From: [walter sorton] at [proom.com] (Walter Sorton)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns
Subject: BATF AW "traces" ... 1/3
Date: Thu, 19 May 1994 19:27:00 GMT
February 2, 1993
Do Federal Gun Traces Accurately Reflect Street Crime?
Small Fraction of Guns Selected for National Trace may not be
Typical of Ordinary Crime Guns
By David B. Kopel
In an average year, there are about 360,000 violent crimes committed with
firearms. Of those 360,000 crimes, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (BATF) is asked to trace about 5,600 crime guns (less than 2%
of total crime guns). There is little doubt that BATF traces have provided
important information in the solution of individual crimes. Do the BATF
traces also provide accurate information about the nature of armed crime
in general?
BATF trace data is often used in the debate over restricting or banning
firearms. In early 1989, when the concern over 'assault weapons' was at
its height, BATF gun trace data was used to provide an estimate about how
frequently 'assault weapons' were used in crime. In 1993, BATF trace data
is used to estimate how many crime guns in jurisdictions such as New York
and Washington, D.C. (with stern gun controls) come from jurisdictions
such as Virginia (with more moderate controls).
To assess whether BATF traces offer reliable information about street
crime in general, this Issue Paper first examines the issue of
'assault weapon' use in violent crime. In the months following the
publication of the BATF trace estimate, many city police departments
published detailed reports showing how often 'assault weapons' were
used in crime in the particular city. Thus, it is possible to compare the
estimate of 'assault weapon' use based on BATF traces with the actual
police data based on analysis of every seized crime gun in various cities.
After analyzing the evidence regarding 'assault weapons,' the Issue Paper
examines the BATF trace data regarding interstate gun-running, and
discusses whether the use of trace data to estimate the number of crime
guns in a particular jurisdiction which have come from another
jurisdiction is likely to be accurate.
Assault Weapons : Police Data Shows BATF Traces to
Overestimate Criminal use by 1000%
In May 1989, two reporters from the Cox newspaper chain conducted a study
of BATF firearms traces. The reporters found that for some crimes,
'assault weapons' were involved in approximately 10% of the traces. Since
'assault weapons' constitute only about 1% of the total firearms stock, the
10% figure indicated that 'assault weapons' were disproportionately
involved in gun crime. Police data, however, showed the 10% figure to be
false.
The Cox report gave trace percentages for both the nation as a whole
(10%), and for selected major cities. The percentage of 'assault weapons'
reported by Cox newspapers, based on the BATF traces, was 10% for Chicago,
19% for Los Angeles, 11% for New York City, and 13% for New York City. In
each of those cities, police departments conducted complete counts of all
guns which had been seized from criminals (not just the guns for which the
police department requested a BATF trace). According to the actual police
department counts of crime guns in each city, the percentage of assault
weapons were only 3% for Chicago, 1% for Los Angeles, 1% for New York
City, and 0% for Washington, D.C. Thus, when the BATF trace sample was
compared with the comprehensive police gun seizure data, BATF traces
over-stated the percentage of assault weapons used in crime by over 1,000%
for Los Angeles, New York, and Washington.
Why would the types of guns traced by BATF be so different from the types
of guns actually used in crime? First of all, it was statistically likely
that there would be a difference. The 2% of guns selected for a trace
request are not a random sample, but rather a select group chosen by local
police departments. As basic statistics theory explains, a non-random
sample of 2% is very unlikely to accurately represent the larger whole. A
non-random sample becomes statistically valid only when 60% to 70% of the
total relevant population is sampled. But the BATF traces, of course, are
a non-random sample of only 2% of gun crimes.
In addition, there are a number of possible reasons why 'assault weapons
would be more likely be selected for a trace request than other guns.
Almost all 'assault weapons' were manufactured after the Gun Control Act
of 1968, and therefore have a serial number, and therefore can be traced.
Many pre-1968 guns, having no serial number, are untraceable. Moreover,
many 'assault weapons' have an unusual appearance, which might pique
curiosity (and hence a trace request) more than an old-fashioned, common
crime gun such as Smith & Wesson .38 Special. The vast publicity
surrounding 'assault weapons' may also have increased police interest in
the guns, and hence the likelihood that trace would be requested. And as
the Congressional Research Service notes, a law enforcement officer may
initiate a trace request for any reason.
It should be noted that the discrepancy between the BATF traces and the
actual crime gun seizures was not confined to the four major cities
discussed above. Researchers have now obtained comprehensive crime gun
data for many cities, based on actual inventories of firearms seized by
the police, and in not one of the cities does the percentage of 'assault
weapons' seized even remotely approach the BATF trace figure of 10%. (See
graph on previous page.) Accordingly, it can only be concluded that BATF
firearm trace requests are not an accurate mirror for actual firearm use
in crime.
