Date: Sat, 5 Oct 1996 14:27:36 -0400 (EDT) From: [E--rS--r] at [aol.com] To: Multiple recipients of list <[n--b--n] at [mainstream.net]> Subject: JAMA letters on gun design & 1 gun/month articles None of us are surprised that Mr. Feldman's and Dr. Blackman's letters appear 10 months after the offending articles and that their criticisms that invalidate the original articles received none of the press or fanfare by JAMA accorded the original articles. ********** JAMA, October 2, 1996: Vol 276, No. 13 pages 1035-1036 Firearm Design and Firearm Violence To the Editor.-A product-oriented approach to firearm violence is fraught with pitfalls, as even Dr Wintemute admits,[1] and may indeed result in unintended, counterproductive effects. The banning by policymakers of a product today because of its lethality or perceived prevalence in crime may well lead to the substitution of even more lethal weapons in the future. Therein lies one of the frailties of Dr Wintemute's product-oriented focus on firearm-related crime. Despite his self-effacing denial that he is not advocating any particular product-based policy agenda, the gist of his article is clear. Because in selected studies medium-to-large-caliber semiautomatic pistols appear to be more prevalent in firearm-related homicides, policymakers might do well to consider banning them. What then are policymakers to do when large-caliber revolvers become the criminals' weapon of choice? If the vast majority of homicides occur in circumstances in which long guns could be substituted for handguns (54%-80%), and since criminals admit they would simply switch to more lethal, sawed-off long guns if handguns were unavailable, policymakers would then be confronted with exactly the unintended, counterproductive effects at which Wintemute hints.[2] Wintemute's approach is misdirected primarily because it ignores an integral part of the equation regarding firearms and crimes of violence. More so than firearm design as a primary factor in such violence are the user factors, which include perpetrator motivation, and attacker lethality in the commission of criminal acts. It has been well-documented that criminals, both adult and juvenile, avail themselves (illegally) of firearms, in part for self-protection from members of their own criminal subculture.[3] Surveys of inmates show that they prefer larger-caliber, high-quality handguns.[3] A sample study of juvenile inmates in 4 states revealed that 58% owned a revolver, usually a .38 or .357 caliber; 55% owned a semiautomatic pistol, usually a 9 mm or .45 caliber; and 51% owned a sawed-off shotgun (essentially outlawed by the National Firearms Act of 1934).[4] A Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services study found that juvenile offenders were more likely than adult offenders to have carried a handgun (18% vs 7% for juveniles carrying a pistol and 10% vs 7% for juveniles carrying revolvers).[5] As illustrated by the increasing number of homicides involving multiple gunshot wounds (although the number of wounds almost always totals fewer rounds than held by a 6-shot revolver), today's younger criminal offenders appear to be more aggressive, with a greater willingness to hurt others, and have more lethal intentions than their predecessors.[6] Those with such intent purposely select weapons perceived to be more lethal. Overlooking or ignoring this critical human factor may well affect adversely the rates of firearm violence, lead to an increase in the case-fatality rates for all types of shootings, and doom to failure any diagnosis for effective solutions to the criminal violence problem. Richard J. Feldman, JD American Shooting Sports Council Atlanta, Ga 1. Wintemute GJ. The relationship between firearm design and firearm violence: handguns in the 1990s. JAMA. 1996;275:1749-1753. 2. Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter; 1991. 3. Wright JD, Rossi PH. Armed and Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and Their Firearms. New York, NY: Aldine de Grnyter, 1986. 4. Sheley JF, Wright JD. In the Line of Fire: Youth, Guns and Violence in Urban America. New York, NY: Aldine de Grayter, 1995. 5. Bureau of Justiee. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Selected Findin,os: Guns Used in Crime. Washington, DC: US Dept of Justiee; July 1995. Publication NCJ-148201. 6. Webster DW, Champion HR, Gainer PS, Sykes L. Epidemiologie changes in gunshot wounds in Washington, DC, 1983-1990. Arch Surg. 1992;127:694-698. [Suter - Please note that, among other flaws, Wintemute pretends that a product-oriented approach for guns, where 97% of injuries are _intentional_, is sensible because of his perception of benefits of a product-oriented approach with cars and tobacco where virtually none of injuries are _intentional_. When called on this by Mr. Feldman, Wintemute only says that he does not suggest ingoring the human factor. He cites his own "Ring of Fire" publication which attempted to link inexpensive guns with crime based on gun trace data (gun trace data is thoroughly debunked in Dr. Blackman's followiing letter) noting a large percentage of affordable guns amongst gun traces --- but I have never found any instance anywhere where Wintemute acknowledges that, even if one accepted the gun trace data, that such guns represent a lower percentage of traced guns than their proportion of manufactured guns. Compared to their percentage of manufactured guns, affordable guns are _under_-represented amongst gun traces. Please also note the exaggerated solicitude that Wintemute extends to potential defensive gun users - "Legitimate gun owners who purchase those unreliable guns for self defense may be needlessly putting themselves in harm's way; few situations pose more immediate danger than using a gun that will not work to confront a hostile intruder" - an interesting assertion since I have never seen (or read) Wintemute acknowledge the preponderance of utilitarian usage of guns in defense compared to his much lamented "costs" of guns. Since about 98% of guns used in defense are never fired, it is unlikely that Wintemute has any source for his claim other than his imagination. Ironically, two years ago a UC Davis medical student reported to me that he frequenty saw Wintemute as a member of the University of California, Davis Pistol Club and NRA] In Reply.