hanno nutrito inimicizie contro a se medesimi; alcuni altri
si sono volti a guadagnarsi quelli che li erano suspetti nel
principio del suo stato; alcuni hanno edificato fortezze; alcuni
le hanno ruinate e destrutte. E benche di tutte queste cose non vi
possa dare determinata sentenzia, se non si viene a' particulari di
quelli stati dove si avessi a pigliare alcuna simile deliberazione,
non di manco io parlero in quel modo largo che la materia per se
medesima sopporta. [Some princes, so as to hold securely the state,
have disarmed their subjects; others have kept their subject towns
by factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others
have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in
the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some
have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a
final judgment on all one of these things unless one possesses the
particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made,
nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of
itself will admit.]
Non fu mai, adunque, che uno principe nuovo disarmassi e' sua
sudditi; anzi, quando li ha trovati disarmati, li ha sempre armati;
perche, armandosi, quelle arme diventono tua, diventono fedeli si
mantengono, e di sudditi si fanno tua partigiani. E perche tutti
sudditi non si possono armare, quando si benefichino quelli che tua
armi, con li altri si puo fare piu a sicurta: e quella diversita del
procedere che conoscono in loro li fa tua obbligati; quelli altri
ti scusano, iudicando essere necessario, quelli avere piu merito che
hanno piu periculo e piu obligo. Ma, quando tu li diarmi, tu cominci
ad offenderli, monstri che tu abbi in loro diffidenzia, o per vilta
o per poca fede: e l'una e l'altra di queste opinioni concepe odio
contro di te. E perche tu non puoi stare disarmato, conviene ti
volti alla milizia mercenaria, la quale e di quella qualita che di
sopra e detto; e, quando la fussi buona, non puo essere tanta, che
ti difenda da'nimici potenti e da' sudditi sospetti. Pero, come io
ho detto, uno principe nuovo in uno principato nuovo sempre vi ha
ordinato l'arme. Di questi esempli ne sono piene le isorie.
Ma, quando uno principe acquista uno stato nuovo, che come membro
si aggiunga al suo vecchio, allora e necessario disarmare quello
stato, eccetto quelli ancora, col tempo e con le occasioni,
e neccesario renderli molli et effeminati, et ordinarsi in modo
che tutte l'arme del tuo stato sieno in quelli soldati tua proprii,
che nello stato tuo antiquo vivono appresso di te. [There never
was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when he has
found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming
them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become
faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects
become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed,
yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be
handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which
they quite understand, makes the former your dependants, and the
latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most
danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when
you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust
them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of
these opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot
remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are
of the character already shown; even if they should be good they
would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and
distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a
new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of
examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as
a province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men
of that state, except those who have been his adherents in
acquiring it; and these again, with time and opportunity, should be
rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such
a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own
soldiers who in your old state were living near you.]"
--Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527),_Il Principe,_[_The Prince_]
ch.12-14 & ch.20 (1513)
<<Machiavelli's insights into politics were familiar to many of the
learned men who founded the U.S., including Benjamin Franklin and
Thomas Jefferson, both of whom were fluent in Italian (among other
languages).>>
17th CENTURY
"It's the misfortune of all Countries, that they sometimes lie
under a unhappy necessity to defend themselves by Arms against the
ambition of their Governors, and to fight for what's their own.
If those in government are heedless of reason, the people must
patiently submit to Bondage, or stand upon their own Defence; which
if they are enabled to do, they shall never be put upon it, but
their Swords may grow rusty in their hands; for that Nation is
surest to live in Peace, that is most capable of making War; and a
Man that hath a Sword by his side, shall have least occasion to
make use of it."
--John Trenchard (1662-1723) and Walter Moyle (1672-1721),
"An Argument, shewing; that a standing Army is Inconsistent with
a Free Government and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution
of the English Monarchy," (London, 1697)
"'Those who have the command of the arms in a country are masters
of the state, and have it in their power to make what revolutions
they please. [Thus,] there is no end to observations on the difference
between the measures likely to be pursued by a minister backed by
a standing army, and those of a court awed by the fear of an armed
people.'"
--Aristotle, quoted by John Trenchard (1662-1723) and Walter
Moyle (1672-1721), "An Argument, shewing; that a standing Army
is Inconsistent with a Free Government and Absolutely Destructive
to the Constitution of the English Monarchy," (London, 1697)
18TH CENTURY
"Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little
temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."
--Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), reply of the Pennsylvania Assembly
to the governor, November 11, 1755 <<later, motto of the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, c. 1759>>
"False is the idea of utility that sacrifices a thousand real
advantages for one imaginary or trifling inconvenience; that would
take fire from men because it burns, and water because one may
drown in it; that has no remedy for evils except destruction.
The laws that forbid the carrying of arms are laws of such a
nature. They disarm only those who are neither inclined nor
determined to commit crimes. Can it be supposed that those who
have the courage to violate the most sacred laws of humanity, the
most important of the code, will respect the less important and
arbitrary ones, which can be violated with ease and impunity, and
which, if strictly obeyed, would put an end to personal liberty
--so dear to men, so dear to the enlightened legislator-- and
subject innocent persons to all the vexations that the guilty alone
ought to suffer? Such laws make things worse for the assaulted
and better for the assailants; they serve rather to encourage than
to prevent homicides, for an unarmed man may be attacked with
greater confidence than an armed man. They ought to be designated
as laws not preventive but fearful of crimes, produced by the
tumultuous impression of a few isolated facts, and not by
thoughtful consideration of the inconveniences and advantages of a
universal decree."