The actual gun data from cities throughout the country validate the
Congressional Research Services caution that the firearms Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms selected for tracing cannot be considered
representative of the larger universe of all firearms used by criminals or
any subset of that universe, because the firearms selected for tracing
do not constitute a random sample. As a result ATF tracing data could be
potentially biased.
Claims that 41% of New York Crime Guns Come from Virginia
are Implausible
In Project Lead, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has traced
selected guns seized by the police in New York City and Washington, D.C.
Again, the number of guns traced is a tiny percentage of the guns used in
crime. For example, from January through September 1992, 'BATF traced 824
handguns' seized in New York City. The traced guns amounted to about 6% of
all the guns that had been seized from 13,382 crime scenes in the same
period. In 1990, there were 13,769 guns seized by the New York City
police, of which only about 1,126 (8%) were selected for tracing.
Some gun control advocates have attempted to make the selective trace of
New York guns appear to be comprehensive, by asserting that BATF traced
all traceable guns. In fact, BATF traced all 'traceable guns' only of
the 8% of crime guns which it was asked to trace. Since most the remaining
92% were likely traceable (they contained a serial number which had not
been filed off), the number of guns which actually were traced was far
smaller than the number of guns which could have been traced.
In 1989, gun control advocates used BATF trace data to make misleading
claims about the frequency with which 'assault weapons' are used in crime.
Analysis of comprehensive police data about crime guns disproved the
exaggerated claims based on trace samples. In 1993, many of those same
gun control advocates are using BATF trace data to claim that the Virginia
supplies 41% of New York City's crime guns (sometimes a lesser figure,
such as 25%, is claimed). Unfortunately, it is impossible to definitively
verify or disprove the figure. Unless the New York City police disclosed the
serial number of every gun seized by the police, it would be impossible for
neutral researchers to determine the origins of New York City crime guns.
It is possible, however, to use common sense to conclude that the 41%
figure is very unlikely to be accurate. To begin with, simplistic reliance
on BATF traces has been demonstrated to vastly exaggerate the frequency of
'assault weapon' use in crime. 'Assault weapons,' according to
comprehensive police data, were only used by 1/10th as many criminals at
the trace requests would indicate; the guns accounted for only 1% of crime
guns, rather than 10%. Accordingly, it is entirely possible that, based on
what prior studies of BATF traces have shown, Virginia guns may account
for only 4% of New York City crime guns, rather than the asserted 41%. The
BATF trace figure is no more likely to be an accurate depiction of the
actual crime gun picture in New York City than a Batman comic book is to
be an accurate depiction of the world of crime-fighting.
Common sense also suggests that a claim of 41% of New York City crime guns
originating in Virginia is implausible. There are a large number of
jurisdictions which are about as close to New York as Virginia is, and
which have less intrusive gun control laws, including no instant
background check. Those jurisdictions include Ohio, Vermont, West
Virginia, New Hampshire, and Maine. In addition, Delaware has gun controls
no more restrictive than Virginia's (both states have an instant check),
and Delaware is considerably closer to New York than is Virginia. Indeed,
New York counties outside the New York City region allow long guns to be
bought over the counter, with no waiting period, and no background check.
It is unrealistic to believe that so many New York gun-runners would
travel farther than they need to, and to a state where gun laws and
background checks are stricter than in closer states, to purchase crime
guns. True, urban parts of Virginia may offer gun-runners an anonymity
that rural Vermont does not, but Delaware; southern New Hampshire;
Portland, Maine; much of Ohio; and upstate New York also have urban areas.
It is also important to note that the BATF trace reports do not indicate
that a gun was used in a violent crime. When the Congressional Research
Service asked BATF about the connection between gun traces and gun crimes
for 'assault weapons,' The agency response noted that it is not possible
to determine if traced firearms are related to criminal activity.
Since the simple ownership of a handgun by an honest citizen and
first-degree murder by a repeat offender are both considered 'crimes' in
New York City, it is necessary to consider what kind of New York City
crime that Virginia guns may be involved in.
The statement that the New York guns which BATF traced were seized from a
'crime scene' does not demonstrate that the guns were used in a violent
crime. A 'crime scene,' by New York City definition, includes the bodega
where a store-owner used his unlicensed handgun to scare away a robber, as
well as the automobile where police found a handgun that a secretary was
carrying for protection against car-jacking.
Nationally, nearly 80% of BATF gun traces do not involve guns used in
violent crime; the traces are for technical violation of gun control laws,
such as possession of a firearm without a license. In New York City,
obtaining a handgun license is very difficult. Although New York law
requires that the police act on license applications within six months,
delays of nearly a year are routine -- even for crime witnesses who are being
threatened by criminals out on bail. In addition, it is nearly impossible
for an applicant to get a license to carry a handgun, unless the applicant
is named Donald Trump, in which case the carry permit will be granted in a
few days.