-I agree with Mr Feldman's point that a reactive, uninformed "gun control" policy may have unintended negative consequences. I disagree with his contention (not a surprising one, coming as it does from an industry representative) that we should therefore abandon the product-oriented approach. Mr Feldman sets up a straw man by arguing that any attention given to firearms per se ignores the "user factors" he cites. I am not aware that anyone, whatever their position on firearms policy may be, suggests that these human factors should be ignored: I certainly do not. Rather, we have largely ignored any possible effect on firearm violence that is attributable to firearms themselves-a head-in-the-sand approach that we have forsworn in recent decades, with highly beneficial results, in the case of both motor vehicles and cigarettes. Consider, as just 1 example, the hundreds of thousands of inexpensive handguns produced each year by the southern California manufacturers known as the "Ring of Fire" companies.[1] These guns exist as a consequence of the Gun Control Act of 1968, a generally laudable attempt to prevent firearm violence that outlawed the importation of small, poorly made handguns, but not their manufacture in this country. The guns have no sporting purpose and are marketed primarily as a means of self-defense: "Protection, Peace of Mind, and Self Confidence Under $100," according to 1 manufacturer's advertisement.[2] Yet the journal Gun Tests, a highly regarded source of independent consumer information on firearms, emphasizes that many of these "poorly constructed" guns cannot be relied upon for protection and may be "worse than useless."[3] Legitimate gun owners who purchase these unreliable guns for self-defense may be needlessly putting themselves in harm's way; few situations pose more immediate danger than using a gun that will not work to confront a hostile intruder. These same guns appear disproportionately in registries of firearms involved in crime, such as the gun tracing data compiled by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. They thus may pose greater risks to their users-and to society at large-than do other handguns and offer fewer benefits. Yet, like all firearms, these weapons have largely been granted special immunity from regulation; no federal agency has authority even to evaluate these guns, let alone take action to protect the public's safety. I can think of no other consumer product for which such a situation has been allowed to persist. Mr Feldman may be satisfied with the status quo; I am not. Garen Wintemute, MD, MPH Violence Prevention Research Program University of California, Davis Sacramento 1. Wintemute GJ. Ring of Fire: The Handgun Makers of Southern California. Sacramento, Calif: Violence Prevention Research Program; 1994. 2. Advertisement for Phoenix Arms HP22 and HP25 pistols. Am Firearms Ind. 1994;22(9):53. 3. Speeial supplement: self-defense, ammunition, and firearms. Gun Tests. 1996;8: 17-18. Effectiveness of Legislation Limiting Handgun Purchases To the Editor.-In July 1993, a Virginia law limited sales of handguns to 1 every 30 days unless police give permission for multiple sales. The law was enacted following active lobbying by Sarah Brady, and now, Brady's employees have evaluated the 30-day law and found it effective. There are several reasons to doubt their findings.[1] This report is based on tracing data, although such data are "not designed to collect statistics."[2] Most crime guns are not traced; most traced guns are not involved in violent crimes,[3] and, as even this report acknowledges, traced guns may not be representative of recovered guns.[l] Guns that are traced are not randomly chosen and are not representative of guns used in crime.[2,3] For example, most cities now report a minority of crime guns to be semiautomatic pistols,[4] but New York City recently indicated that at least 86% of all traced guns fit that description. When police in Los Angeles, Calif, reported that only 1% of crime guns were "assault weapons," tracing data put the figure at 19%.3 In addition to unintentional bias, traces are not attempted for guns more than 10 years old, and, more often than not, other trace attempts are unsuccessful.