--Cesare [Bonesana, Marchese di] Beccaria (1735-1794), _Dei delitti
e delle pene,_ [_On Crimes_And Punishments,_] ch.38 (1764)
<<as quoted by Thomas Jefferson in his Commonplace Book>>
"I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people,
so dead to all the feelings of liberty, as voluntarily to submit to be
slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest."
--William Pitt (Earl of Chatham), speech in Commons,
January 14, 1766
"Here, every private person is authorized to arm himself, and
on the strength of this authority, I do not deny the inhabitants
had a right to arm themselves at that time, for their defense, not
for offense..."
--John Adams (1735-1826), opening argument for the defense in_Rex.
v. Wemms,_a 1770 case arising from the actions of a British soldier
in the Boston Massacre, in Lyman H. Butterfield and Hilda B. Zobel,
eds., _The Legal Papers of John Adams,_ vol.III, p.248 (MacMillan,
1965)
"No kingdom can be secured otherwise than by arming the people.
The possession of arms is the distinction between a freeman and a
slave. He, who has nothing, and who himself belongs to another,
must be defended by him, whose property he is, and needs no arms.
But he, who thinks he is his own master, and has what he can call
his own, ought to have arms to defend himself and what he
possesses; else he lives precariously, and at discretion."
--James Burgh (1714-1775), "Political Disquisitions: Or, an Enquiry
into Public Errors, Defects, and Abuses," (London, 1774-1775)
"No man, Mr. President, thinks more highly than I do of the
patriotism, as well as the abilities, of the very honorable
gentlemen who have just addressed the House. But different men
often see the same subject in different lights; and, therefore,
I hope it will not be thought disrespectful to those gentlemen if,
entertaining, as I do, opinions of a character very opposite to
theirs, I should speak forth my sentiments freely, and without
reserve. This is no time for ceremony. The question before the
house is of awful moment to this country. For my own part,
I consider it nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery.
And in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the
freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to
arrive at truth, and fulfil the great responsibility which we hold
to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a
time, through fear of giving offence, I should consider myself as
guilty of treason towards my country, and of an act of disloyalty
towards the majesty of Heaven, which I revere above all earthly
kings.
Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the illusions
of Hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and
listen to the song of that siren till she transforms us into
beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and
arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number
of those who, having eyes, see not, and having ears, hear not, the
things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my
part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know
the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it.
I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the
lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging of the future but
by the past. And judging by the past, I wish to know what there
has been in the British ministry, for the last ten years, to
justify those hopes with which gentlemen have been pleased to
solace themselves and the House. Is it that insidious smile with
which our petition has lately been received? Trust it not, sir;
it will prove a snare to your feet. Suffer not yourselves to be
betrayed with a kiss. Ask yourselves how this gracious reception
of our petition comports with those warlike preparations which
cover our waters and darken our land. Are fleets and armies
necessary to a work of love and reconciliation? Have we shown
ourselves to be so unwilling to be reconciled that force must be
called in to win back our love? Let us not deceive ourselves, sir.
These are the implements of war and subjugation, --the last
arguments to which kings resort.
I ask gentlemen, sir, what means this martial array, if its
purpose be not to force us into submission? Can gentlemen assign
any other possible motive for it? Has Great Britain any enemy in
this quarter of the world, to call for all this accumulation of
navies and armies? No, sir, she has none. They are meant for us:
they can be meant for no other. They are sent over to bind and
rivet upon us those chains which the British ministry have been so
long forging.
And what have we to oppose them? Shall we try argument? Sir,
we have been trying that for the last ten years. Have we anything
new to offer upon that subject? Nothing. We have held the subject
up in every light of which it is capable; but it has been all in
vain. Shall we resort to entreaty, and humble supplication?
What terms shall we find which have not been already exhausted?
Let us not, I beseech you, sir, deceive ourselves longer.
Sir, we have done everything that could be done to avert the storm
which is now coming on. We have petitioned; we have remonstrated;
we have supplicated; we have prostrated ourselves before the
throne, and have implored its interposition to arrest the
tyrannical hands of the ministry and Parliament. Our petitions
have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional
violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded; and
we have been spurned with contempt at the foot of the throne.
In vain, after these things, may we indulge the fond hope of
peace and reconciliation. There is no longer any room for hope.
If we wish to be free; if we mean to preserve inviolate those
inestimable privileges for which we have been so long contending;
if we mean not basely to abandon the noble struggle in which we
have been so long engaged, and which we have pledged ourselves
never to abandon until the glorious object of our contest shall be
obtained, --we must fight! I repeat it, sir, --we must fight!
An appeal to arms, and to the God of hosts, is all that is left us.
They tell us, sir, that we are weak, --unable to cope with so
formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it
be the next week, or the next year? Will it be when we are totally
disarmed, and when a British guard shall be stationed in every
house? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction?
Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance by lying
supinely on our backs, and hugging the delusive phantom of Hope,
until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot?
Sir, we are not weak, if we make a proper use of those means
which the God of nature hath placed in our power. Three millions
of people armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country
as that which we posess, are invincible by any force which our
enemy can send against us.