Because New York City is such a dangerous place, and because the police
cannot offer adequate protection against crime, and because obtaining a
handgun permit is very difficult for unwealthy persons who cannot afford
lawyers, many citizens obtain handguns illegally; they adopt the adage
that "it is better to be judged by twelve than to be carried by six." They
would rather face the risk of prosecution for an unlicensed handgun than
face the risk of living in New York City without a handgun. Non-criminal
New York City residents are estimated to own over two million unlicensed
handguns.
Much the same story can be told for Washington, D.C., where crime is even
worse than New York City, where the police are notoriously ineffective,
and where handgun purchases are entirely illegal.
Accordingly, the simple fact that some Virginia guns were found 'at the
crime scene' in New York (or Washington) does not indicate whether they
were found in the hands of a violent criminals, or in the hands of a good
citizen who owned an unlicensed gun for legitimate protection.
Indeed New York's 'gun criminals' who own handguns under circumstances
which would be entirely lawful in Virginia (possession of a handgun for
home protection) are more likely to own a traceable handgun than are
actual violent criminals. A person owning a handgun for home defense would
have little reason to file off the serial number. But 60% of actual
felons, according to the National Institute of Justice, consider a gun's
untraceability to be 'very important' and another 21% consider it to be 'a
little' or 'somewhat' important.
It may well be true that a large number of residents of Washington, D.C.,
and New York City have obtained unlicensed handguns for protection, and
some of these fearful citizens have been caught, and their guns have been
traced back to a Virginia purchase. The fact does not prove that Virginia
guns are being used in violent crime in New York or Washington. The fact
proves that Virginia guns are being used for legitimate protection in
cities which have attempted to outlaw self-defense.
In fact, of the New York City firearms traced to Virginia during the first
nine months of 1991, only 32 guns (or 17% of the traces) of Virginia guns
related to a violent crime. The rest were associated with technical
violations of New York City's arduous handgun licensing scheme, or other
non-violent offenses. Forty-seven percent of the violations involved
weapons possession crimes (including as simple possession of an unlicensed
gun in the home); 35% involved other non-violent offenses (such as
possessing a handgun and a gram of cocaine in the same apartment).
One final factor suggesting caution in leaping from the Project Lead trace
information to possibly unjustified conclusions about Virginia
gun-running: The 'Virginia' guns identified by Project Lead likely
included guns which had been stolen from, rather than purchased in a gun
store. and which had found their way through the black market to New York
City. Project Lead does not attempt to determine if a Virginia gun found
in New York had been stolen from a Virginian, and then transported to New York.
Conclusion
Less than 2% of guns involved in violent crime are traced by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and more than 80% of BATF gun traces do not
involve guns thought to be connected to a violent crime. Traces may occur
for any reason, including simple curiosity, as well as alleged violation
of hyper-technical gun control regulations such as those in New York City.
Accordingly, BATF gun traces have no particular relation to the pattern of
gun use in violent crime. In fact, analysis of city-by-city police data
regarding the actual use of 'assault weapons' in crime showed that BATF
traces vastly over-estimated the frequency of the criminal use of such
guns. Gun control advocates who made the simplistic claim in 1989 that
BATF trace data 'proved' that 'assault weapons' were frequently used in
crime misled the public.
Today, many of those same gun control advocates claim that BATF trace data
'proves' that Virginia is the source of 41% of New York City crime guns.
There is no reason to believe the 1993 claims any more than the 1989
claims which were proven false. The BATF traces only involved about 6-8%
of New York City crime guns. Only 32 guns traced to Virginia (17% of all
Virginia traces) were thought to be involved in violent crimes; far more
Virginia 'crime guns' in New York City simply involve non-violent
offenses, including technical violations of the City's draconian laws
against simple possession of a handgun. And since BATF did not attempt to
determine if Virginia guns in New York City had been stolen from Virginia,
it is impossible to use the BATF trace data to conclude that gun-runners
>>> Continued from previous message
guns.
[This document is an ASCII version of an Issue Paper published by the
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Copyright 1993 - David B. Kopel
INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE is a
nonprofit, nonpartisan Colorado think tank. It
is governed by a statewide board of trustees
and holds a 501(c)(3) tax exemption from the
IRS. Its public policy focuses on economic
growth, education reform, local government
effectiveness, equal opportunity, and the
environment.
PERMISSION TO REPRINT this paper in
whole or in part is hereby granted, provided
full credit is given to the Independence
Institute.
DAVID B. KOPEL is Director of the Second
Amendment Project at the Independence Institute. He
also serves as an associate policy analyst with the Cato
Institute, a Washington, D.C., think-tank. His book The
Samurai, the Mountie, and the Cowboy: Should
America Adopt the Gun Controls of Other
Democracies? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992)
was awarded best book of the year prize bythe
American Society of Criminology's International and
Comparative Criminology Division.
JOHN K. ANDREWS, JR., is President of the
Institute... Endnotes
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