[3-5] Additionally, politics and allocation of limited law-enforcement resources affect trace requests from local law-enforcement agencies. There is simply too much uncontrolled for intentional and unintentional bias in tracing data to allow scientific study based on those data. Even if a study based on traced guns could be valid to evaluate the 30-day handgun purchase restriction, the study would have to determine whether that law might have prevented the purchase of a traced gun. However, no effort was made to find whether any guns traced to Virginia or elsewhere, before or after the new law took effect, involved transfers affected by the policy in question. Even if there were a decline in gun trafficking from Virginia, good science would require evaluating whether there were alternative explanations for the change, alternatives rarely considered in violence research. In fact, the same legislative session establishing the 30-day limit required proof of residency for driver's license applicants (Virginia Code Section 46.2-323), a more direct approach to preventing out-of-state traffickers from buying guns in Virginia. On its face, without data on multiple purchases, that legislative policy would appear as likely an explanation as the 30-day law. It is also important to note that the 30-day restriction rarely applies: the Virginia Department of State Police report that they approve about 95% of multiple handgun purchase requests (Captain R. Lewis Vass, Virginia State Police, oral communication, August 29,1995). Thus, this study is like evaluating the effectiveness of a mandatory seatbelt law where only a nonrepresentative convenience sample of new cars was studied, 95% of drivers could quickly win exemption from the mandate, and concurrent change in speed laws also took effect, with no effort made to determine whether seat-belts were worn in the crashes studied. Paul H. Blackman, PhD National Rifle Association of America Fairfax, Va 1. Weil DS, Knox RC. Effects of limiting handgun purchases on interstate transfer of firearms. JAMA. 1996:275:1759-1761. 2. Bea K. 'Assault Weapons': Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms, Facts and Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Serviee, 1992. 3. Kopel DB. Do Federal Gun Traces Accurately Reflect Street Crime? Golden, Colo: Independence Institute; 1993. Independence Issue paper 5-93, 4. Wintemute GJ. The relationship between firearm design and firearm violence: handguns in the 1990s. JAMA. 1996,275:1749-1753. 5. Wachtel J. Sources of crime guns. Presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences; March 12-16, 1996; Las Vegas, Nev. [Suter - note that Weil quickly bypasses the fundamental and invalidating flaw in his data set - that even the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms recognizes that gun traces cannot be used for statistical purposes. Apparently, gun prohibitionists were never taught or, more likely, they dishonestly ignore the GIGO concept - "garbage in = garbage out."] In Reply.-Dr Blackman questions our use of available data generally and of the firearms trace database specifically, suggesting that problems with the data undermine our conclusions. We strongly disagree. To evaluate the impact of Virginia's 1-gun-a-month law on gun trafficking patterns, we needed to collect data on 4 variables: when and where guns traced as part of a criminal investigation were purchased, and when and where they were recovered by the police. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms collects this information and maintains it in the Firearms Trace Database. The fact that the data were collected to aid in police investigations is irrelevant. The use of available data can, however, limit the depth of the analysis. As Blackman suggests, we cannot determine which guns in our sample were obtained as part of a multiple purchase, although he is wrong to imply that our conclusions are, therefore, without merit. We looked for and eliminated alternative explanations to our hypothesis. Notably, we conducted a survey of state laws governing private gun ownership and determined that there were no relevant changes after Virginia's law took effect that could explain the results of our analysis. We reject Blackman's suggestion that the proof of residency requirement for driver's license applicants in Virginia is a more likely explanation for changes in gun trafficking patterns than the 30-day restriction on handgun purchases. Interstate gun traffickers may reside in the source state and also routinely acquire firearms by employing third party purchasers who are residents of the state.[1] These purchasers are selected because they are able to meet the legal requirements for firearm purchases. Requiring proof of residency does not erect a barrier to traffickers' use of third party purchases. Contrary to Blackman's suggestion that police approval of exemptions to the law is evidence that the law isn't working, the ability to obtain legal exemptions proves only that the individuals with legitimate reasons to exceed the purchase limit (eg, gun collectors bidding to purchase an intact collection of firearms) are not being frustrated by the law. This does not mean that the law is ineffective in stopping gun traffickers. Finally, the issue of whether the trace database is representative of guns used in crime is irrelevant to our analysis. The only relevant concern related to the tracing data is if, after the Virginia law was implemented, requesting agencies changed the way they selected firearms to be traced in such a way that related to when and where the gun was originally purchased. There is no evidence that New York, New Jersey, or any of the states included in our analysis changed the procedure by which they requested gun traces. In fact, as we reported, the consistent set of results in several different states, the northeast region, and the country as a whole argues strongly against a confounding explanation related to which guns are traced and argues strongly in favor of our results. Douglas Weil Center to Prevent Handgun Violence Washington, DC 1. United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia. Washington Afro-American. September 12,1992.