Besides, sir, we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a
just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will
raise up friends to fight our battles for us. The battle, sir, is
not to the strong alone: it is to the vigilant, the active, the
brave. Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough
to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest.
There is no retreat but in submission and slavery. Our chains are
forged. Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston.
The war is inevitable. And let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it
come!
It is in vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may cry
peace, peace, but there is no peace. The war is actually begun.
The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the
clash of resounding arms. Our brethren are already in the field.
Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? what
would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be
purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty
God! I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give
me liberty, or give me death!"
--Patrick Henry (1736-1799),"The War Inevitable" speech to the
Virginia Convention, March 23, 1775
"His Lordship[ the Lord Sandwich]'s plan [...] amounts to this.
[The Americans, quoth this Quixote of modern days, _will not
fight;_ therefore we will.] These people are either too
superstitiously religious, or too cowardly for arms; they either
_cannot_ or _dare not_ defend; their property is open to any one
who has the courage to attack them. Send but your troops and
the prize is ours. Kill a few and take the whole. Thus, the
peaceable part of mankind will be continually overrun by the vile
and abandoned while they neglect the means of self-defense.
The supposed quietude of a good man allures the ruffian; while on
the other hand, arms like laws discourage and keep the invader and
the plunderer in awe, and preserve order in the world, as well as
property. The balance of power is the scale of peace. The same
balance would be preserved were all the world destitute of arms,
for all would be alike; but since some_will_not,_ others_dare_not_
lay them aside. And while a single nation refuses to lay them
down, it is proper that all should keep them up. Horrid mischief
would ensue were one half the world deprived of the use of them;
for while avarice and ambition have a place in the heart of man,
the weak will become a prey to the strong. The history of every
age and nation establishes these truths, and facts need but little
arguments when they prove themselves."
--Thomas Paine (1737-1809), "Thoughts on Defensive War,"
in_The Pennsylvania Magazine,_July 1775
"It is always dangerous to the liberties of the people to have
an army stationed among them, over which they have no control."
--Samuel Adams (1722-1803), letter to Elbridge Gerry, October 29,
1775
"Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God."
--Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), motto found among his papers
and on his seal, c.1776 <<Jefferson adopted this motto after copying
it from an "epitaph" written by Benjamin Franklin, said by Franklin
to have been found on a cannon marking the grave of John Bradshaw
(1602-1659) in Martha Brae, a town in northeastern Jamaica.
Jefferson was of the opinion that Franklin made up the "epitaph".
Bradshaw was president of the British commission that sentenced
Charles I, but there is no other evidence known that his body,
which was exhumed and disgraced a few years after his death, was
ever later reburied in Jamaica.>>
"It is certainly of the last [or, ultimate] Consequence to
a free Country that the Militia, which is its natural Strength,
should be kept upon the most advantageous Footing. A standing
Army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always
dangerous to the Liberties of the People. Soldiers are apt to
consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of Citizens.
They have their Arms always in their hands. Their Rules and
their Discipline is severe. They soon become attach[e]d to their
officers and dispos[e]d to yield implicit Obedience to their
Commands. Such a Power should be watched with a jealous Eye.
I have a good Opinion of the principal officers of our Army.
I esteem them as Patriots as well as Soldiers. But if this War
continues, as it may for years yet to come, we know not who
may succeed them. Men who have been long subject to military
Laws and inured to military Customs and Habits, may lose the Spirit
and Feeling of Citizens. And even Citizens, having been used
to admire the Heroism which the Commanders of their own Army
have display[e]d, and look up to them as their Saviors may be
prevail[e]d upon to surrender to them those Rights for the
protection of which against Invaders they had employ[e]d and
paid them. We have seen too much of this Disposition among some
of our Countrymen. The Militia is compos[e]d of free Citizens.
There is therefore no Danger of their making use of their Power
to the destruction of their own Rights, or suffering others to
invade them.
I earnestly wish that young Gentlemen of a military Genius
(& many such I am satified there are in our Colony) might be
instructed in the Art of War, and at the same time taught the
Principles of a free Government, and deeply impress[e]d with a
Sense of the indispensible Obligation which every member is under
to the whole Society. These might be in time fit for officers in
the Militia, and being th[ourough]ly acquainted with the Duties
of Citizens as well as Soldiers, might be entrusted with a Share
in the Command of our Army at such times as Necessity might require
so dangerous a Body to exist."
--Samuel Adams (1722-1803), letter to James Warren, January 7, 1776
"How strangely will the Tools of a Tyrant pervert the plain
Meaning of Words!"
--Samuel Adams (1722-1803), letter to John Pitts, January 21, 1776
"Shame on the men who can court exemption from present trouble
and expense at the price of their own posterity's liberty!"
--Samuel Adams (1722-1803), writing as "Candidus," February 3, 1776
"No freeman shall [ever] be debarred the use of arms [within his
own lands or tenements]"
--Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), proposed Virginia Constitution,
June 1776, in Thomas Jefferson's_Papers,_J. Boyd, ed., vol.1 p.344
(Putnam, 1896)
"We hold these Truths to be Self evident; that all Men are
created equal and independent; that from that equal Creation
they derive Rights inherent and unalienable; among which are the
Preservation of Life, and Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness;
that to secure these Ends, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the governed; that
whenever, any form of Government, Shall become destructive of these
Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new Government..."
--Thomas Paine (1737-1809), original draft of the U.S. Declaration
of Independence, July 1776
"If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquillity of
servitude better than the animating contest of freedom, go home
from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down
and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains set lightly
upon you, and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen."
--attributed to Samuel Adams (1722-1803), August 1, 1776
<<This quotation, often attributed to Samuel Adams, is taken from
a pamphlet first published in London, purporting to be the text
of an oration delivered by Adams, titled_An Oration Delivered at
the State-House in Philadelphia, to A very numerous Audience, On
Thursday, the 1st of August 1776._ Trouble is, there is no other
historical record of such a speech in any of the diaries or letters
of Adams' familiars, or in any American newspapers of the period.
Internal evidence as well casts doubt upon the pamphlet's
authenticity, since the oration contains no mention of the
Declaration of Independence, which had been approved only the
previous month. The Continental Congress (of which Adams was a
member) was also in session that day; and the following day, the
engrossed copy of the Declaration of Independence was signed, but
this information escaped the awareness of the false "oration"'s
presumably British author. Nonetheless, the above quotation is
in Adams' style, and may well reflect rhetoric he had used
elsewhere. Unfortunately for history, Samuel Adams' highly
effective speeches have not survived to the present day, having
been discarded after they, in his words, "had served their
purpose".>>
"If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign
troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms,
-- never --never --never! You cannot conquer America."
--William Pitt (Earl of Chatham), speech in the House of Lords,
November 18, 1777
"I received, by Mr. Mazzei, your letter of April the 20th.
I am much mortified to hear that you have lost so much time;
and that, when you arrived in Williamsburg, you were not at all
advanced from what you were when you left Monticello. Time now
begins to be precious to you. Every day you lose will retard a
day your entrance on that public stage whereon you may begin to
be useful to yourself. However, the way to repair the loss is to
improve the future time.
I trust, that with your dispositions, even the acquisition
of science is a pleasing employment. I can assure you, that the
possession of it is, what (next to an honest heart) will above
all things render you dear to your friends, and give you fame
and promotion in your own country. When your mind shall be well
improved with science, nothing will be necessary to place you in
the highest points of view, but to pursue the interests of your
country, the interests of your friends, and your own interests
also, with the purest integrity, the most chaste honor. The
defect of these virtues can never be made up by all the other
acquirements of body and mind. Make these, then, your first
object.
Give up money, give up fame, give up science, give the earth
itself and all it contains, rather than do an immoral act.
And never suppose, that in any possible situation, or under any
circumstances, it is best for you to do a dishonorable thing,
however slightly so it may appear to you. Whenever you are to do
a thing, though it can never be known but to yourself, ask yourself
how you would act were all the world looking at you, and act
accordingly. Encourage all your virtuous dispositions, and
exercise them whenever an opportunity arises; being assured that
they will gain strength by exercise, as a limb of the body does,
and that exercise will make them habitual. From the practice of
the purest virtue, you may be assured you will derive the most
sublime comforts in every moment of life, and in the moment of
death.
If ever you find yourself environed with difficulties and
perplexing circumstances, out of which you are at a loss how
to extricate yourself, do what is right, and be assured that that
will extricate you the best out of the worst situations. Though
you cannot see, when you take one step, what will be the next, yet
follow truth, justice, and plain dealing, and never fear their
leading you out of the labyrinth, in the easiest manner possible.
The knot which you thought a Gordian one, will untie itself before
you. Nothing is so mistaken as the supposition, that a person is
to extricate himself from a difficulty, by intrigue, by chicanery,
by dissimulation, by trimming, by an untruth, by an injustice.
This increases the duties tenfold; and those, who pursue these
methods, get themselves so involved at length, that they can turn
no way but their infamy becomes more exposed. It is of great
importance to set a resolution, not to be shaken, never to tell an
untruth. There is no vice so mean, so pitiful, so contemptible;
and he who permits himself to tell a lie once, finds it much easier
to do it a second and third time, till at length it becomes
habitual; he tells lies without attending to it, and truths without
the world's believing him. The falsehood of the tongue leads to
that of the heart, and in time depraves all good dispositions.
An honest heart being the first blessing, a knowing head is
the second. It is time for you now to begin to be choice in your
reading; to begin to pursue a regular course in it; and not to
suffer yourself to be turned to the right or left by reading
anything out of that course. I have long ago digested a plan
for you, suited to the circumstances in which you will be placed.
This I will detail to you, from time to time, as you advance.
For the present, I advise you to begin a course of an[c]ient
history, reading everything in the original and not in
translations. First read Goldsmith's history of Greece. This
will give you a digested view of that field. Then take up an[c]ient
history in the detail, reading the following books, in the
following order: Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophontis Anabasis,
Arrian, Quintus Curtius, Diodorus Siculus, Justin. This shall
form the first stage of your historical reading, and is all I
need mention to you now. The next will be of Roman history [Livy,
Sallust, Caesar, Cicero's epistles, Suetonius, Tacitus, Gibbon].
>From that, we will come down to modern history.
In Greek and Latin poetry, you will have read or will read at
school, Virgil, Terence, Horace, Anacreon, Theocritus, Homer,
Euripides, Sophocles. Read also Milton's 'Paradise Lost,'
Shak[e]speare, Ossian, Pope's and Swift's works, in order to
form your style in your own [English] language. In morality, read
Epictetus, Xenophontis Memorabilia, Plato's Socratic dialogues,
Cicero's philosophies, Antoninus, and Seneca. In order to assure
a certain progress in this reading, consider what hours you have
free from the school and the exercises of the school. Give about
two of them, every day, to exercise; for health must not be
sacrificed to learning.
A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of
exercises, I advise the gun. While this gives moderate exercise
to the body, it gives boldness, enterprise and independence to
the mind. Games played with the ball and others of that nature,
are too violent for the body and stamp no character on the mind.
Let your gun therefore be the constant companion of your walks.
Never think of taking a book with you. The object of walking is
to relax the mind. You should therefore not permit yourself to
even think while you walk; but divert yourself by the objects
surrounding you.
Walking is the best possible exercise. Habituate yourself to
walk very far. The Europeans value themselves on having subdued
the horse to the uses of man; but I doubt whether we have not lost
more than we have gained, by the use of this animal. No one has
occasioned so much the degeneracy of the human body. An Indian
goes on foot nearly as far in a day, for a long journey, as an
enfeebled white does on his horse; and he will tire the best
horses. There is no habit you will value so much as that of
walking far without fatigue. I would advise you to take your
exercise in the afternoon: not because it is the best time for
exercise, for certainly it is not; but because it is the best time
to spare from your studies; and habit will soon reconcile it to
health, and render it nearly as useful as if you gave to that the
more precious hours of the day. A little walk of half an hour,
in the morning, when you first rise, is advisable also. It shakes
off sleep, and produces other good effects in the animal economy.
Rise at a fixed and an early hour, and go to bed at a fixed and
early hour also. Sitting up late at night is injurious to the
health, and not useful to the mind. Having ascribed proper hours
to exercise, divide what remain, (I mean of your vacant hours)
into three portions. Give the principal to History, the other two,
which should be shorter, to Philosophy and Poetry. Write to me
once every month or two, and let me know the progress you make.
Tell me in what manner you employ every hour in the day.
The plan I have proposed for you is adapted to your present
situation only. When that is changed, I shall propose a
corresponding change of plan. I have ordered the following
books to be sent to you from London, to the care of Mr. Madison.
Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon's Hellenics, Anabasis and
Memorabilia, Cicero's works, Baretti's Spanish and English
Dictionary, Martin's Philosophical Grammar, and Martin's
Philosophia Britannica. I will send you the following from hence:
Bezout's Mathematics, De la Lande's Astronomy, Muschenbrock's
Physics, Quintus Curtius, Justin, a Spanish Grammar, and some
Spanish books. You will observe that Martin, Bezout, De la Lande,
and Muschenbrock are not in the preceding plan. They are not to
be opened till you go to the University.
You are now, I expect, learning French. You must push this;
because the books which will be put into your hands when you
advance into Mathematics, Natural philosophy, Natural history, &c.
will be mostly French, these sciences being better treated by the
French than the English writers. Our future connection with Spain
renders that the most necessary of the modern languages, after the
French. When you become a public man, you may have occasion for
it, and the circumstance of your possessing that language, may give
you a preference over other candidates. I have nothing further
to add for the present, but husband well your time, cherish your
instructors, strive to make every body your friend; and be assured
that nothing will be so pleasing, as your success."
--Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), letter to his nephew Peter Carr,
(from Paris, August 19, 1785)
"Another source of power in government is a military force.
But this, to be efficient, must be superior to any force that
exists among the people, or which they can command: for otherwise
this [tyrannical] force would be annihilated, on the first exercise
of acts of oppression. Before a standing army can rule, the people
must be disarmed; as they are in almost every kingdom of Europe.
The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the
sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and
constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that
can be, on any pretense, raised in the United States. A military
force, at the command of Congress, can execute no laws; but such
as the people perceive to be just and constitutional; for they
will possess the _power,_ and jealousy will instantly inspire the
_inclination,_ to resist the execution of a law which appears to
them unjust and oppressive. In spite of all the nominal powers,
vested in Congress by the constitution, were the system once
adopted in its fullest latitude, still the actual exercise of them
would be frequently interrupted by popular jealousy. I am bold to
say, that_ten_ just and constitutional measures would be resisted,
where _one_ unjust or oppressive law would be enforced. The powers
vested in Congress are little more than _nominal;_ nay _real_ power
cannot be vested in them, nor in any body, but in the _people._
The source of power is in the _people_ of this country, and cannot
for ages, and probably never will, be removed."
--Noah Webster (1758-1843), "An Examination into the leading
principles of the Federal Constitution proposed by the late
Convention held at Philadelphia. With Answers to the principle
objections that have been raised against the system." (1787) in
Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, Paul Leicester
Ford, ed., p.56 (Brooklyn N.Y., 1888)
<<Noah Webster is also the author of the 1806 edition of the
dictionary that bears his name, the first dictionary of American
English usage.>>
"I am to ackno[w]lege the honor of your letter of Jan. 29.
and of the papers you were so good as to send me. They were
the latest I had seen or have yet seen. They left off too in a
critical moment; just at the point where the Malcontents make
their submission on condition of pardon, and before the answer of
government was known. I hope they pardoned them.
The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain
occasions, that I wish it always to be kept alive. It will often
be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised
at all. I like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a
storm in the Atmosphere.
It is wonderful that no letter or paper tells us who is
president of Congress, tho' there are letters in Paris to the
beginning of January. I suppose I shall hear when I come back
from my journey, which will be eight months after he will have
been chosen. And yet they complain of us for not giving them
intelligence. Our Notables assembled to-day, and I hope before
the departure of Mr. Cairnes I shall have heard something of
their proceedings worth communicating to Mr. Adams.
The most remarkable effect of this convention as yet is the
number of puns and bon mots it has generated. I think were they
all collected it would make a more voluminous work than the
Encyclopedie. This occasion, more than any thing I have seen,
convinces me that this nation is incapable of any serious effort
but under the word of command. The people at large view every
object only as it may furnish puns and bon mots; and I pronounce
that a good punster would disarm the whole nation were they ever
so seriously disposed to revolt.
Indeed, Madam, they are gone. When a measure so capable of
doing good as the calling the Notables is treated with so much
ridicule, we may conclude the nation desperate, and in charity
pray that heaven may send them good kings. --The bridge at the
place Louis XV. is begun. The hotel dieu is to be abandoned and
new ones to be built. The old houses on the old bridges are in
a course of demolition. This is all I know of Paris.
We are about to lose the Count d'Aranda, who has desired and
obtained his recall. Fernand Nunnez, before destined for London
is to come here. The Abbes Arnoux and Chalut are well. The
Dutchess Danville somewhat recovered from the loss of her daughter.
Mrs. Barrett very homesick, and fancying herself otherwise sick.
They will probably remove to Honfleur. This is all our news.
I have only to add then that Mr. Cairnes has taken charge of 15.
aunes of black lace for you at 9 livres the aune, purchased by
Petit and therefore I hope better purchased than some things have
been for you; and that I am with sincere esteem Dear Madam your
affectionate humble serv[an]t."
--Thomas Jefferson, letter to Abigail Adams, (from Paris, February
22, 1787) <<Jefferson is referring to the "Malcontents" of Shays'
Rebellion (see note below).>>
"I am now to ackno[w]ledge the receipt of your favors of
October the 4th, 8th, & 26th. In the last you apologise for your
letters of introduction to Americans coming here. It is so far
from needing apology on your part, that it calls for thanks on
mine. I endeavor to shew civilities to all the Americans who
come here, & will give me opportunities of doing it: and it is
a matter of comfort to know from a good quarter what they are,
& how far I may go in my attentions to them.
Can you send me Woodmason's bills for the two copying presses
for the M. de la Fayette, & the M. de Chastellux? The latter makes
one article in a considerable account, of old standing, and which
I cannot present for want of this article. --I do not know whether
it is to yourself or Mr. Adams I am to give my thanks for the copy
of the new constitution. I beg leave through you to place them
where due. It will be yet three weeks before I shall receive them
from America. There are very good articles in it: & very bad.
I do not know which preponderate.
What we have lately read in the history of Holland, in the
chapter on the Stadtholder, would have sufficed to set me against
a chief magistrate eligible for a long duration, if I had ever been
disposed towards one: & what we have always read of the elections
of Polish kings should have forever excluded the idea of one
continuable for life. Wonderful is the effect of impudent &
persevering lying. The British ministry have so long hired their
gazetteers to repeat and model into every form lies about our being
in anarchy, that the world has at length believed them, the English
nation has believed them, the ministers themselves have come to
believe them, & what is more wonderful, we have believed them
ourselves.
Yet where does this anarchy exist? Where did it ever exist,
except in the single instance of Massachusetts? And can history
produce an instance of rebellion so honourably conducted? I say
nothing of it's motives. They were founded in ignorance, not
wickedness. God forbid we should ever be twenty years without
such a rebellion. The people cannot be all, & always, well
informed. The part which is wrong will be discontented, in
proportion to the importance of the facts they misconceive.
If they remain quiet under such misconceptions, it is lethargy,
the forerunner of death to the public liberty. We have had
thirteen states independent eleven years. There has been one
rebellion. That comes to one rebellion in a century & a half
for each state. What country before ever existed a century &
a half without a rebellion? & what country can preserve its
liberties, if its rulers are not warned from time to time that
his people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms.
The remedy is to set them right as to the facts, pardon and pacify
them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree
of liberty must be refreshed from time to time, with the blood of
patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.
Our Convention has been too much impressed by the insurrection
of Massachusetts: and in the spur of the moment they are setting
up a kite to keep the hen-yard in order. I hope in God this
article will be rectified before the new constitution is accepted.
--You ask me if any thing transpires here on the subject of S.
America? Not a word. I know that there are combustible materials
there, and that they wait the torch only. But this country
[France] probably will join the extinguishers. --The want of facts
worth communicating to you has occasioned me to give a little loose
to dissertation. We must be contented to amuse, when we cannot
inform. Present my respects to Mrs. Smith, and be assured of the
sincere esteem of, dear Sir, your friend and servant."
--Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), letter to Col. William S. Smith,
(from Paris, November 13, 1787) <<Jefferson is referring to Shays'
Rebellion, in which farmers in western Massachusetts, led by
Revolutionary War veteran Daniel Shays (c.1747-1825), took over
courthouses to protest high state taxes which had driven them into
debt and resulted in seizure of their property and/or imprisonment.
The unsuccessful rebels were imprisoned, but later pardoned, much
in keeping with Jefferson's sentiments expressed here.>>
"FEDERALIST No. 26
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defence Considered
To the People of the State of New York:
It was a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular
revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which
marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and
combines the energy of government with the security of private
rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the
great source of the inconveniences we experience, and if we are
not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future
attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from
one chimerical project to another; we may try change after change;
but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the
better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means
of providing for the national defence, is one of those refinements
which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than
enlightened. We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far
an extensive prevalency: that even in this country, where it made
its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North-Carolina are the only
two States by which it has been in any degree patronized: and that
all the others have refused to give it the least countenance;
wisely judging that confidence must be placed somewhere; that
the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating
power; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence
than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by
impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents
of the proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general
decision of America; and instead of being taught by experience
the propriety of correcting any extremes into which we may have
heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others
still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of
government had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines
they teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it,
by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been condemned or
forborne. It may be affirmed without the imputation of invective,
that if the principles they inculcate, on various points, could so
far obtain as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit
the people of this country for any species of government whatever.
But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended. The citizens
of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy.
And I am much mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep
and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy
of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the
community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin
and progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military
establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it
may arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such
institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other
ages and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced
to those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from
whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the
authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were
gradually made upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first
by the barons, and afterwards by the people, till the greatest part
of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not
till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince of Orange to
the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely
triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war,
an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles IId. had, by
his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000
regular troops. And this number James IId. increased to 30,000;
who were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish
the exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article
of the Bill of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a
standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, _unless with the
consent of Parliament,_ was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest
pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was
thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised
or kept up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate.
The patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too
temperate, too well informed, to think of any restraint on the
legislative discretion. They were aware that a certain number
of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable; that no
precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a
power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere
in the government; and that when they referred the exercise of that
power to the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the
ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety
of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to
have derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty,
from standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a
revolution quickened the public sensibility on every point
connected with the security of popular rights, and in some
instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree which
consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The
attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the
legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the
number of these instances. The principles which had taught us
to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an
injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people
in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where
this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that
standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT
THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE --I call them unnecessary, because
the reason which had introduced a similar provision into the
English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any of the State
constitutions. The power of raising armies at all, under those
constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside anywhere
else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous,
if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done without
the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it.
Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in
that of this State of New-York; which has been justly celebrated,
both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of
government established in this country, there is a total silence
upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States, which seem to
have meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time
of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary
than prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies _shall not
be_ kept up, but that they _ought not_ to be kept up, in time of
peace. This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result
of a conflict between jealousy and conviction; between the desire
of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion
that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation
of public affairs was understood to require a departure from it,
would be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition,
and would be made to yield to the necessities or supposed
necessities of the State? Let the fact already mentioned, with
respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is
the use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the moment
there is an inclination to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point
of efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that which is
contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the
appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of
two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to
effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent
extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision
for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful
operation.
The legislature of the United States will be _obliged,_ by
this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate
upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come
to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the
matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They
are not _at liberty_ to vest in the executive department permanent
funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious
enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.
As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be expected to
infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in
the national legislature willing enough to arraign the measures
and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the
support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for
declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public
attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party
in opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to
exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the
danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard
against it. Independent of parties in the national legislature
itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State
legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious
and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against
encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have
their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and
will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the
alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if
necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community _require
time_ to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously
to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive
augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary
combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued
conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a
combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would
be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive
variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would
naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every
man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House
of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents
and to his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be
found one man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a
conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents
of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made, there
ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people
should resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted
with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves into as many
States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to
manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be
impracticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance
of augmenting the army to so great an extent in time of profound
peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so
situated, for such vast augmentations of the military force?
It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and the
destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly
follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the
appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period
of two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when
once possessed of a force large enough to awe the people into
submission, would find resources in that very force sufficient
to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the
legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense
could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time
of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence
of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a
case not within the principles of the objection; for this is
levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace.
Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that
military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or
resist an invasion; and if the defence of the community under
such circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so
numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamaties
for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be
provided against by any possible form of government; it might
even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it
should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form
an army for common defence.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a
united than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted
that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter
situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers
so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force
considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy,
especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the
militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and
powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully
shown in another place), the contrary of this supposition would
become not only probable, but almost unavoidable."
--Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), writing as "Publius" in
the_Independent Journal,_ December 22, 1787
"FEDERALIST No. 27
The Same Subject Continued
(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defence Considered)
To the People of the State of New York:
It has been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution
of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the
aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like
most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on
mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible
designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I
have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it
seems to originate in a pre-supposition that the people will be
disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter
of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken
to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between
internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to
presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we presume
at the same time that the powers of the General Government will be
worse administered than those of the State governments, there seems
to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection,
or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a
general rule that their confidence in and obedience to a government
will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its
administration. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to
this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental
causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to
the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only
be judged of by general principles and maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these
papers, to induce a probability that the General Government will be
better administered than the particular governments; the principal
of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election
will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the
people; that through the medium of the State Legislatures which
are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of
the national Senate, --there is reason to expect that this branch
will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment: That
these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive
information in the national councils: And that they will be less
apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the
reach of those occasional ill humors, or temporary prejudices and
propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate
the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of
the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify
a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress,
dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of
considerable force, to fortify that probability, will occur when
we come to survey, with a more critic[al] eye, the interior
structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. It will
be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can
be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal government is
likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious
or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable
foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will
meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need
of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of
the particular members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the
dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it.
Will not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a
due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources
of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the _former_
sentiment and to inspire the _latter,_ than that of a single State,
which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent
faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with
the friends to the government in that State; but it can hardly be
so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts
of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger
of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals to the
authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not
be the less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that
the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled
in the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are
accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their
political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and
to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which
touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active
springs of the human heart, the greater will be the probability
that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the
community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that
rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little influence
upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out
of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the
people. The inference is, that the authority of the Union, and
the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened,
rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters
of internal concern; and will have less occasion to recur to force,
in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its
agency. The more it circulates through those channls and currents
in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will
it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of
compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government
like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity
of using force, than that species of league contend for by most
of its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon
the States in their political or collective capacities. It has
been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for
the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are
the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that
as often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all,
by war and violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority
of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several
States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary
magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy
to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common
apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which
they might proceed; and will give the federal government the same
advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which
is enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the
influence on public opinion which will result from the important
consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and
support the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular
attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to
the _enumerated_ and _legitimate_ objects of its jurisdiction,
will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which
all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State,
will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures,
courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be
incorporated into the operations of the national government
_as far as its just and constitutional authority extends;_ and
will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. [The
sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to
the destruction of the State governments, will, in its proper
place, be fully detected.] Any man who will pursue, by his own
reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive
that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable
execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered
with a common share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose
the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please from the
supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious
exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever
was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the
people into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries
of the proposed Constitution should presume that the national
rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to
the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests
of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such
a conduct?"
--Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), writing as "Publius," in the
_New York Packet,_ December 25, 1787
"Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have
been in Actual Rebellion"
--Proposed constitutional amendment by New Hampshire, 1788
"FEDERALIST No. 28
The Same Subject Continued
(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defence Considered)
To the People of the State of New York:
That there may happen cases in which the national government
may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own
experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of
other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes
arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and
insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the
body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that
the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law
(which we have been told is the only admissible principle of
republican government), has no place but in the reveries of those
political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of
experimental instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be
employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief.
If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State,
the militia of the residue would be adequate to its suppression;
and the national presumption is that they would be ready to do
their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause,
eventually endangers all government. Regard to the public peace,
if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to
whom the contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the
insurgents: And if the general government should be found in
practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people,
it were irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to
its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole
State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different
kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that
Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing
the disorders within that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere
apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens, has
thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose
the State of New-York had been inclined to re-establish her lost
jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped
for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia
alone? Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain
a more regular force for the execution of her design? If it
must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force
different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature,
is applicable to the State governments themselves, why should the
possibility, that the national government might be under a like
necessity, in similar extremities, be made an objection to its
existence? Is it not surprising that men who declare an attachment
to the Union in the abstract, should urge as an objection to the
proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan
for which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation
in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon an
enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the
unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the
continual scourges of petty republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose,
in lieu of one general system, two, or three, or even four
Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty
oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies?
Would not each of them be exposed to the same casualties; and when
these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients
for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government
for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be
more ready or more able to support the federal authority than
in the case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men
must, upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of
the objection is equally applicable to either of the two cases;
and that whether we have one government for all the States, or
different governments for different parcels of them, or even if
there should be an entire separation of the States, there might
sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted
differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the
community and to maintain the just authority of the laws against
those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections
and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is
a full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision
against military establishments in time of peace, to say that the
whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of
the representatives of the people. This is the essential, and,
after all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges
of the people, which is attainable in civil society. [Its full
efficacy will be examined hereafter.]
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents,
there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original
right of self-defence which is paramount to all positive forms
of government, and which against the usurpations of the national
rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success
than against those of the rulers of an individual State. In a
single State, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become
usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of
which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can
take no regular measures for defence. The citizens must rush
tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without
resource; except in their courage and despair. The usurpers,
clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush
the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory,
the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular
or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be
to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily
obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military
force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly
directed against the part where the opposition has begun.
In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence of
circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance
increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the
citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them.
The natural strength of the people in a large community, in
proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater
than in a small, and of course more competent to a struggle with
the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a
confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be
entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always
the rival of power, the General Government will at all times stand
ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these
will have the same disposition towards the General Government.
The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of
redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the Union
to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too
highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system,
that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies,
afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty
by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked
under pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select
bodies of men, as of the people at large. The Legislatures will
have better means of information. They can discover the danger at
a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the
confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan
of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the
community. They can readily communicate with each other in the
different States, and unite their common forces for the protection
of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have
already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign
power. And it would have precisely the same effect against the
enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the
federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State,
the distant States would have it in their power to make head
with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be
abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the
part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its
efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must,
at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country.
For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a
large army; and as the means of doing this increase, the population
and natural strength of the community will proportionably increase.
When will the time arrive that the federal Government can raise
and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great
body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a situation,
through the medium of their state governments, to take measures
for their own defence, with all the celerity, regularity, and
system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered
as a disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources
of argument and reasoning."
--Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), writing as "Publius," in the
_Independent Journal,_December 26, 1787
(continued) 1/4
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